On Turkey’s Quest for Strategic Autonomy; the Positive Synergy Between “Global South” and Turkey
An Analysis from the Perspective of the “Global South”[1]
About the Authors: Chen Likuan, PhD, is an associate professor at the School of History and Culture, Yan’an University. Pan Shaopeng is a 2024 doctoral candidate at the Institute of International Relations, China Foreign Affairs University; Beijing
Abstract: The collective rise of the “Global South” countries is a landmark feature of the evolution of the international landscape. As a member of the “Global South,” Turkey’s strategic autonomy is manifested in several ways: economically, Turkey strengthened government intervention and emphasizes traditional values and independence; politically, Turkey independently explores a development path which will suit its national characteristics; culturally, Turkey has returned its face to the Islamic world and tries to enhance its ethnic identity; in defense, by accelerating the development of its defense industry complex to promote its defense autonomy; and diplomatically, Turkey advances a transformation of its foreign policy and Turkey also participates in the reform of the global governance system. The rise of the “Global South” countries has provided a favorable external environment for Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy. Most strong countries of the “Global South” are China and Russia; China is objectively and subjectively within the “Global South” collective for long decades; Russia has subjectively and consciously chosen to be part of “Global South” since 2020 and has decided to elevate “supporting the struggles of the “Global South”” to a most prominent component part of its grand foreign strategy.
The cognitive changes brought about by the enhancement of its comprehensive national strength are the root cause of Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy…. while the coarse attitude of the US and other Western countries towards Turkey has been a driving force for Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy. Turkey’s Strategic autonomy is conducive to Turkey’s diplomatic manoeuvring in great power competition, providing policy space and benefits for many other “Global South” countries, and this accelerates the transformation of Turkey’s relations with non-“Global South” countries.
Constraints for Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy
Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy is a) constrained by the overall development trend of the “Global South,” ; b) constrained by the non-“Global South” countries, and c) constrained by domestic factors and opposition parties, but nevertheless Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy continues to guide Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy transformation. Turkey will continue to draw closer to the practical goals of “Global South” countries to achieve a multi-faceted balance.
Text Begins Here
The collective rise of the “Global South” countries is a landmark feature of the evolution of the current international landscape. The economic strength and political influence of these countries have significantly increased, and they are playing an increasingly important role on the international stage. As great power competition unfolds, some “Global South” countries that once followed and were influenced by the United States have gained broader room for manoeuvre. These countries increasingly demonstrate a tendency toward strategic autonomy. As a major regional power in the “Global South” with relatively rapid development potential and prominent strength, Turkey has become increasingly active on the regional and international stages, thus attracts widespread attention from all circles.
A series of Turkey’s actions can be examined under the objective of strategic autonomy. Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy serves as a key entry point for examining the overall development trend of “Global South” countries, which fully demonstrates the universality and particularity of this type of countries’ pursuit for strategic autonomy.
Currently, global academia has conducted multi-dimensional research on Turkey’s strategic autonomy.
Firstly, a wealth of research on this topic focuses on Turkey’s alliance relationship with the United States.
Some scholars argue that Turkey’s distancing from the US and the West reflects a certain degree of strategic autonomy.
Secondly, Turkey’s rise as a middle power is the power basis for its strategic autonomy. Some scholars argue that Turkey’s use of its status as a middle power to a balancing policy between the East and West to exert Turkey’s discourse power and influence on the international stage also reflects a certain degree of autonomy.
Thirdly, some scholars have studied the specific manifestations of strategic autonomy from the perspective of Turkey’s influence on surrounding neighbour areas and regional affairs.
Fourthly, other scholars argue that Turkey expresses its demand for strategic autonomy by developing relations with countries other than the United States.
This research provides a solid foundation for our thesis, but it still remains at the level of analyzing Turkey’s foreign policy transformation.
Therefore, with the rise of the “Global South” countries and the enhancement of Turkey’s demand for strategic autonomy, it is necessary to systematically and comprehensively analyze the interactive relationship between the two (Turkey/”Global South”).
In view of this, this article attempts to explore Turkey’s performance, motivations, impact, and its limitations as a “Global South” country in its pursuit of strategic autonomy
and this article will propose some ideas on the future prospects of Turkey’s strategic autonomy.
Part I. The Rise of the “Global South” and Turkey’s Positioning
The collective rise of the “Global South” countries is becoming a landmark feature in the evolution of the international landscape, which frames the broad environment for Turkey’s strategic autonomy. The concept of the “Global South” is continuously being endowed with new connotations. In the new era, “Global South” countries have a new pursuit of strategic autonomy, and Turkey’s actions in this regard should rightly be a key entry point for analysis.
(I) The Origin and Strategic Transformation of the “Global South”
The concept of the “Global South” has no clear definition but has gradually transitioned from a geographical or regional concept to one which includes both economic and political integration, reflecting the increasing demands of these newly güçlenen countries.
In this article, “Global South” countries refer to the collective of emerging market countries and developing countries. The political foundation of “Global South” countries is independence and self-reliance.
Historical mission of “Global South” countries is development and revitalization,
and the common proposition of “Global South” countries is fairness and justice. This is the crucial starting point and foothold when examining the “Global South” countries.
In 1969, the American writer and left-wing political activist Carl Oglesby began to use the term “Global South.”[6]
Entering the 21st century, benefiting from globalization, some southern countries developed rapidly, and their connections with each other became increasingly close. In 2001, Jim O’Neill, chief economist at Goldman Sachs, proposed the “BRIC” concept to specifically refer to emerging market countries. In 2004, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) released a report titled “Forging a Global South.”
In the foreword of this report Zhou Yiping pointed out that “although developing countries vary in their economic, social, and political attributes, they all face a series of vulnerabilities and challenges.” In the report, China was also considered one of the “Global South” countries.[7]
In 2006, Goldman Sachs proposed the “Next Eleven” countries (N-11), countries with growth potential second only to the BRIC nations. With the rise of the “BRICS” and the “Next Eleven,” countries the international status and global influence of the “Global South” countries have rapidly increased, and the multiple expansions of the BRICS also reflect the trend of solidarity, cooperation, and joint action for self-strengthening among these countries.
According to International Monetary Fund data, calculated by purchasing power parity, the GDP of emerging and developing economies accounted for 50.6% of the world’s GDP in 2009, while the share of advanced economies had fallen to 40.17% by 2024.[8]
Furthermore, after the 2008 global financial crisis, the status of some “Global South” countries in the international system became more prominent. They gradually changed their unfavorable position on the periphery of the global governance system and became committed to reforming and improving it, converting their growing economic strength into international influence and enhancing their influence and voice in the global governance system.[9]
After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the new round of the Palestine-Israel conflict (Aksa Tufani), we saw that some “Global South” countries adopted policy positions different from those of the US and Western countries, which demonstrates a stance of strategic autonomy, which has garnered widespread international attention.
(II) Turkey’s Role and Positioning as a “Global South” Country
The rise of the “Global South” countries refers to a group of emerging economies and developing countries with similar characteristics beginning to exert international influence and appeal, with Turkey being one of them. More importantly, Turkey is a typical representative among the members of the “Global South” with strong national power and a strong preference for strategic autonomy and active toward strategic autonomy.
