War and Peace: The World is in an Era of Great Contention and a New Type of “World War” is Erupting! What should China Do?
September 2024
Authors: Wang Wen, Chen Xiuhao, Liu Jintao, Long Chen
This article analyzes and sorts out the characteristics of the new type of “world war” in the context of the “era of great contention”, reviews the valuable experience accumulated by China in foreign relations in recent years, and explores the risks brought to China by the “era of great contention” and the hidden opportunities given by the times based on China’s experience.
Editor’s Note: Four full-time researchers at the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China, Wang Wen, Chen Xiuhao, Liu Jintao, and Long Chen, published a 10,000-word article in the 9th issue of the core journal Academic Exploration in 2024 titled “Age of Great Contention: Characteristics, China’s Experience, and Recommendations for Response.”
Summary
In recent years, the world has entered a “World of Great Contention,” characterized by the highest incidence of armed and violent conflict since the end of World War II. New changes have occurred in the patterns, actors, and severity of global conflict, posing greater challenges and uncertainties to China’s external environment for development. Unlike World War I and World War II, this new “world war” is not an all-out military confrontation between two major state camps on a global scale. Instead, this new “world war” is a frequent, and prone to, and continuous armed conflict affecting the entire globe, triggered by the complex and ever-changing international situation and geopolitics.
This article analyzes and summarizes the characteristics of a new type of “world war” in this context, reviews the valuable experience China has accumulated in recent years in foreign relations, and, drawing on this experience, explores the risks and opportunities this “World of Great Contention” presents to China. Furthermore, this article offers five recommendations for China’s strategic response to this “World of Great Contention,” focusing on building a community with a shared future for mankind, leveraging public diplomacy to stabilize Sino-US relations, prioritizing preventive diplomacy with invisible regional forces, strengthening the global reach of hard power, and deepening regional and country-specific research.
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In recent years, the world has entered a period of the most military conflict since the end of World War II. These conflicts are fragmented, multi-faceted, and increasingly brutal, resembling a new “world war” in an era of great contention.
On September 21, 2021, President Xi Jinping addressed the general debate of the 76th United Nations General Assembly via video link and delivered an important speech, clearly stating that “the world has entered a new period of turbulence and change.” This is a significant assessment of the current state of affairs in this era of great contention. Against the backdrop of the accelerating transformation of a century, the world has entered a new turbulent landscape characterized by the complex interweaving of multiple severe challenges: the restructuring of the international order, frequent geopolitical conflicts, the growing climate crisis, and the eruption and accumulation of economic risks. What exactly is causing this turbulence in the world? And how can China demonstrate its advantages amidst this turbulence? These are topics of widespread concern.
What exactly is causing this turbulence in the world?
Many prominent scholars around the world have attempted to describe this volatile situation. For example, renowned American current affairs commentator Fareed Zakaria argues that conflict has become the “new normal” in the world, with the international order constantly facing threats that are difficult to resolve.
Renowned international relations theorist John Mearsheimer has argued that the multipolar world we have entered is fundamentally different from the one we experienced a decade ago. These rapid changes are having a fundamental impact on international politics, and that current conflicts around the globe are more dangerous than those during the Cold War.
Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in an interview before his death, stated that today’s world is multipolar, with a number of non-European countries emerging as potential threats and the world poised to become highly volatile.
Robert Manning, a former US State Department official and senior fellow at the Stimson Center, argues that our world is spiraling out of control and disintegrating. The simultaneous and colliding effects of unfortunate events are foreshadowing the most uncertain period since World War II.
Japanese scholar Hisashi Owada, former president of the International Court of Justice, argues that the foundations of the international order have been severely negatively impacted and the world urgently needs to get out of the chaosç
German media argues that the world is “between war and crisis”; Yehezkel Dror, the father of policy science, argues that the world today is increasingly caught in universal adversity and has entered the “VUCA” era full of volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity; Hal Brands, a strategic scholar at Johns Hopkins University in the United States, also argues that the world has once again entered an age of conflict full of amoral behavior.
To help the Chinese public more clearly understand the current chaos and turbulent changes in the world, some Chinese scholars have used the term “Age of Great Contention” to describe the current state of the world. I argue this concept warrants deeper and clearer discussion. At the same time, we must also guard against its impact on public confidence and expectations, preventing it from causing negative effects such as social chaos. With this in mind, we propose further research into this concept.
