The Ontological Foundations of Dialectics: Hegel and Marx

Author Wu Xiaoming is Prof in the Western Marxism Studies Institute of Fudan University, Shanghai, May 2019

For a period of time, the Marxist philosophical community has generally been enthusiastic about studying the critique of political economy, especially Capital. This is not only related to the reconstruction of the basic understanding of Marxism on the theme of intellectual history, but also especially related to the epochal significance of explaining Marx’s entire ideological methodology. For Marx, the method of the critique of political economy or Capital is dialectics.

However, for a long time, dialectics, first of all Marx’s dialectics, has rarely been truly understood, and its fundamental nature, characteristics and significance seem to have fallen into obscurity involuntarily. Engels saw this when he wrote a book review for Marx’s Critique of Political Economy in 1859 , and Marx also pointed this out in the postscript to the second edition of Capital in 1872 ( see Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 2 , pages 40 and 109 ) .

We can observe the same situation in the theorists of the Second International and in the theorists of Western Marxism starting with Lukacs and followed by other Western Marxism theorists. In order to get out of this obscure and often misleading situation, any superficial perfunctory and patchwork will be of no help here and the ontological basis of dialectics must be fundamentally clarified. ( such practices are not uncommon, but only lead to more and more obscurity )  It is for this reason that we require an ontological exploration of Hegel and Marx’s dialectics, although this paper can only reveal some of its key points as a beginning.

Since Socrates and Plato, up to Hegel and Marx, the most general and basic meaning of dialectics in ontology is to express: the self-movement of things, or the self-manifestation of things. For Socrates and Plato, dialectics as dialogue or conversation means: to make things themselves appear in various chaotic and contradictory opinions; therefore, dialectics is an art of disintegrating inappropriate opinions by questioning, and thus it is an art of making things themselves – “the presence from themselves” – appear.

For Hegel and Marx, dialectics also means the self-movement of things in ontology, and this self-movement is grasped as an “objective” process in the context of modern thought. In the terms we often use, the self-movement of things is objective because it is not subject to human subjective will. “…Dialectics as a logos event for the Greeks was not a movement completely guided by thought, but a movement of things themselves that can be experienced by thought. Although this sounds like Hegel’s words, this does not indicate a false modernization, but rather proves a historical connection. Hegel deliberately adopted the paradigm of Greek dialectics in the context of modern thought that we have marked.” ( Gadamer, 1999 , p. 588 ) 

Gadamer tried to show that this historical connection is crucial to understand dialectics: if the problem is to understand the “super-subjective force” in the process of things ( that is, objective forces that are not subject to human subjective opinions or will ) , then the paradigm of Greek dialectics is superior to some extent, “because we are deeply trapped in the dilemma of subjectivism.” ( Gadamer, Ibid .)

This dilemma of subjectivism is particularly prominent when understanding dialectics , especially Marx’s dialectics. It is most clearly and intensely manifested in young Lukacs’ History and Class Consciousness. When this work, subtitled “A Study of the Marxist Dialectic”, launched a large-scale attack on the “vulgar Marxism” of the “Franz Mehring- Plekhanov orthodoxy”, its entire ideological content revolved around the pivot of Marx’s dialectics: just as the main purpose of Lukacs’ this work was to expound the critical and revolutionary nature of Marx’s dialectics, it academically and strikingly follows the question of “Marx’s direct connection with Hegel” to formulate its direction, and ultimately grasps the social – historical process of the present era as the dialectics of the proletarian “class consciousness” – that is, becoming the “identical subject – object” of history.

No matter how important this masterpiece of Lukacs is in the history of the development of Marxism in the 20th century, no matter how profound its influence on contemporary thought and scholarship, and no matter how prominently and faithfully it reflects the universal “mentality” of alienation in that era, it still falls into the dilemma of subjectivism on the fundamental theme of dialectics. Lukács ’s self-criticism in the preface to the new edition in 1976 was by no means an exaggeration: the core concept of History and Class Consciousness, “practice” – which involves the ontological basis of Marx’s dialectics – manifests itself as an “exaggerated high tone” and thus falls back into “idealistic intuition”.

If this “abstract, idealistic concept of practice” is politically closer to the “messianic utopianism” popular among the communist left at that time, then its philosophical crux is that it equates “practice” with “given” (zugerechnet) consciousness. ( See Lukacs, pp. 12-13 ) 

The dialectic based on this ontological foundation reaches the pinnacle of subjectivism when the proletariat is regarded as the subject – object of historical identity; the “identity” at this pinnacle is no more real than a purely metaphysical construction, nor does it overcome the idealist system, but becomes an “attempt to be more Hegel than Hegel.” This attempt meant: first, “boldly transcending all reality”; second, the practice of the revolution becomes “Fichtean activism.” ( Ibid., pp. 17-18 ) It must be noted, however, that in this 1976 preface Lukács refers to the “current debate about genuine Marxism”, and refers to the “experimental character” of his work between 1918-1930 , and writes: “Since there is still great uncertainty today about how the essential and lasting content and permanent method of Marxism are to be understood, intellectual honesty requires me to state this explicitly.” ( Lukács, p. 1 )

If the subjective dilemma of Lukacs’s dialectic is obvious in his exposition of it, what about the understanding of dialectic among other scholars – scholars in general and Marxists in particular ? ( such as the theorists of the Second International ) 

Here we encounter the most popular understanding of dialectic, which is in fact the understanding that has long dominated all kinds of operations, imaginations and evaluations of dialectic. The core of this understanding is that dialectic is a formal method. As a formal method, dialectic is a method similar to the so-called “scientific methodology” prevalent in intellectual science. Although the two are different in principle and expression – for example, dialectic emphasizes the view of change, development and connection, their methodological nature is the same: they both manifest themselves as a series of laws, rules, categories and category connections, but all of these are purely formal, that is, separated from the content; and it is precisely because of the complete separation from the content that the method establishes itself as a method, that is, as a purely formal method, it can be applied to any content without restriction.

Understanding dialectics as a formal method seems not only to conform to the universal rules of modern knowledge, but also to completely escape the subjective dilemma that dialectics may fall into ( we see such a dilemma in Lukacs ) . Isn’t the method of intellectual science, that is, the formal method, objective like the laws of Newtonian mechanics? Isn’t dialectics, which is identical in nature to the method of intellectual science, also free from all subjective interference and therefore objective?

Let us first state our views directly and put aside the relevant discussions and arguments: 

(1) From the very beginning, dialectics is intended to critically transcend intellectual science ( the basic and dominant style of modern knowledge ) and its methodology. If this transcendence is not achieved or cannot be achieved, dialectics has no reason to exist. 

(2) Understanding dialectics as a formal method will not help it escape its subjective dilemma. On the contrary, it will make it fall deeper into this dilemma. It is just that the philosophical illusion of formal method is indulged in a more childish and naive subjectivism. 

(3) Therefore, in terms of its ontological basis, dialectics cannot be any formal method, or perhaps it is more clear to say the opposite: any formal method is fundamentally anti-dialectical. All of the above points undoubtedly need to be clarified on the ontological basis of dialectics, but let us start with the obvious understanding of phenomena.