Turkey’s rise as a middle power has made Turkey one of the stronger members of the “Global South.”
In terms of economic strength, benefiting from the neoliberal economic policies that began in the 1980s, Turkey’s economic development has become increasingly remarkable. In the early years of the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) rule, Turkey had already developed into an emerging market country. Turkey was also regarded as a member of the “VISTA” (Vietnam, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey, Argentina) and “Next Eleven” (N-11) countries, and joined the Middle Powers’ Cooperation (MIKTA).[10]
At the same time, Turkey has repeatedly expressed its willingness to join the BRICS cooperation mechanism and has formally submitted an application.
Military Aspect
From a military aspect, Turkey is the second-largest military force in NATO after the United States and a military power in the Middle East. By developing its indigenous defense industry, Turkey is reducing its military and security dependence on the United States.
Cultural aspect
From Cultural aspect, Turkey is a “bridge country” connecting Eastern and Western cultures, Turkey is seen by the United States as a democratic model for the Islamic world, and Turkey values Islamic culture and the traditional values of Asian Turkic-speaking countries.
On the diplomatic front, Turkey did not positively respond to Western sanctions against Russia in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Turkey preferred to adopt a flexible and autonomous strategy to safeguard its national interests and its security.
Thus, Turkey is in transition from a passive role which follows the West to a “Global South” role which is a constructive role and which pursues strategic autonomy.[11]
After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey began to “leave Asia and enter Europe,” learning from the West. After the start of the Cold War, Turkey sided with the capitalist camp led by the United States, tying its national security to NATO and seeking to join the European Union (EU). However, as a NATO member and an EU candidate country, Turkey did not fully comply with the demands of the US and the West, demonstrating a preference for and concrete actions toward strategic autonomy. During the Cold War, Turkey became dissatisfied and suspicious of the defense security provided by NATO and began to develop its own defense industry to pursue defense autonomy.
After the AKP came to power, with Turkey’s rise as a middle power, its strategic autonomy became more prominent at the economic, political, cultural, and diplomatic levels. In recent years, with the intensification of great power competition, the differences between Turkey and its Western allies on a series of issues such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the new round of the Palestine-Israel conflict have become increasingly prominent, and the pace of its strategic autonomy has gradually accelerated.
II. Manifestations of Turkey’s Strategic Autonomy
Strategic autonomy refers to the ability of an allied country which is within an asymmetric alliance: If this allied country (Turkey) can go against the will of the dominant powerful countries (example USA or UK) in the alliance system, if it can resist its (USA) pressure;
if it can make independent strategic choices on issues involving major national interests, mainly in the political, economic, military, and diplomatic fields.
Based on this judgment, when this article discusses about Turkey’s strategic autonomy, in fact this article discusses Turkey’s will and action to handle its domestic and foreign affairs independently, free from US domination, in order to achieve its own national goals. As mentioned earlier, as one of the more vigorously developing members of the “Global South,” Turkey will inevitably have differences and conflicts with the US and Western countries.
Turkey is often able to go against the will of a dominant powerful country, and can even resist its pressure, in order to make independent strategic choices on issues involving major national interests. This is specifically manifested in Turkey’s pursuit of autonomy at the economic, political, cultural, defense, and diplomatic levels, which is also an important entry point for understanding the strategic autonomy of “Global South” countries.
(I) Economic vision : Strengthening Government Intervention, Emphasizing Traditional Values and Independence
In Turkey’s quest for strategic autonomy and great power status, the economy has always been the core element and key foundation. Although Turkey’s economic scale is not as large as the BRICS countries, Turkey has become a representative of the “Global South” and “near-BRIC” countries due to its economic growth and rising influence.[12] Academic research on Turkey’s economy often focuses on the successes and crises of its economic development, but objectively speaking, we can say that there is an implicit logic of opposing the West and seeking strategic autonomy behind Turkey’s economic development and transformation.
In dealing with external normative forces, Turkey has not been completely dominated by them, and shows a certain degree of autonomy. If we look from the perspective of “Global South” countries, institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are promoting an unfair concentration of economic and political power in the hands of Western countries.[13]
For a long time, Turkey’s reliance on external capital has led to increasing economic vulnerability.[14]
However, the economic growth in the early 21st century has reshaped the relationship between Turkey and international economic institutions, and the influence and normative power of these institutions (IMF/World Bank) on Turkey’s economic development has significantly weakened.[15]
When Turkey encountered a crisis of lira depreciation and inflation, Turkey did not seek aid from international financial institutions like the IMF but instead sought currency swaps and loans from some Arab Gulf countries. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan pointed out that international loans should be based on gold and that nations should be saved from the pressure of the dollar because in history gold has never been a tool of oppression.[16]
Turkey agreed to purchase Russian energy with rubles and use Russia’s independently developed MIR payment system, which means Turkey helped Russia counter EU sanctions, achieve “de-dollarization,” and challenge the dollar’s dominance in the global financial system. After Erdoğan won the 2023 election, Erdoğan appointed a finance minister (simsek) and central bank governor with Western educational backgrounds and professional experience, attempting to adopt monetary policies more in line with “Western orthodox economics” to attract investment from Western countries. However, this measure failed to achieve the expected results, and Turkey still faces a government budget deficit, high inflation, and a continuously depreciating lira. In this context, on September 2, 2024, Turkey formally applied to join the BRICS cooperation mechanism, largely because Turkey hopes to benefit from trade with countries like China and Russia to surmount its current economic difficulties.
Furthermore, Turkey’s economic policy shows characteristics of being influenced by Islamic capital and Turkey’s economic policy haa increased state intervention, this state intervention has a conservative tendency which reflects Erdoğan’s authoritarianism. The AKP government is implementing a deeper “reform and adjustment program” in the economy field, which emphasizes both globalization and integration into the world economy, while this program also supports traditional Islamic values.
The relatively conservative newly emerged industrial and commercial class of Anatolia has grown rapidly (since 1970s to today), becoming a new economic force alongside the traditional secular large enterprise groups of the west.
Thus in Turkey’s private capital sector, a bipolar pattern has formed, one pole represented by the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) and another pole the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (MÜSİAD), injecting a moderate Islamist color into the Turkish economy.[17]
There are other important Industry and Business Associations which is involved in politics but they hide themselves: Turkey Contractors Union (Türkiye Müteahhitler Birliği) with magnate 102 members dealing with international contracts. They are second strong after China.
The 2008 financial crisis severely weakened the economies of the US and the EU, exposed the theoretical flaws of mainstream Western economics theory and the shortcomings of neoliberal economic policies, and accelerated the process of global power shift towards China and accelerated the process of global power shift to the emerging world.
