Russia: Cultural and Ideological Analysis of Russian Diplomatic Philosophy

The author, Ouyang Xiangying is Doctor of Philosophy, researcher of the Institute of World Economy and Politics, attached to Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Beijing, January 4, 2021

Summary: Since the 21st century, using philosophy as a clue to explore the ideological roots behind diplomatic behavior has become a new topic in diplomatic studies. The concept of diplomatic philosophy has emerged, with its main task being to study the ways of thinking and values behind foreign policy and diplomatic Studying Russian diplomatic philosophy helps to understand the logical premise and behavioral basis of Russian foreign policy and actions. The sources of Culture of Russia are diverse. Mysticism, nationalism, utopian spirit and Marxism are the most distinctive or influential ideological traditions in Culture of Russia and constitute the main task being to study the ways of thinking and values behind foreign policy and diplomatic actions. Mysticism, nationalism, utopian spirit and Marxism are the most distinctive or influential ideological traditions in Culture of Russia and constitute the ideological source of Russian diplomacy. From Kievan Russia up to now, Russian thought has gradually developed and matured, and its great power appeal is very clear, but it has not formed a unified diplomatic philosophy, but WAS affected by different philosophical trends, and has resorted to different philosophical approaches. philosophical trends, and has resorted to different conceptual expressions at different stages. “Universal responsiveness”, Moral obligation, criticism and contradiction are the core concepts of the Russian foreign policy. Universal responsiveness”, Moral obligation, criticism and contradiction are the core concepts of diplomatic philosophy corresponding to the four ideological sources, which are clearly reflected in Russia’s foreign policy. Russia’s diplomatic practice and diplomatic philosophy are both complementary and difficult to fully align. When the national strength cannot support Russia’s magnificent strategy, the duality of “God Saint Ross” and “Barbarian CRoss” will be exposed simultaneously. The Antinomy in diplomatic ideas is an important reason for the conflict between Russia and the outside world.

Keywords: Russian Diplomacy/Diplomatic Philosophy/Russian Thought/Major Power Relations

Part 1. Russia is an amazing country.

As the Russian poet Fedor Ivanovich Tyutchev lamented, “It is impossible to understand Russia with reason.” Both Russian culture and behavior often have a transversal quality that makes it difficult to figure out their logical premises and behavioral foundations. (1)

We would also be hard pressed to find another country in the world with such a long history as Russia’s that has survived to the present day, but with a history of ideas so broken and fractured that it has almost lost its original character. Russian culture was constantly subjected to various foreign influences, mainly from Byzantium, Western Europe and Mongolia, while its own Slavic culture was disparaged as “coarse and unformed”. Due to the fragmentation of Russian culture, some even suspect that there is no özgün Russian philosophy at all.

There is some truth in this statement, for philosophy is the centralized expression of the national spirit, and for quite some time Russian philosophy has merely interpreted Western philosophy. However, as in other areas of culture, from time to time a “star” suddenly shines in Russian philosophy, which successively builds up a distinctive native Russian philosophy and takes its place in the history of world philosophy. As Semyon L. Frank puts it, “Inherent in the Russian spirit is an intention for completeness, for an all-embracing concrete totality, for an ultimate supreme value and foundation, thus making the Russian mind and spiritual life not only religious in its inner nature, but also this religiosity pervades all the external spheres of spiritual life.” (2) This “all external spheres of spiritual life” naturally includes diplomacy. Russian diplomacy draws its ideas, methods and values from philosophy.

Although there is still no conclusion on “what is philosophy of diplomacy”, (3) it has become a new topic in the study of diplomacy to use philosophy as a clue to dig out the ideological roots behind diplomatic behavior. Hans J. Morgenthau has repeatedly emphasized the importance of philosophy in diplomacy and international relations and has referred to his own research as “philosophy of international relations”. In “The Great Diplomacy”, Henry Kissinger suggests that international relations should be grasped from the heights of diplomatic philosophy. Western scholars and theorists such as Hedley Bull, Francis Fukuyama, Samuel P. Huntington, and Zbigniew Brzezinski have pondered the nature of diplomacy at the philosophical level. There is also a new generation of scholars such as Richard Weitz, (4) A. Pablo Iannone (5) and Emil Vlajki, (6) A series of articles have been written around the philosophy of diplomacy.

Since the 21st century, China’s international relations academy has paid increasing attention to diplomatic philosophy. In the existing studies, there are two basic ideas for constructing China’s diplomatic philosophy: first, from the perspective of Neo-Confucianism, combining with traditional Chinese culture to find the roots for China’s millennium diplomacy; second, from the perspective of Marxism, focusing on the value orientation and the evolution process of contemporary China’s foreign policy.

The concept of “Russian philosophy of diplomacy” is used in other senses: first, the study of Russian philosophy of diplomacy, which primarily describes the progress made by Russia in the field of philosophy of diplomacy; The second is a philosophical study of Russian diplomacy, focusing on refining and summarizing the philosophical dimensions of Russian diplomacy. Despite not utilizing the concepts of diplomatic philosophy, Alexei D. Bogaturov, Pavel A. Tsygankov, Nikolay A. Kosolapov, and Maria M. Lebedeva’s Their philosophical writings have pushed the study of Russian diplomacy into line with the world. In 2005, Eduard Y. Batalov’s book “Philosophy of International Relations” was published in Moscow. (7) The book illustrates the differences and connections between international relations and the philosophy of international relations and analyzes the ontology of international relations as well as cognitive, moral, aesthetic, and anthropological dimensions, playing a seminal role in the study of the philosophy of diplomacy in Russia. In 2019, Theory of International Relations as Political Philosophy and Science by Tatiana A. Alekseeva appeared, discussing the ontological, epistemological and methodological foundations of international studies in the context of history and realpolitik. (8)

In short, not much has been written on Russian diplomacy from a philosophical perspective, but the reading of Russian foreign policy from an ideological and cultural perspective is a tradition in the academic world. For example, the five-volume History of Diplomacy, edited by Russian scholar Vladimir P. Potemkin, Kim and others, the five-volume History of Russian Foreign Policy, edited by Andrei N. Sakharov, a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and Andrei A. Gromyko, edited.and others, are the product of a combination of history and theory. Philosophical formulations by international relations scholars tend to be less philosophical, preferring instead to read diplomatic behavior and policy in terms of the history of ideas or national character, independent of the ontological, epistemological, and linguistic turns of philosophy in the traditional sense. Bringing philosophical meta-problems into international relations and analyzing them in the context of Russian diplomatic traditions and practice is the aim of this paper.

II. Ideological sources of Russian diplomacy

Russia is a diplomatic power. It is a diplomatic power not only because of its vast territory, but also because it has its own diplomatic philosophy and is able to synthesize a wide range of cultural traditions. Diplomacy is a continuation of internal affairs and is bound to reflect the political culture and traditions of the country, of which political philosophy is the root.

Going back to its roots, the most distinctive characteristic of Russian philosophy is its religious character. “Russian atheism, nihilism, and materialism have religious overtones,” and even “Russian philosophy is religious.” (9) “The fundamental features of the process of development of philosophical thought in Russia, as well as the main sources of various processes of complication, depend on it.” (10) Of course, there are scholars who oppose the philosophy of religion as the basic characteristic of Russian philosophy. (11) Here, this paper proposes that religios character is the most prominent feature of Russian philosophy. Scientificity was an aspect of Russian philosophy, and the philosophy of science prevailed for a time in the USSR and achieved a high level of success. And ethnicity cannot be ignored in Russian philosophy, without which it cannot be called Russian philosophy. At the same time, Russian philosophy was deeply influenced by Western philosophy, and after localization of Western philosophy, it took an evolutionary path combining discursiveness and radicalism. Taken together, mysticism, nationalism, utopian spirituality, and Marxism are the most characteristic intellectual traditions of Russian culture, and they constitute the ideological sources of Russian diplomacy.

(i) Mysticism

When we use the word “mysticism” in the sense of “mysticism,” it takes on an epistemological coloring of “returning from the outer world to the inner, in a meditative, contemplative, or ecstatic mental state of union with or dissolution into God or some supreme principle”. The epistemological color of combining or dissolving the highest principles. Attempts to solve the universal problems of the Western world on the basis of Orthodox values are a characteristic feature of Russian philosophy. As Mikhail A. Bulgakov has said, mysticism is the air of Orthodoxy,(12) and therefore Russian diplomatic philosophy is inevitably characterized by mysticism.

While all religious philosophies are inevitably oriented toward mysticism, mysticism is particularly evident in Solovyov’s philosophy. Vladimir S. Solovyov, the originator of Russian philosophy of religion in the late 19th century and an outstanding representative of the systematization and nationalization of Russian philosophy, put forward the important concept of “complete understanding”. In Solovyov’s view, “complete knowledge” means abandoning the false principles and absurd conclusions of empiricism and rationalism, basing oneself on mysticism and absorbing the objective content of these schools.( empiricism and rationalism) The combination of “integral knowledge” and “purposeful creation” constitutes “integral society” and “integral life”. “Whole society” and “Whole life”. However, “no change in social relations, no reconstruction of social forms, can satisfy the eternal demands and questions which determine human life itself …… These eternal questions about the inner meaning of life, about the sublime purpose of human activity, will still be powerfully and endlessly referred to our before us”.(13)

How can these eternal problems be solved? Solovyov pointed out that Eastern, Western and Slavic civilizations are the three main historical forces that have determined human civilization, but that the first two civilizations have fallen into the “quagmire of dead unity” and “a state of universal egoism and anarchy”, respectively, and that the world can be resurrected and renewed only by relying on the Slavic civilization, which is based on Orthodoxy, and which is represented by the Russian nation. “The ideal of sanctity is to enable Holy CRoss to do ‘holy things,’ that is, to unite the churches, to spiritually (religiously) reconcile East and West, and to unite them in the human-godly unity of worldwide Christianity.” (14)

On the 14th of September, the Greek Orthodox Church commemorates the Feast of the Universal Exaltation of the Precious and Life-Giving Cross, which is a blessed day and a celebration of the tremendous power of the Cross of our Lord. Through the Cross, the power and wisdom of God have been revealed. By the Cross, we are reconciled to Christ, and we can find true and enduring peace. It is the Cross that directs us to Christ and to the way of salvation and eternal life. The Feast commemorates the finding of the True Cross of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ by Saint Helen, the mother of the Emperor Constantine. In the twentieth year of his reign in 326, Emperor Constantine sent his mother Saint Helen to Jerusalem to venerate the holy places and to find the site of the Holy Sepulchre and of the Cross. Relying upon the oral tradition of the faithful, Saint Helen found the precious Cross together with the crosses of the two thieves crucified with our Lord. However, Helen had no way of determining which was the Cross of Christ.