The theorists of the Second International understood dialectics almost exclusively as a formal method. Mehring and Plekhanov are particularly mentioned here not only because they represent the “authority” and “orthodoxy” of this group of theorists, but also because they deal more with fundamental philosophical issues, so that the nature and characteristics of dialectics as a formal method are particularly prominent.

Plekhanov talks about Hegel and dialectics very often – and often with passion – but Plekhanov only talks about dialectics formally; and precisely because dialectics is only discussed formally, the dialectics Plekhanov talks about does not and in fact cannot be essentially different from the equally formalized Hegelian dialectics, both of which are formalized “dialectical” laws and formalized categorical reasoning.

This is best demonstrated by the fact that while Plekhanov equates Marx with Feuerbach ( and refers to Spinoza ) on an ontological level , Plekhanov simultaneously demands that dialectics should be placed ready-made on the basis of what is essentially Feuerbach’s ( ! ) materialism. This is possible only if the dialectic is understood in its entirety as a formal method: just as a formal method can be imposed on any content, so only a completely formalized dialectic can be imposed on any ontological basis, such as that of Feuerbach or Spinoza.

Since the dialectic is for Marx’s materialism nothing more than a “supplement” or “addition” to such an insignificant formal method ( no matter how many praises are given to it at the same time ) , the real contempt of the dialectic by the theorists of the Second International is fundamentally explained. For this reason, Mehring, who was known as “the only philosopher in the German party”, while understanding Marx’s doctrine as an intellectual science or as an empirical science, wrote: “We fully respect dialectics, but we feel that practical knowledge without dialectics is more valuable than dialectics without practical knowledge.” ( Mehring, p. 156 ) It is very clear that such a statement is also only possible when dialectics is merely a purely formal method; and we have to add that what is shown here is the extreme of the abstract possibility of dialectics as a formal method: not only is dialectics irrelevant to the “practical knowledge” of the content as a whole, but as a pure form it can also be an embellishment or even an obstacle to true knowledge.

  This popular view, which was actually dominated by the ideology of modernity, was actually echoed by the theorists of the Second International, which naturally aroused Lukacs’ indignation: “If this meaning of the dialectical method is blurred, it will inevitably appear as a superfluous burden, an ornament of Marxist “sociology” or “economics”. It may even appear to be an obstacle to the “realistic” and “impartial” study of “facts”, an empty structure by which Marxism rapes facts.” ( Lukacs, pp . 51-52 )

This popular understanding of dialectics, that is, the understanding of it as a purely formal method, is undoubtedly a powerful force with specific social and historical roots. Like the vast ocean of fate, it stubbornly hinders or distorts the correct understanding of dialectics. Just read the postscript to the second edition of Marx’s Capital to know how poorly and contradictory people of that time understood the “method used in Capital”: some denounced it as “metaphysics” or “Hegel’s sophistry”, while others fell into great confusion in the entanglement and struggle between analysis and deduction, idealism and realism. ( See “Selected Works of Marx and Engels” , Volume 2 , pages 109-111 ) 

And all of these seem to be lumps in the theoretical stomachs of later Marxists that are difficult to digest, and it seems that these lumps suddenly disappear only when dialectics is transformed into a purely formal method. As is well known, Engels once wrote a series of very famous “late letters”, and the core point of the relevant letters is nothing more than saying that the key point of those theorists who consider themselves or are called Marxists is that they do not understand dialectics and therefore cannot truly understand and grasp historical materialism. The intensity of this criticism by Engels can be observed from the fact that Engels repeatedly quoted Marx’s statement “I only know that I am not a Marxist” and reinforced this statement with Heine’s famous saying “I sow dragon seeds and harvest fleas”. ( See “Selected Works of Marx and Engels” Volume 4 , pages 695 and 691 ) 

The real philosophical problem left by this series of criticisms is that if historical materialism does not also become dialectics, it will inevitably transform into its opposite, and this “opposite” in a broader sense is nothing more than subjectivism.

How the purely formal dialectic is further mired in the dilemma of subjectivism can be seen from the transformation of the principle of historical materialism into its opposite in a non-dialectical situation. It is therefore unnecessary to discuss here how, when Mehring has completely formalized the dialectic and reconciled it with the materialist foundation of Feuerbach, in order to preserve the “revolutionary force” of Marx’s materialism, Mehring speaks admiringly of “Fichte, the son of the proletariat” – “he is a revolutionary from head to toe” ( Mehring, pp. 119 , 125 ) .

This is only a “supplement” to a certain subjectivism, and the really important point is that the purely formal dialectic, like all formal methods, like any principle or principle that remains in abstraction, lives and acquires its essence in what Hegel calls “external reflection”; and external reflection is subordinate to subjective consciousness, subjective thought, in short, in itself, it is essentially subjectivist.

To put it simply, external reflection is a kind of reasoning ability that works here and there. External reflection never goes deep into the specific content of things; but external reflection knows abstract general principles and knows how to apply general principles to any content. It does not take much intelligence to see that so-called external reflection is what we usually call dogmatism ( more often called formalism in philosophy ), because the characteristics of dogmatism or formalism can never go deep into the content of specific things, but crudely applies abstract principles to any content – a priori imposed. It also does not take too much intelligence to understand that the formalism or dogmatism of external reflection is thoroughgoing subjectivism, and it is always more or less naive and crude subjectivism.

Therefore, Hegel called those who only know external reflection ( but cannot raise it to speculative reflection ) “outsiders”, and in almost all of his works, Hegel launched a continuous criticism of external reflection ( “reflective philosophy” ) as the viewpoint and mechanism of subjective consciousness. “Hegel considers this process of external reflection to be a modern form of sophistry, because external reflection arbitrarily subsumes given things under general principles. … Hegel demands that thought should fully enter into the objective content of things and abandon all its illusions.” ( Gadamer, 1994 , p. 111 ) 

It is with this criticism that subjective thought or subjective consciousness demands to progress to the stage or realm of so-called “objective thought”. According to Hegel, the term “objective thought” best indicates truth, and “… truth should not only be the goal pursued by philosophy, but also the absolute object of philosophical research.” ( Hegel, 1980 , p. 93 )

Even such a simple discussion can make us realize that it is completely improper to understand dialectics as a formal method and to apply its laws, categories, etc. as purely formal laws. It is completely untenable in terms of the essence of dialectics. Because any purely formal method, law or principle can only exist in external reflection, that is, it can only be applied to external reflection. And external reflection itself is not only subjective, but also anti-dialectical. Someone must ask, is it anti-dialectical to apply “change”, “development”, “negation of negation”, etc. to any content? Yes, it is indeed so, as long as this application is abstract and external reflection. This is so because of the nature of external reflection itself, because the principles or laws limited to the operation of external reflection can only be abstract metaphysical and subjective. As we can see in Engels’s late letters, if someone applies only external reflection to the basic proposition of historical materialism, “… saying that the economic factor is the only decisive factor, then he is turning this proposition into empty, abstract, absurd nonsense.” ( Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 4 , p. 696 ) 

Needless to say, such nonsense has nothing in common with the true historical materialism, because it is both subjective and anti-dialectical; it also goes without saying that Hegel’s idealism and Marx’s materialism both most resolutely reject subjectivism and both require the most thorough transcendence of external reflection that operates only in subjective consciousness through dialectics. Of course, this point especially needs to be explained on the ontological basis of dialectics.