As Turkey’s economy continues to struggle with problems, this situation of turkey also signifies the failure and ineffectiveness of previous economic governance models, representing the failure of neoliberal ideas and their governance practices in Turkey. Turkey needs to undergo a new economic transformation, find new drivers for economic growth, and change its economic structure. To achieve such goals, the role of state power in the economic sphere has become more prominent. Today In Turkey some people see a revival of the statist tradition that advocates strengthening of state control in the economic sphere and a trend of departing from liberal market principles.[18]
In traditional Western economics, the way to curb inflation is to raise interest rates. However, once in the past around 2021 Erdoğan argued that low-interest rates can combat high inflation by promoting production, employment, and exports. Erdoğan also criticized high-interest rates for violating Islamic teachings and exacerbating the wealth gap, declaring an “economic war of independence,” which has been dubbed “Erdoğanomics.”[19]
Through Erdoğan s unique interest rate (faiz oranları) management policy, Erdoğan has provided a new approach for Turkey’s emerging economy to deal with inflation. In the short term, this policy has brought about a boom in manufacturing and a decrease in the unemployment rate, representing a radical attempt to break through the theories of Western economics. Some scholars interpret Turkey’s economic policy as an attempt by an emerging economy to achieve independent development and these scholars applaud the marginalization of neoliberalism in Turkey.[20]
In addition, Turkey has also launched a series of active industrial strategies and economic development models, which indicates Turkey’s focus on economic growth and Turkey’s focus on adjustment of its industrial structure, and shows Turkey’s commitment to making Turkey a “global manufacturing center.”
The “2023 Vision” strategic plan, proposed by Turkey in 2011, includes the main goal of making Turkey one of the world’s top ten economies and building Turkey into a globally competitive major power. In 2021, Turkey proposed a “New Economic Model” which focused on expanding exports and increasing employment. Erdoğan stated that the share of foreign exchange in the country’s total debt stock would be reduced in order to lower Turkey’s sensitivity to external shocks, in order to decrease Turkey’s dependence on imports, and this “New Economic Model” aimed to prioritize increasing the production and export of high-value-added products.[21]
In conclusion, strengthening government intervention into economy and finance sector and emphasizing traditional values and emphasizing national independence are important manifestations of Turkey’s strategic autonomy. Turkey’s measures at the economic level highlight its realistic demand as a member of the “Global South” to break through the economic control of the US and the West.
(II) Politically: Turkey Independently Explores a National Development Path suited to its National realities
Countries’ confidence in and developing self-awareness about their development model suited to its National realities mean political awakening of a “Global South” country.
“Global South” countries should, based on their own national conditions, independently explore a modernization path suitable for their own development.[22]
After World War II, since Turkey sided with the Western capitalist camp, its political development model became Westernized. Under the influence and intervention of the political systems and development models of Western countries, Turkey was deeply influenced by the West in its political development process.
After Entering the 21st century, the traditional political elite who believed in Kemalism were gradually marginalized, and the AKP, with a broad popular base, came to power. After AKP consolidated its power, Turkey’s political development began to break through the democratization paradigm set by Western countries, which shows a significant change. Under Erdoğan’s leadership, Turkey began a period of shaking off the interference of Western capital and external political forces, and pursued for an autonomous development path, and began to create a unique political model suited to its own national conditions.
Erdoğan gradually weakened the power and the shadow of the military on politics and state affairs and weakened the independence of judiciary through constitutional amendments (generally by referendums), thus Turkey’s newly established state and politics has strengthened authority of the government and its head. (towards other arms of the state: judiciary, legislation (parliament) and supervision: yasama ve yargı
After being elected president in August 2014, Erdoğan began the political transition from a parliamentary system to the presidential system which is unique (different from USA and France).
After the failed military coup of July 15, 2016, Erdoğan has purged the mass base of Gulen movement related to this military coup and also suppressed some other political dissent groups,
Turkey temporarily suspended the European Convention on Human Rights, and considered restoring the death penalty. This showed that Turkey was not carrying out liberal democratic reforms as expected by the EU. At the same time, Turkey changed its state system from a parliamentary to a presidential system through a referendum (2018), and Erdoğan became the first elected president of Turkey (by the whole population defined to elect by law).
This presidential system has distinct Turkish characteristics, with the president as the head of the executive organ (government) and the head of state, which now enjoys a dominant position compared to judiciary and legislation (parliament) powers.
in fact Turkey’s such recent moves has deviated from the Western-style democracy advocated by the United States, these moves contain an enhanced sense of endogenous/native or independent development pursuit suited to Turkey’s realities and suited to Turkey’s needs, and such moves reflect a will by the country leadership which seeks for independent exploration of a development path suited to Turkey’s realities and suited to Turkey’s needs.
After the AKP came to power, Turkey accelerated the reform process of its civilian and military relations and revised the old mission of army and in tandem Turkey began to develop moderate Islamic democracy, these two reforms have weakened the power of the army on politics and weakened the ( last) decision power of the army on military equipment and personnel demotion/promotion issues… All these changes have ensured the stable rule of the AKP as a moderate Islamic party. Especially after the 2016 military coup, Turkey has intensified such reforms and intensified reforms which weakened the past strong role and status of the army within the broad political field and military field: for example the land, sea, and air forces were placed under the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense.
The gendarmerie forces and coast guard police and coast guard army were placed under the leadership of the Ministry of Interior.
Military hospitals were placed under the leadership of the Ministry of Health; and newly established military academies were also put under the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense; the number of military personnel in the National Security Council and the Supreme Military Council was reduced. [23]
All These measures, which weakened the military’s influence and status in Turkey, have in turn strengthened the government’s powers and status, have especially strengthened the president’s, control over the army, and also laid the foundation for Erdoğan to implement the presidential system quite smoothly.
Overall, current Turkey’s elites who are supportive of the Erdogan government generally argue that mechanically copying the Western political development model cannot solve its political problems and that politically Turkey should Independently Explore a National Development Path suited to its national realities
They generally argue: “we should achieve a balance between state-building, the rule of law, and democracy”.
Such a political change has challenged the old, original model of Western-style democratization.
Such a political change has gradually led to the weakening of Turkey’s democracy and has gradually led to concentration and centralization of political power in the hands of central government led by the president.
(III) Culturally: Turkey has returning to the bosom of Islamic World plus began Enhancing National Identity
Turkey is rejuvenating its cultural identity by rediscovering and re-exploring its true identity as an Islamic and Turkic-speaking country, with such a new cultural policy Turkey is trying to obtain a source of legitimacy for strategic autonomy on a deeper spiritual level.
Turkey emphasizes respect for traditional religious values and actively promotes connections between Turkey and Islamic and Turkic-speaking countries. Islamic values and norms and Islamic tradition have also begun to permeate the socio-cultural sphere of people, this has gradually changed people’s attitude of imitating and following Western social and cultural norms.
Turkey celebrates the anniversary of the “Conquest of İstanbul ” (1453) and the Prophet’s birthday with high-profile events, expressing nostalgia for history and the glory of the empire,[24] thereby Turkey is awakening the nation’s sense of pride.
Mosques, as the most important praying buildings in Islam.
In history Mosques have had multiple functions, including economic, religious, cultural, and even political. During the AKP’s rule, a large number of mosques were built. In 2020, Turkey converted the Hagia (Aya) Sophia Museum in Istanbul back into a mosque. In the field of education, Turkey proposed in 2012 to cultivate a “pious next young generations ” and government brought a law which stipulates that entry into religious schools would be much easier and without entrance examination, and without the need for parental consent.