The fact that Solovyov elevates Slavic civilization based on Orthodoxy to such a high level does not mean that he fully identifies with the reality of the Orthodox Church and the Russian state. Quite the contrary, he was very critical of church and state. According to Solovyov, it is necessary to reform both Church and State and to establish an “ecumenical” Church, following the example of the Holy See in the Vatican. This is also a reflection of the fact that although the Byzantine Empire had a positive influence on Russia and gave the Russians confidence in their “superiority over the pagans,” the brutal rule of the Mongol Khanate severely undermined the Russians’ confidence and made them realize the need for religious reform. Solovyov believes that Russia’s task is not to emulate the West or the East, but to follow its own unique path. The revival of Slavic civilization based on Orthodoxy is at the root of the revival of world civilization.

Mysticism gives Orthodox Christianity a sacred status and provides theoretical support for the “divine right of kings”… From sanctity to sacred alliance, mysticism left a distinctive mark on Russian foreign policy. Alexander I, Emperor of the Russian Empire, the initiator of the Holy Alliance, was a mystic. As representatives of the defeated nations of the Fourth Coalition against France, Alexander I ( Emperor of the Russian Empire and French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte met in 1807 on a raft in the Neman River near Tilsit to discuss terms of peace. Two emperors discussed terms not only for peace but for a Franco-Russian alliance. This first treaty was signed between Napoleon and Alexander on 7 July and granted Russia favorable terms; the second treaty, signed on 9 July with King Frederick William III of Prussia was much harsher. Despite the impassioned pleas of Queen Louise of Prussia, Napoleon forced the Prussians to cede nearly half of their pre- war territories, out of which he established the Kingdom of Westphalia and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw as French client states.

Representatives of the two sides signed the Franco-Russian Peace Treaty, which stipulated that most of the area west of the Elbe River, which had previously belonged to Prussia, was to be transferred to the newly created Kingdom of Westphalia, with Jerome Bonaparte, Napoleon’s younger brother, as its king; that the Duchy of Warsaw was to be established in the area seized by Prussia during the Second and Third Divisions of Poland, with the king of Saxony as its monarch; that Gdansk was to become a free city; the Białystok region was transferred to Russia. Białystok , city, capital of Podlaskie region northeastern Poland. It is located in the undulating Podlasie Plain. Russia recognized Napoleon’s brother Joseph Bonaparte as King of Naples and Louis Bonaparte as King of Holland, promised to transfer the Gulf of Cataract to France, and recognized French sovereignty over the Ionian Islands. The Treaty of Alliance between France and Russia, signed at the same time, stipulated that Russia would sever diplomatic relations with Great Britain and participate in the continental blockade against Britain in the event of her rejection of the terms of peace proposed by Russia, and that France and Russia would act concertedly against Turkey in the event of İstanbul’s refusal to mediate or of failure to achieve a satisfactory outcome of the Russian-Turkish negotiations within a period of three months. The Peace of Tilsit, which included the Franco-Russian Peace Treaty, was a complete failure for Prussia, but a redivision of Poland among France and Russia. Speaking of Russia’s successive defeats to France at the Battle of Austerlitz and the Battle of Friedland, yet Russia was able to sign with France the Peace of Tilsit, which partitioned Europe, Engels exclaimed, ” an advantage Russia’s strategically secure position gave it. Though it was defeated in both wars, it gained new territory by sacrificing its own yesterday’s allies, and formed an alliance with Napoleon to divide the world: the West to Napoleon, the East to Alexander I ” (15)

After defeating Napoleon in 1815, Russia Çerı Alexander I called upon Emperor Franz II of Austria and King Frederick William III of Prussia to enter into a conservative political alliance and issued a declaration stating that the three countries belonged to “three branches of the same family” under God. The declaration stated that the three countries belonged to the “three branches of the same family” under God and that they would conduct their relations with each other in accordance with the traditional Christian creed of the West. The countries of the Holy Alliance must provide each other, whenever and wherever possible, with economic, military and other assistance for the maintenance of the borders redrawn at the Vienna Conference and for the suppression of revolutions. In the same year, Russia, Britain, Prussia and Austria signed the Quadruple Alliance. Three years later, France joined in. Eventually, European monarchs joined, with the exception of the British Regent, the Ottoman Sultan and the Pope. By the 1820s and 1830s, revolutionary storms swept through Spain, Italy, Greece, Russia, France, and Belgium, and the conservative Holy Alliance was on its way to disintegration. Nevertheless, the Holy Alliance remains significant for Russian diplomacy. It was the first international arrangement to be launched by the initiative of Russia and always played a significant role in it, and although it did not last long, it changed Russia’s marginalization in Europe to a considerable extent.

The high status of mysticism in Russian politics was also manifested in the interplay between theocracy and the state. Although Russia was a secular state, the Orthodox Church has a wide range of believers, including many heavyweights, which is the social basis for the Church’s participation in major events at home and abroad. To this day, the Russian Orthodox Church maintains contacts not only with secular international organizations, such as the European Union and the United Nations, but also interacts actively with religious international organizations, such as the World Council of Churches, and uses its patrimony for Russian political purposes in Palestine, cooperating with its “sister churches” in Georgia on the Ossetian issue. Some scholars have argued that, with the Orthodox Church’s status as a transnational subject, Russia has engaged in religious diplomacy, strengthening Slavic identity in Belarus and Serbia, enhancing cooperation with Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Northern Macedonia and Montenegro on the basis of common beliefs, and fostering pro-Russian forces in Ukraine, Georgia and Estonia. (16) The Russian Church’s spiritual guidance of the nation and its participation in the politics of the country should be given attention.

(ii) Nationalism

Nationalism, combined with patriotism, constitutes the basic sentiment of a nation. At the beginning of the 16th century, Philotheus of Pskov created the doctrine of “Moscow-Third Rome”, i.e., two Romans had fallen, the third, the Russian Empire, was still standing, and there would be no fourth Rome. Alongside “Divine Doomsday”, Filofei’s theory contains a purely political program. Philotheus of Pskov (or Filofei) (1465–1542) was a hegumen of the Yelizarov Monastery, near Pskov , in the 16th century. He argued that all Christian nations should be integrated into one Russian empire, and that Moscow should be given the status of depositary of the only true Christian, i.e., Orthodox, faith, and thus it is the only kingdom of global significance. The doctrine of the “Third Rome” was far-reaching.

The rise of nationalism in Russia was no accident. If Peter the Great opened the way to Westernization, the victory in the Patriotic War of 1812 greatly boosted Russian self-confidence and drew intellectuals’s attention back to itself. The discussion of the “Idea of Russia” and the “Essence of Russia” was once a hot topic. Although French Enlightenment and German Romanticism still held a great deal of influence, the Russian intelligentsia no longer blindly imitated the West, but were convinced that Russia would eventually find its roots and the guarantees of moral freedom in philosophy. In a letter published in 1836, Pyotr Y. Chaadayev, who had been denounced as a “madman”, mercilessly and harshly condemned Russian society. He says pessimistically, “We belong to a people which cannot be a member of the human family, which exists only to teach the world some important lesson.” (17) This was Pyotr Y. Chaadayev’s understanding of Russia’s destiny. Russia’s destiny is pessimistic because it is constantly trial and error, but at the same time Russia’s destiny is majestic because one day it will have to take on the mission of providing a solution to all problems of mankind.

Chadaev was convinced of the existence of a “world history”, whose subject is the whole of humanity, “but the essence of the ‘world history’ is not the mixing of peoples into a cosmopolitan mixture, but in the different destinies of the peoples – in the different paths of the different peoples – each of which is a ‘moral individual'”. individual destinies, in the different paths of the different peoples-each of which is a ‘moral individual’.” (18) His thinking was in line with filozof Hegel, who believed that the spirit of the world realizes itself through the spirit of the nation, and that the ultimate purpose of mankind exists in the history of the world. Reason replaces the monarch as the supreme ruler. It can be seen that the Russian intellectuals were skeptical about the “divine right of kings”, which originated from mysticism, but they were still enthusiastic about the “doctrine of divine providence” and moral salvation of human reason.

Nationalism has been the soul of the Slavophile ideologs and their followers. One of its founders, Aleksey S. Khomyakov, was a rationalist. He believed that the course of history is essentially a process of self-expansion of the rational spirit, and that the purpose of historiography is to think deeply about the destiny of mankind through the chaos of events. Aleksey S. Khomiakov was both opposed to the West and critical of Russia, which was in opposition to it. He argued that Russian society at the time was characterized not only by slavery violence and bureaucracy, but also by a general lack of human rights and a lack of individual personhood and dignity. If Russia does not wake up to its worldwide mission and find a special path, it will not be able to “liberate mankind from the one-sided and false process of development that history has begun under the influence of the West”. (19) Other representatives of the early Slavophiles also paid full attention to epistemology and, on this basis, put forward specific positions different from those of Western philosophy.

As much as they were anti-Western and critical of Russia at the time, they were also clearly opposed to following the Eastern path, believing that Russia could be headed for destruction if it followed the old path of Eastern despotism. Koustantin S. Aksakov presented Tsar Alexander II with a “Report on the Internal Condition of Russia,” stating that the lack of freedom in Russian society was the root cause of the government’s lack of credibility despite its strong power. It was the lifelong quest of the Slavophiles to construct a system of thought that overcame idealism and was closely related to real life, which could be used to guide Russian social practice, to perfect it, and to truly represent and practice the spirit of orthodox Christianity. Without exception, they were concerned with the philosophy of history, did not recognize Catholicism and Protestantism as universal, and believed that Orthodoxy should have an exalted place in philosophy. A return to religion became the spiritual aspiration of the Slavophiles, as did the Later period Slavophiles.

Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, an advocate of “neo-Slavism”, believed that Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are the “own people” of the East Slavic peoples with a unified ethnic origin, religious beliefs and cultural traditions. In the opinion of Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are the “own” East Slavic peoples with unified ethnic origins, religious beliefs and cultural traditions. This view had its origins. Russians have always believed that Greater Russia, Little Russia, Belarus, and Red Russia (Galicia) together form Greater Russia, and accordingly, the Greater Russians, Lesser Russians, Belarusians, and Rusyns (inhabitants of Galicia and the Carpathian Mountains region) constitute the Russians. The name “Little Rus’/Russia” went out of use in the late 15th century.[2] It was revived again in late 18th century. Then “Little Russia” developed into a political and geographical concept in Russia, referring to most of the territory of modern-day Ukraine, especially the territory of the Cossack Hetmanate. Accordingly, derivatives such as “Little Russian” (Russian: Малоросс, romanized: Maloross )[a] were commonly applied to the people, language, and culture of the area. A large part of the region’s elite population adopted a Little Russian identity that competed with the local Ukrainian identity. The territories of modern-day southern Ukraine, after being annexed by Russia in the 18th century, became known as Novorossiya (“New Russia”).[4]

However, the collapse of the Soviet Union hit the Great Russianists hard. After the collapse of the Soviet Union former “Russia’s borders in the Caucasus have retreated to the 19th century; in Central Asia they have retreated to the middle of the 19th century. Even more dramatic and distressing was the fact that in the west, Russia’s borders retreated to around 1600 i.e. shortly after the reign of ‘The Terrible’ Ivan IV. The loss of the Caucasus revived strategic fears of a resurgence of Turkish influence. The loss of Central Asia has created a sense of loss of the region’s rich energy and mineral resources, as well as concerns about potential Islamic challenges. Ukraine’s independence, in turn, has shaken the very foundation of the claim that Russia is the providential flag-bearer of a common pan-Slavic identity.” (20) It was on this basis that the Communist Party of the Russian Fedaration advocated the restoration of the Greater Russia, Lesser Russia, and Belarusian Union, while the ultra-nationalist Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky favored a move southward to expand Russia’s interests into the Indian Ocean.

