After the “Change” in Syria, is Türkiye the Biggest Winner?
February 2025
The author Li Yanan is deputy director of the Institute of Middle East Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
On December 8, 2024, the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad collapsed suddenly under the lightning attack of the opposition, becoming another landmark event that accelerated the evolution of the geopolitical pattern in the Middle East and even the world. As the former opposition became the actual power holders, the influence of Russia and Iran in Syria began to ebb; Turkey, as one of the long-term “backers” of the opposition, ushered in a historical opportunity for strategic expansion. However, the dust of the drastic changes in Syria has not yet settled, and the game between the parties around the nature of the Syrian regime, factional conflicts, and power distribution has not yet been determined. It may be too early to assert that Turkey is the “biggest winner.”
Syria Affecting internal and external interests of Turkey
Syria is Turkey’s most important neighbor. The two countries share a land border of more than 900 kilometers and are closely related. The Syrian issue not only affects Turkey’s diplomatic layout, but is also often linked to Turkey’s internal politics, economy, and social changes. This has become the fundamental driving force for Turkey’s involvement in Syria and also determines Turkey’s special position in the Syrian issue.
Historically, Syria was under the rule of the Ottoman Empire and then under French trusteeship. It did not achieve independence until the middle of the last century. Turkey still owns an enclave in Syria, which is the mausoleum of Suleiman Shah, the founder of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey regards it as a “holy place” and sovereign territory, and has stationed troops there in the name of guarding the mausoleum. It has also won the special right for Turkish citizens to enter the mausoleum through Syria with their passports. This actually leaves a convenient door for Turkey to intervene in Syria’s internal affairs when necessary. After Turkish President Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power, the “neo-Ottomanism” in their ideology continued to rise, intending to restore the “glory of the empire”, and even regarded Syria and other old Ottoman lands as potential targets for expansion.
The so-called “Arab Spring” in 2011 triggered the Syrian civil war, and Turkey’s interests in Syria became more concrete.
Firstly, Turkey fighting for the power vacuum.
The Syrian civil war caused the Bashar government to lose effective control of the country, and various forces began to intervene. In order to prevent regional opponents from taking the opportunity to approach “the bedside”, Turkey, on the one hand, strongly supported the Syrian opposition armed groups, especially the political Islamist forces among them, intending to take the opportunity to support the pro-Turkish regime and turn Syria into a strategic vassal; on the other hand, it actively responded to the expansion of Russia and Iran’s influence in Syria, preventing them from approaching the Turkish-Syrian border, so as to leave enough strategic buffer for itself.
The second is the increasingly severe refugee crisis.
The Syrian civil war has caused more than 5 million refugees to flee, of which more than 3.5 million are stranded in Turkey, placing a heavy burden on Turkey’s economy and society. Especially since 2018, Turkey’s economy has been in trouble, with currency depreciation and inflation soaring. The people are extremely dissatisfied and have gradually pointed the finger at the refugee group, accusing them of squeezing out job opportunities and public resources, and calling on the government to repatriate refugees. The opposition party used this as an excuse to criticize Erdogan for supporting the Syrian opposition and accepting refugees as a “strategic mistake.” This not only led to a drop in the support rate of Erdogan and the AKP, and they almost lost in the “election of the century” in 2023, but also became the main reason for their heavy losses in the local elections in 2024. The refugee issue has been highly politicized in Turkey and has reached the point where it has to be resolved.
The third is the ” Kurdish threat” that Turkey cannot compromise
Turkey has long been troubled by Kurdish separatist forces, and the violent conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has lasted for nearly half a century. The Turkish government regards the PKK as a terrorist organization and identifies the Syrian Kurdish armed forces as its branch. After 2011, the Syrian Kurdish armed forces took advantage of the chaos to propose autonomy and established a political entity in northeastern Syria near the Turkish-Syrian border. In 2014, the extremist organization “Islamic State” emerged in Syria, and the Kurdish armed forces were selected by the United States to become its anti-terrorism ally. The assistance from the United States and the West further strengthened its strength. This made Turkey deeply anxious. It was worried that Syrian Kurdish autonomy would stimulate the centrifugal movement of the Kurdish community in Turkey, and it was also worried that the PKK would take the opportunity to obtain external resources. Therefore, it continued to increase the intensity of the attack on the Syrian Kurdish armed forces, raising it to the level of defending territory and sovereignty, and did not hesitate to quarrel with the United States for this.
Turkey’s Changing Goals
Over the past decade, Turkey’s policy toward Syria has basically revolved around the above-mentioned core concerns and can be roughly divided into three stages.
