China-Soviet 1:  How Did Relations Deteriorate in 1957? Khrushchev, Mao and the Unrealized Sino-Soviet Military Cooperation

Shen Zhiua

Author is professor of history at Peking University in Beijing. He is the deputy head of its Modern History Research Center and Its Archives, affiliated with the Parallel History Project.

The term “Sino-Soviet military cooperation” is narrowly defined here as the cooperation of both sides during times of war, or ensuring national security by carrying out national defense plans and organizing joint military operations in times of peace. It does not include more common executed mutual assistance and cooperation; such as the exchange of military technologies, offers of weapons and equipment, and military training. In this sense, from the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), to the Korean War, the Sino-Soviet alliance was expressed wholly in terms of military significance. The joint military actions within that period materialized mainly through the assistance of the Soviet air force helping Chinese communist troops rapidly occupy Xinjiang, assisting China with the implementation of coastal air defense, and safeguarding the Volunteer Army’s supply lines. This military cooperation clearly was very significant to the consolidation of the new Chinese regime.[1]

After the Korean War, China entered a period of peaceful construction, focusing on economic development. While implementing comprehensive economic assistance to China, the Soviets also wished to increase military cooperation, consolidate the eastern border of the socialist camp, and strategically insure Soviet national security. Concomitantly China, in the process of mobilizing national strength for economic construction, required Soviet military assistance and Soviet military power to ensure national defense and consolidate the regime. Due to ideological differences and dissimilar viewpoints on internal relations of the socialist camp, the Sino-Soviet relationship, from its “honeymoon period” to the Sino-Soviet split, failed as both sides, even in a peaceful environment, were unable to achieve successful cooperation. In this respect, both Khrushchev’s and Mao’s personalities played a major role.

This paper analyzes three aspects of Sino-Soviet military cooperation in the late 1950s; the Far Eastern Air Defense Agreement, the construction of the long-wave radio station, and the proposal for establishing a combined fleet. In past studies of Sino-Soviet relations, Chinese scholars have created a large body of work focusing on the long-wave radio station and combined fleet, largely based on Chinese documents. Their conclusions have been somewhat simplistic: the Soviets wanted to control China. This paper on the contrary, combines newly declassified Soviet documents with the memoirs of former Soviet participants, and objectively analyzes the historical background, the causes behind these issues, and the responses from leaders on both sides. As a result, this paper presents some views which deviate from past analyses.

The Desire for Mutual Cooperation and the Rise of Soviet Chauvinism

After Stalin’s death, Khrushchev readjusted the Soviet Union’s policies toward China, as he struggled for the leadership of the USSR, both accelerating and increasing the pace of assistance. Sino-Soviet relations entered a “honeymoon period,” as both sides actively expressed a desire to cooperate economically, diplomatically, and politically. However, despite the needs and desires of both sides, Sino-Soviet military cooperation surprisingly did not develop on the basis of mutual support during the Korean War.

In January 1955, the Soviet Defense Department proposed that the two countries increaseair defense cooperation in the far east. China immediately dispatched a 9 member delegation to Khabarovsk on January 24 to discuss this proposal with the Soviet Far Eastern Military District and the Pacific Fleet.

Chen Geng, Vice Chief of Staff, Wang Bingzhang, Vice Commander of the Air Force, and Cheng Jun, Vice Commander of the Air Defense Army, were included in this delegation.

On February 6, both sides signed the “Soviet Far Eastern Military District, Pacific Fleet, and Chinese PLA Shenyang Military District Joint Air Defense Agreement”, composed of three documents concerning the following topics:

1. A Coordinated military plan to intercept cross-border enemy aircraft.

2. The execution of a plan to practice coordinated air defense.

3. The coordination of air defense plans during times of war.

These documents however, were only written in Russian, not in 2 languages Russian and Chinese. Moreover, on the basis of the agreement, the additional intelligence organs and communication facilities established by the Chinese would report to the Soviets in Russian.