Nationalism is not wrong in itself, but if it morphs into narrow nationalism or expansionist nationalism, it will not be able to unite the spiritual forces of the multinational state and the post-Soviet space, and it will also adversely affect the real interests of other countries. It has always been a challenge for the Russian state to harness the nationalistic sentiments of Russians and channel nationalistic sentiments towards patriotism and struggle rather than selfish exclusion and militarism. If the transformation does not go smoothly, Russia will always appear as a “hungry bear”, irritating the nerves of neighboring countries which will worsen its external environment.

(iii) Utopianism

As early as the 18th century, following the translation into Russian of The Adventures of Telemachus, a long novel of a fantastical nature by the French Archbishop of Cambrai, Francois Fenelon, Utopia by the English state activist Thomas More was introduced to Russia. This allowed the Russians, on the one hand, to escape from the kind of Western way of life and philosophy that had previously enamored them, and, on the other hand, to fill their declining religious thinking with some strong illusions. The outstanding representatives of Russian humanism in the 18th century combined reason and virtue and were concerned with the place of human nature in the relations of life, showing a tendency towards “pan-moralism”. The core of pan-moralism was fraternity and the desire to build a society in which all people were equal, and its paths could be divided into radicalism and nihilism.

There was a very important faction in Russian thought – the Westernizationists – whose spiritual essence was radicalism. They were explorers of the Russian way, except that they believed that everything Russian should be discarded and that total westernization was the best path from barbarism to civilization. The Westernizers appeared as early as the beginning of the Romanov dynasty, and their numbers increased dramatically with the reforms of Peter the Great, enjoying a uniquely revered position among the Russian elite until the 19th century. It can be said that in the Golden Age and even in the Silver Age, the hearts of Russian intellectuals generally yearned for the West, and as the saying goes, “We Russians have two homelands – Europe and our Rus”. Europe is not a foreign land for Russians, but a spiritual home. However, the most embarrassing thing for Russians is the fact that they cannot integrate into the European mainstream, which forced some of Russians to explore alternative paths of development.

The etymology of nihilism is the Latin word “nihil”, meaning “nothing”. As a result of ” such nihilizm Russian thought in the nineteenth century can be directly described as an appendage of German thought”, (21) At that time, Alman düşünür Fichte and the Young Hegelians were going further and further down the road of nihilism, so that the Europeanized intellectuals in Russia embraced nihilism to varying degrees. They carried nihilism through their actions and carried out ideological liberation movements and social movements that denied the old traditions and values. The great Russian thinker Nikolai A. Berdyaev pointed out that behind Russian nihilism lay religious and moral motives aimed at demanding the end of history and expecting a new life to begin after the end. (22) In a sense, radicalism and nihilism are related in spirit, for they both “deny the past, history, tradition, and absurdly seek to build a pure utopia in the middle of nowhere.” (23) Berdyaev even argues that nihilism is also a form of radicalism, that it is “a radical form of the Russian Enlightenment. This is the dialectics and unity of oppsites in the development of the Russian spirit and Russian consciousness.” (24)

Westernization has had a great impact on the reality of foreign policy, which has manifested itself in the identification with Atlanticism and even in the full convergence with the Western bloc led by the United States. After the severe weakening of Russia near to the end of the 20th century and the sanctions and blockade after the Ukrainian crisis, Russia’s dream of “Westernization” has been gradually shattered, but “the destruction of the myth will not lead to the triumph of its rival, pure reason: one myth will only give way to another”. One myth will only give way to another myth “.(25) It may be a cult of consumption and markets, a reverence for science and technology, or an expectation of allies and new partnerships. Once the myth is shattered again, Russia could once again see a major revolution-like turnaround based on the extremism and dichotomy inherent in the Russian character.

The utopian spirit was a very unique part of Russian culture and laid the foundation for the later spread of Marxism in Russia. The most important theoretical contribution of the famous anarchist Mikhail A. Bakunin was precisely revolutionary utopianism. His close friend Vissarion A. Belinsky was obsessed with utopian (Vissarion A. Belinsky) socialism, while Alexander E. Herzen showed early tendencies towards political and social radicalism. Herzen, in particular, when he realized the supremacy of commercial values over all values and the extreme poverty of the spirit in Europe at that time, shattered his faith in the West and turned to the Russian village community for all his social ideals. Enlightened by these democratically-minded intellectuals, Russian radicalism came to the stage of history in the late period of Nikola I (Ⅰ). Nikolai G. Chernyshevsky, the son of a priest, was a man of great erudition, not only fluent in many European languages, including Latin, Greek and Hebrew, but also in the philosophy of science, history, aesthetics, sociology, ethics and biology. Through his critique of Hegel and his study of ünlü alman filozof Feuerbach, he established his own humanistic and materialistic worldview and soon became the leader of the radicals and socialists within the Russian society. And his spiritual companion Peter L. Lavrov became the leader of a revolutionary publishing organization abroad and became a member of the Comintern. They all advocated freedom, and their doctrines and actions were filled with idealistic passions and characterized by utopianism.

This kind of pan-moralism has been brewing and fermenting in Russian literature and art, and finally gave birth to the great writer Leo Tolstoy in the 19th century. As the strongest and most distinctive expression of the Russian philosophy of individualism, Tolstoy pursued eternal and absolute goodness, while at the same time advocated “non-resistance to evil”. Fyodor M. Dostoevsky was also an uncompromising utopian, and in his view “love and true education are a great work. This is my utopia.” (26) The pan-moralists’ deep sympathy for the poor and their fascination with socialist programs are both associated with utopian spirituality and linked to religious inquiry. In addition to objective socio-economic reasons, pan-moralism was the ideological basis for a number of later events, including the serddom abolitionist movement, the Decembrist uprising, and even the October Revolution. Serddom abolitionist Reforms in Russia have always been conducted before the broad masses of people came to conclusion that they were necessary and timely. Thus serfdom was abolishedjust because the authorities and the learned society came to conclusion that it was nomore possible to withhold the existing state of affairs. However it was not at all exhaustedfrom the point of view of economics (P. B. Struwe wrote about it in his wellknown bookon economics of serfdom).Serfdom could well go on and on; it was the authorities that abolished it. The general thesis of Soviet literature consisted in emphasizing that serfdom was unprofitable andineffective; this thesis was not in complete concordance with historical facts. Only a third of landlords were concordant with abolition of slavery; two thirds were against it, justbecause it was quite profitable for them

(iv) Marxism

“Russian culture lacks a transitional middle ground, lacks a an intermediate stage, an intermediate link in the course of its vertical development, always jumping from one end to the other without transition stage, as in the case of the polytheistic culture before the ‘baptism of Rus’ to the Orthodox culture, and from the religious culture before the October Revolution to the Soviet-era Communist culture, all of them focus on the extremely distinctive interruptions and jumps that characterize the process of cultural development in Russia and Soviet Union.” (27) Marxism is a philosophy of struggle and Marxism is atheist. As a foreign culture, on the one hand the rationality of Marxism’s existence and popularity in Russia can be explained by its historical origins in radicalism and pan-moralism, and on the other hand its conflict with tree-hugging mysticism and nationalism compels concern about its future prospects.

Russia’s most famous native thinkers were mostly religious philosophers, and there was a clear break between their thinking and post-1917 Revolutions in Russia. However, as a philosophy of enduring vitality, Marxism has borne fruit not only in the socialist Soviet Union, but also has a place in today’s Russia. Georgii V. Plekhanov was an early Russian Marxist. He held amoralist views and denied the innate nature of religious needs, yet this did not prevent him from having high moral standards and an ardent quest for truth. Alexander A. Bogdanov was also an early Marxist, with the difference that he took a revisionist position towards Marxism. Plekhanov once blamed Bogdanov for turning to “an adherent of Machism,” but Bogdanov believed that he was only developing a Marxist epistemology.

Lenin and Plekhanov had many conversations about philosophy, and his philosophical studies continued uninterrupted after he became a revolutionary leader. Lenin accepted Immanuel Kant’s notion of the “thing-in-itself” and purposed it as “the thing for us”. The idea of “practice” as the key link from “things in themselves” to “things for us” and as the criterion for evaluating truth laid the foundation for Russian the revolution. “The path of history has been traveled, and beyond is the cliff and the abyss, or the fall, or the leap, the path of superhistory, the religion.” (28) “Leap” is the central concept put forward by Lenin, referring to the revolutionary transformation into the dictatorship of the proletariat. According to him, all the obstacles to the transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat are “untrue”, and the whole impetus for the “leap” has to do with the “transformation of being”. Berdyaev was also a Marxist in his early years, but he sought to combine transcendental idealism with a Marxist social program, and in his later years moved from idealism to religious ideology, which was already far from Marxism. Intriguingly, Russian thinkers tended to slip from their natural affinity for Marxism to its antithesis. Unlike other thinkers, Lenin was a staunch Marxist who wrote many articles refuting revisionists and anti-Marxists of all shapes and sizes and promoting the integration of Marxist theory into the practice of the Russian Revolution.