Hegel sometimes calls external reflection “intellectual reflection” because, according to the outstanding distinction made by Kant ( the distinction between intellect and reason ) , external reflection operates on the same plane as “formal intellect” or “abstract reason”. In the strict sense, intellect refers to thinking that can only produce finite determinations and can only operate within finite determinations. Its finiteness here means: (1) The determinations of thought are only subjective, because there is always an objective object that opposes them; (2) The content of each determination of thought is finite and therefore opposed to each other, and especially to the so-called infinite, opposed to truth, and absolute. ( See Hegel, 1980 , p. 93 ) 

Hegel mainly attributes external reflection or intellectual reflection to “old metaphysics” or “intellectual metaphysics”, that is, “metaphysics before Kant”, because they most typically apply finite intellectual concepts to objects. “But this is only an external reflection on the object, because the definition or predicate used to refer to the object is my own ready-made representation, which is only externally added to the object.” ( Hegel, 1980 , p. 98 ) Although Hegel regards intellectual metaphysics as an earlier link in “the attitude of thought towards objectivity”, and although other links – empiricism, critical philosophy, direct knowledge, etc. – have also been proposed and discussed, Hegel knows that this old metaphysics is only something of the past in terms of the history of philosophy; “as far as it is concerned, that is, the grasp of rational objects from the perspective of abstract reason, it still generally always appears.” ( Hegel, Ibid., p. 95 )

This metaphysics, which is always present in general, belongs to a more general ideology. It has not been truly superseded by the appearance of the other links mentioned above. Rather, the lack of principle height in these links themselves makes them stagnate while making only some partial progress: they are unable to overcome the old metaphysics, but on the contrary, due to their own stagnation, they either return to intellectual metaphysics at the key points of ontology, or partially remain in external opposition with it.

Kant’s philosophy is particularly worth mentioning here. The greatness of Kant philosophy does not need to be listed here; in fact, no one has revealed the greatness of Kant’s philosophy more thoroughly and accurately than Hegel; because and only because Hegel stands on a higher foothold, according to Heidegger, the highest and impossible foothold of modern metaphysics or general metaphysics. ( See Heidegger, 2018a , pp . 3-4 )

 Therefore, this higher standpoint of Hegel on the one hand, actively appropriates the main achievements of Kant’s philosophy – first of all, the “pure activity” of self-consciousness – and on the other hand, it points out the subjectivism of Kant’s philosophy as “subjective idealism” on the basis of ontology.

Kant leads the essentiality of knowledge back to self-consciousness, and in the pure activity of this subject, the independence and autonomy of self-consciousness are fully achieved, and the universal necessity of our knowledge ( objectivity in the sense of Kant ) is also established a priori in the origin of essence. However, it is from Hegel’s higher point of view that Kant’s so-called objectivity of thinking is still only subjective. Hegel  wrote: “Because, according to Kant, although thought has the categories of universality and necessity, it is only our thought, and there is an insurmountable gap between it and the thing-in-itself. On the contrary, the true objectivity of thought should be: thought is not only our thought, but also the thing itself (ansich) , or the essence of objective things…” ( Hegel, 1980 , p . 120 ) This means: for Kant, the universal necessity as objectivity all comes from the self, and it is the a priori unity of self-consciousness that constitutes the specific basis of intellectual concepts or thinking categories; since the unity of self-consciousness does not belong to the object itself outside of knowledge, first, the essentiality of our knowledge lies only in the “pure activity” of self-consciousness; second, our knowledge is essentially impossible to reach the thing itself.

When such thoughts gave unprecedented positive impetus to German philosophy and made it great, the stagnant “subjective idealism” began to decompose itself in a certain sense of the so-called “effect history” (Wirkungsgeschichte) of hermeneutics , and returned to the track of intellectual metaphysics at many key points. The thing that fits this track most widely is what Hegel said in Section 52 of “Small Logic” as “abstract thinking”, which is often called “rationality” but was actually just “thoroughly abstract thinking”. ( Hegel, 1980 , p. 141 ) 

This way of thinking means that reason has nothing else except the “formal unity” required to simplify and systematize experience. If we compare this to Kant’s philosophy, the result is that it ultimately tends to be a formalism that is empty of reason: just as theoretical reason is actually reduced to abstract identity and abandons its unconditionality, the law based on which practical reason itself legislates is also just the abstract identity of reason, “so Kant’s practical reason has not gone beyond the final view of theoretical reason – formalism” ( Hegel, ibid., pp. 142 , 143 ) . If we see from this that this stagnant “subjective idealism” can return to or even turn around to support previous metaphysics in many ways ( we clearly remember: it was Kant who destroyed the dogmatism of intellectual metaphysics ) , then Hegel’s criticism of “reflective philosophy” (external reflection) is not so much directed at Kant in particular, but more broadly at various forms of subjectivism and formalism – whether it belongs to intellectual metaphysics, empiricism or critical philosophy. Therefore, for example, in terms of theory, when talking about the “critical philosophy” that regards ignorance of truth as conscience, Hegel said: “This imaginary knowledge even calls itself philosophy. There is no doctrine that is most popular and easiest to accept for people with shallow knowledge and shallow character.” ( Hegel, Ibid., p. 34 ) In the field of practice, Hegel especially criticized those “people who are accustomed to using reason”: they always like to separate ideas from reality in order to talk about pure “should” ( especially like to talk about “should” in the political field ) , “the world seems to be waiting for their wisdom, so as to learn from them what is right, but what the world has not achieved” ( Hegel, Ibid., pp. 44-45 ) .

It can be seen from this that Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s philosophy is actually a battle of a larger battle, and this larger battle is aimed at the broad “philosophy of reflection” and the essence of the subjectivism – formalism of external reflection.

This situation is very prominently reflected in the preface to “Phenomenology of Spirit”. For example, although Hegel affirms “Kant’s triad” in a certain sense, Hegel still calls it a concept-less “triad” or a lifeless “schema”; this is a definite formalism, and this formalism is no different from the old metaphysics in terms of its “style” – both of them only list the objects from ordinary intuition or thought determination in the schema and make them only externally applied. But even if this external and empty application of the schema ( or formula ) is called “construction”, this formalism is essentially no different from any formalism. ( See Hegel, 1979 , pp. 32-33 ) 

Therefore, Hegel is no longer targeting a certain philosophy or philosopher here, but instead emphasizes attributing formal intellect or empty reason to external, that is, non-scientific knowledge. The method that corresponds to this external knowledge is purely formal: “This method, since it affixes certain provisions of the universal schema to all things in heaven and on earth, all natural and spiritual forms, and arranges them in this way, can only produce a clear report on the organic organization of the universe, that is, a diagram…” ( Hegel, 1979 , p . 34 ) 

In this sense, the methodological change required by Hegel is not to overcome a certain formal method, but to try to liberate “science” from all formal methods; since the sum and essence of this formal method is quite specifically named “metaphysics”, what will be developed here is the struggle between the so-called “dialectics” and “metaphysics” in general, or in almost the same sense, the struggle between “philosophy” and “intellectual reflection” – philosophy “is a protracted war with intellectual reflection.” ( Quoted from Heidegger, 2000 , p. 519 )

At the beginning of this struggle, critical philosophy has made a great contribution, which Hegel called “negative contribution”. ( See Hegel, 1980 , pp. 150-151 ) Because critical philosophy shows that the categories of the intellect belong to the scope of finiteness, so the knowledge that operates within these categories cannot reach the things in themselves – that is, it is impossible to reach the truth; since the categories of the intellect belong only to self-consciousness, that is, subjective thinking, our knowledge can only be the knowledge of phenomena, and the things in themselves will always remain on the “other side” of knowledge.