“Age of Great Contention”
This article examines the characteristics of a “World of Great Contention,” reviews the valuable experience China has accumulated in its foreign relations in recent years, and, drawing on this experience, explores the risks and hidden opportunities this presents for China. The authors argue that, in this “World of Great Contention,” China should seek new strategic opportunities, both by maintaining a distance from conflict and by creating an external environment conducive to national development. Furthermore, the author suggests that China should adhere to the overall strategy of “building high walls” with Southern countries and “stockpiling food” with Western countries, and China should avoid hegemony in global competition.
China should prioritize preventive diplomacy, establish necessary channels of communication and dialogue with various hidden local military forces, increase cooperation with the United States, strengthen its military projection capabilities, and intensify its regional and country-specific research. This will help China effectively respond to various challenges, further enhance its international status and influence, and achieve victory amidst chaos.
Part 1 Characteristics of the “Age of Great Contention”
In recent years, the number of military conflicts worldwide has continued to rise. Over the past year or so, conflicts such as those between Russia and Ukraine, Israel and Gaza, and Azerbaijan and Armenia have erupted or intensified. Civil wars and civil unrest in countries like Sudan and Ethiopia have also intensified, resulting in significant civilian casualties and displacement. According to the Uppsala Conflict Dataset (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset), the number of armed conflicts worldwide reached 137 in 2022. The United Nations also announced in January 2023 that the number of violent conflicts worldwide has reached its highest point since World War II.
Currently, a quarter of the world’s population, or approximately 2 billion people, live in areas affected by armed conflict and are forced into this new “world war,” which can be described as the most intense and brutal “era of great contention” in the nearly 80 years since the end of World War II.
Unlike World War I and World War II, this new “world war” is not an all-out military confrontation between two major state camps on a global scale. Instead, it is a frequent, prone to, and continuous armed conflict affecting the entire globe, triggered by the complex and ever-changing international situation and geopolitics. The level of participation of non-state actors has also increased sharply, and the trend of “permanence” of war poses a long-term threat to international peace. In summary, against the backdrop of the “era of great contention,” this new round of “world war” has the following major characteristics:
First, conflicts around the world are of high intensity, long duration and wide impact, all reaching the highest levels since the end of World War II.
The persistence of violent armed conflicts around the world is on the rise. Ten years ago, major conflicts ended within an average of seven years, but now they persist for at least eight to eleven years. And every year, an average of five ceasefires reignite within a year. While the First and Second World Wars had a beginning and an end, this new “world war” is increasingly experiencing a lack of end, further deteriorating the international environment.
At the same time, the scope of conflict and the resulting death toll are also increasing. Data analysis shows that the global death toll from organized violence surged 97% in 2022 compared to 2021, conservatively estimated to have risen from approximately 120,000 to 237,000 in a single year. This makes 2022 the deadliest year globally since the 1994 Rwandan genocide.
This upward trend is likely to continue as conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict worsen. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of May 2023, approximately 11.4 million people worldwide had been forcibly displaced by war, persecution, violence, and human rights violations—more than the entire population of Germany. Over half of these people were in Syria, Ukraine, and Afghanistan. This number is expected to reach 130 million by 2024, far exceeding the 60 million forcibly displaced during World War II. For example, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has already created over 5.9 million refugees, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has generated over 2 million new refugees. The Sudanese civil war, which broke out in 2023, has displaced over 10 million people, and factors of instability that worsen the situation continue to exist.
In the past two years, six military coups have occurred in Africa. Military coups in Niger, Gabon, Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso are linked to both a certain degree of strife and the waning influence of Western powers like France in their former colonies. Failed coups continue to threaten regional stability and cooperation. In Latin America, political instability and armed conflict continue to ferment in countries like Venezuela, Guatemala, and Ecuador, with clashes between regional criminal groups and state forces becoming almost a regular occurrence. Ecuador has been in a state of “internal armed conflict” since January 2024, and its security forces have arrested nearly 20,000 people nationwide. Security challenges are also present in Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is evolving, with North Korean leaders openly characterizing inter-Korean relations as “hostile.” Regions like northern Myanmar and the Philippines are potential flashpoints for conflict.
