On the State Theory of Gramsci and Neo-Gramscianism

 Prof. Yu Jianxing and Prof Xiao Yangdong, are from the School of Marxism in Hebei University

Despite his extensive discussions on the nature and role of the state, as well as on the bourgeois state, the state in the transitional period, i.e., the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the disappearance of the state, it is an indisputable fact that Marx did not create a systematic theory of the state. Marx’s discussions on the state are mostly composed of a series of fragmentary and unsystematic philosophical reflections, contemporary historical analysis, newspaper articles, and comments on occasional events.[1] (Bob Jessop)

Therefore the famous French Marxist political theorist Lefebvre commented: “If someone wants to find a theory of the state in Marx’s works, that is, to find a coherent and complete system of state doctrine, I can tell Marx without hesitation that such a system of doctrine does not exist. On the contrary, if someone thinks that Marx ignored the state, we can also tell him that the state issue is an issue that Marx often paid attention to.” [2] (Lefebvre)

This characteristic of Marx’s state theory and the negative impact of socialist countries’ abuse of the means of proletarian dictatorship have led to the fact that Marxist state theory has not made due progress for a long time and has been relatively quiet in the research field. This situation did not change fundamentally until the 1960s and 1970s.The debate between two political theorists, Miliband and Poulantzas, reawakened people’s interest in Marxist state theory, which led to three revivals of state theory. [3] (Bob Jessop)

 In this process, Gramsci’s ideas were rediscovered and activated, or in other words, Gramsci’s works written in 1930s became an important ideological resource for the revival of Marxist state theory.

The state theory from Gramsci’s ideas to neo-Gramscianism is an important clue to the contemporary development of Marxist state theory, which has unfolded, verified and enhanced the contemporary explanatory power of Marxist state theory.

1. Gramsci’s Theory of the State

Compared with traditional Marxist theory, Gramsci emphasized the importance of the ideological superstructure over the economic structure, and the importance of civil society (which embodies the function of consent) over political society ( which embodies the function of violence ). In Gramsci’s view, the real power of the system does not lie in the violence of the ruling class and the coercive power of the state apparatus, but in the acceptance of the ruling class’s ” worldview ” by the ruled class .Therefore, the question is how the ruling class can gain the consent of the subordinate class, and how the subordinate class can overthrow the old order and establish another order in which everyone can enjoy freedom.[4]

Ellen Meiskins Wood points out that Gramsci ‘s concept of civil society is a weapon against capitalism.

 ” Civil society ” in Gramsci marks a new field and new form of struggle.It makes the fight against capitalism not limited to its economic base, but also points to its cultural and ideological base in daily life.[5] Michael Hart also argues that Gramsci focuses on the democratic aspects of civil society in the multiple mechanisms of civil society and the input channels or ways these mechanisms provide for the rule of political society, that is, the state. [6] Therefore, unlike the traditional Marxist view of civil society, Gramsci no longer puts and limits civil society to the field of economic base, but attributes it to the field of superstructure.Civil society includes ” not ‘ all material relations ‘ , but all ideological – cultural relations; not ‘ the whole of commercial and industrial life ‘ , but the whole of spiritual and intellectual life ” [7] .

 Bobbio argues that Gramsci’s definition of civil society is mainly influenced by Hegel’s “Principles of Right Philosophy”. In the Philosophy of Right, civil society as a direct link in the decomposition of ethics includes three links: the system of needs; the protection of ownership, personality, etc. through the judiciary legal system; and the prevention of the contingency left in the above two systems through the police and trade associations, and the care of special interests as common interests.

 Therefore, in Hegel: ” civil society includes not only the field of economic relations, but also their spontaneous or voluntary organizational forms, that is, associations in the rule of law and their most basic rules and regulations .” [8] Based on this understanding of civil society, Gramsci also expanded his understanding of the state: the state is both a major tool for the expansion of the power of the ruling class and a coercive force ( political society ) to weaken and disintegrate subordinate groups.[9] The state is not only a violent machine, but also includes civil governance and education.

 Gramsci pointed out: ” The understanding of the state is inseparable from the understanding of civil society ( because one can say that the state = political society + civil society, that is, the leadership guaranteed by coercive force ) .” [10]

The contemporary capitalist state has an overall meaning. It is actually composed of two parts: the first is political society, which is often defined as the political machine in the traditional sense, including the state’s administrative organs, army, police, courts, prisons, etc ; the second is civil society, including various organizations and groups in civic life such as churches, trade unions, and schools. These organizations and groups are also an organic part of the state. They exercise the state’s ruling function in different ways.

