Wu Xinbo: What Is US Policy Towards China? What Did Happen in Blinken’s April 2024 Visit to China?
Wu Xinbo, Professor, Ph.D., Fudan University Dean, Institute of International Studies, Fudan University in Shangai Director, Center for American Studies, Fudan University in Shangai
Wang Hui and Fang Jiyi from Observer News
Blinken Visited China twice within one year. In 2024 From April 24 to 26, US Secretary of State Blinken once again started his visit to China.
In three days, Blinken visited Shanghai and Beijing and held talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. China and the United States reached a five-point consensus.
Why did Blinken choose to visit China at this time? How was the discussion going? Is Blinken’s trip worthwhile? In the past year, what changes and changes have occurred in Sino-US relations and US policy towards China? What will happen next?
Focusing on the above issues, Observer specially invited Professor Wu Xinbo, Dean of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University and Director of the Center for American Studies, to give an interpretation.
The following is the transcript of the interview:
Observer : From April 24 to 26, Blinken embarked on a three-day trip to China. During his stay in China, he held talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Overall, what do you think of Blinken’s talks in China this time? Is Blinken’s trip worthwhile?
Wu Xinbo: I think it mainly depends on how to measure it. If China and the United States are promoting the implementation of the “San Francisco Vision” of the two heads of state (Biden-Xi), this visit has some positive results.
The five-point consensus reached by the two sides is basically a continuation of the consensus reached by the two heads of state in San Francisco. But if we look at the USA wish list before Blinken’s visit to China, Blinken did not achieve his expected goals.
This also reflects the different thinking between China and the United States in handling bilateral relations. China is still promoting the improvement of relations along the consensus reached by the two heads of state at the meeting in San Francisco. Judging from the expectations of the United States before Blinken’s visit to China, it shows that the United States wants to reset and change the agenda for Sino-US relations. However, the five-point consensus reached by the two sides shows that the US attempt failed.
Observer : When President Xi met with Blinken, he mentioned that only when the “first button”of the jacket is buttoned well can China-US relations truly stabilize, get better, and move forward. What do you think is the key to buttoning your “first button”? In what areas do both parties need to make efforts?
Wu Xinbo: Buttoning the “first button” well mainly means having a correct understanding of each other.
China adheres to mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation. The United States still regards China as its main strategic competitor and the most severe geopolitical challenge, and believes that China is the most capable and willing to challenge the existing international order.
If the United States views China from this perspective, it sees China as a rival, or even an adversary, and the relationship between the two countries will definitely not be handled well.
The key issue is whether the United States regards China as a rival, adversary, or partner. It is now difficult for the United States to escape from its cognitive trap about China. Therefore, the “first button” cannot be buttoned well, which leads to problems in its China policy and cannot handle Sino-US relations well.
Therefore, I believe that the United States must have the courage to identify and correct its wrong perception of China.
Observer: This is Blinken’s second visit to China within a year, 10 months after his last visit in June last year, and about half a year before this year’s US election. Why did Biden choose this moment to send Yellen, Blinken and other senior officials to visit China one after another?
Wu Xinbo: In November 2023, the heads of state of China and the United States reached a consensus at their meeting in San Francisco to maintain high-level exchanges and engage in communication and dialogue. Yellen and Blinken’s recent visits to China are part of high-level exchanges.
The United States is more proactive in China-US relations, mainly because the Biden administration needs to promote some specific interests and goals in its China policy during the election year, including domestic affairs, foreign affairs.
The focus of Yellen’s last visit to China was in the economic field. The so-called “China’s overcapacity production problem” she repeatedly emphasized is nothing more than the fact that the United States is now uneasy about China’s rapid expansion in the “three new” markets, because it is the reason why the United States is currently lagging behind.
Blinken had a relatively long list of key issues during his visit to China, including Russia and Ukraine, the Middle East, the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, fentanyl drugs and other issues.
The United States hopes to benchmark China on these issues, raise China’s attention, and hopes that China can cooperate according to US interests and needs.
Observer : On the eve of Blinken’s visit to China, China and the United States held news briefings to introduce their respective goals and demands during the visit.