The entry age for religious schools was also lowered from 15 to 10, and Sunni doctrines and values were added to the curriculum of religious schools. (İmam Hatip Liseleri)
Legally, Turkey has restored the influence of Islamic law, strengthening the role of religion in the socio-cultural sphere through decrees such as abolishing the headscarf ban, alcohol prohibition, and vigorously building new mosques.
The “Central Asia complex” is a fundamental aspect of Turkey’s culture
Orta Asya ile kurduğu manevi kültürel bağ bugünkü Türkiye kültürünün temel önemde olan bir yanıdır
Turkey has called for the establishment of the Organization of Turkic States, pushing for the integration of Turkic-speaking countries of Central Asia. In this way Turkey is enhancing its own Turkic ethnic identity, actively participating in Central Asian affairs, and tries to increase its own influence in the Central Asia regions and Turkey tries to gain more leverage in its competition with European and American countries, all these are complementing Turkey’s “Look eastward” foreign policy transformation. [25]
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the creation of independent Turkic republics, Central Asia became an important direction for Turkish foreign policy. Turkey encouraged students from Central Asian countries to receive higher education in Turkish schools and has established exchange platforms such as the “Union of Turkic Universities.”
In 2009, the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States was established, an organization aimed at promoting exchanges and cooperation in politics, economy, culture, education, and other fields among Turkic-speaking countries.
Turkey is a founding member of this organization, and its secretariat is located in Istanbul. Under Turkey’s promotion, the organization has been renamed the “Organization of Turkic States,” aiming to initiate the transformation of the Turkic Council from an informal cultural association to a political and economic organization. Furthermore, Turkey has applied to the United Nations to change its foreign name from “Turkey” to “Türkiye,” which means “home of the Turkish people,” with the root of the word meaning “Turk,” indicating Turkey’s identification with its Turkic descendants. In June 2022, the United Nations officially approved this request. Turkey’s series of actions reflect its attempt to rediscover and re-explore its ethnic identity, enhance its status among Turkic-speaking countries, and even ains to become a leader of Turkic-speaking nations.
In summary, Turkey’s emphasis on Islam and its identification with Turkic-speaking countries demonstrate Turkey’s quest for cultural autonomy and demonstrates the enhancement of Turkey’s ethnic identity, showcasing Turkey’s civilizational consciousness and cultural confidence.
(IV) National Defense: Accelerating Defense Industry Complex Development, and Promotion of Defense Autonomy
Building a secure and reliable defense force is the prerequisite and foundation for strategic autonomy. Turkey’s preparation for autonomous military and defense measures is primarily aimed at achieving strategic autonomy and has begun since Cyprus crisis with the West and Greece in mid 1960s.[26]
During the Cold War, Turkey began to adjust its security policy of relying on US protection, focusing on developing its own defense industry. Since the 21st century, Turkey has repeatedly and publicly expressed its will and determination to reduce its dependence on foreign military aid and to develop its indigenous defense industry. This official declaration has become a significant driving force for the development of Turkey’s defense industry.
In its “2024-2028 Strategic Plan,” Turkey has set the ambitious goal of increasing the localization rate of its defense industry from 80% in 2023 to 85% in 2028.[27]
In 2023, Erdoğan released the “Right Steps for the Century of Türkiye: 2023 Election Manifesto” (the “Century of Türkiye Manifesto”). This Manifesto set out Turkey’s development goals for Turkey’s second century, with the defense industry goal being: to reduce foreign dependence in the defense industry, further increase the rate of domestic production rate, vigorously promote investment and technological innovation, achieve technological breakthroughs, and finally realize the goal of a fully independent defense.[28]
To this end, Turkey has begun to develop its domestic defense industry and enhance its military strength, building a competitive and innovative defense industry. Currently, Turkey has established a military-industrial system that can cover the weapon systems of its main military branches, including the army, navy, and air force. It is capable of manufacturing various types of military equipment required by the Turkish armed forces, including fighter jets, drones, large surface ships, armored vehicles, and turret systems.
Well-known companies in the Turkish defense industry include: Aselsan, Turkish Aerospace Industries, missile manufacturer Roketsan; Bayraktar; Istanbul Shipyard, Otokar, FASS Defense, etc., some of which are even ranked among the world’s top 100 defense companies. In addition, Turkey has launched a series of defense industry modernization projects. On March 12, 2004, the Turkish Navy established the “National Ship” (MILGEM) project office to formulate a development plan for the “National Ship” project. In 2023, Turkey’s aircraft carrier “Anadolu” (a drone jet carrier which can navigate in seas) was launched, with a domestically supplied material ratio of 75%.[29]
The construction of the aircraft carrier in the sea “Trakya” is also being accelerated. Turkey has become a global leader in the research, development, and manufacturing of drones. Drones such as the TB-2, Anka-S, and “Kızılelma” (Red Apple) are all independently developed by Turkey. Turkey’s domestically produced drones played a significant role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and occupy an important position in Turkey’s military exports. In 2017, Turkey expressed its intention to purchase Russia’s S-400 air defense missile system, and the two sides completed the first batch of S-400 transactions in 2019. This move by Turkey signalled s a deep sense of distrust in the United States and a pursuit of defense autonomy.
Currently, the defense industry has transformed from a procurement model primarily dependent on foreign imports to a self-reliant model with a strong R&D base and reduced imports, while maintaining strong export momentum. A research report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows that Turkey’s share of arms exports from 2020-2024 increased by 103% compared to 2015-2019, ranking 11th globally, while its import share decreased by 33%, ranking 22nd. The United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, and Qatar, Malasia are the top three destinations for Turkey’s arms exports, while Spain, Italy, and Germany are the top three sources of its arms imports.[30]
(V) Diplomatically: Turkey Advances its Foreign Policy Transformation, and Participates in Global Governance System Reform
Entering the 21st century, with the rise of the “Global South” countries, Turkey’s diplomacy has also undergone a significant transformation.
Around 2010s, guided by the “Strategic Depth” doctrine proposed by Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey launched a neighborhood countries policy known as “zero problem policy,” began to enhance its influence in the regional and even international levels. [31]
While developing relations with the United States and the European Union, Turkey emphasizes the development of relations with Russia, China, and other “Global South” countries. Turkey’s main goal is to become a global player while supporting its foreign policy objectives at the regional and global levels. The “Global South” countries are seen by Turkey as a space for obtaining economic opportunities, as a space for seeking political legitimacy, and as a space gaining international support.[32]
After the changes in the Middle East (so called Arab Spring), Turkey actively intervened in the Syrian civil war, thus initiated another period of foreign policy transformation. Especially after the failed military coup in 2016, under the guidance of “proactive and humanitarian” diplomacy, Turkey has carried out humanitarian aid, actively intervened in regional hotspots, and conducted independent military operations,…in this period Turkey’s differences with the United States and the European Union becoming increasingly prominent.