The political society implements direct coercive power, while “‘ civil society ‘ is a place for ideological – cultural or ethical – political activities aimed at obtaining the public opinion of the whole society ” [11] (Jacques Texier) Through knowledge and morality, it obtains the leadership of the masses’ ideology and consciousness, thereby establishing its own rule on the conscious obedience of the masses. Unlike Leninism, which sees political leadership as the essential element of leadership and hegemony, Gramsci prefers intellectual and moral leadership.[12]

In Gramsci’s view, leadership not only includes the mobilization of the ruling class’s ” active consent ” of the ruled class through their intellectual, moral and political practices , including systematic consideration of the interests and needs of the masses, but also includes making compromises on minor issues when necessary to maintain support and unity ( but not sacrificing fundamental interests ) , that is, ensuring intellectual and moral leadership by establishing and regenerating a collective will and a common worldview. In addition, just as the factor of violence is institutionalized in a system of repressive machinery, leadership is also crystallized in and mediated by a complex ideological machinery system. In fact, although they certainly occur in the government system, the exercise of leadership in its narrow sense mostly occurs outside the state. Gramsci argues that, first, they appear in civil society or the so-called private sphere, such as churches, trade unions, schools, mass media or political parties; second, they are transformed into reality by intellectuals. The role of intellectuals is to explain ideology, educate the people, organize and unify social forces and ensure the leadership of the ruling group.[13]

Therefore, Gramsci argued that the state cannot be equated with a coercive machine, nor can the state’s functions be limited to violence functions. “The state has the role of education and shaping, and its purpose is to create a higher level of new civilization, so that the ‘ civilization ‘ and the moral style of the masses can adapt to the continued development of economic production equipment, thereby developing a real new human being .” ” Civil society can function without ‘ legal constraints ‘ or forced ‘ obligations ‘ , but it can still bring collective pressure and produce objective effects through the evolution of customs, thoughts and behaviors, and moral trends.” [14]

Taking into account the specific historical context in which Gramsci wrote and thought, such as the failure of the Italian factory committee movement in 1920 , the victory of the Russian Revolution, the socialist construction in the Soviet Union, the crisis of the liberal state and the rise of Italian fascism, the impact of the economic crisis in Europe and the United States from 1929 to 1932 on the political environment, and the multiple impacts of technological change on capitalist social relations [15] , we have reason to closely link Gramsci’s unique understanding of the state and its leadership with the political strategies adopted by the Soviet Union and Western developed countries in their exploration of the revolutionary path.

 “In Russia, the state is everything, and civil society is in a primitive and undeveloped situation; in the West, the relationship between the state and civil society is appropriate, and once the state is shaken, a stable civil society structure will immediately emerge. The state is just an external trench, behind which are powerful fortresses and fortifications.” [16]

 In Gramsci’s view, due to the insufficient development of capitalism, Russia’s civil society has not matured, and its rule still mainly relies on the coercive state apparatus. In developed Western countries, civil society has evolved into a more complex structure that can resist the disastrous consequences of direct economic factors (such as crises, depressions, etc.)” The superstructure of civil society is like the trench system of modern warfare. In war, fierce artillery fire sometimes seems to be able to destroy the enemy’s entire defense system, but in fact it only damages their external fortifications; and when they march and attack, they find that they are still facing effective fortifications” [17] This means that the revolutionary strategies of the East and the West should be different. In backward Eastern countries, the state should be the target of frontal attack, while in developed Western societies, the target of frontal attack should be civil society. If I borrow Gramsci’s unique expression, the first type of attack can be called “mobile warfare”, which means concentrating forces to instantly break through the ruling group’s defenses, allowing revolutionary forces to quickly move from one place to another, attack and conquer the fortress, and finally seize power; the second type can be called “positional warfare ” , which means a protracted trench warfare in the form of a cultural offensive. [18]

The ” Gramsci fever ” triggered by the rediscovery of Gramsci’s works in the late 1960s has had a huge influence on contemporary feminism, Foucault’s analysis and postmodernism. As far as state theory is concerned, Poulantzas, Laclau and Mouffe have become the main representatives of neo-Gramscian state theory.