 Hegel would certainly agree that in such a knowledge construction framework, just as the categories of the intellect cannot grasp the objects of reason, the intellectual science or the intellectual method cannot reach the things in themselves at all. However, since philosophy, that is, the knowledge of true science, aims at truth, it must comprehensively and decisively transcend the entire field of activity and basic system of intellectual knowledge, and the name of this transcendental methodology is dialectics. If Hegel demands the revival of dialectics in this sense, then this methodological transcendence must also be an ontological “reversal”; because this ontological reversal is unnecessary only if dialectics remains within the scope of formal method, that is, within the scope of the broad intellectual metaphysical system. The ontological issue here fundamentally involves the possibility of philosophy and scientific knowledge reaching the truth, and thus involves the relationship between the so-called “phenomenon” and “things in themselves.”

Heidegger summarized the situation here very succinctly: “Kant’s view is that if or because what we experience is a phenomenon, the object of our cognition is a simple phenomenon. Hegel said the opposite: if what is first accessible to us is a phenomenon, then our real object must be something supersensible. If the phenomenal characteristics of the objectivity of consciousness are set, then the knowability of the thing in itself or the supersensible world is precisely confirmed in principle.” ( Heidegger, 2018b , p . 134 ) Therefore, for Hegel, “phenomenon” becomes a basic speculative concept, and the special dialectical characteristic of “phenomenon” lies in that phenomenon is such a manifestation, a manifestation of something different from itself – something supersensible, that is, the thing in itself. In short, phenomenon is the phenomenon of the thing itself.

It is obvious that this relationship between phenomenon and thing-in-itself is a dialectical connection, or in other words, a dialectic between phenomenon and thing-in-itself. Since the activities and categories confined to self-consciousness, that is, subjective thought, can only be limited to pure phenomena ( we have seen that this is what Kant and Hegel agree on ) , it is also obvious that for Hegel, unless the activities and concepts of thought can decisively transcend pure subjective self-consciousness, and unless such transcendence is truly guaranteed and demonstrated on an ontological basis, our knowledge can only fundamentally reach the thing-in-itself ( that is, gain the truth ) .

In the Phenomenology of Spirit, which Marx called “the true birthplace and secret of Hegel’s philosophy”, the dialectics of phenomenon and thing-in-itself unfolds on the theme of the science of experience of consciousness, and its ontological basis appears at the beginning of the book: ” [1. The concept of the Absolute as subject ] In my opinion – the correctness of this view can only be proved by the statement of the system itself – the key to all problems lies in: not only understanding and expressing the real thing or truth as entity, but also understanding and expressing it as subject.” ( Hegel, 1979 , p . 10 ) 

If, as Marx said, the “final result” of Hegel’s Phenomenology is dialectics, that is, negativity as the driving principle and creative principle ( see Volume 3 of The Complete Works of Marx and Engels , pp. 319-320 ) , then this entire negative dialectics is based on the ontological foundation of “entity as subject”.

The foundation of this ontology implies such a “trinity”: (1) Spinoza’s “substance”, which is called “nature”, “God”, “self-cause”, “all”, etc., in short: the absolute; (2) Kant and Fichte’s “self-consciousness” or “self”, which is called “pure activity” or “activity itself”, in short: pure spontaneity or creativity; (3) The synthesis of the above two, that is, the self-activity of the absolute, or the absolute with infinite spontaneity or creativity, is mainly called “absolute spirit” or simply “absolute”. ( See “Collected Works of Marx and Engels” , Volume 2 , page 177 ) Compared with Spinoza’s “substance”, Hegel grasps absolute spirit as an active, free, and conceptual entity.

Only on such an ontological basis is the dialectic of phenomenon and thing-in-itself possible. If the knowledge of phenomenon is limited, then the knowledge of thing-in-itself is infinite. Phenomenology maintains the process of reaching infinite knowledge by negating limited knowledge in the concept of “absolute knowledge”. Absolute knowledge means that all finite things ( sensual, phenomenal, intellectual or purely formal ) are negated, thereby defining the truth of existence with its infinity, that is, making the supersensible thing, that is, the thing-in-itself, accessible.

Although Heidegger tried to argue with Hegel on this ontological point, in the basic pattern of modern metaphysics, as long as the position of “truth” – that is, the position of true philosophy – is to be maintained, the ontological position of the absolute – in Hegel, the position of the absolute’s self-activity – is indispensable. Just as Hegel pointed out a contradiction in the modern philosophical situation when Hegel talked about “objective thought”, that is, the contradiction between thought and objectivity; or the “turning point of modern philosophical interest” specially developed by Kant, that is, the contradiction between thought and things (Sache) ; or more generally speaking, the contradiction between thinking and existence. ( See Hegel, 1980 , pp. 93 , 77 ; 1978 , pp. 5-6 ) Since truth lies in the ability of thought to reach the thing itself, and since the possibility of such access lies only in the ontological unity or “reconciliation” of the above two, then the position of the absolute is absolutely necessary for speculative dialectics.

In Hegel’s view, the true objectivity of thought lies in the fact that thought is not only “our thought” but also “the thing itself (an sich) “. Only when thought is grasped absolutely can “our thought” truly reach “the thing itself”. As Gadamer said, German idealism even coined the term “philosophy of identity” to explain this situation; Gadamer wrote: “In my opinion, the advantage of classical metaphysics lies in the fact that from the very beginning it transcends the dualism of subjectivity and will on the one hand and objects and things-in-themselves on the other, because it believes that there is a predetermined harmony between them.” ( Gadamer, 1994 , p. 75 ) Speculative dialectics unfolds and realizes this predetermined harmony on the ontological basis of the self-activity of the absolute. In Heidegger’s words, it has been predetermined from the beginning of “transcendence” ( Absolvenz ) . ( See Heidegger, 2018b , p . 139 )