At the same time, Turkey has positioned itself as a development promoter for the least developed countries and has voiced their claims in international forums, thereby adopting a middle position between high-income and lowest-income economies.[33]
After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in February 2022, the Turkish presidential spokesperson explicitly stated that Turkey would not impose economic sanctions on Russia.[34]
Thus, Turkey became the only NATO member country that did not close its airspace to Russia or did not impose economic sanctions on the country.
In 2019, Turkey announced the “Asia Anew” initiative to enhance dialogue and cooperation with Asian countries.
In particular, Turkey seeks to gain leverage in its competition with the United States by moving closer to “Global South” countries like China and Russia, aiming to compel the US to change its attitude and approach toward Turkey. Regarding Turkey-Russia relations, in 2004, Turkey and Russia signed the “Joint Declaration on Deepening Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership,” which stated that both countries are Eurasian powers that value security and stability, highlighting the significance of strengthening their cooperation.[35]
In October 2016, Russia and Turkey reached the “TurkStream” natural gas pipeline agreement, leading to close cooperation in the energy sector.
The two sides also signed the S-400 missile purchase contract in December 2017. After the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out, Turkey balanced among multiple competing powers, which to a certain extent benefited Russia.
In terms of Turkey-China relations, the changes in relations between Turkey and China are, to some extent, related to the shift in Turkish foreign policy towards a more autonomous and less Western-oriented line, which became particularly evident after the Arab Spring.[36]
Since the establishment of a strategic cooperative relationship between China and Turkey in 2010, relations have warmed rapidly. On April 26, 2013, Turkey became a “dialogue partner” of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, making it the first NATO member to establish such a relationship. In October 2014, Turkey joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Turkey is willing to strengthen the alignment of its “Middle Corridor” initiative with the “Belt and Road” initiative, elevate Turkey-China relations to a new level, and help realize connectivity across the Eurasian continent. Turkey has also repeatedly expressed its intention to join the BRICS, using this platform to achieve joint self-strengthening.
After the 2008 financial crisis, the global governance system saw its first major adjustments, reforms, and developments favorable to the “Global South” countries, and these countries also became the biggest driving force for the reform of the global governance system.[37]
As the issues of global governance continue to expand, with traditional and non-traditional security intertwined, the collective rise of the “Global South” countries has contributed new strength to the international community’s joint response to such common problems of mankind.
By serving as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council from 2009 to 2010, Turkey showed strong enthusiasm in the United Nations, playing a more constructive role in global governance and accelerating its active participation in this area.[38]
As a member of the “Global South,” Turkey has put forward its own propositions and ideas on issues such as the Iranian nuclear issue, food security, and UN reform, actively participating in global governance and striving to change the unreasonable Western-dominated governance system.
Turkey and Iran
On the Iranian nuclear issue, Turkey is dissatisfied with the pressure Western countries are putting on Iran over the nuclear issue and refuses to implement the dual-track policy of negotiations plus sanctions against Iran by Europe and the US.
Turkey argues that any country has the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but these countries must cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency and abide by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.[39]
In 2010, Iran, Turkey, and Brazil signed the “Tehran Joint Declaration” on nuclear fuel exchange in Tehran, and Turkey also voted against the UN resolution imposing comprehensive sanctions on Iran.
This Declaration set Turkey on a course opposite to the United States on the Iranian nuclear issue. After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Turkey and Russia discussed global food security issues in a situation where the West was unable to fulfil the grain agreement. With the promotion of the United Nations and Turkey, the United Nations, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine reached the “Black Sea Grain Initiative” in Istanbul, aiming to restore Ukraine’s exports of grain, food, and fertilizer through a safe maritime humanitarian corridor.
Turkey has also criticized the existing structure of the international system. Erdoğan once pointed out that the number of permanent members of the UN Security Council should be twenty, not five. Erdoğan called for the reorganization of an institution under the UN framework that could be “responsible for the peace, security, and welfare” of the world, and the construction of a “global governance structure that can represent all origins, beliefs, and cultures.”[40]
Turkey argues that the operation of the UN security architecture, based on Cold War conditions, does not conform to the current world order. In the past Davutoğlu had also pointed out: “The new global order must be more inclusive and participatory… Turkey will be one of those active and influential actors who sit at the table to solve problems, not watch them.”[41]
III. What are the Motivations Behind Turkey’s Pursuit for Strategic Autonomy
Turkey’s strategic autonomy quest is the result of a combination of several factors.
The collective rise of the “Global South” countries provides a favorable external environment for Turkey’s strategic autonomy quest. The enhancement of Turkey’s national strength and the resulting changes in Turkey’s perception of itself and Turkey’s perception about the world situation are the root cause of its strategic autonomy, while the unreasonable demands and hegemonic actions of the United States, the European Union, and other non-“Global South” countries are the driving force this quest.
(I) The Rise of “Global South” Countries Provides a Favourable External Environment
The interaction between international actors constitutes a holistic structure, which is the international system. Only by understanding the changes occurring in the international system can we understand why Turkey is able to shift towards strategic autonomy practices.[42]
During the Cold War, the Middle East was a scene of intense competition between the Eastern and Western blocs, and regional countries were often forced to “take sides.”
In the context of major global changes, the collective rise of “Global South” countries has led to demands to reshape the international system, accelerating the trend toward a multipolar international landscape. Under such conditions Turkey is able to pursue its national interests in a more flexible manner. This multipolar trend is prominently reflected in the relative decline of the United States and the relative collective rise of the “Global South” countries. And within the “Global South,” countries the strategic transformations in Russia and China are closely related to Turkey’s strategic autonomy.
In Turkey’s process of strategic autonomy, Russia has played an important role, and the development of Russia-Turkey relations has provided significant support for Turkey’s strategic autonomy.[43]
Russia positions itself as a leader of the “Global South” countries
After the end of the Cold War, Russia experienced a brief period of Westernization in its foreign strategy (Yeltsin). After Putin came to power, Putin initiated a pragmatic foreign policy of “balancing East and West, giving equal importance to Europe and Asia.”
However, from the 2008 Russia-Georgia War to the 2022 Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia’s relations with Western countries have continuously deteriorated. The Western countries, led by the United States, have imposed sanctions on Russia multiple times, and great power competition between United States and Russia has intensified.
During this process, Russia’s foreign strategy has shifted from a “pivot to the East” to a “pivot to the South,” positioning itself as a leader of the “Global South” countries in confronting neo-colonialism and focusing on developing relations with “Global South” countries. [44]
Russia and “Global South”
In March 2023, Russia released the “Foreign Policy Concepts of the Russian Federation,” pointing out that the West has lost its dominance over the international order and that “Global South” countries should cooperate with Russia to jointly overthrow the current liberal international order and establish a new type of international order.[45]
This analysis highlights the important position of “Global South” countries in Russia’s foreign strategy, and Turkey, as a representative country of the “Global South,” Turkey has benefited from Russia’s strategic transformation and adjustment.
China and “Global South”
The “Global South” countries, represented by China (as generally accepted), are playing an increasingly important role in the newly emerging global order. China’s growing strength and influence provide a strong impetus for Turkey to seek closer relations with China.[47]
At the same time, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the 2008 economic crisis, have accelerated the decline of US hegemony.