The first stage was from the outbreak of the Syrian civil war to 2015. Turkey took the overthrow of the Bashar regime as its main goal and actively participated in the early organizational process of the Syrian opposition. In June 2011, the first meeting of the Syrian opposition was held in Antalya, Turkey; in August of the same year, the Syrian National Council was established in Istanbul, bringing together representatives of various opposition organizations, clarifying the “struggle line” and setting up its headquarters in Turkey. Since then, Turkey has continued to selectively provide funding, weapons, personnel training and intelligence support to the Syrian opposition, and used some opposition organizations to check and balance the Kurdish armed forces.
The second stage is from 2016 to 2022. Although Turkey has not verbally given up “overthrowing Bashar”, it is actually more focused on reducing the impact of refugees and combating Kurdish armed forces. This is due to Russia’s high-profile intervention in the Syrian situation in 2015, and joined hands with Iran to help Bashar stabilize the situation. Turkey realized that the Syrian regime would not change in the short term, so it focused on solving specific problems. For example, it continued to select and support agents among the Syrian opposition, formed the “Syrian National Army” in 2017, and trained them to become “pro-soldiers”; after the United States and the Gulf countries reduced their investment in the Syrian opposition, it continued to provide them with shelter, and helped them repel the offensive of the Syrian government forces in Idlib Province in northwestern Syria many times; launched the “Euphrates Shield”, “Olive Branch” and “Spring of Peace” operations in northern Syria, cut off the Kurdish armed control area, compressed their scope of activities, and opened up a “safe zone” controlled by Turkey; and jointly launched the “Astana Process” with Russia and Iran to seek a solution to the Syrian crisis and strive for strategic initiative.
The third stage is from 2022 to 2024, when Turkey abandons its goal of overthrowing Palestine and initiates the process of normalizing Turkish-Syrian relations, intending to solve the refugee and Kurdish issues with the help of the Bashar regime. This is a limited concession that Erdogan has to make under increasing domestic pressure, intending to expand the policy space for maneuver. However, Bashar insisted on withdrawing Turkey’s troops from northern Syria as a prerequisite for negotiations, and refused to agree to Turkey’s crackdown on Syrian Kurdish forces and refused to reach a reconciliation with the Syrian opposition, resulting in a stalemate in Turkey’s policy toward Syria.
Sudden Opportunity for Turkey
In order to create a turning point, Turkey acquiesced to the Syrian opposition launching a new round of offensives, originally intending to use this to put pressure on Bashar and force him to accept the negotiation conditions. But unexpectedly, the Syrian government army collapsed at the first touch, and its most important allies Russia, Iran, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah were either restrained or weakened and unable to come to the rescue.
Bashar Esad’s regime eventually fell in the aftermath of the so-called “Arab Spring”. Erdogan’s long-abandoned goal suddenly came true, which brought Turkey a strategic opportunity.
First, The Syrian opposition’s seize of power will ease domestic political pressure on Turkish Government
The Syrian opposition’s seize of power, turned Erdogan’s previous policy on Syria from a “strategic mistake” into a “strategic decision success “, and Erdogan’s political reputation was restored. Syrian refugees issue in Turkey were exploited by the secular and ultra nationalist and populist opposition.
Under the current circumstances, the prospect of refugees returning home is promising, which will effectively ease people’s dissatisfaction with Erdogan and the AKP.
Not only that, Turkey is also actively planning to participate in Syria’s post-war reconstruction. It is estimated that Syria’s reconstruction may cost 250 billion to 400 billion US dollars. If Turkish construction, power and other companies can get a share of it, it will bring huge profits to the Turkish economy and help the Erdogan government maintain public support and consolidate power.
The second is to expand Turkey’s space for interests in Syria.
Although the “Help Tahrir al-Sham Organization” (SLA), which took the lead in launching the offensive and took over the Syrian regime, is not a “direct line” of Turkey, it was once protected by Turkey in Idlib, and its weapons and equipment, especially drones, are suspected to be supported by Turkey.
In the future, it will continue to rely on the Turkish-Syrian border trade to obtain income, so it has needs and expectations from Turkey. After the fall of the Assad regime, Turkey quickly reopened its embassy in Syria, and senior Turkish intelligence and diplomatic officials visited Syria intensively. Turkey also reached a consensus with the new Syrian government on rebuilding armed forces and planned to sign a bilateral defense agreement. According to reports, the agreement will allow Turkey to deploy security forces in Syria and open two new military bases; in return, Turkey will assist Syria in deploying air defense systems to resist Israeli attacks.