However, such an ontological foundation of Hegel’s philosophy immediately means that dialectics is directly the self-activity of the Absolute Subject ( i.e., the Subject – Substance ) , and therefore also immediately means that dialectics completely changes the previous general concept of “method” and cannot be any formal method at all. Because since dialectics is the self-activity of the Absolute such as the Substance – Subject, it is absolutely impossible to impose any form on its course from the outside. The Absolute has no “outside”, and it is self-contradictory to say that formal methods are imposed on it from the outside; and as long as formal methods are imposed on it from the outside, it can no longer “self-activate”. Because in this way, it seems that the Substance – Subject was previously just a pile of simple “material”, and it was only because a certain form that always seems to be “dialectical” was imposed on it that it could begin to act – here it is not the Absolute and its self-activity, but precisely their opposite. Hegel has said enough and clearly about this. For example, as truth, the “Absolute” is essentially a result; because by its nature, it is reality, subject, “self-formation”. For another example, the real concept is “the object’s own self”, so the concept’s “self-movement” is both the formation movement of this “self” presenting as an object and the movement of taking back the concept’s definition into itself. ( See Hegel, 1979 , pp. 12 , 14 ) 

Finally, when talking about the truth of propositions, Hegel said: “Admittedly, propositions should express truth, but truth is essentially the subject; as a subject, truth is nothing more than dialectical movement, nothing more than the process of producing itself, developing itself and returning to itself.” ( Hegel, 1979 , p. 44 ) 

In this sense, dialectics is the self-activity process of the absolute subject. As long as there is no self-activity of this real subject, there is no dialectics at all. Heidegger’s analysis is correct: “Hegel also calls ‘speculative dialectics’ simply ‘method’. By the name of ‘method’, it neither refers to a representational tool nor merely to a special way of philosophical inquiry. ‘Method’ is the most internal movement of subjectivity, the ‘soul of existence’, and the production process by which the organization of the reality of the absolute as a whole functions.” ( Heidegger, 2000 , p. 511 ) “Thinking in this way, speculation is the full positive meaning of the ‘dialectic’ mentioned here: not a priori limited or even polemical way of thinking, but the reflection and unity of the opposites of the process of the spirit itself.” (Heidegger Ibid . p. 512)

It is also because of such an ontological foundation of dialectics that the substantial content itself is unprecedentedly required and called into philosophy, which especially shows the fundamental fallacy of understanding dialectics as a formal method. The so-called “substantial content” is not the kind of content that is generally distinguished from the form, as if it is just a simple “material” or a “diversity” that is merely defined by the form; the substantial content is the unfolding process of the self-activity of the “substance – subject”, the concrete and real manifestation of this process, and the “living essence of things” that is obliterated by the formalism of the intellect or reason. It is in this sense that Hegel criticizes the formalism of external reflection, and it is also in this sense that he grasps the substantial content of dialectics itself – “the inner content of things”. In such a dialectical perspective, “… knowledge is not an activity that treats the content as an alien, nor is it a reflection that goes out of the content and returns to itself; science is not an idealism that replaces the dogmatism of assertion with a dogmatism that provides guarantees or is sure of itself, but rather, because knowledge sees or allows the content to return to its inherent inner nature, the activity of knowledge is both a penetration into the content and a return to itself…” ( Hegel, 1979 , p. 37 ) As for such substantial content itself, it is sufficient for us to mention the extremely rich and vivid social – historical content in “Phenomenology”, “Philosophy of Law” or “Philosophy of History”, etc.

Therefore, when Hegel summarized the basic nature of his dialectics ( as a “scientific method” ) on the basis of “logical necessity” , Hegel particularly highlighted the following two points: (1) the method is not separated from the content; (2) it determines its own rhythm by itself. ( See Hegel, 1979 , p. 39 ) 

These two points fundamentally point to the ontological basis of dialectics, that is, the self-activity of the absolute subject. Because only when dialectics is the self-activity of this subject can it determine its own rhythm by itself, and it can also make itself as a method directly reflected in the process of the unfolding of the substantial content. In this regard, Gadamer is right: “Hegel once criticized the concept of method that regards itself as a kind of action different from things with the concept of ‘external reflection’ (Reflexion) . The real method is the action of things themselves.” ( Gadamer, 1999 , p. 592 ) – Such a methodological concept is undoubtedly most deeply rooted in its ontological basis. However, such an ontological foundation began to become precarious shortly after Hegel’s death.

  The disintegration of Hegel’s philosophy

The disintegration of Hegel’s philosophy first began with the absolute subject ( entity – self-consciousness ) , followed by Feuerbach’s attack, which was directed at the “last rational pillar” of theology, that is, the absolute of speculative philosophy – God.

In line with classical metaphysics, Hegel’s philosophy had a definite theological origin in ontology. Just as his concept of truth ( the unity of knowledge and object ) is based on a theological unity, and just as the idea of ​​objective spirit comes from the concept of Pneuma or the Holy Spirit in the New Testament, the “essence of God” as spirit, for Hegel, “is ultimately presented in a specific Christian God consciousness.” ( Heidegger, 2018b , p . 123 ; see Gadamer, 1994 , pp. 75 , 113 )

However, when Hegel ‘s philosophy – first of all its ontological foundation – was attacked as “speculative theology”, the collapse of the absolute spirit meant the advent of a new era; and the essential characteristics of this era were philosophically described in particular through Nietzsche’s words “God is dead”: the supersensible world has decayed, collapsed, and is no longer binding. Or, to use Lowith’s expressive words, the new era consciousness can no longer promise to ride on the high horse of the absolute spirit to leap over all finite things and mediate all their contradictions and oppositions, as Hegel did.

When Hegel’s philosophy could no longer really stand on an ontological basis, could the dialectic, which had its roots in Greek philosophy and was revived by German classical philosophy, survive and be preserved? The answer is: it was either rejected ( which is the usual case ) or preserved; in the latter case, it was either preserved formally ( which is the usual case ) or substantially preserved. In any case, however, the dialectic was preserved in Marx, and it was preserved substantially; further, and most importantly: unless the ontological basis of the dialectic was revolutionary reconstructed, the dialectic could not be preserved substantially in the absence of God ( the Absolute ) . 

Marx’s statement in 1872 made the above situation very clear: first, Marx openly admitted that he was a student of the great thinker Hegel on the subject of dialectics; second, “My dialectical method is fundamentally not only different from Hegel’s dialectical method, but also diametrically opposed to it.” ( Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 2 , pp . 111-112 ) Just as the former means the demand for the essential retention of dialectics, the latter highlights the change in the ontological basis that makes such essential retention possible.

However, since the ontological foundation of Marx’s dialectics has long remained in obscurity, this dialectics, if not being removed as a wart, is often not grasped in essence, but is understood only as a simple form, that is, the dialectics has once again degenerated into the formal method that it originally wanted to overcome fundamentally. As we have pointed out above, the method of pure form or scientific methodologicalism is completely limited to the scope of abstract reason and empty intellectuality, and therefore, in its application that is only suitable for external reflection, it is most likely to fall into subjectivism and contentless sophistry. If someone imposes the “formula” of dialectics a priori on any content, just like the “formula” of historical materialism, then will not the dialectics immediately turn into its opposite?

Therefore, any attempt to understand and use dialectics as a formal method is to disintegrate dialectics and make its meaning and reason for existence disappear without a trace.