After Chen and the others in the delegation returned to China to report on the meeting, Peng Dehuai believed that this agreement did not follow international standards, which was to present the context of the agreement in the languages of both sides, and therefore, was unequal. Under these circumstances, Peng suggested that the Central Committee, for the moment, not ratify this agreement.[2]

Although the air defense agreement was tabled, it is not accurate to say the Chinese side was unwilling to proceed with military cooperation. In fact, China’s need for air defense cooperation in the Far East was much greater than the Soviet’s.

The initial problem was only China’s strong dislike of the Soviet military’s chauvinism. After the truce in Korea and the Geneva Conference, China was determined to move towards full-scale economic development, which required an international environment that could ensure security and guarantee peace. The emergence of the Warsaw Pact provided for just such an opportunity.

The enlargement and gradual militarization of NATO was evident, and compelled the Soviets to create a counter military organization in Eastern Europe. Whether China raised the issue of participating in the Warsaw Pact remained questionable, but the Soviets did propose to accept China and other non-Europe countries (such as Cuba) into the Warsaw Pact in the following years.

Eastern European countries however rejected this motion.[3] At the very least, one could say the Chinese demonstrated a supportive attitude towards safeguarding the collective security of the socialist countries and resisting the military menace of the western camp. On May 12, Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai attended the commencement ceremony of the Warsaw Pact. At the ceremony Peng Dehuai said that the series of security treaties between the United States and far eastern countries, as well as the constant American clamoring for war “made the people of Asia, just like the people of the Europe, face the increasingly serious danger of a new war.”

Therefore, China “will give its full support and cooperation to all resolutions of the Warsaw Pact.” Peng, representing the Chinese government at the conference, declared “peace is inseparable.” “If the peace in Europe is destroyed,” China “will definitely carry out the common anti-aggression war along with the governments and people of our brother countries, until the final victory is achieved.”[4] Peng’s statement seemed to informally expand China’s military commitments, enshrined in the 1950 Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty, to the entire socialist camp. Peng also made similar commitments during his brief visits to Eastern European countries before and after the Warsaw conference.[5]

As Peng passed through Moscow on his way to and from the Warsaw meetings, he had in-depth talks with both Khrushchev and Minister of Defense Zhukov. Both sides hoped they could specify plans for military cooperation based on the 1950 treaty. China had the same defense requirements that were stated in the Warsaw Pact, and these were compatible with Khrushchev’s ideas on the subject, but differed from the opinions of the Soviet military. Before going abroad on April 29, Peng reported to Mao that he was prepared to discuss with the Soviets how to coordinate military action in the future anti-aggression war. Mao agreed, making clear that the Chinese military strategy was based on an active defense, never a first strike.[6] Peng then brought to Moscow a Ministry of Defense draft concerning Chinese strategy and military policy.[7]

During the talk, Khrushchev spoke frankly to Peng of the strategic significance of the Warsaw Pact forces, their military strength compared to NATO, and the power and effectiveness of newly developed Soviet weapons. Khrushchev also expressed his willingness to help China develop these types of weapons.

When they discussed Soviet policy, Khrushchev said the Warsaw Pact was defensive in nature, and its goal was to promote peace. For this reason, the Soviet Union offered the west an arms reduction proposal, and would unilaterally reduce its own troops in an effort to develop peaceful negotiations, the race toward peace, and an easing of the tension in the international situation. The Soviet Union would withdraw all troops from Austria, despite internal disagreement. Peng expressed his agreement with Khrushchev regarding his views on these international issues, believing that the tension in the international situation needed to be eased, and that China needed a period of peace to carry out reconstruction. Regarding China’s relationship with the Warsaw Pact, Khrushchev mentioned twice that the Warsaw Pact was not only aimed at the west, but also the east. He hoped to integrate China and the Warsaw Pact in some fashion. China and the Soviet Union already had an alliance treaty; once the situation changed, that treaty could be implemented and a means of combining this treaty with the Warsaw Pact, or developing the alliance treaty itself could be considered. Presently, the important thing was to consider and research some concrete cooperation topics. The format must be the same as that of the Warsaw Pact, but should be suitable to the situation in the Far East and China, so as to deter the United States from attacking. Khrushchev also said that the Soviet Union had a formidable military force in the Far East and the Pacific, especially regarding air and naval forces. If China desired, the Soviet could cooperate with the Chinese military at anytime and both sides should adopt concrete methods to increase cooperation.