2.Rediscovering Poulantzas

Jessop argues that among postwar Marxist theorists, Poulantzas was almost the only one who paid sustained attention to and explored important issues in Marxist political theory, such as what is the true nature and structure of bourgeois democracy, what revolutionary strategy should be adopted to overthrow this historical state form, and what is the institutional form of socialist democracy in the West.[19]  However, due to his famous debate with Miliband in 1969-1970 , Poulantzas has long been regarded as a structuralist Marxist, and many people ignored the fact that Poulantzas’ main inspiration came from Gramsci and Lenin, especially Gramsci. Based on this, Jessop regards Poulantzas as a neo-Gramscian. [20] Poulantzas initially devoted himself to the study of legal philosophy, attempting to make a new analysis of law by integrating existentialism, phenomenology and Marxism to overcome the binary opposition between facts and values ​​in law.

 In 1965, Poulantzas’ doctoral thesis titled as “The Nature of Things and Rights: On the Dialectics of Things and Their Values” was published, which won him considerable reputation. Since then, Poulantzas has drawn inspiration from Gramsci and other Italian Marxists, and his academic interests have shifted from legal philosophy to the political sociology of capitalist countries.

In his first article on the nature and role of hegemony, Poulantzas launched a critical analysis of the capitalist state.Poulantzas argued that there was a fundamental difference between the pre-capitalist and capitalist states, a difference that was rooted in the mode of production. In pre-capitalist societies, direct producers maintained a natural connection with the community organized by a hierarchical order, and class exploitation took on a mixed economic – political character, which required the use of oppression to impose the direct private interests of the ruling class on the ruled class.

 In the capitalist mode of production, on the other hand, economics and politics are institutionally separated, the economy is dominated by surplus value and exchange as the direct purpose and driving force of production, and extra-economic coercion (ekonomi dışı zor)  is excluded from the direct organization of capitalist production.

Since extra economy (ekonomi dışı) forces are no longer directly involved in production and exploitation, the state can monopolize and legitimize violence and promote the interests of the ruling class through the exercise of hegemony.

 Poulantzas noted that whereas the pre-capitalist state acted in the form of an ” economic group ” through marginalized and mechanical compromises and distributed state power in a zero-sum game, the capitalist state must provide guarantees for the subordinate classes and, if necessary, even sacrifice the short-term interests of the ruling class to ensure its long-term political goals. The importance of the state as a generalized situation gives intellectual and ideological class struggle a crucial role in organizing and leading the ruling and ruled classes.

In addition, Poulantzas examines how leadership can be exercised not only to secure the active consent of the ruled, but also to unify ruling class factions and / or classes into a coherent power bloc.

 Poulantzas agrees with Gramsci that class rule in capitalist society depends on a unique combination of active consent and institutionalized forms of repression.

 But he extends Gramsci’s analysis by arguing that the economic rupture of the bourgeoisie can only be overcome through the state — a state that exhibits its own inherent class unity and institutional autonomy vis-à-vis ruling class factions. In short, Poulantzas insists that the capitalist state must be understood as an institutional whole that has the primary function of organizing leadership within power blocs and mobilizing the active consent of the ruled classes and society as a whole.[21]

However, as a close disciple of Althusser, Poulantzas’s main theoretical framework at this time was structuralism. In Political Power and Social Class (1968) , Poulantzas criticized the dominant Marxist approach to law, state, and ideology, and appealed to Althusser’s structuralism to defend his political and ideological theories.[22]

Poulantzas argued that the study of the capitalist type of state required the development of three interrelated theories:

 A) a general theory of the mode of production, class-differentiated society, state, and politics in historical materialism; B) a specific theory of the capitalist mode of production that determines the exact position and function of the state and politics in the entire structural organism of capitalism; C) and a sectoral theory of the capitalist state and politics.

In other words, the study of the state is to examine it as a political sector in a specific mode of production, and the mode of production as a whole, as a complex of various factors, determines the scope, status, and functions of this sector.

Therefore, we must understand the state from the perspective of the mode of production as a whole, and grasp the state from the combination of the various sectors of the mode of production.