At the same time, global military spending has surged, reaching record highs both in absolute terms and in terms of growth. In 2024, the US defense budget reached $886 billion, accounting for approximately 40% of global military spending, setting a new record. France’s military spending was $49.7 billion, a 7.5% increase; Japan’s was $55.9 billion, a 16.5% increase; and Russia’s was approximately $120 billion, a whopping 68% increase.
Second, local military forces are emerging as new variables influencing the global situation.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has identified 614 non-state armed groups (NSAGs) worldwide as “of humanitarian concern,” such as Hamas in Gaza, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Approximately 60 to 80 million people live directly under their control. Unlike previous “world wars,” where states or groups of states played a central role, new “world wars” are increasingly being waged between states and non-state armed groups. These groups are highly flexible and face few constraints, allowing them to unexpectedly provoke international disputes. However, their threats are difficult to eradicate, making them long-term drivers of regional instability. If they become “proxy agents” for major powers, these armed groups can quickly access vast quantities of high-tech warfare resources, becoming a formidable obstacle in resolving regional conflicts.
At the same time, traditional conflict resolution mechanisms are at risk of complete failure. In the past decade or so, no war has been ended through a comprehensive peace agreement brokered by international actors. International multilateral governance mechanisms such as the United Nations and the G20 are dysfunctional and failing, significantly weakening the ability of parties to resolve regional conflicts through diplomatic means. Non-state armed groups exist outside existing international governance and conflict resolution mechanisms, making traditional conflict resolution methods incapable of addressing new conflict patterns. Furthermore, the inequality and irrationality of the post-Cold War international order has created an international environment characterized by a profound lack of trust. The resulting vacuum of checks and balances and power has pushed the world toward a new level of anarchy.
Third, conflicts are fragmented and multi-faceted, with increasing severity and frequent humanitarian disasters.
The conflict dynamics of this new “world war” have undergone significant changes: fragmented and multi-faceted conflicts, but as mentioned above, they are mostly between local military forces and sovereign states, increasing in severity and drawing them into the dynamics of great power play.
For example, the current Gaza conflict, while relatively narrow in scope—approximately 360 square kilometers, roughly the size of a small county town in southern China—has nevertheless been unprecedented in its ferocity. Within six months of the conflict’s inception, at least half (55.9%) of the buildings in the Gaza Strip were destroyed or damaged, 1.7 million people were displaced, only 10 of Gaza’s 36 hospitals remained operational, over 90% of schools were damaged, and over 1.1 million Palestinians faced “catastrophic” food shortages, creating an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, including famine.
The United States, Britain, and Iran have all become embroiled in the conflict, seeking their own proxy wars. The potential for war between Iran and Israel is increasing, and the spillover effects of this fragmented conflict are significant, leading to numerous, scattered exchanges of fire. The flexibility of non-state armed groups also means that national borders are no longer “hard” boundaries of war. The increased possibility of international and inter-regional movement of armed personnel also brings new challenges to the global security situation, and the emergence of multiple conflicts has become a direct reflection of the new pattern of conflict.
In Africa and Latin America, a new wave of proxy wars is expected to lead to more multifaceted and widespread small-scale armed conflicts. Armed conflict is becoming contagious in regions experiencing sociopolitical instability and inadequate governance. For many regions, long-term, sustainable peace is elusive. The current realistic goal is to manage conflict, not resolve it.
Fourth, the United States’ global leadership has declined sharply, and provoking conflicts in other countries has become its main tactic to maintain its hegemony.
In recent years, the United States’ leadership has declined dramatically. United States’ is unable to provide the primary driving force for development around the world, and it is deeply aware of the threat of substitution from emerging economies. Many American scholars and politicians argue that the post-Cold War era of “strong unipolarity” dominated by the United States is over. They see the post-Cold War “Pax Romana” as the “Roman Peace” brought about by the Roman Empire during its heyday, and the United States also brought about the “American Peace” (Pax Americana) underpinned by its hegemony. However, this “American Peace” is now gradually disintegrating, and the international order has entered a long and brutal period of transformation.
As a result, the United States has transformed from a “troublemaker” to a “troublemaker.” To maintain its hegemony, it has adopted an offshore balancing strategy, promoting binary oppositions and engaging in numerous regional conflicts. On the one hand, United States’ aims to create an image of the United States as a “leader of its peers.” On the other hand, United States uses conflicts and chaos to disrupt the normal development of emerging economies, particularly creating frequent disruptions to China’s rise.