Due to the failure to truly understand the ontological basis of Marx’s dialectics, and more importantly due to the dominance of modern ideology and its dominant knowledge style ( intellectual science ) , dialectics has inevitably degenerated into the already dead “schema” of formal methods and their lifeless regulations. Just as Engels once accused the official Hegelian school of only learning the simplest techniques ( stereotyped formulas and vocabulary quotations ) from their teacher’s dialectics and “applying them everywhere” ( see “Selected Works of Marx and Engels” , Volume 2 , page 40 ) .

 Marx ridiculed Proudhon’s cartoon-like – equally formalistic – vilification of dialectics; and Heidegger’s later criticism of dialectics also focused on its abstract formalization: when talking about the basic orientation of dialectics, Heidegger said: “A formalistic decision is not allowed here… Empty methodological conceptions destroy science.” ( Heidegger, 2016 , page 57 ) It is in this situation that dialectics seems to have become a simple skill. As long as one studies it for one year, one can talk about everything; “People should examine the sophistry models that are deliberately pursued today, such as form – content, rationality – irrationality, finite – infinite, mediation – non-mediation, subject – object.” ( Ibid., p. 59 ) Phenomenology, which initially attempted to fundamentally oppose the above-mentioned sophistry model, also encountered the heavy pressure of formalism, so much so that Heidegger talked about Husserl’s students in 1913 who spent a whole semester arguing about how a mailbox appeared, and angrily said: “If this is philosophy, then I am all for dialectics.” ( Heidegger, Ibid., p. 128 ) The reason why we cite such examples here is nothing more than to show: what is the ideological atmosphere and knowledge orientation in which Marx’s dialectics is understood as a formal method, so as to identify the key point of how the true meaning of dialectics can break out of the situation dominated by formalism. In fact, such a situation has existed for a long time. Hegel has already widely criticized the formalist illusion that reduces the “organic organization of science” to a diagram, and Heidegger even talked about in 1969 that people today understand “theory” as a kind of program (Programmierung) , that is, the display, predetermination and notification of a formal plan – but this formalism is like considering the program arrangement of a concert as a theory of music. ( See “Minutes of the Three-Day Discussion Class on Late Heidegger” ) 

Just as Hegel, Marx, Heidegger and other great philosophers tried to truly transcend this long-standing intellectual emptiness and academic poverty and powerlessness, in order to revitalize thought and strongly promote the positive progress of academia as a whole, I think we are actually still facing the same philosophical task today.

Understanding Marx’s dialectics as a purely formal method, on the one hand, makes the clarification of its ontological foundation completely unnecessary and thus this task is postponed for a long time – because as a formal method, there is no real difference between Marx and Hegel. Just as this method can be formally separated from a specific ontological foundation, it can also be formally placed on any ontological foundation; on the other hand, dialectic as a formal method, its laws, categories, institutions, etc., immediately return disastrously to the essence of intellectual metaphysics and immediately expose their own subjectivism in the use of its unstoppable external reflection; because here there is neither the self-activity of the real subject nor the generation of substantial content in the activity, but only: abstract forms or principles are a priori imposed on any content ( as pure material ) . The result is that the formal method – which has the same essence as the formalism of intellectual reflection – is the real enemy of dialectics and the fatal source that causes dialectics to collapse and decompose into anti-dialectical factors. The question that arises from this is: where the ontological basis of Hegel’s dialectics, namely the Absolute – God ( substance – subject ) , has been eliminated as a mystified illusion of speculative theology, is there a possibility for dialectics to refuse to become a formal method? What is the ontological basis that allows dialectics to persist in substance? On such an ontological basis, what is the real subject that is self-active and allows substantial content to unfold on its own?

   Ontological foundation of Marx’s dialectics

Obviously, it is through these questions that the ontological foundation of Marx’s dialectics begins to become highly explorable and worth exploring. In order to get to the core of the issues in this short essay as quickly as possible, we can only briefly list the necessary and decisive steps in the history of thought as follows: (1) Marx’s criticism of Hegel’s dialectics – which essentially goes beyond Feuerbach’s criticism – began with the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. There, Marx was no longer satisfied with Feuerbach’s view of dialectics, the negation of negation, as “merely a contradiction of philosophy with itself”, but grasped it as such an important philosophical event: Hegel “found an abstract, logical, and speculative expression for the historical movement”. ( Volume 3 of “Collected Works of Marx and Engels” , pp. 315-316 ) 

 This history (of Hegel) is certainly not “real history as a premise of man”, but it is real history covered by speculative mystification. Real history is not sacred history and its manifestation in temporality ( the “theodicy” in Hegel’s “Philosophy of History” ) , but real human history. This judgment is consistent with the statement in Engels’ The Holy Family, which was written almost at the same time: the absolute spirit, which speculatively synthesizes Spinoza’s “substance” and Fichte’s “ego”, that is, the entity – subject of self-activity, is nothing but “metaphysically disguised…real man or real humanity”. ( See Volume 2 of The Complete Works of Marx and Engels , p. 177 ) 

In a word, the secret of speculative dialectics is history, and therefore its truth is the history of real man. (2) Since Hegel’s dialectics means the history of real man metaphysically disguised, only when the metaphysical disguise of “real man” is stripped off at the same time can “real history” be truly revealed, and thus the truth of speculative dialectics – real man and his real history – can be revealed and confront us.

Here, the core essence of speculative dialectics, namely negativity, is critically grasped as “labor”, just as the self-activity of the absolute is critically grasped as “objective activity” on the same plane. ( See Volume 3 of The Complete Works of Marx and Engels , page 324 ) 

“Thus, the greatness of Hegel’s Phenomenology and its final result – dialectics, negativity as the driving principle and creative principle – lies first in the fact that Hegel regards the self-production of man as a process, objectification as de-objectification, as externalization and the transcendence of this externalization; thus, Hegel has grasped the essence of labor and understands objective man, the real and therefore true man, as the result of his own labor.” ( Ibid., pages 319-320 ) 

About 100 years later, Heidegger, who tried to think deeply about “negativity” and argued with Hegel, said almost the same thing: “The metaphysical essence of the new era of labor is also thought of in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit as the process by which unconditional production arranges itself, that is, the process of objectifying real things through man who experiences it as subjectivity.” ( Volume 1 of The Selected Works of Heidegger, pages 383-384 )

(3) This inevitably leads to a question of consciousness ( Unless this critique achieves its ultimate goal, the above -mentioned intentions of “ reversal ” will remain unrealized. If the concept of “objective activity” in Marx’s Paris Manuscripts has already carried out this work and prepared it for the decisive argument in the subsequent journey, then when “objective activity” is expressed as “practice” and made into the principle of activity of real history – neither the “pure activity” of self-consciousness nor the “self-activity” of the absolute subject – the ontological critique of “consciousness” is most essentially expressed in the following two concise propositions: “Consciousness [das Bewusstsein] can only be conscious existence [das bewusste Sein] at any time , and the existence of people is their real life process.” ( “Selected Works of Marx and Engels” Volume 1 , page 72 ) 

The other proposition is: “It is not people’s consciousness that determines their existence, but on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness.” ( “Selected Works of Marx and Engels” Volume 2 , page 32 ) Nothing can show more clearly than these two propositions: they are ontological propositions, an ontological critique of “consciousness”, the starting point of modern metaphysics. The essence of these two propositions is nothing more than saying that the essential nature of consciousness lies in people’s real life process; and this life process is both the development and confirmation of human social existence and the process of determining the essence of consciousness as social existence. ① If Gadamer correctly understood Heidegger’s early main work as an ontological critique of the “existence” presupposed by “consciousness” [ “He found a slogan for his ontological critique of consciousness with the following assertion, that is, Dasein is ‘being-in-the-world’.” ( Gadamer, 1994 , p. 118 )] , and Heidegger did once again highlight the “existence” problem here, that is, the ontological problem, by splitting the word “consciousness” as (Bewusst-sein) , then this only shows that the ontological critique of modern metaphysics was not yet completed at that time, and philosophy that progressed along the path of phenomenology – hermeneutics could not but face the same task of ontological critique.