“In order to characterize the sectoral structure of a particular mode of production ( for example, the capitalist state in the capitalist mode of production ) , we must determine its position within the pattern peculiar to that mode. Only from this starting point can the concept of this link be derived.” [23]  Poulantzas pointed out that a mode of production includes various links or aspects, namely economic, political, ideological and theoretical aspects, among which the dominant one is the economic link in the final analysis, but this determining role is neither a linear causal relationship nor an expressive mediating relationship. In the mode of production as a whole, the relationships that constitute the various levels are not simple, but are subject to the multiple influences of relationships at other levels, that is, multiple determination theory of Althusser . [24] ( Bkz.Althusser çoklu belirlenim teorisi) It must be pointed out that although Poulantzas mainly adopted Althusser’s structuralist theoretical framework in Political Power and Social Class, he did not fully agree with Althusser’s position.

Jessop pointed out that Poulantzas adopted the structuralist Marxist theoretical framework mainly to defend his theory of political sectors and state sectors.

Poulantzas’ main and substantive arguments mainly come from the analysis of legal systems and political systems and the careful connection with Marx, Lenin and Gramsci’s analysis of political class struggle in capitalist society.[25] In other words, Poulantzas embodies more Althusserian elements when analyzing the capitalist system, and more Gramscian elements when analyzing class struggle as a historical driving force.

Moreover, when analyzing the function of the capitalist state, Poulantzas expanded Gramsci’s idea of ​​leadership (hegemony). Poulantzas argues that in the capitalist social formation, in the sense that it can play a role in coordinating all aspects of a complex unity, the state should be understood as a kind of “order” or “organizing principle” of social form .[26]

Unlike slave and feudal societies, which maintained the unity of social forms through hierarchy and open violence, the capitalist state itself presents itself as a mass class state, “in which everything is done as if there is no class ‘struggle’.” [ 27] In capitalist society, everyone exists as an atomic, isolated individual, competing for profit in civil society.

 This “isolated ” state of existence is reinforced by political – legal ideology of the ruling class. Because the legal order questions production actors as legal subjects rather than as members of hostile classes, this means that production actors experience capitalist relations not as class relations, but as isolated individuals competing with capitalist groups. This “isolation effect ” extends to the entire field of economic relations in capitalist society and penetrates into classes belonging to other modes of production. [28]

Through this isolation effect, the capitalist state attempts to disintegrate the organization and unity of the ruled working class and stipulate that they are equal and free citizens of the state in form. If we can say that the book Political Power and Social Class tends to attribute an objective function to the structure of the capitalist state and assumes its essential class unity, then we can say that in the book Class in Contemporary Capitalist Society and The Crisis of Dictatorship, Poulantzas expresses his concern for the importance of class struggle and reminds us of the contradictory nature of the division of the capitalist state.

 In addition to greatly advancing class theory, the book Class in Contemporary Capitalist Society, published in 1974, also discusses the application of state theory to the issue of communist strategy and criticizes the French Communist Party’s “anti-monopoly capitalism alliance” strategy and its “state monopoly capitalism” theory.[29]

In the book The Crisis of Dictatorship, published in 1975-1976, Poulantzas began to realize that the state is permeated with internal conflicts and that the state itself is a main battlefield of struggle rather than a monolithic entity. Poulantzas further argues that revolutionary strategies based on the Leninist model should be abandoned and revolution should no longer be narrowly understood as a classic situation involving dual power, in which a monolithic state is overthrown by an opposing state based on workers’ soviets.Instead, the transition to socialism can be carried out from within the capitalist state by exploiting its contradictions and combining them with popular struggles outside the state to support its actions.[30]

In his final book, State, Power and Socialism (1978) , Poulantzas engages in dialogue with Marxist state theory, Althusserian structuralism, Foucault’s micro-power theory, and the technocratic view of the state.

 Poulantzas considers for the first time the institutional features that characterize normal and exceptional forms of the state, including:

 (a) the state as the embodiment of intellectual labour as distinct from manual labour and as the embodiment of the link between power and knowledge;

 (b) its contribution to individualisation as a form of normative control and normalisation and to struggles for hegemony as a whole;

 (c) the institutionalised form of the state as a contradictory unity of the legal and the illegal, based on an institutionalised monopoly of violence; and (d) the institutional form of the nation-state. Each of these features is seen as rooted in capitalist production relations, and each is seen as multi-determined by class struggle.[31] Poulantzas thus rejects the view of the state as a simple tool ( object ) of the ruling class , and also as a subject with power outside the class structure. On the contrary, Poulantzas argued that the state is a place where the ruling class strategically organizes itself in relation to the ruled class. State is the place and center for exercising power, but it has no power of its own.[32] Poulantzas further pointed out that the state should be seen as a social relationship. This elliptical claim from him means that state power ( not the state apparatus itself ) should be seen as a form of political and political struggles that determine the balance of power. This means that we must examine the state form as a complex system as a whole and consider the composition of class power itself. [33]