The prosperity of Marxist philosophy appeared under Stalin. Despite later criticisms that Sovyet Marksist philosopher fMark B. Mitin’s textbooks has systematized and politicized Marxism, and Stalin’s own On Dialectical and Historical Materialism vulgarized and dogmatized the Soviet philosophical system, the status of the official philosophy led to the systematic organization, interpretation, and popularization of Marxism. Guided by the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was established in 1917, formed the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) together with Ukraine, Belarus and the Transcaucasian Federation in 1922, and ultimately developed into a federal state with 15 constituent republics. With the support of the Soviet Union, eight people’s democracies were established in Central and Eastern Europe between 1944 and 1949, which together with the Soviet Union formed a “parallel world market” to rival the capitalist system and this profoundly changed the world landscape. “For scholars of foreign policy in Marxist-Leninist countries, pointing out the explanatory power of ideology is a central issue.” (29) According to Vyacheslav M. Molotov, then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, “We have created our own socialist Germany in parts of Germany, while Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, etc. are still in a state of instability, and there must be a general reorganization of the order and elimination of the capitalist stuff. And this gave rise to the so-called Cold War.” (30)

The capitalist camp, on the other hand, argued that out of a traditional view of security and Marxist-Leninist ideology, “Russia, though generally hostile to the West, has so far remained a relatively weak state, its policies are flexible, and Soviet society contains the seeds of decay. This requires the United States to be confident in a firm policy of containment and to use irrevocable counterforce at every point where the Russians show signs of encroaching on world peace and stability.” (31) The philosophical struggle in diplomacy became an important part of the soft power contest between the great powers during the Cold War period. In the 1960-1980s, Soviet philosophy made a series of important achievements in epistemology, philosophy of natural science, philosophy of education, philosophy of culture and philosophy of ethics, which advanced the popularization of philosophy, but also suffered from the problem of rigidity.

At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, with the launching of the ideological liberation movement, the Soviet philosophical community began to shift from “dogmatism” to “humanism”. (32) The “radical deniers” led by Alexander N. Yakovlev and the “defenders” led by Richard I. Kosolapov fought fiercely in the field of ideology. Teodor I. Oizerman’s critical reflection on Marxist philosophy opened up a new path, because he was against both wholesale overthrow of Marxism and copying. However, at this time, Western philosophy and Russian religious philosophy returned back strongly, and Marxist philosophy was marginalized as “hegemonic philosophy” and “slave philosophy”. This situation lasted for almost 20 years and did not change until the beginning of the 21st century. Lenin’s and Stalin’s philosophies have been reappraised, and in particular Lenin’s “theory of imperialism” has been given renewed attention and recognized as still relevant to understanding the relationship between capitalism and socialism today. The Marxist theory of globalization has been taken seriously, and “globalization” has even been included as a hot topic of study in the philosophy section of the State Education Programs of the Russian Federation.

The reasons for this change are profound and complex, and are related both to the deepening of Russians’ understanding of capitalism and to the philosophical community’s rational reflection on the historical achievements of the USSR, reflecting changes in Russia’s socio-economic conditions and in its understanding of the outside world. The answer to the question of Russia’s relations with the world must be based on reflection on Western civilization, concern for the future of mankind, and exploration of Russia’s future role. While affirming that Western civilization has played a catalytic role for the aleyhine of Russian society, most russians and elites see the current stage of globalization as the globalization of American imperialism and the capitalist system, and are highly wary of the risks of homogeneity, formalization, and moral degradation that imperialist economic globalization poses to global politics and culture.

The above summary of the ideological sources of Russian diplomacy does not exhaust everything. Liberalism, conservatism, positivism, intuitionism, humanism and scientism are all integral parts of Russian philosophy and are bound to have a direct or indirect influence on Russian diplomatic thought. It is just that mysticism, nationalism, utopianism and Marxism have either a deeper historical tradition or a more significant social effect in Russia than other above mentioned social trends, and thus constitute the most valuable spiritual wealth of Russian diplomatic thought.

Chapter III. Core concepts and policy manifestations of Russia’s Diplomatic Philosophy

Philosophy is the creation of concepts. (33) Unlike Chinese diplomatic philosophy, which has developed the concept of “peace”, Russian thought, despite its gradual maturation from Kievan Rus’ to the present day and the clarity of its great-power aspirations, has not formed a unified diplomatic philosophy, but has been influenced by different philosophical currents and has resorted to different conceptual expressions at different stages. However, this does not mean that Russia’s foreign policy is only fractured and without continuity. At many important life-and-death moments in Russia’s history, at urgent junctures in determining the priority directions of Russian diplomacy, Russian diplomacy has more than once looked to the past for lessons, such as the “Gorchakov Doctrine”, which has been brought up many times by the former Minister of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Igor S. Ivanov, and by the current Minister of the Foreign Ministry, Sergey V. Lavrov. “Gorchakovism”.

After the defeat in the Crimean War, Y. M. Gorchakov served as foreign minister during the most difficult period of isolation in Russian politics (1856-1882), leading the development of a new diplomatic program. His diplomatic program had two main points: first, to prioritize domestic issues and stop actively intervening in European affairs; and second, to expand alliances and refocus the strategy from the West to the Middle and Near East. This is the same as Russia’s foreign policy after the recent Crimean referendum.

Although Russia is a major diplomatic power, not all of its policies have been successful, and some of them have failed to improve the international environment and have exacerbated external hostility. As former minister Ivanov puts it, “the concept of continuity in foreign policy encompasses not only an understanding of positive historical experience, but also of negative historical experience.” (34) Recognizing historical mistakes and avoiding repeating them should be the value of the existence of negative historical experiences. However, the damarcation line between positive and negative experiences is not absolute. When they are applied to diplomatic practice, the consequences may have less to do with experience per se than with the actual level of operation. This part below distills four concepts from Russian diplomatic thought and argues that they form the core of diplomatic philosophy.

(i) “Ecumenical responsiveness”

When we endeavor to extract from mysticism a core concept related to diplomacy, “ecumenical responsiveness” is undoubtedly the most appropriate. This concept comes from Dostoevsky and refers to the ability to empathize with the disasters of others, the ability to give assistance, the ability to accept others, and the ability to reinvent oneself. It transcends the quest for a single nation-state and has two sources: religious salvation and great power ambitions. Thus, “ecumenical responsiveness” is a secular concept. This idea is well explained by both Solovyov and Berdyaev, and although they may argue in different ways, the message of “presence” is the same.

In Orthodox theology there exists a unique “Aya Sophia Doctrine”. Agia Sophia, akin to Mother Earth and the Goddess of Wisdom, has also been abstracted by many philosophers as the mystical foundation and original driving force of the universe. Aya sofya was the remnant of Byzantine Enpire. In Solovyov’s view, Sophia is a “universal entity,” not only an entity of God, but also the cause and goal of God’s creation, the fundamental law of all things in heaven and earth. In other words, Sophia was the first motivation that drove God to create the world. This “Madonna worship” led metaphysics to anthropology, and the power of love came to the fore, leading the whole world to the ultimate goal of “the unity of all things”. Around this idea of Solovyov, the school of “Philosophy of the Unity of All Things” developed.

However, in life, people’s thoughts are full of differences and lack of care for each other, which is a reality that philosophers have to face. Another philosopher, Nikolai F. Fyodorov, gives a different answer to the question of how to deal with the relationship between alienation and “universality”. He argues that the essence of contemporary civilization is that the human heart is headed for total division and that the end of the catastrophe is the end of the world. “Everything in contemporary times is in the service of war, and there is no invention which the soldier is not making full use of with the intention of using it for war, and it is obvious that everything that man does is evil.” (35) Fyodorov points the finger at the relationship between man and nature and man and man and reveals that the root of the contradiction lies in industrialization and the savage plunder of capitalism. In order to save mankind from a situation of impending doom, he put forward the “theory of inner resurrection”, i.e., the consummation of rational, moral and artistic life. This fulfillment is not given by God, but is constructed through “action”.

Philosophers explored the path of harmony and unity in the world, both in terms of love and violence, with the aim of answering the question of Russia’s relationship with the external world. However, whether in the name of salvation or naked wars of aggression, “the aggressive expansionist policies of successive tsars, and the post-World War II Soviet strategy of great power chauvinism in international relations were essentially a continuation of the historical tradition of pan-Slavism, which has its roots in salvationism.” (36) “It is this idea of Russian salvationism, whether it appears as an official ideology, or as the theory of processed intellectuals, or as the ‘great power’ mentality of the masses, which was and still today is the ideological basis for territorial expansion. ” (37)

“Ecumenical responsiveness” resonates in reality for a long time, and especially affects Russia’s fundamental approach to global issues. The Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, introduced in 2000, states that the international order of the twenty-first century should be based on collective mechanisms for resolving key problems, the primacy of international law and the broadly democratization of international relations. “For the çağdaş modern world, a unipolar model is not only unacceptable, it is usually impossible.” (38) In order to maintain the stability of the international order and to seek a balance among the major international forces, Russia places special emphasis on the authoritative status and role of the United Nations, international mechanisms and international law.

The Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, which was reissued on 12 July 2008, highly values the role of the United Nations, noting that the role of the United Nations Security Council, as a comprehensive mechanism for safeguarding the norms of international law, is particularly important in the context of deepening globalization and security threats to peaceful development. Russia actively participates in the activities of various international organizations within the framework of the United Nations and attaches particular importance to its participation in the Economic and Social Council’s series of issues and activities relating to economic relief, development assistance, information technology and international cooperation for development, thus securing additional external resources for the country’s economic and social development. However, in their approach to globalization, while Russia’s radical reformists are fond of globalization, the centrists and the left are cautiously skeptical of it.

Judging by the premise that regional integration is more favorable to Russia, integrating the Russia’s currentperiphery has become the first priority of Russian diplomacy. Russia has not only strengthened its ties with the former Soviet republics, but has also actively expanded relations with Europe. In 1994, Russia and the EU signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement aimed at establishing an orderly common system, which entered into force in 1997. Under the slogan “European unity without borders”, Russia successfully assumed the presidency of the Council of Europe for the first time in 2006. In December 2007, the EU-Russia partnership agreement expired and negotiations on an agreement for a new bilateral relationship began. In early 2008, Russia resumed its partnership with the EU, but as a result of the outbreak of the conflict in South Ossetia (Gürcistan) in August, the EU’s interim meeting adopted a resolution to suspend negotiations. Since then, Russian-European relations have eased at times, but the challenges continued until 2010, when the 25th high-level meeting in Rostov resulted in the signing of the outline of the “Modernization Partnership” between Russia and the European Union, which accelerated the development of Russian-European relations. However, the Ukrainian crisis, which began at the end of 2014, shattered the harmony, and Europe, along with the United States, imposed sanctions on Russia, then Rusya foreign policy began to turn to the East.

Russia attaches great importance to regional international organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union and the BRICS mechanism, and has strengthened its ties with international organizations of developing countries such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the League of Arab States, the African Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.And also began Russia Africa forum in Sochi and second meeting was held in St. Petersburg. From “global presence” during the Soviet period, to “global penetration” at the beginning of the disintegration, to “global contraction” today, it is not that Russia does not want to “respond to the world”, but that it is unable to take care of the world. Russia’s contraction from a world power to a regional power is a desperate move, and once its strength grows it will inevitably re-expand and return to being a great power with world influence.