Although the above points are far from exhaustive ( and even contain important omissions ) , they can still serve to outline the ontological basis of Marx’s dialectics and its theoretical consequences. (1) Since the truth of speculative dialectics, stripped of its mysterious cloak, is nothing but real history, and since Marx’s theory of real history is the so-called “materialist conception of history”, then for Marx, there can be no dialectics outside of materialist conception of history: Marx’s dialectics is ( ! ) materialist conception of history. It is for this reason that Engels called Hegel’s grand historical principle both “dialectics” and “historical conception”; and Engels said, “This epoch-making historical conception is the direct theoretical premise of the new materialist viewpoint, and alone provides a starting point for the logical method.” ( Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 2 , page 42 ) 

 Marx’s ontological critique of Hegel’s dialectics places the truth of dialectics in its identity with the materialist conception of history: if the materialist conception of history is not also dialectics, its basic viewpoints or principles will immediately degenerate into abstract dogmas or formulas – for which it is sufficient to apply external reflection alone; and if dialectics is not also historical materialism, then everything that is separated from or beyond “real history” will either be mystified again into “super-historical” speculation, or will directly degenerate into the abstract shell of a purely formal method. 

(2) Since real history is the history of real people, and since the reality of people is essentially determined by social existence, Marx’s dialectic – as materialist historical conception – is entirely based on the production and reproduction of social life, and is at the same time the revelation and development of the substantial content of this social life. The point here is not that “single people” ( atomic individuals ) constitute society, but on the contrary, that social relations constitute the real essence of people; and that only at a certain historical stage, that is, in the era of the most developed social relations so far, does the view of the isolated individual come into being. “Man is the most genuine political animal, not only a gregarious animal, but also an animal that can be independent only in society.” (Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Volume 2 , page 2 ) 

 (3) Since the essential nature of consciousness does not come from the self-activity of the absolute, but from the real life process of people, and since the real life process of people is a limited and temporal field according to Hegel’s standards, Marx’s dialectics – as a materialist conception of history – must refuse to become a speculative logic in its ontological position, or “God – logic” or “existence – God – logic” according to Heidegger ( see Selected Works of Heidegger, Vol. 2, pp. 828-829 , 833 ) , but inevitably points to and requires a “historical science”. We have seen this term in The German Ideology, and the meaning of the word “science” here is obviously very different from Hegel’s usage ( i.e., rising to “absolute knowledge” ) , and it is precisely in order to decisively distinguish it from this speculative usage that Marx specifically calls this historical science “real empirical science”. ( See Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1 , p. 73 ; p. 66 , note ② ) 

In this sense, Marx’s dialectics should be identified in its essence – on its ontological basis – as “dialectics – materialist conception of history – historical science”, and the loss of any link can only mean the actual disintegration of dialectics; and for Hegel, just as Hegel often sent sensory reality to annotations in his writings, “Philosophy of Law” or “Philosophy of History” are “applied logic”. Heidegger wrote: Although Hegel correctly explained beings and direct representations as abstract or one-sided, “his comprehensive, provided, and real things are ( obviously ) still only an unconditional defense of abstract things – the most abstract things – because the truth of existence is not questioned or cannot be questioned at all.” ( Heidegger , 2018a , p . 49 ) On this point, both Marx and Engels, as well as Lukacs and Gadamer, have made quite similar comments.

The ontological investigation of Marx’s dialectics leads us to the conclusion that Marx’s dialectics can only be: dialectics – historical materialism – historical science; in other words, historical materialism – historical science is the lifeline, and “categorical imperative” or basic mode of existence of this dialectics. Isn’t it true that Marx’s dialectics has always and only been active and developed in this way? If we see living dialectics in “Capital” or “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte”, etc., it is precisely because they are the genius works of “dialectics – historical materialism – historical science”.

After abandoning the ontological basis of speculative dialectics, only this dialectics – historical materialism – historical science can ontologically retain the real subject of the actor and its substantial content, thus avoiding it from falling back into the formal method and its external reflection. Such an “active subject” is very clearly identified in the “Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy” and is identified as the ontological premise of “scientifically correct method” and “theoretical method” of “any historical science or social science” ( Selected Works of Marx and Engels , Volume 2 , pp. 18-19 ) , although this fundamental point has been almost completely misunderstood or forgotten.

This kind of active subject that enables dialectics to maintain itself is called “real subject” or simply “subject” by Marx. As long as we are slightly familiar with the terminology of German classical philosophy, we know that real subject or subject means “self-active” and “action determiner”. But in Marx, is such a real subject still the “entity – subject” that Hegel regards as the absolute?

No, on the contrary, Hegel’s mystification is the result of understanding “reality” as self-synthesis, self-deepening and self-moving thinking, while Marx’s real subject is a specific “society” with substantial content. We generally call such a society the “object” of science, but such an object is a self-active “real subject”; that is to say, it is not subject to human subjective will, nor can it be bound by any formalistic external reflection – this is the inherent meaning of the term “real subject” in Marx. “The real subject still retains its independence outside the mind; as long as this mind acts only speculatively and theoretically. Therefore, even in the theoretical method, the subject, that is, society, must always appear before the representation as a premise.” ( Marx-Engels; Ibid., p. 19 ) This statement makes it clear that the society that we regard as the object of scientific research will be presented to us by dialectics in such a way ( “appear before the representation” ) that it is presented as the self-activity of the real subject.

In Marx’s view, since the truth of Hegel’s dialectics is grasped in the history of real people, and since the reality of people is grasped in social existence, it is natural that the ontological basis of Marx’s philosophy requires that the “real subject” of dialectics be established as “society” and that history be described in the process of “society’s” self-activity. Here, we can clearly see the direct identity of dialectics and historical materialism. However, it must be emphasized here that the “real subject” of Marx’s dialectics is not an abstract society, not an abstract stipulation or intellectual category about society, but a real society, that is, a specific, existing, and substantial society. For example, modern bourgeois society, French society in the era of Napoleon, and Chinese society between the Qin and Han dynasties or Chinese society since 1840 are such societies as real subjects. “In studying the development of economic categories, as in studying any historical or social science, we must always bear in mind that the subject – here modern bourgeois society – is given, both in reality and in the mind; that the categories therefore express the form of existence, the determination of existence, and often only a particular aspect of this definite society, of this subject; and that, therefore, this definite society does not begin to exist scientifically only when we talk about it as such a society.” ( Marx-Engels; Ibid., p. 24 ) Since a specific society with substantial content is the object of what is generally called historical science or social science, and since dialectics essentially requires in-depth study of the substantial content of the self-activity of the real subject, then dialectics as a materialist conception of history must essentially require itself to become a “historical science” at the same time.