Martin Carnoy argues that in this book, Poulantzas applied Gramsci’s discussion of civil society to the state, absorbed Gramsci’s complex and universal concept of ruling class leadership, combined it with the state, and turned the state itself into a battlefield. [34] In addition, due to changes in the historical context, the Leninist model of attempting to seize power through a frontal attack was increasingly questioned.

Poulantzas pointed out: ” Talk of smashing or destroying the state apparatus is only a game of words. What is involved in various transformations is the political permanence and continuity of the representative democratic system – not as an unfortunate relic that must be tolerated only out of necessity, but as a fundamental condition of democratic socialism.” [35] Therefore, according to Poulantzas the appropriate strategy is to transform the state through democratic means and develop direct grassroots democracy, recognize the role of universal suffrage, expand and increase political freedom, and transition to socialism through democratic means. Poulantzas quoted Luxemburg’s words: ” Without universal suffrage, without unlimited freedom of the press and assembly, without opinions but only confrontation, life in any public system will be eliminated and it will become something that only resembles life, in which only the bureaucracy will remain an active factor.” [36]

It can be seen that labeling Poulantzas’s theory of the state as “ structuralist ” is an oversimplification. Jessop pointed out that to correctly understand Poulantzas’s theory of the state, it is necessary to consider its three theoretical sources:  French philosophy, Italian Marxism, and the Roman – German legal tradition [37] . And Bob Jessop added that we should  pay attention to Poulantzas’s comparative study of the democratic openings caused by the crises and collapse of dictatorships in countries such as Spain, Portugal, and Greece, as well as a series of political events that occurred in France, such as the rise of the French authoritarian state, the unification of the French left, and the democratic socialist program. It was through the examination of some specific political events that Poulantzas gradually broke free from the shackles of structuralism, identified the complex forms of specific struggles, and introduced the dimension of class struggle into the center of state theory, pointing out the role of the state in shaping economic class struggles, political class struggles, and ideological struggles. Poulantzas’s work focuses on the nature of social classes, the role of the state in shaping and limiting class conflict, and the impact of class conflict on the state itself.[38]

 At the same time, with the change of historical context, Poulantzas also noticed the role of non-class forces, such as student movements, feminism, and ecological movements, in social, economic, and political struggles, as well as the impact of new forms of interest representation on the state. In this way, Poulantzas gradually transitioned from his early departmental theories of politics and to his early state theory to the study of state relations and strategies, especially the assertion that ” the state is a social relationship ” , which became a precursor to Jessop’s strategic theoretical approach to the state.

3. State and Discourse Theory

If we can say that Poulantzas has advanced Gramsci’s work by integrating the analysis of leadership (hegemony) into an abstract theory of political sectors and examining its structural determination and its nature as constructed through class struggle, then we can say that the main contribution of the neo-Gramscians like Laclau and Mouffe is that, with the help of discourse theory, Laclau and Mouffe focus on ideology and ideological class struggle ( an area which was neglected by Poulantzas ) and link it to the development of political leadership (hegemony) and the struggle for state power, further exploring the interpellation mechanisms of social subjects and the ways in which social formations are integrated.[39]

In their early writings, Laclau and Mouffe combined Gramscian focus on historical – specific events with contemporary post-structuralist insights, and emphasized the importance of ” non-class ” ideology and ” mass democracy ” in their own different ways. For example, in the book “Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory” (1977) , Laclau argued that Poulantzas’s reduction of the middle class to a homogeneous class was a ” class reductionism ” .In fact, the contradiction between the middle class and the ruling group is not caused by the dominant production relations level but by the political and ideological level and therefore cannot always be attributed to class contradictions.

 Laclau further argued that in the entire ideological structure of the middle class, democratic – mass interpellations are more important than specific class interpellations, and the main political feature of the middle class is not its class attributes, but the dominant ” mass democracy ” component in its ideology.