Currently, hidden conflicts surrounding China, such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the India-Pakistan conflict, the conflict in northern Myanmar, and the conflicts in Taiwan and the South China Sea, all bear traces of US influence. “Exploiting chaos” and using military conflict to suppress the continued rise of emerging countries has been a US strategy for maintaining hegemony since the early 20th century.
Part 2 The “Era of Great Contention” and China’s Experience in Diplomatic Relations
Facing a new era of turbulence and change, China has consistently maintained a unique strategic fortitude, thereby distancing itself from the center of international disputes despite facing multiple incentives to fight. This has led to China becoming the most peaceful, socially stable, and fastest-growing major economy in nearly half a century. In the 46 years since the beginning of reform and opening up, China’s GDP has increased approximately 342 times compared to 1978. According to World Bank data, China’s GDP has grown at an average annual nominal rate of 14.5% since reform and opening up. Taking inflation into account, the average annual real growth rate has reached 9.1%, exceeding that of all other major economies, achieving the “Chinese Miracle.”
However, China cannot avoid the significant external risks inherent in this “era of great contention.” If conflicts continue to escalate during this new period of turbulence and change, China, as an export-oriented economy, will face challenges in its development. Therefore, maintaining a fundamental stance of staying away from conflict, identifying opportunities inherent in external risks, and creating an external environment conducive to national development are key to China’s future stability and prosperity.
Overall, China has inherited four aspects of experience in exploring opportunities and maintaining diplomatic confidence in the “era of great contention.”
China’s Four Valuable Experiences
First, the general tone of China’s foreign relations of “persuading peace rather than fighting” is being developed in a compatible and comprehensive manner, fully releasing China’s charm as a great power of peace and its role as an international adhesive.
In recent years, from Afghanistan’s reconstruction to Saudi-Iran reconciliation, China has been the only major economy in the world with the fundamental capabilities, basic credibility, and benchmark qualifications to engage with all countries and groups.
Regarding the current conflicting parties and Western media calls for Chinese mediation, China’s approach of “persuading peace rather than conflict” is a crucial methodology that it must continue to adhere to. “Persuading peace rather than conflict” demonstrates the mature and responsible attitude of a major international power. This not only meets the international community’s expectations for peaceful resolution of issues, but also demonstrates China’s responsibility as a major power in international affairs.
Compared to the US diplomatic approach of continuously using offshore balancing tactics, provoking conflict, and suppressing regional competitors, China’s philosophy of dialogue, exchange, reconciliation, and win-win cooperation is increasingly becoming the greatest common denominator among all parties. For example, in December 2023, the Houthi/Yemen armed forces blockaded the Red Sea entrance, allowing only Chinese ships to pass through. This fully reflects the security expectations placed on China by the international community. This also stems from China’s new interpretation of “security interests” through years of practice. On the basis of political and military security, it strengthens the emphasis on economic security, takes into account non-traditional security interests such as international reputation, promotes positive interaction between China and the international community, and deepens the cooperative strategic culture and the concept of international cooperation for a community with a shared future for mankind.
The core of the international competition between China and the United States lies in achieving sustained gains by competing for “friends” and minimizing losses by avoiding and reducing “enemies.”
For example, while China may have fewer allies than the United States, the United States has created more hostile forces in the international community than China with its coarse politics. Continuously advocating peace, cooperation, and win-win outcomes, and creating a world without enemies, is the principle of upholding integrity and innovation that China adheres to in the context of “a world of great contention.”
Second, the experience of “daring to fight well”, “fighting without breaking”, and “using fighting to promote unity” in the Sino-US game can help China avoid encountering more external conflicts.
In recent years, China has successfully resisted US offensives in numerous struggles, including trade frictions, technological warfare, ideological warfare, human rights warfare, and financial warfare, thereby enhancing its international prestige. More importantly, while daring to fight and excelling at it, China has consistently maintained an overall stance of cooperation with the United States, avoiding and guarding against a situation of “decoupling and severing ties” or “walled enclaves.” China has proactively shaped the overall direction of Sino-US relations with measured flexibility, maintaining a high degree of strategic control. Furthermore, China has led the accelerated pace of transformation in the last century through major concepts such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, the Community of a Shared Future for Mankind, and the Sustainable Development Agenda, significantly mitigating US efforts to exploit chaos to contain China.