Peng said that the Warsaw Pact Conference was a timely, far-sighted, and momentous strategic measure for the present international situation. It was a great contribution towards safeguarding both the security of the socialist countries and world peace, and would also play an important role in the security of Asia and China.

Developing the Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty, and enhancing military cooperation were good and necessary; socialist countries should cooperate with each other. Peng said that China supported the Soviet Union’s international policies, and that China was already reducing its troops in concert with Soviet policy. Regarding military cooperation, Peng said these issues were very important, especially the cooperation of the navy and air force, which would help enhance China’s coastal defenses.

He said he would ask the Chinese Communist Part Central Committee (CCP CC) to consider these topics. Khrushchev agreed to increase military assistance to China, and asked Peng to either negotiate with the Soviet Ministry of Defense himself, or send a special delegation to the Soviet Union.[8]

Here we have an issue worthy of note, namely that Khrushchev discussed Soviet internal divisions regarding foreign policy issues [with Peng Dehuai].

At that time, though Khrushchev had successfully removed Malenkov as Chairman of the Minister’s Conference, he had not yet consolidated his own position. Khrushchev did not yet have full control of diplomatic and military issues. Proponents of a hard line foreign policy towards the west not only included Molotov, who was in charge of Soviet foreign affairs, as well as other Eastern European leaders, but also Soviet military leaders.

Khrushchev’s criticism of Malenkov’s argument, “the incalculable destructiveness of nuclear war,” the ineffectiveness of a hard line foreign policy and the development of nuclear weapon soon pushed Khrushchev towards a more pragmatic, personal diplomacy. Khrushchev’s decision to unilaterally disarm 640,000 troops without prior consultation with his allies, not only elicited doubt from the Eastern European countries, but also fostered strong discontent and passive resistance from the Soviet military.[9] In Khrushchev’s opinion, the importance of the Warsaw Pact was symbolic.

Its main purpose lay not in military action, but in the current Cold War environment, as a bargaining chip with the west during negotiations. For Molotov however, the Warsaw Pact’s strength lay in its role as a military organization and defensive tool, enhancing the cohesion of the socialist camp. The difference was clear in Soviet newspapers: as the party newspaper, Pravda emphasized detente and highly praised Khrushchev’s analysis of the European situation, the military newspaper, Krasnaia Zvezda, repeated Molotov’s warning, that enhancing the defensive powers of the Warsaw Pact countries was necessary in a hostile world.[10]

 On May 22, when Zhukov and Peng were discussing strategy for the future anti-aggression war, Zhukov articulated this Soviet military opinion. Zhukov thought that China’s active defense Strategy was outdated. In the current environment, a nuclear attack would be decisive. Modern war is different from traditional war, and one cannot allow the enemy an opportunity for a first strike. As Peng told Khrushchev of this split in strategic thinking between the two sides, Khrushchev announced that they could discuss this topic at a later date.[11] Soviet military leaders were not only inclined towards a hard line strategic position vis-is the west, but also revealed a chauvinistic arrogance during their cooperation with China.

In September 1955, the Soviet Ministry of Defense again suggested signing an air defense coordination agreement between the outer Baikal military district and the Shenyang military district.

Shengyang military district air force commander Zhou Chiping was assigned to negotiate with the Soviets. Before leaving, General Chief of Staff Su Yu, and air force commander Liu Yalou, told Zhou that these negotiations were limited to air defense intelligence cooperation only. However, when Zhou arrived at Chita on September 23, the Soviets wanted him to sign a previously prepared agreement, which included provisions giving Soviet airplanes the right to enter Chinese airspace and land in Chinese airports without giving advance notice to the Chinese. However, Chinese airplanes flying in Chinese airspace, or entering Soviet airspace must inform the Soviets in advance. In addition, the Beijing military district should report all enemy aircraft intelligence to the Soviets. The agreement further called for China to construct additional airports in Manchuria to satisfy the landing needs of Soviet airplanes. Moreover, conditions regarding the offering of fuel, accommodation and food to the other side were all unequal. Because these provisions exceeded the limits of his authority, Zhou Chiping quickly sent a telegram to China, requesting further instruction. Liu Yalou replied, saying the agreement was unacceptable, and that talks must be limited to the topic of air defense intelligence cooperation only.