It seems that China’s practice of “breathing the news” in advance is rare. What is your interpretation of this practice and the focus of the respective briefings between China and the United States?
Wu Xinbo: This approach is very common for the United States.
Before a USA president or senior official visits a foreign country, the USA side often publicizes its requests with great fanfare.
On the one hand, this approach is to explain to the United States domestically, and on the other hand, it is also to put pressure on the other party and seek a psychological advantage at the negotiating table in a sense.
This is a common tactic of American diplomacy.
For China, in the past, when the two sides were about to contact or meet, China would generally create an atmosphere and say some more positive and polite words.
I think China’s actions this time were stimulated by the United States, and it was a counterattack against the United States’ desire to dominate Sino-US relations and counterattack US unilateral pressure on China. Therefore, China clarified its position on some key issues at the news briefing before Blinken came..
In the past two days, China also expressed its dissatisfaction with the US’s so-called overcapacity of production remarks and US policies towards the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea.
This is indeed different from China’s previous diplomatic style.
I think when dealing with the United States, we still need to be familiar with the American diplomatic style and tactics, and we must talk targetedly.
Comparing the contents of the “news briefings” between China and the United States, we can see the differences in positions and interests between the two sides in Sino-US relations.
The United States is expressing its current interests and concerns in domestic and foreign affairs and putting pressure on China.
While China argues that it is still necessary to implement the consensus reached at the San Francisco meeting between the Chinese and American presidents, establish correct mutual understanding, strengthen dialogue, and effectively manage differences. promote mutually beneficial cooperation, and jointly shoulder the responsibilities as being major powers of the world. China said we must return to the main theme of Sino-US relations. The interaction between China and the United States cannot only serve the United States’ unilateral short-term interest goals, but Blinken’s visit must be considered within the larger framework of China- USA relations.
Observer : Before Blinken visited China in June last year, the United States, Japan and the Philippines held the first trilateral meeting of national security advisers. Before his visit to China this year, the United States, Japan and the Philippines held the first summit between the three countries. Both meetings involved East China Sea, South China Sea and Taiwan Strait and other related issues. What kind of signal does this arrangement before the two Blinken visits to China send?
Wu Xinbo: The Biden administration’s policy towards China can be summarized in three words: “investment, alliance and competition”:
first, investing in oneself is to make the United States stronger; second, drawing in allies to keep China in check; and third, competing with China in bilateral relations.
The United States, Japan and the Philippines belong to the second part of the United States policy towards China, is the so-called strengthening of partnership, to engage in small groups, forming gangs against China.
This is not a new routine, and the Biden administration may be hoping to use these so-called these moves to gain some kind of advantage for Blinken’s visit to China and to strengthen the USA position in the US-China struggle game. But from China’s point of view, these moves show precisely that the United States is insincere in improving its relations with China.
The U.SA says that it does not seek to contain China, does not draw in allies to deal with China.
But USA actually does the opposite, the USA policy toward China lacks sincerity and credibility, and USA’s words are not trustworthy. These actions are actually not plus points for Blinken’s visit to China, but minus points, played the exact opposite effect, so that Brinker’s visit to China shrouded in a more negative atmosphere. This is because the USA approach makes it difficult for the Chinese side to believe in its sincerity and for the Chinese side to take the actions they want on issues of concern to the US side.
Observer : The first stop of Blinken’s visit to China was Shanghai. In Shanghai, he met with Shanghai Municipal Party Committee Secretary Chen Jining, went to New York University Shanghai and the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, visited Yuyuan Garden, and watched a basketball game.
What do you think of his trip to Shanghai?
Wu Xinbo: Except for his meeting with Secretary Chen Jining, most of Blinken’s activities in Shanghai were not official. I think the main purpose of his itinerary in Shanghai was to increase his understanding of China.
His last visit to China only went to Beijing, but China is very big country. To understand China, just going to Beijing is not enough. As one of China’s important economic centers, Shanghai is an important bridge connecting China and the United States, so going to Shanghai is also an important way to experience China.