Overall, consistently prioritizing competition with the United States within international competition and cooperation strategies remains crucial for the future direction of China-US relations. While America’s global leadership continues to decline, USA will retain its greatest destructive power worldwide for a considerable period of time. USA is also the world’s leading financial market and technological power, making it a major partner in both cooperation and competition that China cannot avoid in its external environment. Amidst the current uncertainty in international relations, China has chosen to maintain its ability to make independent decisions, avoiding both being drawn into too many international alliances and avoiding being excessively disengaged from any one single country. This balancing act allows China to act flexibly in multilateral cooperation and respond quickly to external changes.
Overall, in terms of relations with the United States, China will continue to pursue both pressure and support, avoiding either alliance or decoupling, and maintaining containment and a tug-of-war with the United States.
This will be the primary lever for China to exploit opportunities in its foreign relations for a long time to come. This fundamental approach lies in actively guiding US policy toward China while simultaneously confronting the United States, proactively promoting the establishment of guiding principles for Sino-US relations. While daring to confront the US, China will also focus on identifying common interests in the Sino-US game, demonstrating the sustainability of the Sino-US relationship through concrete actions.
Third, the international friendship strategy of prioritizing infrastructure investment and promoting win-win outcomes for all parties is helping to cultivate a long-term international demand market.
From the perspective of long-term trends and paths in international cooperation, the regions currently involved in geopolitical conflicts all possess ample potential for infrastructure development. China, possessing the world’s most comprehensive industrial and supply chains and the world’s most mature infrastructure capabilities, will become the primary force in meeting the rigid post-war reconstruction needs of all parties.
In 2023, China’s overseas contracted engineering business revenue (1,133.88 billion yuan) increased by 8.8% year-on-year, and the value of newly signed contracts (1,863.92 billion yuan) increased by 9.5% year-on-year, the latter 1.7 times the former.
This data demonstrates China’s significant post-war infrastructure output capacity. Through infrastructure cooperation, China has achieved a win-win goal of sharing dividends with local communities. This not only helps build local transportation networks such as roads and railways, promotes urbanization, expands urban retail and service consumption, but also creates more employment opportunities upstream and downstream of the industrial chain. In this process, China has established a positive global reputation and international interaction in the region, reduced negative political interference, and ensured the stability and long-term sustainability of future investments and operations. This has enabled China to transcend conflict and disputes and achieve strategic cooperation across ideologies. Prioritizing infrastructure investment will also help cultivate a longer-term international demand market. China provides a better development environment for local countries, enabling them to become more economically independent and sustainable.
Following the overarching principle of “staying out of dangerous areas and not investing in chaotic areas,” China will rapidly promote the internationalization of its surplus production capacity by creating various conditions and collaborating with developing countries to promote the construction of infrastructure such as railways, highways, buildings, airports, ports, hospitals, schools, and networks.
This will ensure the security, sustainability, and long-term development of these investments, and more steadily advance its globalization strategy in the international market. At the same time, China’s assistance to other countries in promoting industrialization and urbanization will help mitigate the negative impacts of conflict. Furthermore, through industrial investment, China will also invest in China’s soft power, including its national image, political power, and public sentiment. This will respect and embrace the cultures of host countries, promote dialogue between civilizations, avoid investment risks caused by cultural conflicts, and help host countries better understand China, thereby strengthening their recognition of China’s image and culture. In recent years, projects undertaken and effectively operated by Chinese companies in conflict-prone areas, such as the Tel Aviv Light Rail Red Line in Israel, the Crimean Techno-Industrial Park, and the Merowe Dam in Sudan, have provided valuable examples for identifying production capacity markets and creating a favorable external environment in conflict-prone regions. In the future, “building infrastructure, promoting development, and preventing risks” will continue to be China’s proactive and effective measures to cope with the “era of great contention”. It will continue to coordinate and balance development, cooperation, and security to form an international benign interaction model with Chinese characteristics.
Fourth, China’s experience of “doing its own things well” is becoming increasingly attractive to the outside world.
In recent years, China has achieved a series of new achievements, new concepts, and new technologies in social development and livelihood areas, including poverty alleviation, public security, anti-corruption, ecology, infrastructure, online shopping, and food delivery, which have been widely praised by the international community.
Gallup’s 2021 Global Law and Order Index, which surveyed 120,000 people in 115 countries, ranked mainland China third globally in terms of rule of law and social order, far ahead of the United States, which ranked 22nd.