In particular, the changes in the Middle East have highlighted the partiality taraflı politika izledğini ortaya koyuyor of US Middle East policy and the limitations of US capabilities. These reflect the US’s governance dilemma in the Middle East and the further decline of its influence in the region.
Under these circumstances, Turkey has gained more strategic space and a favorable external environment to pursue its own national interests and implement a more active foreign policy in its surrounding regions, rather than passively adapting to the demands put forward by the United States. All these developments have prompted Turkey to seek new mechanisms to ensure and strengthen its strategic autonomy in the evolving regional order.[48]
As Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu pointed out, “Our neighborhood and the global environment are undergoing breathtaking changes. Due to Turkey’s geopolitical position, the ability to foresee and manage vulnerabilities and crises around us is vital. We are entering a period where new ideas and new initiatives must be put forward.”[49]
It can be seen that Turkey is attempting to balance and even hedge against the influence of the US and the West by developing relations with “Global South” countries, striving to become a key country sought after by multiple nations.
(II) As Turkey’s National Strength Enhances, this enhancement Brings Cognitive Changes in Turkey’s ruling elite’s mindset
As a “Global South” country, the significant enhancement of Turkey’s own national strength has provided a power basis for Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy, and Turkey’s demand for great power status has become more urgent.
Turkey has become one of the world’s top twenty economies, achieving significant accomplishments in economic construction. From 2002 to 2021, Turkey’s nominal GDP increased by 340%, and Turkey’s GDP calculated by purchasing power parity increased by 420%.[50]
Rapid economic development has enhanced Turkey’s national strength, laying a material foundation for its strategic autonomy. Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy is based on Turkey’s own interests; as a long-term guiding principle, the discourse of strategic autonomy influences the cognition of Turkey’s leaders and elites.[51]
In its “2023 Vision,” Turkey set a centennial development goal: to transform from a “bridge country” to a global power playing a key role.
In the 2023 election, Erdoğan proposed the “Century of Türkiye” election manifesto, reaffirming Turkey’s strategic autonomy. The ideological foundation supporting this grand vision is the strategic thinking that Turkey has formed since Erdoğan and the AKP came to power.[52]
Some scholars point out that although most of a country’s activities on the international stage are reactions to the actions of other countries, countries also try to implement coherent and unified long-term strategies to achieve their national interests.[53]
Strategic autonomy is an important part of Turkey’s overall national strategy, and the vision and goal of this “grand strategy” is to become a global power with strategic autonomy. Guided by this strategic thinking, Turkey has begun to change its one-sided “Westernization” and “Europeanization” stance, instead Turkey began a return to the Islamic world and began to emphasize its great power quest and identity.
After the AKP came to power, AKP continuously challenged secularism.
Islamic ideology became a core variable and lasting driving force in shaping how Turkey views the outside world, fundamentally shaking the ideological foundation of Turkey’s pro-Western stance and causing anti-American sentiment in the country to rise.
Turkey’s active intervention in the recent Palestine-Israel conflict (since 2023) can be seen as an attempt to occupy the moral high ground on the issue and play a leading role in the Islamic world.
Furthermore, the inheritance of the Ottoman Empire’s historical legacy is a source of legitimacy for Turkey’s pursuit of world power status and leadership in the Islamic world.
Turkey aims a redefinition of Turkey’s strategy and national identity. The foreign policy of Turkey during the AKP era has also been marked by neo-Ottomanism. Turkey uses this historical identity and national identity to restore Turkey’s contemporary great power quest and ambition. Thereby Turkey is intervening in countries and regions that were formerly part of the Ottoman Empire.
This identity recognition has also changed Turkey’s traditional choice of leaning towards the West and traditional choice of staying away from the Middle East countries.
Turkey’s special geographical location and identity characteristics have influenced Turkey’s strategic thinking, indicating that Turkey’s path of complete Westernization will not last long, and “balancing East and West” is more in line with Turkey’s own interests.
Therefore, influenced by this strategic thinking, Turkey has begun to rediscover its Islamic identity and draw closer to the East although Turkey stays within the Western alliance system, in the same manner Turkey aims to develop strategic autonomy while it develops relations with the US and the West.
(III) The Coarse Attitudes of the United States and the European Union Push Turkey Away from the West
Among the “Global South” countries, Turkey is a nation that was historically reduced to a semi-colony, Turkey joined the US-led military alliance after World War II, and Turkey has long actively sought to integrate with the West.
However, it is very difficult for Turkey to become a truly Western country, and in particular the coarse attitudes of the United States and the European Union, towards Turkey have pushed Turkey to gradually distance itself from the West.
While the West considers the legitimacy of Turkey’s NATO and EU memberships, Turkey weighs whether these will harm Turkey’s national interests and considers the possibility of withdrawing from NATO.[54]
Although Turkey is a “pivot state” and an important ally in US geostrategy, the United States has not treated Turkey as an equal partner. In many issues, such as the 2015 Turkey-Russia “jet incident,” the 2016 failed military coup, and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the United States has disregarded Turkey’s interests and feelings and has not provided effective support and assistance.
This course attitude has led to a sense of “abandonment” in Turkey.[55]
When discussing the alliance theory, scholars who hold the “balance of threat” view argue that a common external threat is the main reason for the formation of an alliance.[56]
If the perception of a common threat changes among allies, this will affect the stability and cohesion of the alliance. In the Syrian war, the United States cooperated with the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which Turkey views as a major source of external threat.
Therefore, the different perceptions of a common threat between Turkey and the US constitute the key to their disagreements and have become an important reason for Turkey to independently safeguard its national security.
Erdoğan once warned the United States that if USA did not change its unilateralist and disrespectful approach to Turkey, Turkey would be forced to find new partners and friends.[57]
During the Cold War, the United States’ secret betrayal of Turkey in the Cuban Missile Crisis and USA’s threats and military embargoes against its ally Turkey during the two Cyprus crises made Turkey deeply aware of the problems of completely siding with the United States.
After the 2016 military coup, Turkey argued that the coup was carried out at the behest or with the planning of the United States, yet the US refused to extradite Fethullah Gülen, whom Turkey considered a participant in the coup, which caused dissatisfaction and distrust in Turkey.
A 2022 opinion poll by the German Marshall Fund (Think Tank) showed that 58.3% of Turkish respondents considered the United States to be the greatest threat to Turkey’s national interests.[58]
Furthermore, since Turkey applied to join the European Economic Community in 1960s, Turkey has remained on the outside of the EU.
During the long accession process, Turkey promoted domestic political democratization and economic liberalization reforms according to the EU’s “Copenhagen criteria,” weakening the power of the military and increasing the rights of the Kurdish minority.
However, the EU still argued that Turkey’s reforms did not meet EU standards, and the negotiations between the two sides progressed slowly until they were frozen. Not only did the two sides remain deadlocked on the Cyprus and Kurdish issues, but the EU also became increasingly dissatisfied with the various policies adopted by the AKP, and it seems that the profound religious and cultural differences could no longer be concealed. (rise of ultra right populism in EU)
On the issue of identity, Turkey’s Islamic identity is considered to be vastly different from the European identity and should not be included in the EU.
