Taiwan Issue and the US Deterrence Policy Against China

Liao Zhengrong, Director of the Institute of Peace and Development, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, August 2023

In the post-Cold War era, Sino-US relations have developed into the most important and complex bilateral relationship in the world. ¹  The state of deep economic dependence, high strategic competition, and fierce security confrontation constitutes the main content of Sino-US relations. ² 

But the above content is not static, instead it is changing rapidly. The United States is trying to weaken its economic interdependence with China. USA imports from China continue to decline, and it is tightening its investment from China and its investment in China. The strategic competition aspect of Sino-US relations was not prominent, but the Trump administration launched a trade war and put Sino-US relations on a competitive track.

The current tone of Sino-US competition completely overwhelms cooperation. China hopes to make economic interdependence the strategic basis of bilateral relations, but the United States refuses.

The United States emphasizes that competition is the main axis of the relationship and economic interdependence must be subject to the national security needs of the United States. The security confrontation aspect of Sino-US relations has existed for a long time. After the end of the Cold War, relations between major powers have been fully eased, and peaceful development and globalization have become the mainstream.

The United States continues to maintain its alliance system in the Asia-Pasific region. The two sides have security differences over issues such as North Korea’s nuclear missiles, Taiwan and the South China Sea, but it is generally just a “cold confrontation”.

The conflict in security has become a negative background for the development of relations between the two countries, but it has not caused a major obstacle to the development of relations. However, as China and the United States move toward strategic competition, security conflicts have also turned from cold to hot.

The United States is worried that China’s rise will change the regional military balance, and is actively renovating the regional alliance system, expanding and strengthening the network of partners, and enhancing the substantive relationship between the United States and Taiwan to deter China.

China is actively promoting national defense modernization and striving to have more options and initiative in resolving the Taiwan issue. Therefore, although China and the United States are not yet militarily equal and there is a huge gap in nuclear power, there is still an increasingly fierce security confrontation.

The security confrontation between China and the United States is mainly the United States using regional alliances to deter China. China has developed “regional denial” capabilities against possible US interference, forming a kind of counter-deterrence against the United States (and the Taiwan authorities).

Since the Ukrainian crisis, the mutual deterrence between China and the United States over the Taiwan issue has been escalating, and there is even a possibility of losing control. At present, Sino-US relations are in a downward spiral. Although there are some signs of warming recently, they are far from returning to a stable track. Normal communication and dialogue channels between China and the United States are still being restored and built.

In addition to accusing each other in the media, deterrence has become a way of dialogue. Senior US military officials often shout across the air to release deterrence information, and Chinese military spokespersons have repeatedly reiterated their determination to fight for Taiwan. In this case, it is undoubtedly necessary to seriously summarize the experience of the Cold War and clarify the meaning of deterrence in order to avoid accidental firing and effectively implement crisis management.

The US deterrence against China is divided into several levels.

The top level is a comprehensive and multi-faceted deterrence policy with nuclear and conventional military advantages as the core policy, the alliance system as the support, and economic diplomacy as the main means of application.

Austin, the Secretary of Defense of the Biden administration, proposed the “integrated deterrence” (“hybrid warfare” ) strategy, which is a new method to implement this type of deterrence. It was tested in the Ukrainian crisis and is generally referred to as “hybrid warfare” and “total war”.

As the name suggests, it is not limited to the use of military force, but a comprehensive use of various resources and means such as economy, finance, energy, and political diplomacy to win over allies and partners to participate and act in coordination.

It forms the constant background of the entire deterrence strategy. Regardless of whether Sino-US relations improve or not, the United States will continue to promote its “integrated deterrence” strategy, which is the cornerstone of maintaining the American world order.

The second level is specific deterrence strategies, which are designed specifically for specific potential conflicts, such as the Taiwan issue.

The United States has long maintained “strategic ambiguity” on the Taiwan issue. According to people in the U.S. strategic community, it is a dual deterrence, hoping to both deter mainland China from using force against Taiwan (through comprehensive deterrence) and prevent China from passively engaging in conflicts provoked by Taiwan (through unclear commitments on whether to directly send troops to defend Taiwan) and being dragged into the water by the Taiwan authorities. As the military power comparison between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait tilts toward the mainland, the United States is increasingly worried that “strategic ambiguity” will not be able to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, and “integrated deterrence” will not be enough to deter China’s determination to take back Taiwan by force.