According to the Statista Digital Market Outlook report, over one billion Chinese people use mobile payments in physical stores, with mobile payment penetration being the highest globally, approximately three times that of the United States. China’s global governance contributions and domestic governance performance continue to be recognized, and Chinese initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative continue to receive positive feedback. Young people generally have a high level of recognition of China. By adhering to its principle of “doing its own thing well” and showcasing its national appeal, China has successfully become a role model admired by all parties to the conflict. Its rise in economic, cultural, and technological fields has provided new opportunities and reference points for the world, showcasing China as a responsible major power. This experience has also provided strong support for China to seek more opportunities in international affairs and made positive contributions to building an international order of peace, stability and common development.
Excluding ideological factors, favorable impressions of Chinese society and governance are growing in more and more countries. This directly boosts the credibility and authority of Chinese discourse and increases the likelihood of China being viewed as a leverage power in post-conflict regions. From the perspective of a community with a shared future for mankind, people around the world are increasingly recognizing and deepening their conscious consensus on the political ethics and practices centered on peace. China’s image as a peaceful superpower will become a standard model for most developing countries in their modernization and internationalization efforts. China is also a major force in continuously expanding international cooperation that is de-ideological and depoliticized, strengthening the international community’s sense of security and trust in investing in China.
Part 3 The “Age of Great Contention” and China’s Response
Against the backdrop of deepening globalization, the impact of the “World of Great Contention” is becoming increasingly prominent. How to respond to the crises and challenges brought about by this “World of Great Contention” is both a question of the times posed by the world to China and a crucial opportunity for China to break through the current situation and achieve comprehensive development. Based on the aforementioned characteristics and potential opportunities of this “World of Great Contention,” combined with China’s experience and the shortcomings and problems of current foreign policy, We propose the following suggestions on how to skillfully respond to this “World of Great Contention”:
First, classify cooperation priorities based on the characteristics of cooperation partners and refine the construction of a community with a shared future for mankind.
As President Xi Jinping said, “China’s development benefits the world, and China’s development cannot be separated from the world.” The concept of a community with a shared future for mankind represents both an innovative development of China’s perspectives on international order and global governance, and a Chinese solution to improving the global governance system. The global influence of the “Age of Great Contention” resonates with the concept of a community with a shared future for mankind. Refining the construction of a community with a shared future for mankind provides a new approach to addressing this “Age of Great Contention.”
From the perspective of promoting the building of a community with a shared future for mankind, the countries of the Global South, due to their generally good relations with China, share broad consensus on this issue. Therefore, building on the existing foundation, they should continue to consolidate and enhance cooperation in areas such as the economy, security, and healthcare, and gradually broaden the depth and scope of this cooperation. However, with regard to the United States and Western countries with which China has disagreements and disputes, while not only consolidating cooperative relations through consensus-building global issues, such as cooperation on climate change, but also strengthening communication channels and mechanisms to ensure smooth communication. When emergencies arise, these mechanisms should provide a minimum guarantee for policy communication, preventing misunderstandings caused by the risk of sudden economic sanctions and technological blockades, which could lead to escalating tensions.
At the same time, these mechanisms should strengthen China’s cooperation with multilateral organizations around the world, leveraging multilateral cooperation mechanisms such as the United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to present China’s proposals.
On international hot-spot issues, we should always maintain strategic composure and speak calmly and forcefully. We should adhere to the principle of not getting involved in war and refrain from the reckless use of force. However, on major issues of right and wrong, such as territorial issues, we must always adhere to the bottom line principles and frequently remind the outside world of China’s red lines.
We must not only demonstrate our ability, bottom line and deterrence to safeguard national sovereignty, but also avoid being seized upon by Western public opinion to smear us as “aggressors”. We must use collective and multilateral power to curb unilateralism and global hegemony, promote the building of a community with a shared future for mankind, and maintain world peace.
Second, we should give full play to the “second track” diplomatic power represented by public diplomacy, and make stable China-US relations the pillar of maintaining world peace.
As the world’s most important bilateral relationship, a stable and strong China-US relationship is not only beneficial to the development of both countries, but also beneficial to world peace and prosperity. However, driven by the hype of some US politicians, China-US relations have plummeted to a historic low since 2023. The history of win-win cooperation has been distorted, the reality of interdependence has been ignored, and official diplomacy has been continuously hindered and has almost come to a standstill. Against this backdrop, it is particularly important to strengthen efforts in public and people-to-people diplomacy to stabilize China-US relations.