However, the reply Zhou received agreed with the terms, and on September 27, he signed it. When Zhou Chiping returned to China and reported the news, Liu was shocked. Peng was extremely angry, and reported the situation to Zhou Enlai. Since telegrams sent between the Chinese delegation and Beijing were transferred by the Soviet communications system, it was highly possible that the Soviets were behind the deception. Zhou Enlai ordered that before the truth was uncovered, China would ignore Soviet consultants’ opinion that the agreement should go into effect in December. On December 29, the Central Military Committee (CMC) held a regular working meeting in which they agreed that China had no need to invest in additional airports, and decided to tell the Soviet Chief Consultant and Ministry of Defense the following: Zhou Chiping violated the instructions of the General Staff and the Air Force Command when he signed the air defense agreement between the two countries. This was an unorganized, undisciplined action, which should be punished, and the agreement could not be executed.[12] 

The results of the investigation were never known. However, one thing is certain: the proposed Soviet agreement was not equal. That undoubtedly was the major problem that impeded the implementation of a Sino-Soviet air defense military cooperation agreement.

This type of unequal treatment was common. For example, in the 1950s, Soviet specialists helped China develop its military surveying and mapping operations. Based on these operations, China drew military maps on a scale of 1:50,000 [km]. The Soviet side requested a copy of every new map, but was not willing to provide the Chinese side with Soviet drawn maps of the Sino-Soviet border, only revised maps captured from the Japanese. The Chinese military mapping bureau naturally declined the Soviet’s request. Another example occurred in May 1955, when the Soviet army withdrew from Lushun and Dalian. The Soviets transferred the naval equipment and bases, but held out in returning mapping materials and navigational maps of the adjacent areas. After negotiating, the Soviet side provided a copy of “Survey Measurements and Coordinate Data for the Lushan-Dalian Region.”[13]

In spite of these events, Sino-Soviet relations were still in a “honeymoon” period. The greater trend towards mutual assistance and support was not affected by these incidences. On January 28 1956, at the first political consultative conference of the Warsaw Pact countries, Nie Rongzhen, acting as an official observer, pointed out that “peace in Europe and Asia is inseparable. Six hundred million Chinese people will unite with the Soviet Union and all the people of the people’s democratic c

ountries forever.”[14] China continued its full-scale cooperation with the Soviet Union on political and diplomatic aspects, which was evident in helping the Soviets resolve its conflict with Poland, the Hungry incident, and at the Moscow Communist Party Conference. Similarly, the Soviet Union continued its increased economic and military aid to China, particularly on October 15 1957 at the signing of the National Defense New Technology Agreement, which promised to assist China in developing nuclear industry and weaponry.

The November 1957 Moscow Communist Party Conference demonstrated the strength and unprecedented unity of the socialist camp, as Sino-Soviet relations reached its apex. However, not long after the conference, serious differences began to emerge between Chinese and Soviet leaders regarding military cooperation. These events are usually referred to as the “long-wave radio station” and “the combined fleet” incidences. It is commonly believed that this first direct conflict between the two sides was the beginning of the Sino-Soviet split. The cause of the conflict, according to Chinese leaders headed by Mao, was that Soviet behavior violated Chinese sovereignty; that Khrushchev intended to control China.[15] For a long time, this view prevailed in Chinese society and in historical studies, and seems to be the historical consensus.[16]

In recent years however, newly declassified Russian documents and the publication of Soviet party memoirs relating to these two incidences have surfaced, allowing people to investigate the course of these historical events more thoroughly. Making a serious comparison of material from both sides, and considering the international background of the time, it appears that things were not as simple as previously imagined.

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