European countries argue that Turkey does not belong to Europe.[59] Germany and France have consistently questioned Turkey’s “Europeanness” in terms of values and culture, viewing Turkey not as an internal member with a common European identity, but see Turkey as a “privileged partner” status with shared economic and security interests.
Therefore, Turkey’s difficult accession process has created adaptive pressure in its Europeanization process, and Turkey’s fatigue with the process of joining the EU has become an important reason for Turkey to detach from the West and seek strategic autonomy.
IV. The Impact and Limits of Turkey’s Strategic Autonomy Practice
Turkey is Still far away from true independence
There is an interactive relationship between the rise of the “Global South” countries and Turkey’s strategic autonomy practice. On the one hand, the rise of the “Global South” has a shaping effect on Turkey’s strategic autonomy, providing Turkey with strategic space and an international environment. On the other hand, Turkey’s measures and performance in Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy will also provide direction, pathways, and policy space for “Global South” countries. However, due to the constraints of various factors, Turkey’s strategic autonomy is still limited.
(I) The Impact of Strategic Autonomy
The pursuit of strategic autonomy has largely freed Turkey from its dependence on Western allies, placing Turkey in a favourable position in great power competition, providing strategic space and benefits for “Global South” countries, and this accelerates the transformation of Turkey’s relations with non-“Global South” countries.
1. Strategic Autonomy Practice is Conducive to Turkey’s Maneuvering in Great Power Competition
In great power competition, “Global South” countries are gaining richer experience in international struggles. “Global South” countries’ ability to make independent decisions is growing stronger, and “Global South” countries’ diplomacy is becoming more mature.[60]
Currently, Turkey’s national identity and diplomatic behavior are undergoing a reshaping.
Turkey is shifting from a pro-Western US ally to the “Global South,” with a clear stance of strategic autonomy.
Strategic autonomy has brought Turkey a more stable space for survival and development in the international system. By actively integrating into rather than passively adapting to the current international situation, Turkey can not only avoid being drawn into difficulties due to US policy mistakes but also maintain and enhance Turkey’s international influence and strengthen its ability to safeguard its own security and interests. Through strategic autonomy practices, Turkey has fostered closer economic ties with “Global South” countries.
In 2000, the regions of the Southern Hemisphere, with which Turkey traditionally had weak ties, accounted for less than 6% of Turkey’s exports and about 13% of Turkey’s imports. Ten years later, Turkey’s exports to these regions jumped to 9%, and Turkey’s imports from these regions jumped to 22%.[61]
Turkey’s cooperative relation with Latin America countries including Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua has developed rapidly.
Turkey’s dual identity as an ally of the West and a “Global South” country
Turkey’s dual identity as an ally of the West and a “Global South” country helps Turkey benefit from both sides and reduces constraints and enticements over Turkey from either side.
On the one hand, as a NATO member and an EU candidate country, despite Turkey’s distrust of both, Turkey can still obtain security protection from NATO and access to the vast market and economic assistance of the EU, thanks to Turkey’s important geographical location and identity.
On the other hand, Turkey’s application to join the BRICS cooperation mechanism may allow Turkey to demonstrate and enhance Turkey’s influence through interaction with “Global South” countries and gain their recognition and acceptance.
Guided by Turkey’s own security and development calculations and plans, Turkey, through a multi-faceted balance, not only maintains strategic flexibility but also benefits from strategic flexibility, maximizing Turkey’s national interests.
In the context of great power competition and gamesmanship, through strategic autonomy, Turkey’s national interests are no longer tied to the US and the West, and this strategic autonomy reduces constraints from the US and the West and lowers the risks Turkey faces.
The fact that Erdoğan’s AKP has been able to stay in power continuously for so long itself shows that AKP’s discourse of strategic autonomy has gained the approval of the domestic populace and played a certain role in Erdoğan’s winning the presidential election.
Guided by strategic autonomy practices, Turkey emphasizes safeguarding its national interests in the development of its relations with regional and global powers and pursues a multilateral and balanced policy, viewing strategic autonomy as a window of opportunity for more room to manoeuvre in its foreign policy. The stability and security in the surrounding regions are long-term goals for Turkey. Especially on the Kurdish issue, Turkey, uninfluenced by the United States, strikes at Kurdish armed groups, which helps to maintain its own national security and regional stability.
2. Strategic Autonomy Practice of Turkey Provides Strategic Space and Benefits for “Global South” Countries
Turkey’s strategic autonomy represents the overall trend of the “Global South” countries, which includes China and Russia. Russia’s situation is interesting: although its past history has the shadow of hegemonism, Russia’s current foreign policy has adopted a policy which prioritizes strong support for the collective rise and struggles of the “Global South”.
Objectively, Turkey’s strategic autonomy can bring new strength to the international community’s call for win-win cooperation, enhance the international status and influence of “Global South” countries, and provide space for “Global South” countries to exert influence in Turkey.
This influence enhances the status of these countries in Turkey’s diplomacy, which is conducive to the joint self-strengthening of “Global South” countries, which is also conducive to the establishment of a fair and reasonable new international political and economic order, and which is also conducive to the promotion of the development of world multipolarization.
Turkey-Russia relations
Regarding Turkey-Russia relations, Turkey’s more autonomous interaction with Russia is conducive to improving bilateral Turkey-Russia relations and provides opportunities for the development of Turkey-Russia relations, while Turkey’s more autonomous interaction with Russia also benefits Russia in the US-Russia big power competition. Turkey has manifold cooperative relations with Russia: nuclear energy, gas, oil, tourism, fresh foodstuff.
For Russia, Turkey’s pursuit of cooperation with Russia within its strategic autonomy practice can weaken the strategic competition pressure from the US and Western countries on Russia. Since the 21st century, the United States has imposed economic sanctions on Russia multiple times. However, Turkey did not follow the US’s lead in imposing sanctions after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which to some extent has alleviated the economic and political pressure Russia faces.
Furthermore, the trade volume between Russia and “Global South” countries, including Turkey, has significantly increased, and the attempts by the US and the West to exhaust Russia through war and economic sanctions could not be achieved.
As NATO continued to expand eastward, Russia’s strategic buffer zone has contracted.
Turkey’s drawing closer to Russia when it practices and develops strategic autonomy can weaken the ability of the US-led NATO to contain Russia, and divide the US’s alliance system in the Middle East, and have a profound impact on the direction of US-Russia competition.
Turkey’s series of diplomatic activities has improved the deteriorating relationship between the two countries since Russia’s high-profile intervention in the Syrian civil war and the Turkey-Russia “jet incident” in 2015, and bilateral Turkey-Russia relations of have warmed up.