 In his book “Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci” (1979) , Mouffe pointed out through his reading of Gramsci that Gramsci’s research has broken with the epi-phenomenalism and class reductionism of ideology. For Mouffe, not all political forces are essentially class subjects. Political forces are constructed as inter-class collective wills in and through ideological struggles. Gramsci also rejected pure class ideologies that correspond to different classes in a paradigmatic form, and argued that there are multiple ideological elements, and different classes can selectively ” join ” these multiple ideological elements in different ways to produce their own class ideologies. In addition, Gramsci insisted that there are important ideological factors that do not necessarily have class connotations and belong to the “national masses” . Gramsci also regarded these ” national masses ” elements as the preeminent place for ideological class struggles. However, early works of Laclau and Mouffe still emphasized that ideological leadership must be class leadership, because the economy ultimately determines the necessity of class politics.

In 1985, Laclau and Mouffe published the book Hegemony and the Strategy of Socialism, which took ” hegemony ” as the core concept and expanded the early research into a general theory of hegemony discourse construction. In the genealogical study of the concept of ” hegemony ” , Laclau and Mouffe  pointed out that ” hegemony ” has long been used to re-integrate society around the concept of class, and is therefore closely linked to the logic of essentialism.

 Even Gramsci , although he expanded the scope of political reorganization and hegemony more than other theorists of his time, retained economist factors in the concept of hegemony.

However, Laclau and Mouffe argue that ” hegemony ” is still a category worthy of attention. Once it is freed from the logic of essentialism, it can still become ” a basic tool for the left forces to conduct political analysis.” With the help of academic resources such as phenomenology, post-structuralism and post-analytic philosophy, they have carried out a series of deconstructions of the Marxist tradition. Laclau and Mouffe not only rejected the Marxist concept of totality as a grand meta-narrative, cutting off the logical support points of historical necessity and social certainty, but also deconstructed the economic determinism and a priori class unity of Marxism. Laclau and Mouffe argue that attempts to construct leadership practices solely from the economic level will inevitably encounter difficulties for the following reasons:

 First, the economy cannot become an autonomous world that operates according to its own inherent laws. Economy will produce uncertainty due to political or other external interventions.

Second, it is difficult to satisfy the unity and homogeneity of social representation at the economic level.

Third, it is also difficult to establish that the mechanisms of social actors at other social levels must be ultimately explained on the basis of economic interests.[40] According to Laclau and Mouffe, the economic sphere itself is constructed by discourse, social unity originates from the “ articulation ” of different discursive practices rather than the logical correspondence between the supra-discursive base and the discursive superstructure, and class and non-class forces are also constructed through discourse rather than being embedded in the supra-discursive system of social relations and acting as its subjective carriers or supporters. Since all “ levels ” or “ spheres ” of social formations are constructed through discourse and tend to be transformed through equally constructed social forces, we must replace the long-standing Marxist concept of “ causal primacy of the economy ” with “ political primacy ” or “discursive primacy” .

This means that the economy, like the political and ideological spheres, is a sphere of struggle, and the so-called “ laws of motion ” are not governed by the supra-discursive “ logic of capital ” ( or its equivalent in other modes of production ) Instead, economic movements must be explained in terms of the “ articulation ” of hegemony in a given society . Laclau and Mouffe emphasize that since any given society is characterized by a plurality of subjects and there is no reason to give priority to class subjects, hegemony must be seen as the discursive “ articulation ” of different subjects .

 Thus, if the ruling class or the working class is to contend for “ political, intellectual, and moral leadership , ” it depends on their respective abilities to develop a political program that must be recognized by other subjects, and on their respective abilities to develop an “ organic ideology ” that can function as a shared ideological frame of reference, based on which multiple subjects can redefine and negotiate alliances to promote this program. [41] Thus, the concept of leadership (hegemony) , freed from essentialism, introduces a new social logic, in which relative fixity of society can be achieved, albeit through the establishment of nodal points . Society is not only the infinite play of differences, but also an attempt to limit this infinite play, to naturalize and contain infinite differences in a temporary social order. But this social order does not have a necessary essence, but is constructed through a complex process of multi-determination. In other words, society has no positive essence, but only contains negative essences in its fundamental openness, and neither its elements nor its whole have a pre-given necessity.