The specific society with substantial content is generally regarded as the “object” of intellectual science, while Marx’s dialectic grasps such “object” as “subject” or “real subject” at the same time. What is the difference between these two approaches?

The decisive methodological difference lies in that the former regards the given society as a large amount of amorphous and simple “material”, a “multiplicity” on which abstract principles, laws or categories, etc. can be imposed a priori; in this case, the “real subject” is no longer a subject, it can neither act on its own nor “appear before the appearance” as a premise, that is, it is completely immersed in the formalistic darkness of intellectual reflection. The latter, on the other hand, means methodologically that the given society is a real subject of self-activity, and therefore, while abandoning the external reflection and subjectivism of abstract principles, laws or categories, etc., dialectics requires the development of all its concrete, rich, substantial content in the self-activity of this subject, just as it requires the reproduction of the comprehensive concretization of this substantial content in scientific narrative. From this we can see again that understanding Marx’s dialectics as a formal method and applying external reflection to the principles, laws, categories, etc. of dialectics can only mean the restoration of formalism and subjectivism, and the actual disintegration of dialectics.

When Heidegger critically compared dialectics and phenomenology, Heidegger specifically targeted the formalist dialectics ( partly derived from Hegel’s own speculation ) : “… the question of the relationship between dialectics and phenomenology must be determined relative to the object of philosophy, or more precisely, in the problem of the concrete formation of this object and the basic task of determining it. But dialectics puts itself aside from this task; it cannot tolerate such a thing as remaining in the object and letting it predetermine the way and limit of grasping this object according to the object itself.” ( Heidegger, 2016 , pp. 59-60 )

The discussion of the ontological basis of Marx’s dialectics leads us to two simple basic conclusions: (1) Marx’s dialectics cannot be any formal method at all, and the disintegration of Hegel’s speculative theology does not mean that dialectics can be placed in the external reflection of formalism. (2) The ontological basis of Marx’s dialectics is also based on – although contrary to Hegel – the self-activity of the real subject, and it is precisely because of this that it manifests itself as “dialectics – materialist conception of history – historical science.” These two basic conclusions have a very broad space for discussion and development, and in such a space for discussion, the questions will be answered much more clearly and clearly; but within the scope of the subject of this article, we can only be satisfied with the following preliminary suggestions that need to be further developed.

First, the true exposition of Marx’s dialectics will deal a devastating blow to the formalism ( or dogmatism ) that adheres to external reflection, whether or not in the name of Marx ; and, as Hegel once pointed out, will reveal the external reflection that is still prevalent today as subjectivism and modern sophistry, as “the pathological manifestation of the weak nature of romanticism”.

For Marx, the true dialectical understanding will never allow him to set the German path as a reappearance of the Anglo – French path ( on the contrary, the possibility of the German path lies in its impossibility of following the French path ) ( see Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1 , pp. 12-14 ) , nor will he abstractly imagine the Russian path as a repetition of the general mode of Western European capitalism ( on the contrary, the Letter to Zasulich ridiculed this idea as the mindless slaves of the literary world of the “new pillars of society” ) ( see Selected Works of Marx and Engels , Vol. 3 , pp . 766 , 773 ) , because these established societies are real subjects of self-activity.

However, as long as dialectics is rejected or understood as a mere formal method, it will immediately become a feast of abstract reason and external reflection, which means that the substantial content of the object itself disappears without a trace. In this way, applying theoretical principles to any object, as Engels said, is simpler than solving a linear equation. In China’s academic circles, are there not enough such assumptions and inferences that are lower than linear equations, such external reflections that cancel the self-activity of the real subject? And the presuppositions of such external reflections ( Chinese society will become Western society, and thus Chinese law, morality, state system, etc. will be determined by the essence of Western society ) , whether openly or covertly ( in fact, most of them are completely unconscious ) , don’t they emerge almost everywhere?

Second, since the real subject of Marx’s dialectics means a specific society with substantial content, and since the substantial content of this society cannot ontologically come from the “heaven” of logic ( the self-activity of the absolute spirit sets up differences and transcends differences ) , then the substantial content that unfolds itself can only come from the “historical science” that is essentially related to the materialist conception of history – it is actually one and the same – ( therefore it cannot be any kind of intellectual science ) .

It is in this sense that when Marx first created the materialist conception of history, Marx understood its general principles as a kind of scientific abstraction, “these abstractions themselves have no value apart from real history” ( Selected Works of Marx and Engels , Volume 1 , page 74 ) .

It is also in this sense that Engels denounced many “friends of the materialist conception of history” – they used basic principles “as an excuse not to study history.” ( See Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 4 , p. 691 ) Chinese Marxist academic community should reflect on this: to what extent have we ever demanded that Chinese society ( whether ancient or contemporary ) or other “given societies” be studied as the self-activity of real subjects. In this regard, French sociologist Raymond Aron’s criticism of two famous contemporary Marxist philosophers is justified. Raymond Aron said: Sartre and Althusser only raised some middle school questions ( Engels would call them Kantian questions ) , that is, how Marxism is possible; they did not use the method of Capital to truly study specific societies, such as French society or European society at that time. This criticism is correct because, as mentioned above, for Marx, the dialectics rescued from Hegel exists in the materialist conception of history, and the materialist conception of history can only realize its essence in the true historical science.

Third, due to the theme and goals of this article, we have to hastily skip over some difficult problems that actually emerged in philosophy later in our discussion. Such difficult problems, as epistemological and methodological problems, or as historical and normative problems, are most fundamentally related to the collapse of Hegel’s absolute, including the “supersensible world” of traditional metaphysics. Therefore, in philosophy, mainly in Germany since the late 19th century, we can also see the great efforts to achieve ontological breakthroughs in the basic fields of philosophy and rebuild “science”. This effort seems to be parallel to Marx’s rescue of dialectics in many key points. Whether it is the “historical science” ( “value science” ) of neo-Kantianism or Dilthey’s “spiritual science” ( its English equivalent is “moral science” ) , whether it is Nietzsche’s exposure of the illusion of “self” or Heidegger’s ontological criticism of “consciousness”, whether it is the debate on the theme of phenomenology or the progress on the theme of hermeneutics, they are all inextricably linked to the ontological decline of Hegel’s dialectical “science”. Gadamer clearly expressed this connection. Gadamer called the process of establishing and promoting “philosophical hermeneutics” “between phenomenology and dialectics” ( see Gadamer, 1999 , p. 629 ) . We do not attempt to rely solely on this clue to explain Marx’s decisive transcendence of Hegel’s dialectics, but we hope to identify the philosophical difficulties and fundamental problems in it ( so some relevant citations and comparisons appear in the paper ) so that we can form a deeper understanding and analysis of the ontological basis of Marx’s dialectics. (Author’s unit: Fudan University)