(ii) Moral obligations

No realist would deny that diplomacy serves national interests. However, Solovyov questions this, “The whole question is being asked what kind of interests are being spoken of.” (39) Solovyov argued that national wealth and power, while important interests, should not be the highest and ultimate goal of politics. Putting the interests of one’s own country and own people first will allow for international atrocities (e.g., the British oppression of the Irish and Indians, the poisoning of the Chinese with opium, and the plundering of the Egyptians), and interest is not a justification for atrocities. At times, brutal self-interest is cloaked in the gentle veil that conquest is about the inclusion of “inferior races” in a higher civilization, thus investing atrocities with a “noble” cultural mission. However, no nation is in a position to claim cultural privilege.

Just as individual morality transcends individual interests, national morality should also transcend national interests, thus making a people morally obligated to other peoples and to humanity as a whole. “To elevate one’s own interests, one’s own pretensions, to the supreme principle of the nation, as to make them the supreme principle of the individual, means to legitimize and perpetuate the strife and struggle which make human beings hate one another.” (40) According to Solovyov, although the pursuit of profit is universal, human progress lies in limiting profit and gradually moving towards truth and love. He pointed out that the supreme principle aim of all politics should be wmoral obligation, and that only the elimination of nationalism could save the souls of peoples, for interest itself was something unlimited and insatiable. Of course, moral obligation does not negate legitimate interests or the true vocation of peoples; rather it presupposes the existence of both. “The principle of moral obligation in politics includes the other two (the principle of interest and the principle of self-conceit), and is the most complete principle, the most certain and intrinsically correct. But more importantly for us, it is the only Christian principle.” (41)

Solovyov laid down a code for politics and diplomacy, namely the fulfillment of moral obligations, which is quite different from the principle of interest in Western diplomatic philosophy. The introduction of moral obligations aims at overcoming narrow immediate interests, while introducing the more profound national interest of “moral supremacy” into the political analytical perspective. Through this concept, Russia is incarnated as the voice of political morality, delivering justice in international affairs. Moral obligations are reflected in foreign policy in two main ways: first, by advocating equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect among countries, on the basis of which they should cooperate to address global challenges; and second, by opposing the hegemony of great Powers and the use of violence to dismantle or destabilize the Government of a country.

On September 23, 2016, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov delivered a keynote speech during the general debate of the United Nations General Assembly. Lavrov noted that the international community faced many challenges and threats in its transition from a unilateralist and bilateralist and bi polar international order to new international relations based on polycentricity and a democratic system; there was a need to change the concept of inter-State communication and to eliminate any attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of States or to impose their own model of development on other States and peoples. Lavrov criticized the political elites of certain Western countries for their supremacy of the individualism and individual rights, exclusion of dissenters and unscrupulousness in achieving their goals, to the detriment of efforts to promote justice and fair cooperation, which would undermine the foundations of stability in the world. Russia rejects double standards and finds unacceptable the idea that “all animals are equal, but some are more equal than others”, and notes that it is inappropriate to “tell others what to do”, to reserve for oneself the right to carry out unilateral adventurous actions around the Security Council, and to criticize other countries all the time on the basis of the “principles of freedom and equality”. It was inappropriate to “dictate” to others, to reserve for themselves the right to bypass the Security Council and to take unilateral risky actions, and to always criticize other countries on the basis of the “principles of freedom and equality”.(42)

Russia advocates that the peoples of all countries have the right and the opportunity to independently choose and decide on their own ways and paths of national development. On Syria issue, for example, Russia calls on all external forces to resolve the Syrian crisis through peaceful means, in compliance with international law and respect for national sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs; and to promote the establishment of an international support group for Syria, so that the Syrian people can independently decide on the future of their country through a dialogue that is inclusive of all ethnic and religious groups. To this end, Russia acted actively to facilitate a nationwide ceasefire between the warring parties in Syria from 12 gece hours on December 30, 2016, and also assumed, together with Turkey, the obligations of a guarantor of the ceasefire status in Syria, in an effort to resolve differences between the parties regarding compliance with the ceasefire regime. On human rights issues, Russia supports the protection of human rights and opposes the use of human rights as a means of exerting political pressure. “We do not support the transformation of the Human Rights Council into a tool for political pressure, dividing countries into ‘bad’ and ‘good,’ ‘students’ and ‘mentors’ or diluting the intergovernmental character of the UN’s main human rights body.” (43) Russia rejected the politicization and araçsallaştılaması of human rights issues not only against Russia but also against other countries, believing that the use of human rights as a tool for political purposes was contrary to the principles of the Human Rights Council.

Denouncing Western hegemony, affirming one’s own justice, advocating the equality of nations, and rallying majority support are typical of moralistic thinking, but of course the ultimate goal is to develop Russia’s international interests and strengthen its international voice in the internatioınal arena.

(iii) Critiqal Aprroach in Russia’s past and today

Philosophy is an activity of critical thinking. “Russian philosophy, which ‘takes off at dusk,’ had to encounter nearly two thousand years of Western philosophy at the outset, but what is striking is that Russian thinkers absorbed and digested these rich intellectual resources with astonishing speed, and they hardly experienced the kind of topsy-turvy worship that comes with confronting a colossus before turning to criticism.” (44) Criticism inspires introspection and empowers the urge to push back. Russia has a deep tradition of critical realism not only in literature and art, but also in diplomacy, which is permeated by a spirit of critical reflection.

The concept of “reflection” comes from Hegel, which means that the concept itself sets up a “not-self”, and truly recognizes the “self” in the opposition between the “I” and the “non-self”. The Westernization school of Russia is a clear example. By comparing Russia with the West (mainly Western Europe), Russia’s rulers and elites recognized the crudeness and fragility of Slavic culture, and resolved to reform Russia in its entirety, from customs to institutions. The Slavophiles advocated the defense of national traditions, but they were also dissatisfied with the current state of affairs in Russia, and the Slavophiles, who were taking shape precisely on the basis of critical reflection on the Westernizers, proposed a different path of transformation from that advocated by the Westernizers. The same goes for old Eurasianists and today’s Neo-Eurasianists. They always refer to the former two schools of thought, and in their critique of either/or, they have developed an eclectic political advocacy.

Criticism is the soul of the utopian spirit. Though empty dreams are an essential feature of utopian spirituality, this is said at the level of solutions. The feasibility of a program determines whether it is a pipe dream or not, yet the understanding prior to proposing a program is based on critical reflection. One might question whether there is any point in critical reflection, given that critical reflection is oriented toward what might be an empty dream. In fact, critical reflection is formed in the mind, and if it stays only at that stage, pursuing it is much less meaningful. The translation of reflection into concrete guidance for reality requires a link in the middle, which is the practice. When critical reflection exists only in the mind, logical self-consistency is the only criterion for its scientific character, but this does not mean that it is a true, this does not mean that it is reality-transforming science, because reflection must be repeatedly tested by practice to become truth. As mentioned earlier, both radicalism and nihilism were programs of social reform based on a critical spirit, but they failed to integrate with the realities of Russia’s economic base and cultural traditions, and thus could not take root, but only became a sensational ideological movement.

The fact that Russian diplomacy is characterized by both realism and a tradition of critical realism is that it is both pragmatic and als tinted with idealism. With regard to the distribution of international political power, Russia believes that “the international community has a global governance deficit”. In particular, international community is faced with a large number of strategic issues, such as nuclear disarmament, diversification of development models and cultural identity. Russia supports the organization of collective action by the international community to find solutions to the common challenges faced by all humanity. The surest way to prevent global competition from being transformed into a power confrontation is to work tirelessly to ensure the collective leadership of the world’s leading nations, and that collective leadership should be geographically and civilizationally representative. In order to ensure the success of this endeavour, it is necessary to recognize the general rules of the game and to rely on the rule of law not only in national but also in international affairs. The activities of Russian diplomacy are aimed at positively influencing global processes to create a stable and ideally self-regulating polycentric system of international relations, in which Russia will rightly play the role of an important center. Today’s most serious experts and politicians agree that the main element in the development of the modern world lies precisely in the growing multipolarity.” (45)

Russia has always played the role of “critiquer” of the existing international order and rules, but it cannot only deconstruct but it cab not also construct (because it is alone not strong enough), and therefore advocates the establishment of a polycentric, stable and self-regulating system of international relations based on international law, which would ensure the collective leadership of the world’s leading countries. Relying on international democracy to build an international order is certainly the best solution for global governance, but in this era of unilateralism and hegemony, it is a matter of opinion whether it is utopian or not.

(iv) Contradictions

Paradox or contradiction is the national character of Russia. “For the Russians, it is characterized by a mixture and combination of self-contradictory and extremely antagonistic principles. The only way to characterize Russia and the Russian nation is to use the word paradox or contradiction.” (46) The dualistic structure is a distinctive feature of Russian culture, “on the same basis that the Russian nation is at once a nation of state autocracy and an anarchist freedom-loving nation, at once aspiring to nationalism and national conceit, but also ecumenical in spirit and particularly adept at embodying the whole of humanity; at once brutal and extraordinarily benevolent, at once eager to inflict suffering, and and with an almost pathological sympathy.” (47)

This ambivalence is particularly evident in the Russian aydınlar intelligentsia. They both love the people and take it upon themselves to save the lives of the people; and they despise the people and are disappointed by their ignorance. In the process of opening their eyes to the world, they envied the civilization of Europe, but also stayed in love with the long light in the monastery; they wanted to get rid of the shackles of Mongolian culture, but also had to submit to the autocracy. In the midst of great contradictions and tears, some go to extremes, some become sunken, and some are thus void.

If we are puzzled by the contradictions of the Russians, or if we suspect that their power of action is weakened by their contradictory state of mind, we may wish to revisit Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and Small Logic books in order to realize that internal contradictions within things are the root cause of development and change. Only contradictions are born and tend towards eternity. In fact, Hegel himself was a mystic, and his idea that “there is no truth but the whole bütünsel truth” deeply influenced the Russian philosophers, prompting them to pursue a larger and higher level of spiritual unity.

The contradictory character of the Russians is also reflected in their foreign policy. In its approach to the West, Russia both seeks to learn from the West and is often antagonistic to it; in its approach to the East, Russia both needs allies and fails to identify with them internally. As Bobo Lo, a leading British expert on Russian studies, has pointed out, the source of the contradictions is the lack of internal consensus, which was particularly evident in the early years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. (48)

Contradiction is a central concept of Marxism. Its basic features are reflected in Russia’s relations with both the United States and Europe, and are most evident in its dealings with the United States. In contrast to Europe and Asia, the American Continent and uSA are completely external to Russia. The Russian-American conflict began during the Soviet period, and although it was eased at some stages thereafter, the structural contradictions continue to this day. In the late period of 1940s, the two superpowers began to compete on all fronts, but not on completely equal footing. At that time, the United States, which concentrated 3/4 of the world’s total capital and 2/3 of world industrial production capacity, firmly held the dominant position in the capitalist world economy and succeeded in transforming its economic power into a huge military advantage, constantly expanding its political resources and gaining a dominant position in international relations. The consolidation of hegemony, the suppression of rivals and the maintenance of dominance became the national strategy and the number one goal of the United States, whose dissidents were, first and foremost, the socialist Soviet Union. In order to remove the obstacles, starting with the Truman administration, the United States provoked a Cold War to contain the Soviet Union, squeezing its existence on all fronts. In order to confront the United States, the Soviet Union actively developed its own economy, formed a socialist camp, advocated a parallel world economy, and expanded its sphere of influence in order to safeguard its national security.