The United States is considering whether to move from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity, which means that the United States will clearly publicize the conditions for sending troops to defend Taiwan. Considering that mainland China is rapidly accumulating local military advantages in the Taiwan Strait, it is probably not enough for the United States to simply promise to send troops. Its deterrence must be such that China feels that it not only has no chance of winning, but also that the cost exceeds its ability to bear. For this reason, the United States is discussing two types of policies, namely punitive deterrence or denial deterrence, and which one is more effective. Punitive deterrence is also called retaliatory deterrence, which means that if the Chinese mainland takes Taiwan by force, it will be retaliated and devastated.

The top US military officials have been making frequent statements recently. For example, in late May 2023, Aquilino, commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, claimed in his speech: “There is no so-called quick victory. If we decide to engage in this war (Taiwan Strait conflict), then the US military will carry out devastating attacks on Chinese property and civilians.”

Another example, at the end of June 2023, Admiral Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US Army, claimed that on the Taiwan issue, the United States hopes to use deterrence to “ensure that every day when the Chinese wake up, they say that today is not the day to attack Taiwan, and that decision will never come.”

This kind of deterrence is actually an “ultimate” deterrence, which is powerful but because the stakes are too high, the possibility of actual implementation is relatively small, thereby reducing its credibility. If China has formed sufficient nuclear survivability and counterattack capabilities and can “mutually ensure destruction” with the United States, the credibility of punitive deterrence will approach zero. For this reason, the US strategic community is discussing how to shift from punitive deterrence to deterrence denial, meaning to make mainland China realize that it cannot win a local war to take Taiwan by force, or that the price it pays is far beyond its ability to bear. Since military action cannot achieve its goals, it will choose to give up the use of force. The purpose of this kind of deterrence is limited to defeating the opponent’s military forces and denying them from achieving their goals and tasks. Compared with punitive deterrence, its goals are set lower, the intensity of deterrence is reduced, and it appears to be more “mild”, but more feasible and more credible.

However, as the Quincy Institute in the United States puts it, due to the rapid improvement of the PLA’s military modernization level, the United States is increasingly lacking the confidence to win a local war near China’s coast, and the effectiveness of deterrence is also decreasing. Therefore, the US deterrence strategy has developed to the third level, that is, considering that it is impossible to deter the PLA from taking Taiwan by force, the United States and its allies can turn to encouraging Taiwan to strengthen its self-defense capabilities or destroy important resources to increase the cost of taking Taiwan and reduce its benefits, so as to deter the mainland from using force.

Around this purpose, the United States has gradually improved the targeting and practicality of arms sales to Taiwan, and designed the “Poison Frog Strategy” ⁴ and “Porcupine Strategy” for Taiwan, hoping that Taiwan will become the second Ukraine; around destroying Taiwan’s value, the United States designed the “broken nest strategy” (also known as the “scorched earth strategy”) and the “Silicon Shield Strategy” ⁵ , hoping that when Taiwan is faced with a military attack from the mainland and cannot hold on, it can self-destruct core strategic assets such as TSMC to prevent them from falling into the hands of the mainland, thereby adding bargaining chips to the game between the mainland and the United States.

In addition, according to a principle of deterrence strategy of the USA, “the effectiveness of threats depends on what other alternatives are available to potential enemies.”

The U.S. government tries to provide China with some kind of guarantee to enhance the effectiveness of the above deterrence.

 USA constantly promises China that the U.S. government adheres to the “One China” policy. Although the U.S. “One China Policy” is significantly different from the “One China Principle” required by China and has been hollowed out by the United States, it still retains the “One China” shell. The United States believes that this strategy is enough to make China accept deterrence and thus avoid real military conflict.

China certainly cannot rely on the United States’ guarantee to safeguard its “core interests”.

In China’s view, the United States’ strategic goal is not to maintain the “status quo in the Taiwan Strait”, but to use Taiwan to contain China’s rejuvenation. The above-mentioned deterrence by the United States can be regarded as different manifestations of the strategy of “using Taiwan to contain China”. China itself is also implementing counter-deterrence.

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