Going to the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai is not only to understand the concerns of American companies in China, but also to listen to their calls for promoting Sino-US economic and trade relations; going to New York University Shanghai is more to express support for Sino-US cultural and educational exchanges, which is a more positive stance.
It is said that during Yellen’s last visit to China, she ate out and gained attention on Chinese social media, attracting a lot of attention. Therefore, Blinken also wanted to engage in some (ayağı yere basan) down-to-earth activities, so he went to Yuyuan Garden, and watched a basketball game. This also showed subtle changes in his diplomatic style with China.
Observer : In the 10 months since Blinken visited China last year, what do you think have changed or remained unchanged in Sino-US relations and US policy towards China?
Wu Xinbo: “Change” in relations is reflected in three aspects:
First of all, over the past year or so, China and the United States have maintained relatively close exchanges and communication.
The United States’ willingness to engage in high-level exchanges and communication is relatively obvious. Although there are exchanges, in general there are more American officials visiting China than Chinese officials visiting the United States.
Secondly, judging from some policy discussions within the United States, it is now relatively clear on economic and trade issues that it is impossible for the United States to “decouple” from China and “decoupling” is not in the interests of the United States.
What the United States can do is to “reduce risks.” In fact, “de-risking” itself is also a kind of “decoupling” behavior, but it is only a partial “decoupling”.
If the boundaries of “de-risking” are not grasped, it will lead to more “decoupling”. However, both Yellen and USA Commerce Secretary Raimondo mentioned during their visit to China last year that the United States does not seek “decoupling” from China and hopes to promote the development of Sino- USA economic and trade relations to a certain extent.
Thirdly, some relatively constructive actions have been taken in terms of social exchanges and cultural exchanges between China and the United States, such as increasing direct passenger flights between China and the United States and optimizing the visa application process.
Although these are in the low political realm, I think they are helpful in improving the overall atmosphere of relations between the two countries.
The “unchanged” part in China-USA relations is more obvious and has three aspects:
First, the United States’ basic understanding of China or positioning against China has not changed. It still regards China as its main competitor and most severe geopolitical challenge.
Second, the basic framework of the United States against China has not changed, and it still focuses on containment and suppression of China.
Third, wooing allies and forming cliques to deal with China has not changed.
So we see that on the one hand, senior US officials such as Yellen and Blinken are visiting China; on the other hand, the US continues to intervene in the Taiwan issue and the South China Sea issue, and suppresses China in science and technology.
Observer : What do you think the current state of Sino-US relations is? What will happen next? What time points or important events are worthy of focus?
Wu Xinbo: Currently, Sino-US relations are in a relatively fragile and stable state. Compared with a year ago, Sino-US relations are relatively stable, but this stability is very fragile and unreliable because the United States continues to promote its policy of containment and suppression against China.
I feel that the future development of Sino-US relations will have twists and turns, and there will be no real stability or significant improvement.
Especially in the 2024 election year, the Biden administration will not only show strength against China for the sake of the election, but also put pressure on China to address its own interest concerns.
Under such circumstances, the space for improvement and development of Sino-US relations will be very limited.
The real election campaign in the United States will begin after August. Currently, the two parties are still in the stage of launching their own candidates. The candidates of the two parties will not officially start “fighting” until after the national conventions of the two parties in July and August.
At present, Biden and Trump have not yet faced each other head-on. After the summer, as the election situation becomes tense, I think both parties will intensify their efforts to play the “China card.”
In this way, the impact of domestic politics in the United States on Sino-US relations will make negative spillover effects will become larger and larger.
In fact, Biden has already started. For example, he announced that he will impose tariffs on Chinese steel and aluminum.
This is mainly to gain votes from the United Steelworkers Union and steel industry workers. In addition, he is also considering imposing additional tariffs on China’s new energy vehicles and photovoltaic products. These actions of Biden are aimed at specific voters and are the need for domestic politics. There may be more actions to show strength and pressure on China in the future to manipulate voters and serve the general election results.
If Biden feels that his election situation is not going well, he may step up his efforts to play the China card.
Therefore, I think that Sino-US relations can remain fragile and unreliable in the first half of this year, and the fluctuations in Sino-US relations will be greater in the second half of the year.