In the 1980s, the U.S. adjusted its “containment strategy” against the Soviet Union to a “transcendence strategy,” hoping to use its own prosperity to disprove the Soviet Union’s failures, and thus to defeat the Soviet Union at all, which was advocated by Ronald Reagan. “Reagan was not interested in the details of foreign policy. He absorbed only a few basic ideas, such as the dangers of appeasement, the evils of communism, and American greatness; the analysis of substance was not his forte. Reagan may have possessed only a few basic concepts, but they all happened to be at the heart of the foreign policy of his time, and showed that grasping the general direction and having the strength of conviction could indeed hold the key to leadership.” (49) The influence of diplomatic philosophy on diplomatic soft power is evident.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S.-Russian confrontation not only continued the basic pattern of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation, but also due to the inherent contradictions between Eastern Europe and Russia and also between the former Soviet Union republics and Russia so that the U.S. has the opportunity to take advantage of the confrontation, but also exacerbated the chaos of the situation. The series of “color revolutions”, in which opposition parties in certain CIS countries, supported by hostile forces, have used the occasion of presidential and parliamentary elections to bring about regime change through non-violent means, have disrupted the traditional geostrategic landscape. (50) In 2008, the West’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence “marked the complete loss of Russia’s former political influence in ‘Eastern Europe’ and in the three Baltic States region.” (51) In order to prevent the re-emergence of Russia, the United States did not allow Russia to engage in any form of Eurasian integration, and therefore actively infiltrates the Central Asian region, expanded its military presence in South Asia and even West Asia, inculcated anti-Russian sentiments, and fosters anti-Russian political forces, which has aroused Russia’s vigilance and dissatisfaction. The United States is also using the fight against terrorism to promote American-style democracy and freedom throughout the world, essentially creating a unipolar world headed by the United States, which is all the more objectionable to Russia. Russia and the U.S. have gone toe-to-toe on issues such as the conflicts in Iran and Syria, which is a concrete manifestation of the great power game at the regional level.

However, in its relations with the United States, Russia wants to derive as many practical and, in particular, economic benefits as possible from negotiations and cooperation, rather than “reckless opposition”, let alone refusal to negotiate with the United States on issues such as large-scale reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. Russia has even joined the United States-led Open Government Partnership to develop an action plan and target requirements for the establishment of an open government and to accelerate the pace of integration into the capitalist political system.21 Since the 21th century Russia and the United States did not fall into the Cold War pattern, because both countries are well aware of the importance of each other, and constantly test each other’s bottom line but do not break through the bottom line, many times the relationship between the two countries from the bottom of the fishing up.

According to Angela E. Stent, U.S.-Russian relations have undergone four re-boots: The first, beginning in the last year of the Baba Bush Sr. administration, was brief and partial; The second, initiated by Clinton, wanted to redesign the entire Russian-American relationship; The third was initiated by Putin, who wanted Russia to become a full partner of the United States, and the fourth by Barack Obama, who aimed to improve U.S.-Russian relations, which had hit rock bottom after the Georgian War. (52) Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin met in Finland on July 16, 2018, in what is arguably the fifth reset. On April 25, 2020, the Russian and U.S. presidents issued a joint statement calling the “Spirit of the Elbe” a model of cooperation that puts aside differences, which could be seen as a sixth reboot. Although in the “Russia” under great pressure, Trump in improving U.S.-Russia relations difficult to achieve substantive results, but the United States intention dto reach a strategic balance with Russia’s intention is obvious. The multiple restarts are a testament to the importance of the U.S.-Russia relationship, but they also show that it is often at an impasse. The Russian-American tug-of-war and symbiosis is the broader context that Russian diplomacy has had to face since the beginning of their relations. Russian-American relations are characterized by both struggle and özdeşlik sameness; özdeşlik sameness cannot conceal struggle, and struggle cannot eliminate sameness, which is a typical feature of contradictions.

“Ecumenical responsiveness”, moral obligation, critique and contradiction originate from different schools of Russian thought and constitute the core concepts of Russian foreign philosophy, which are fully reflected in both foreign policy and practice. The analysis of continuity and rupture in Russian diplomacy should be based on these concepts, which should be used to find the coordinates for interpreting Russia’s diplomatic behavior on the spatio-temporal axis.

IV. Russia’s diplomatic practice

Knowing and doing are never difficult. The struggle between east and west, good and evil in Russian thought haunts Russians. Like the double-headed eagle on the national emblem, the Russian nation is characterized by ambivalence and hesitation, not knowing whether to look to the left or to the right, but hoping for a balance between East and West. Neo-Eurasianism, which advocates a balanced diplomacy that does not turn either to the West or to the East, has had a significant impact on contemporary Russia. Nowadays, Russia’s “looking east” implies a certain degree of strategic shift, but it does not mean that Russia has completely shifted its strategic focus to the East.

Russia’s diplomatic practice and diplomatic philosophy are both complementary and difficult to fully align. On the one hand, actions need to be guided by concepts that give legitimacy and sanctity to practice; on the other hand, the ambiguous plurality of concepts also leads to a lack of clear logic in their behavior, making it difficult to unify them in history and reality. “The Russian nation was geographically isolated from the rest of Christendom from the thirteenth century, and this condition promoted spiritual isolation and the development of national pride and national egoism.” (53) Dostoevsky summed up the “Russian idea” as the idea of a common union of human beings all over the world, and there is no doubt that the Russians have an all-European and all-world significance. When the strength of the state does not support the ambitions of the Russians, the two sides of “Sacred Rus” and “Barbaric Rus” are revealed simultaneously, and greed and selfishness are interpreted as the material basis for greater love and sanctity. This inherent dichotomy is a major reason for Russia’s difficulty in integrating with the West.

Europe condemns Russia’s performance on Crimea, yet Russia has its own argument: one is that Crimea was Russian territory before it was transferred to Ukraine in 1954, and therefore it is taking back what is rightfully its own, which has legitimacy. Secondly, there are many Russians in Crimea, and the independence of Crimea and its accession to the Russian Federation was a people s wish, an act of “salvation of compatriots” for Russia, which is of a sacred nature. However, this runs counter to the long-standing European concept of the nation-state, and also violates the agreement not to change the borders of the Union states at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union. No wonder it has been said that “writing the history of Russian expansion as a patriotic textbook to inculcate the ideology of Great Russianism in the entire population” is a consistent practice in Russia,(54) and where Russian expansionist diplomacy and moralistic philosophy are difficult to reconcile.

Russia has a love-hate relationship with Europe. Civilized Europe was the land of Russia’s aspirations. Its admiration and imitation of the French court is unprecedented, its admiration and borrowing from Italy is ubiquitous, and its in-laws with Germany and England have a long history. Yet although the Westernizers were a major force in Russia, and could even take sharp criticism (and even vilification of Russia) from Europe at face value, Europe did not böyle bir durum var diye therefore approve Russia. From the Asian point of view, Russia belongs to the European countries, but from the European point of view, Russia belonged to the despotic and backward “East” rather than to the modern and civilized “West”. Instead of dividing Eurasia by the Ural Mountains and the Ural River, a Christian-Orthodox distinction should be made. The opposition between Catholic Christianity and Orthodoxy determines a fundamental conflict between Western and Russian civilization. In Western accounts, Russia is a “mystical (i.e., uncanny and incomprehensible)” country obsessed with “conquering the world with swords and halberds,” it has “a populace willing to be enslaved by the state so that the state can enslave the rest of the world,” and “a culture spatially divided and unrecognizable,” as well as a “culture that is not a part of the world. “mysterious (i.e., uncanny and incomprehensible)” state that “spatially divides cultures and does not identify with one another”. (55)

The enormous military and economic sacrifices made by the Soviet Union to liberate Europe during the Second World War soon faded into oblivion, leaving behind the memories of the Soviet Union’s partition of Poland and the suppression of democratic movements in Eastern Europe. The most recognized in the West was the Gorbachev period. His “new thinking” doktrini gave him a high reputation in Europe and the United States, but led to the disintegration and decline of the Soviet Union. When Putin came to power in 1999, he initially tried to find a “third way” between “radical neoliberalism and reactionary traditionalism” (56), but he gradually moved towards a strategic confrontation with the United States under the pressure of the West, and his relations with Europe became complicated. Europe’s suspicion of Russia was heightened by Putin’s speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy in 2007 and the outbreak of the Russo-Georgian conflict in 2008. In 2008, the book The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia and the Threat to the West was published in the United Kingdom, calling on the West to stop its current policy of “appeasement” and to respond to the Russian challenge in a confrontational manner. (57) Although Russia’s relations with the West are not always tense, but often fractured, in general Russia is distant from Europe at the level of broader national interests and national psychology.

In fact, Europe has never been a grand unified Europe. According to Nikolai Y. Danilevsky, a Russian natural scientist and culturist, there were two large cultures in Europe, Latin-Germanic and Slavic. Although it has been argued that his view of Germans, English, French, Dutch, Swedes, Poles and Ancient Greeks as Latin-Germanic culture types is not quite appropriate (referring mainly to the categorization of Poles and Ancient Greeks, whose history and culture are markedly different from that of Latin-Germanic cultures), it is clear that the differences between the above peoples are differences between these peoples are indeed much smaller than those among them and the Slavic peoples. If the Russian nation was rejected by the Latin-Germanic culture, is it valid to say that being the leader of the Slavic culture could unite another group of forces, in other words, that a unified type of culture could bring a foreign state closer. It should be said that consistent cultural roots are conducive to civil interaction and can bring each other closer psychologically, but this is not the same thing as official diplomacy, and in some specific cases it is even the opposite. Both world wars erupted first from within the Latin-Germanic culture, showing that a homogeneous culture does not necessarily bring peace and tranquillity.