 However, ” the incomplete character of every totality necessarily leads us to abandon the premise of ‘ society ‘ as a totality that is stitched together and self-determined in the field of analysis. ‘ Society ‘ is not a valid discursive object, and there is no single fundamental principle that applies to the entire field of differences ” [42] . Social relations can only be distinguished according to the specific discourses that give them meaning – discourses include not only language, but also material practices. However, no discourse can completely fix the meaning of an element, there is always a multivalence and surplus of meaning, and thus leaves room for other discourses. Laclau and Mouffe’s argument shows that a completely closed self-identical social structure is impossible, even if individual identity and micro-social relations are unstable. Society is an unstable system of differences formed according to discursive rules, and social identity therefore depends on the accidental pattern of hegemony in an unstable social system.Therefore, Laclau and Mouffe argue that there is no single clearly defined political space, and political discourse unfolds in a relatively open field, and they have not yet settled to the point where they can be reproduced only through repetition rather than continuous ” articulation ” . In this sense, it is not confined to the state or any other single power center, but exists across the entire discursiveness.[43] It is also in this sense that Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory has an important influence on state theory. If identity cannot be perfectly established, if society is impossible, then the distinction between state and (civil) society will be meaningless, and the concept of the state’s complement will become questionable. In addition, once politics is seen as decentralized and decentral, and hegemony is seen as relying on the “openness of society” , floating freely rather than being fixed in the state, then the state may also be seen as having no essence, the state will be unable to express a complete whole, and therefore the state will unable to exist constructively.

In summary, Gramscist and neo-Gramscist state theory is an important clue in the development of Marxist state theory in the contemporary era. Gramscists and neo-Gramscists do not intend to construct a grand narrative. Whether it is the concept of leadership (hegemony), the explanation that the state is a social relationship, or the so-called ” articulation ” of the discourse of leadership by Laclau and Mouffe , they all aim to incorporate the state into the process of social formation and examine it, so as to analyze the complex social foundation of the state, and they understand the accidental structural connection between the economic, political and ideological fields of the social form, and the particularity of ” national masses ” and ” mass democracy ” . As Jessop pointed out in his book The Capitalist State: ” Once we focus on state power at the level of social formation rather than on the form of the state machine at the level of the mode of production, it is extremely necessary to introduce a complex conceptual system that can organize our analysis of the social foundation of state power and the nature of political crises.” [44] Gramsci and the neo-Gramscian school made contributions in this area.

However, although Gramsci and neo-Gramscian theorists examined the issue of political and ideological (hegemony) leadership and elaborated on a large number of concepts and assumptions that advance the analysis of class struggle, they tended to adopt the ” class theory ” approach rather than the “capital theory ” approach. As a result, Gramsci and neo-Gramscian theorists often underestimated or even completely ignored the restrictions on the state contained in the essence of capital and overestimated the autonomy of politics and ideology. In this regard, Poulantzas was considered to have made the mistake of political supremacism. The discourse theory developed by Laclau and Mouffe was criticized for “logocentrism” or ” text reductionism ” because Laclau and Mouffe dissolved non-discursive conditions into discursive conditions and placed language above practice and institutions . Laclau and Mouffe also dissolved the certainty of history and society into randomness and uncertainty, and were also accused of causing the randomization of history and society. Therefore, in order to give a full theoretical explanation of the capitalist state, it is necessary to recognize the particularity of politics and place the development of political forms in the analysis of capitalist production; it is necessary to distinguish the macro dimension of politics and pay attention to the micro level of politics. This can be seen as the thinking lesson we draw from our study of Gramsci and neo-Gramscian state theory.

Notes:

①It is worth pointing out that Perry Anderson argues that Gramsci has three different understandings of the relationship between leadership, civil society and the state: the first is to oppose the two, believing that leadership belongs to civil society and coercion belongs to the state; the second is that the state includes civil society and the state is the sum of civil society and political society, in other words, leadership guaranteed by coercive force; the third is that the state and civil society are unified. See Perry Anderson, The Antimonies of Antonio Gramsci, in New Left Review.No 100 (Nov.1976-Jan.1977), pp.5-78 . We adopt the second understanding here, believing that it is most useful for analyzing capitalist society.

References     

[1],[15],[20],[21],[39],[41] and [44]:Bob Jessop.The Capitalist State.Oxford, 1982., 143, 154, 154, 191-192, 191-202, 142.

[2]: Lefebvre .On the State [M]. Chongqing: Chongqing Publishing House, 1988.122.

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[4],[9],[32],[34] and [38]:Martin Carnoy.The State and Political Theory[M].Princeton, 1984.68, 124-125, 124, 97, 72.

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