On the one hand, we should encourage Chinese and American non-governmental organizations to strengthen exchanges. Leveraging these organizations, we should continuously broaden the scope and reach of Chinese and American people in grassroots exchanges, avoiding becoming trapped in a “network cocoon.”
We should encourage Chinese think tanks and private individuals to visit USA states and key electoral counties in the Midwest. Through these exchanges, ordinary Americans can understand the real China and dispel misunderstandings about China. To address the rumors and exaggerations spread by American politicians and think tanks about China’s social unfriendliness and insecurity following the enactment of the National Security Law and the Counterespionage Law, relevant organizations should invite multiple waves of American individuals to conduct research in China, arranging visits to places of great interest and significance to Americans, such as Liangjiahe, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Pudong New Area.
These visits should also be amplified in domestic and international media to alleviate misunderstandings about China. By fostering deep friendships among people-to-people exchanges, we can lay a solid foundation for the development of friendly Sino-US relations. Furthermore, building on the 284 pairs of sister provinces, states, and cities already established between China and the US, we should continue to leverage these international sister cities as a bridge to broaden channels for external communication with the US. Building on the achievements of sister city cooperation, we should leverage both “self-media” and official media to spread the stories of these sister cities. In terms of communication methods, we should use methods that are popular among the people of both countries and strengthen the communication efforts on international platforms that are familiar to overseas people, such as Facebook and Twitter.
Third, attach importance to preventive diplomacy and establish necessary communication and dialogue channels with all invisible local forces.
One of the key characteristics of this “era of great contention” is the rise of various local military forces as new variables influencing global affairs. To fundamentally resolve these conflicts, we must first mitigate the intensity of these violent clashes and weaken the hostile identities between ethnic groups. In fact the advent of preventive diplomacy follows this line of thought.
Preventive diplomacy involves preemptive intervention through diplomatic means such as good offices, mediation, and conciliation before a conflict breaks out, thereby nipping it in the bud.
Therefore, as a diplomatic concept actively advocated by the United Nations, preventive diplomacy is highly applicable to addressing the current “anarchy” caused by the rise of local powers. As a peacefully rising power, China possesses the confidence and capabilities to engage with other non-state armed forces. Therefore, China needs to, on the one hand, establish a communication, decision-making, and implementation system for preventive diplomacy, focusing on security and diplomacy, and seek localized solutions to conflicts. On the other hand, mediation methods must adhere to international law and norms. Based on the general principles of defensive diplomacy, communication channels should be established in different areas, taking into account the differences in dominant forces in different regions. For countries or regions where non-governmental organizations have a significant influence, while maintaining the focus on official diplomacy, resources should be allocated to public diplomacy and people-to-people diplomacy.
Fourth, adhere to the principle of moderate preparation for war and strengthen the global radiation range of hard power.
China has long adhered to a path of peaceful development and firmly pursued a national defense policy that is defensive in nature. However, as China’s overseas interests, including investments in energy resources, overseas infrastructure, global trade, and the safety of its citizens abroad, continue to expand, the need to enhance its hard power to safeguard these interests is growing. Simultaneously, as China’s military capabilities continue to grow, the international community’s expectations for China to increase its international public security products are also gradually increasing.
However, unlike the United States, which is building a comprehensive global military projection capability, China’s defense capacity building must adhere to the principles of meeting its needs and ensuring appropriate wartime preparedness. Therefore, the strengthening of China’s overseas hard power must primarily focus on key trade, energy, and resource routes. By establishing strategic hubs, China can strengthen its material infrastructure along major trade routes. By enhancing its military projection capabilities, China can provide reliable Chinese hard power support for Chinese companies going global. At the same time, adhering to the principles of extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits, China will strengthen military cooperation with Belt and Road Initiative partners, actively participate in international peacekeeping operations in these regions, prevent the emergence of military power vacuums along the routes, and make its contribution to maintaining world peace and tranquility.
Fifth, deepen regional and country-specific research to enhance China’s ability to predict risks around the world. The definition of regional and country studies is not simply to inform China about the nature and happenings of the target countries. More importantly, regional and country studies aims to inform China about the implications of these countries’ developments for its own national interests and, more importantly, to make the target countries aware of China’s foreign policy intentions.