The same goes for the Slavic peoples. Religiously and culturally, Russia is closer to Greece; by blood, Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians are Eastern Slavs, and in many ways are related to Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks as Western Slavs, and to Serbs, Montenegrins, Croats, Slovaks, Macedonians, Bosnians, and Bulgarians as South Slavs. Historically, however, Russia did not form a special alliance with Greece: after the fall of Constantinople 1453 , the nobles of the Eastern Roman Empire did not migrate to Russia, but fled to Europe; nor did the marriage of Ivan III and Sophia Palaiologina bring Russia and Greece closer together. Nowadays, the Slavic “kinship” has not prevented Russia from parting ways with Eastern Europe and even turning against its “closest brother”, Ukraine. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and Europe had a honeymoon period, but the West’s economic assistance was very little and often attached to the political requirements, as a “follower” coordinated sanctions against the Yugoslavia Federation, Iraq and Libya so that Russia’s economic and strategic interests face double damage, and step by step pressing NATO’s eastward expansion of NATO has led to the Russian Federation had to adjust the “lopsided” policy towards Europe, so that the two sides more and more distant. NATO’s eastward expansion has forced Russia to adjust its “one-sided” policy toward Europe, so that the two sides have become more and more distant from each other, and Russia has finally become an alternative in the eyes of European countries.

Europe can’t digest Russia and Russia can’t digest Europe. Both sides have the will to develop relations, but whenever there is a conflict of core interests, they are stuck in a dilemma and fall into the “dilemma of the modern empire”.

Russia is equally feuding with Asian countries. In the 13th-15th centuries, Russia was in the Tatar-Russian period. The effects of the Mongol invasion on Russia were multiple. Most scholars believe that the brutal Mongol rule lowered the spiritual and cultural level of Russia, while a few scholars believe that this rule was not imposed from the outside, but rather the fusion of the two peoples. If we leave aside the question of whether such integration occured naturally or by force, and discuss only the consequences of integration, it brings about not only blood hybridization, but also the penetration of political traditions and cultures. It is generally recognized that Russia’s authoritarian tradition comes from the East, particularly the iron fist politics of the Mongol rule. This influence continues to this day and forms the popular/people support basis of the Russian polity. During the Imperial Russian period, Russia’s foreign policy was dominated by territorial expansion and expanding interests, and Asia was the main target of expansion. Eurasianism emerged in Russia in the 1920s, flashed briefly and then fell silent, and was revived in the 1950s, allowing Russia to examine its own Asian cultural imprint. In the 21st century, Neo-Eurasianism became an important school of Russian philosophy as well as politics. Russia seeks a third way of integration and commonality between East and West, which makes possible a more independent national spirit and values.

After the Ukrainian crisis, Russia for the first time announced its “eastward strategy”. The Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Economic Belt Initiative have become the main focus of the “eastward strategy”. Since then, Putin has proposed the Greater Eurasian Partnership strategy in place of the original Greater Europe and in place of Integration into Europe strategy. It is an important adjustment in Russia’s foreign strategy to replace Atlanticism with Eurasianism, to counteract maritime civilization with continental civilization, and to oppose the unipolarity of the Anglo-Saxon world with the integration of Eurasia through the construction of the Greater Eurasian Partnership. Although Russia and other countries in the post-Soviet space have different interests, and the integration of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Greater Eurasia Partnership is progressing slowly, based on the design of the Eurasian Union, it can be predicted that the future layout of Russia’s presence in Asia will be based on the Eurasian Economic Union (58) as the core, with China, India, Iran, and other CIS partners as the periphery, with whom Russia has close ties, attracting international organizations such as ASEAN to strengthen cooperation.

At present, China has accepted the reference to the Greater Eurasian Economic Partnership, and China has become Russia’s largest friendly neighbor, a hard-won situation. The Protocol between the Government of the Government of China and the Government of the Government of Russia on the Narration of the Eastern Section of the Sino Russian Boundary signed in 2000, the Protocol between the Government of the Government of China and the Government of the Government of Russia on the Narration of the Western Section of the Sino Russian Boundary signed in 2008 and the Protocol between the Government of the Government of China and the Government of the Government of Russia on the Supplementary Narration of the Eastern Section of the Sino Russian Boundary signed in 2008 are intended to solve the problems left over by history Eliminating the hidden dangers of border disputes between the two countries has laid a legal foundation. The Treaty on Good-Neighborly Relations, Friendship and Cooperation between China and Russia, signed in 2001, legally established the concept of “friendship between the two countries for generations, never to be enemies”, and pioneered a new type of Sino-Russian relations that is “non-aligned, non-confrontational, and not directed against a third party”, which is of landmark significance. From “Mutually Considered Friendly Countries” in 1992, “Constructive Partnership” in 1994, “Strategic Collaborative Partnership of Equality and Trust for the 21st Century” in 1996, to “Comprehensive Strategic Collaborative Partnership of Equality, Trust, Mutual Support, Common Prosperity and Friendship for Generations” in 2011, to “China-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Collaborative Partnership in the New Era” in 2019. in 1996, the “Comprehensive Strategic Collaborative Partnership of Equal Trust, Mutual Support, Common Prosperity and Friendship for Generations” in 2011, and the “China-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Collaborative Partnership for a New Era” in 2019, the two countries have not only realized a smooth transition in their state-to state relations, but have also established the “China-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Collaborative Partnership for a New Era”. The two countries have not only realized a smooth transition in their relations, but have also developed future-oriented strategic cooperation. Bilateral relations between China and the Russian Federation and their strategic stabilization have a decisive impact on the formation of the “Belt Union Docking” and the future Greater Eurasian Partnership. Of course, China and Russia are both permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, initiators of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, members of the World Trade Organization, important members of the Group of Twenty and BRICS and other international organizations, and there is still room for further growth in mutual international collaboration.

However, unlike China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which aims to work with other countries for development, Russia’s diplomatic concerns are not only economic-security but also religious-cultural kaygılar concerns. Because of its location between Europe and Asia, and its traditional influence in Central Asia, the Caucasus and West Asia, Russia seeks to act as a bridge between the large populated Islamic and Christian worlds, and continues to play a role in issues such as Iran’s nuclear program, Syria and Afghanistan, as well as being more intent on safeguarding its own security and economic interests in Northeast Asia, and plays a role in Korean Peninsula affairs.

Russia’s foreign policy has been changing over the millennias, but what has remained the same is the great power. “The independence of Russian foreign policy stems from its geographic size, unique geopolitical position, centuries of historical tradition, culture, and people’s self-perception.” (59) A great Eastern power spanning both in Europe and Asia, a powerful country that inherited the imperial culture and the Soviet legacy, and a country with a unique Orthodox Christian faith, pursuing an independent foreign policy was its natural choice. In his speech in the 2000 State of the Nation Address, Putin suggested that “the only realistic option for Russia is to be strong, to be strong and confident, to be a strong country that is not against the international community, not against other powers, but coexists with them.” Until today, however, the question of how to coexist with the world powers has remained a problem for Russia. This is partly due to Russia itself and partly due to the West. Recalling Winston Churchill, whom Lenin called “the greatest enemy of Soviet Russia,” and Franklin Roosevelt, who lamented, “I don’t understand the Russians,” may help to understand the shift in the roles of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union from allies to rivals in World War II.

The West may prefer a weak, relatively easy-to-control Russia to an inscrutable power, because “the current international system does not yet have a mechanism for accommodating rising powers”. (60) The international order is ultimately determined by national strength, and diplomacy is only one aspect of demonstrating national strength. Even the most skillful diplomacy cannot fundamentally change a country’s international status, but can only improve a country’s external environment to some extent. This is where the boundaries of diplomatic philosophy lie, and the limits of diplomatic practice. The establishment of a new international order will require more countries to achieve greater consensus in their diplomatic philosophies.

Philosophy is the study of the world as a whole and of the fundamental problems of man’s relationship with the world, and the process by which philosophy is applied to specific areas (such as diplomacy and management) is more subtle and indirect, but the concepts, once accepted, have a longer-lasting utility. Diplomacy is an act of state, yet the philosophy of diplomacy is not necessarily a state (or official) ideology, but rather a summation of the nature, laws, and values of diplomacy out of a deeper cultural deposit and a more long-standing national psyche. An important task of diplomatic philosophy is to study the mindset and values behind foreign policy and diplomatic action. If a country is the specific object of study, the link between policy and action is more closely seen, but the underlying mindset and values are less obvious. This is not only because of the long time period covered by diplomacy, but also because the act of diplomacy is full of immediacy and variability, which makes it difficult to generalize it in a unified diplomatic thought or philosophy of diplomacy.

The richness of philosophical concepts exceeds that of science in general. The complexity of Russian philosophy and culture is again unique in the world. The reason why mysticism, nationalism, utopian spirituality and Marxism are used to summarize Russian intellectual traditions is the diversity of cultural sources in Russia, which is different from most mono-ethnic countries. “Ecumenical responsiveness”, moral obligation, critique and contradiction are the core concepts corresponding to the four traditions of thought, and one or more of them may be prominently displayed in each phase of foreign policy, but it would be quite difficult to find a case in which all of them are embodied. Russia is a diplomatic power, and although its national strength has declined since the beginning of 21st century, its diplomatic prowess has not diminished, because its diplomatic practice is backed by a philosophy, not an impulsive act on a whim. Even so, however, Russia’s diplomatic practice is not entirely consistent with its diplomatic philosophy, which, on the one hand, emphasizes “sanctity” and holds up the banner of moral obligation, and, on the other, has a “national character” that makes it impossible to exclude national egoism. The dichotomy in diplomatic philosophy is a major cause of conflict between Russia and the outside world. Recognizing this, one can better understand “Russia going beyond reason at some times.”.

Annotations:

(1) Speaking of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy behavior, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once said that Russia’s actions were a mystery within a mystery.  It has been argued that Russian culture rose out of the ground because secular literature did not exist in Russia until the 17th century (before that there was only religious literature, historical biographies, or chronicles), and the marvelous “Golden Age” did not occur until the late 18th and early 19th centuries, before which the Russian aristocracy had been communicating and writing in French.  After the splendor of the “Golden Age” and the “Silver Age”, Russian culture developed slowly and gradually fell silent.  For a discussion of Russian culture, see Yao Hai, Russian Culture, Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 2013 edition.

(2) Frank, translated by Xu Fenglin, Russian Intellectuals and Spiritual Icons, Shanghai: Xue Lin Publishing House, 1999, p. 29.