If progress goes smoothly, Turkey will turn Syria into a de facto protectorate, gain more freedom of action and resource leverage in Syria, and will not only promote the resolution of the Kurdish issue in a more self-interested way, but will also significantly expand its strategic depth in the Middle East.
Türkiye ayrıca yeni Suriye hükümeti ile silahlı kuvvetlerin yeniden inşası konusunda uzlaşmaya vardı ve ikili bir savunma anlaşması imzalamayı planladı. Haberlere göre anlaşma, Türkiye’nin Suriye’de güvenlik güçleri konuşlandırmasına ve iki yeni askeri üs açmasına izin verecek; bunun karşılığında Türkiye, İsrail saldırılarına karşı koymak için hava savunma sistemlerinin konuşlandırılmasında Suriye’ye yardımcı olacak.
Süreç sorunsuz ilerlerse, bu Suriye’yi Türkiye için fiilen bir nüfuz alanı haline getirecek, Suriye’de daha fazla hareket özgürlüğü ve kaynak kaldıracı elde edecek ve sadece Kürt sorununun çözümünü daha kendi çıkarına bir şekilde çözmede teşvik etmekle kalmayacak, aynı zamanda Orta Doğu’daki stratejik derinliğini de önemli ölçüde genişletecektir.
The third is to elevate the geopolitical status of Turkey.
Turkey, relying on its special relationship with the Syrian opposition, has replaced Russia and Iran as the most important external force influencing the direction of the Syrian situation, and has become a key party in the reorganization of the geopolitical pattern.
Looking at the present, Iran’s land bridge for projecting power outward has been cut off, and it has temporarily lost the upper hand in regional competition, making room for Turkey; Russia has lost its fulcrum in Syria, and its logistical support for operations in Africa (especially North Africa) will be negatively affected, which will significantly change the competitive situation between Turkey and Russia in Libya.
Looking at the future, the United States wants to fight the “Islamic State” in Syria and prevent the resurgence of pro-Iranian forces, Russia wants to keep its important naval and air force bases in Syria, and the European Union hopes to ensure the unity and stability of Syria and avoid a new wave of refugees. All of these forces need to cooperate with Turkey and would like to use Turkey’s influence in Syria. Turkey will become the target of all parties’ wooing. Turkey can revitalize its relations with all parties if it “settles one piece” in Syria, so it is impossible for Turkey to be absent from the subsequent development of the Syrian situation.
Challanges for Turkey: Two Issues
However, whether Turkey can play a key role in Syria or even on a larger stage in the future depends on two issues: first, whether Turkey can maintain its influence on the new Syrian government; second, whether the new Syrian government can achieve a smooth transition of power and effective control over the entire country.
Turkey obviously understands the key point. Within a month after the fall of the Assad regime, Turkey took the initiative to connect with the new Syrian government on issues such as diplomatic recognition, post-war reconstruction, security defense, and energy cooperation. This is to strengthen the binding of the interests of both sides, and to finalize the basic cooperation framework for the new government’s dependence on Turkey while it is still unstable, so as to transform Turkey’s “war value” to the Syrian opposition into “strategic value”. However, the “HTŞ ” and Turkey have differences in basic ideology, and their priority goals at this stage are not completely consistent.
If HTŞ organization can gain more power and wider international recognition, then the demand for Turkey will decrease. If Turkish-Syrian relations return to normal track, the problems that originally existed between the two countries will re-emerge. In the final analysis, Turkey may be confident of maintaining a “friendly Syria”, but it cannot guarantee that it will also be a “submissive Syria to Turkey”.
As for whether Syria can achieve stability and unity in the future, most people focus on differences in parties, ethnicities and religions, but ignore that Turkey’s deep involvement has already laid hidden dangers for internal conflicts in Syria.
For Turkey, among the main armed groups in Syria, the SLA is an informal ally, the Syrian National Army is an agent, and the Kurdish armed forces are enemies.
The disputes among the various factions are not good for Turkey, but the cooperative unity of these factions is not what Turkey prefers. The SLA is currently unwilling to excessively target the Kurdish armed forces for the sake of achieving a smooth transition as soon as possible and avoiding direct confrontation with the United States.
In the future, if the Syrian Kurdish armed forces establish an autonomous entity based on the Iraqi Kurdish region, or enter the Syrian government to form a cabinet based on Kurdish SDG’s participation in politics, it will be Turkey’s nightmare.
Once the nightmare comes true, it is difficult to guarantee that Turkey will not drive its agents to set off a new wave of conflicts in Syria. If the Syrian civil war resumes, everything may return to the starting point or even worse, and Turkey will falls into a trap.