(3) While most Western scholars use the concept of “philosophy of diplomacy” directly, Chinese scholars tend to first analyze the concept itself.  According to Fan, the object of diplomatic philosophy is the most general laws and essence of diplomatic activities and phenomena, and the main content of the study is the worldview, methodology, values and ways of thinking, etc., on which the diplomatic cognitive and practical activities are based.  See Fan Wen, “On Diplomatic Philosophy,” in New Horizons, No. 6, 2002, p. 58.  According to Men Honghua, diplomatic philosophy refers to the political philosophical ideas or values that have emerged from a specific historical and cultural context and that have long-term guiding significance for diplomatic decision-making and diplomatic practice.  See Men Honghua, “The Evolution of Chinese Diplomatic Philosophy,” in Teaching and Research, No. 4, 2005, pp. 47-48.  According to Kang Xin, the philosophy of diplomacy emphasizes the cultural nature of diplomatic practice, and the sources and constraints of human nature, power, and interests are the key words in the study of realism and idealism, while culture, philosophy, and the diplomatic concepts and behaviors influenced by them, as well as the interactions between the two, are the focuses of the examination of the philosophy of diplomacy.  See Kang Xin, “Ruminations on the Concept of Diplomatic Philosophy,” in Study Monthly, No. 3, 2008, p. 27.  According to Yang Jiemian, diplomatic philosophy is the basic principles and values of a country’s foreign relations, the study of the laws of existence, consciousness and knowledge, and the exploration of solutions to major and fundamental problems.  In contrast, Zhang Zhizhou and Zhao Kejin put more emphasis on diplomatic philosophy as a conscious and systematic summary of a country’s diplomatic thoughts and values at a specific historical stage.  See Yang Jiemian, “The Exploration, Construction and Practice of China’s Diplomatic Philosophy,” in International Observations, No. 6, 2015, p. 1;  Zhang Zhizhou, “Ruminations on Constructing China’s Diplomatic Philosophy,” in The Community of Human Destiny: Theory and Practice – Fudan Review of International Relations (25th Series), Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House 2011 edition, pp. 251-252;  Zhao Kejin, “China’s Position and World Role – Exploring a New Diplomatic Philosophy”, in Studies in International Politics, No. 4, 2012, p. 53.

(4) Richard Weitz, “Henry Kissinger’s Philosophy of International Relations,” Diplomacy & Staecraft, Vol. 2, Issue 1, 1991, pp. 103-129.

(5) A. Pablo Iannone, Philosophy as Diplomacy: Essays in Ethics and Policy-Making, Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1994.

(6) Emil Vlajki, “Philosophy of Diplomacy,” Полumeua, Vol. 6, 2016, pp. 37-55.

(7) Э.Я. Ъаталов, О фuлософuuu Межунароных Оmношeнuǔ, Москва: Науя, О6разоват, 2005.

(8) Т.A. Алeксeева, Тeорuя Мeжунароных Оmнзшeнuǔ как Полumuчeская Фuлософuя u Hаука, Москва:Аспeкт Пpeсс, 2019.

(9) N. Berdyaev, translated by Lei Yongsheng and Qiu Shoujuan, Russian Thought: The Main Problems of Russian Thought from the End of the Nineteenth Century to the Beginning of the Twentieth Century, Beijing: Life-Reading-Xinzhi Sanlian Shujian, 1995 edition, p. 246.

(10) V. V. Zinkovsky, translated by Zhang Bing, A History of Russian Philosophy (Volume 1), Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2013 edition, p. 2.

(11) The opposite view is held by Sukhov of the Department for the Study of the History of Russian Philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the St. Petersburg scholar Ilyin, and Sapronov, a specialist in the history of contemporary Russian philosophy.  See Baichun Zhang, “Contemporary Russian Philosophy of Religion,” in Social Science Front, No. 1, 2016, pp. 13-18.

(12) Bulgakov, translated by Xu Fenglin, Orthodox Christianity – An Outline of Church Doctrine, Beijing: Commercial Press, 2001 edition, p. 179.

(13) V. Solovyov, translated by Li Shubai: The Crisis of Western Philosophy, Hangzhou: Zhejiang People’s Publishing House, 2000 edition, pp. 180-181.

(14) Chen Shulin, Philosophical Reflection on the Destiny of Russia – A Study of Solovyov’s Philosophy of History and Its Contemporary Value, Harbin: Heilongjiang University Press, 2010 edition, p. 144.

(15) Compilation and Translation Bureau attached to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for the Writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, ed., The Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 22), Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1965 edition, p. 31.

(16) Miao Song, “A Review of the Current Status of Research on “The Russian Orthodox Church and Contemporary Russian Diplomacy””, in International Studies Reference, No. 10, 2014, p. 45.

(17) Quoted in Nebeljaev, Russian Thought, p. 34.

(18) V. V. Zinkovsky, History of Russian Philosophy (vol. 1), p. 170.

(19) V. V. Zinkovsky, History of Russian Philosophy (vol. 1), p. 215.

(20) Zbigniew Brzezinski, translated by the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS): The Great Game of Chess — U.S. Primacy and Its Geostrategy, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1998 edition, p. 117.

(21) Isaiah Böhring, translated by Peng Huaidong, Russian Thinkers, Nanjing: Yilin Publishing House, 2011 edition, p. 148.

(22) See Yang Yang, “On the Ideological-Historical Background of Russian Nihilism,” in Russian Literature and Art, No. 1, 2016, pp. 96-102.

(23) Hecker, translated by Gao Hua and Yang Bin, Religion before and after the Russian Revolution, Shanghai: Xue Lin Publishing House, 1999 edition, p. 81.

(24) H.A. Ъeрдяeв, pyccкая Иeя, Москва: Издатeлъсто ACT, 2004, c. 147.

(25) A. F. Gurega, translated by Zheng Zhendong, Russian Thought and Its Makers, Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 2018 edition, p. 33.

(26) A. F. Gurega, Russian Thought and Its Makers, p. 101.

(27) Zhou Laishun, Contemporary Scrutiny of Russian Philosophy, Beijing: China Social Science Press, 2019 edition, pp. 27-28.

(28) Merezhkovsky, translated by Yang Deyou: Tolstoy and Dostoevsky (Volume I: Life and Creation), Beijing: Huaxia Publishing House, 2009 edition, p. 6.

(29) Jiang Yi-en, “Research on China’s Foreign Policy: Theoretical Trends and Methodological Discussion”, in World Economy and Politics, No. 8, 2006, p. 65.

(30) F. Chuev, translated by the Department of Foreign Military Studies of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences: Molotov Interviews: 140 Conversations with Molotov, Changchun: Jilin People’s Publishing House, 1992 edition, p. 103.

(31) Former uS Diplomat George Kennan, “The Roots of Soviet Behavior,” in International Political Studies, No. 1, 1988, p. 86.

(32) Zheng Yishi, A Comparative Study: contemporary Russian philosophy and Chinese Marxist philosophy, Beijing: Renmin University of China Press, 2018 edition, p. 111.

(33) This is the claim of the French philosopher Gil Deleuze, see Ouyang Xiangying, “The Problem of Philosophical Legitimacy in the Postmodern Context – A Study of Deleuze’s Philosophical Outlook”, in Philosophical Studies, No. 8, 2000, p. 53.

(34) И.С.Иванов, “Новая Российская Дпломатия, Дeсть Лет Внeшнeй Политики Страны,” https://nаshаuchebа.ru/v14899, Accessed March 19, 2020

(35) V. V. Zinkovsky, History of Russian Philosophy (second volume), p. 155.

(36) Zheng Yishi, “An Analysis of the National Spirit of Traditional Russian Religious Philosophy,” in Academic Exchange, No. 10, 2015, p. 36.

(37) В. Хорос, “Рyсская Идея на Историчeском Пeрекрeсткe,” Свобоная Мысль, No. 6, 1992, cc. 36-47.

(38) “Однополярный Миропорядок Уходит в Прошлое,” https://www.putin-todаy.ru/аrchives/83401,访问时间: June 7, 2020

(39) Solovyov, translated by Xu Fenglin, Russia and Europe, Shijiazhuang: Hebei Education Press, 2002 edition, p. 2.

(40) Solovyov, Russia and Europe, p. 5.

(41) Solovyov, Russia and Europe, p. 9.

(42) “New Security Council Resolution Welcomes the Efforts of Both Russia and Turkey to End Violence and Restart the Political Process in Syria,” https://news.un.org/zh/story/2016/12/268532, accessed May 2, 2020

(43) “Russia says it does not support attempts by some countries to turn the Human Rights Council into a tool for political pressure,” https://news.un.org/zh/story/2012/02/169002, accessed May 2, 2020

(44) Ma Yinmao, “Solovyov’s Critique of Western Philosophy–Another Discussion of Solovyov’s Significance for Russian Philosophy,” in Zhejiang Journal, No. 6, 2000, p. 37.

(45) В. Исраэлян, “Преемственность в Дипломатии,” Межyнaроная Жuзнь, No. 1, 2003, c. 100.

(46) Nikolai Berdyaev, translated by Qiu Yunhua and Wu Xuequan, The Religious Interpretation of Russian Thought, Shanghai: Oriental Publishing House, 1998 edition, Introduction, p. 11.

(47) Nikolai Berdyaev, Religious Interpretation of Russian Thought, Introduction, p. 11.

(48) Bobo Lo, Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking, New York: Macmillan, 2002.

(49) Henry Kissinger, translated by Gu Shuxin, The Great Diplomacy, Haikou: Hainan Publishing House, 1998 edition, p. 708.

(50) The “Rose Revolution” in Georgia in 2003, the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine in 2004, the “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, and another street movement in Ukraine in 2014.  “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, and again in Ukraine in 2014. These color revolutions were followed by the establishment of pro-American and pro-Western governments in these countries.

(51) Xing Guangcheng, “Russia’s Relations with the West: Dilemmas and Roots,” in Studies on International Issues, No. 5, 2016, p. 111.

(52) Angela Stent by Ouyang Jin and Song Hekun, Limited Partners: the New Normal of U.S.-Russian Relations in the 21st Century, Beijing: Petroleum Industry Press, 2016 edition, foreword, pp. 2-3.

(53) Solovyov, Russia and Europe, p. 179.

(54) Dong Xiaoyang, edited by Dong Xiaoyang, Into Russia in the Twenty-first Century, Beijing: Contemporary World Press, 2003 edition, p. 386.

(55) “Conquering the world with a sword and a halberd” is from “On Democracy in America” by the French thinker, Alexis de Tocqueville.  “The people are willing to be enslaved by the State in order that the State may enslave the other peoples of the world” is from “Russia in 1839” by the French writer Questin.  “Cultures spatially divided and unidentified” is from All Russia: Travels and Research in Russia, Finland and Siberia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia in Contemporary Europe by the British journalist Norman.  See above, Lin Jingjing, “Western Representation of the Russian Question – An Introduction to Russian-Soviet Studies on Europe and the United States,” in Russian Studies, No. 3, 2009, pp. 97-123.

(56) Richard Sakwa, Partial Adaptation and Political Culture, London: Macmillan, 2005, p. 62.

(57) Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia and the Thread to the West, London: Macmillan, 2008.

(58) The current member States are Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia.

(59) Сeргeй Лaвров, “Внeшнeполитичeская Философии Роccии,” Межyнароная Жuзнь, No. 3, 2013, cc. 1-8.

(60) Richard Sakwa, “‘New Cold War’ or Twenty Year’s Crisis? Russia and International Politics,” International Affairs. Vol. 84, No. 2, 2008, p. 251.