In addition, due to Turkey’s important geopolitical location, a closer relationship between Turkey and Russia can also provide security for Russia’s access to the Black Sea and ensure the stable transportation of Russian oil and gas resources. Some scholars point out that the strategic autonomy of “Global South” countries brings Russia opportunities for strategic cooperation with global big powers as well as strategic cooperation with regional powers. This is because Russia hopes to see more regional actors who quest for and practice strategic autonomy in its foreign policy and Russia is pleased to see that these countries make decisions without US interference.[62]
Turkey-China relations
Regarding Turkey-China relations, unlike Russia China is a natural member of the “Global South.” Against the backdrop of Turkey practicing strategic autonomy as a member of the “Global South,” the development prospects for China-Turkey relations will be more promising, and Turkey’s strategic autonomy is opening a window of opportunity for the development of Turkey-China bilateral relations.
On the one hand, Turkey holds a more positive attitude towards China’s constructive intervention in Middle East affairs, which is conducive to promoting the implementation of the “Belt and Road” cooperation initiative of China, and promotes the implementation of other new initiatives by China the Global Security Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative.
This provides development space for Turkey-China bilateral economic and trade cooperation; strategic cooperation, and promotes Turkey-China cultural exchanges, all of which in turn helps to break the attempts of the US and Western countries to separate China from the “Global South” countries.
On the other hand, as the greatest driving force and collective subject for the reform of the global governance system, the autonomous demands and conscious actions of “Global South” countries can have an important positive impact on the international order.
In the field of global issues, traditional and non-traditional security issues are intertwined, requiring a joint response from the international community. Turkey’s pursuit of cooperation with China within its strategic autonomy practice, Turkey’s active participation in global governance, and Turkey’s opposition to the Western international political order are conducive to China’s constructive role in reforming the current world order.
3. Strategic Autonomy Practice of Turkey Accelerates the Transformation of Turkey’s Relations with Non-“Global South” Countries
After the AKP came to power, Turkey’s foreign policy has often referred to its imperial past and Turkey’s leadership role in the region, which has led to very tense relations with European countries and the United States.[63]
As an ally of the United States, Turkey’s quest for strategic autonomy has, to a certain extent, widened the differences and conflicts between the two countries (United States and Turkey), Turkey’s quest for strategic autonomy has also worsened their relationship, and caused the United States to begin to doubt the importance of Turkey’s strategic position.
The dissatisfaction of the Western countries, led by the United States, with Turkey can become increasingly strong, and can exhibit a contradictory and vacillating perception of Turkey, in the eyes of Western countries. Even today some Western countries express open dissatisfaction about Turkey.
If we look to the future and make some estimation we can say that Turkey will not abandon its autonomous foreign policy and proactive diplomatic strategy, and Turkey may also develop an increasingly strong “centrifugal” tendency away from the United States, but we must add that due to various constraints, the pace of Turkey’s quest for autonomous foreign policy will further slow down.
In the future US-Turkey relations will be characterized by periodic outbreak of structural contradictions and this will be followed by a short-term easing of these structural contradictions, and Turkey relations bilateral relations will exhibit transactional and instrumental features.[64]
A research report by the US RAND Corporation pointed out that the centripetal forces between Turkey and NATO are being affected by four centrifugal forces, one of which is Turkey’s increasingly apparent strategic autonomy quest. Turkey is more firmly pursuing independent foreign policy goals, which often run counter to NATO’s goals.[65]
From the first Iraq Gulf War in the 1990s to the new round of the Palestine-Israel conflict, US-Turkey relations are undergoing severe tests due to the aforementioned series of differences.
For the United States, Turkey’s strategic autonomy means that Turkey no longer acts as a “pawn” for the US. The US will have to face more autonomous acts of Turkey and should prepare for more equal US-Turkey partnership relations, and the US must consider the impact of Turkey’s strategic adjustments when formulating US foreign policy that conforms to the changing geopolitical landscape and interdependent relationships.[66]
Furthermore, Turkey is also becoming a major element of uncertainty in the US’s implementation of its Middle East strategy. US troops are stationed at Turkey’s Incirlik and Konya air bases, the NATO Land Command in Izmir, and the US early warning radar system in Kürecik.
Taking the Incirlik air base as an example, this base, which began to be used during the Cold War, is an important base for the US to carry out its policies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other parts of the Middle East. However, Turkey often uses Incirlik air base as a bargaining chip in its competition with the United States.
After the failed military coup, the Turkish authorities closed the Incirlik air base, causing the interruption of US Air Force air strikes against the “IŞID Islamic State” launched from that military base. This action deepened US doubts about Turkey’s sincerity and effectiveness as an ally.
EU-Turkey Relations
Although Erdoğan still states that Turkey will not give up on joining the EU, in practice, Turkey’s centrifugal tendency away from the EU is becoming more and more obvious. The conflicts and differences between the two sides on the refugee issue, the Eastern Mediterranean issue, Cyprus issue and issues of democracy and human rights are deepening.
Turkey’s actions contradict the EU’s expectations and requirements for Turkey, deepening the EU’s prejudice that Turkey is experiencing a democracy backsliding and Turkey is increasingly practicing unilateral foreign policy.
After the new changes in the Middle East, Turkey promoted the political value of “moderate Islamic democracy” in the region, committed to developing the “Turkish model” within these Middle East countries. Especially after the 2016 failed military coup, Turkey accelerated its domestic Islamization process and actively promoted Turkey’s political transformation.
This shows that Turkey’s Islamization is gradually replacing its Europeanization in terms of identity-transformation. The political, economic, and socio-cultural transformations that Turkey is undergoing domestically mark Turkey’s embarkation on a path of independently exploring its national development and Turkish modernization suited to itself. These developments also herald the failure of the attempts by the United States and the European Union to transform Turkey into a “Western model” country and also shows the decline of Turkey’s “Europeanization.” Therefore, Turkey and the EU began to think on a new model for their relationship.
(II) The Limits of Turkey’s Strategic Autonomy
Turkey is a member of the “Global South” and highlights its strategic autonomy quest by drawing closer to other “Global South” countries. Although the pace of Turkey’s strategic autonomy is gradually accelerating, Turkey’s strategic autonomy is still limited. Turkey’s strategic autonomy is constrained by factors such as the overall development trend of the “Global South” countries, the competition and wooing of “Global South” countries by the US and the West, and thirdly Turkey’s internal factors.
1. The Limits of the Rise of “Global South” Countries
Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy by drawing closer to other “Global South” countries is significantly influenced by the overall and collective rise of the “Global South”.
As a group and collective subeject, the “Global South” countries are showing a general trend of rising, which has brought benefits to Turkey. However, in the current international system, most “Global South” countries are still at the low-to-middle end of the global industrial chain economically, and they are trying to overcome the predicament of dependency still remains an important issue they face.
Many countries still face the mission of achieving autonomous development politically and are entangled with internal governance problems such as ethnic and religious issues, industrialization, and modernization issues. On the whole, the “Global South” countries are not yet able to pose a fundamental challenge to the traditional developed countries, let alone can they subvert the liberal international order.
Internally, the “Global South” is not an international organization or a political bloc, nor does “Global South” has a clear membership composition. “Global South” is a loose group of developing countries and emerging market countries with diverse values, cultural traditions, and development levels.[67]
At the same time, the “Global South” group includes major powers like China and Russia, middle powers like Turkey and Brazil, as well as a large number of less developed countries. They have diverse interests, leading to key differences and disparities in many areas, making it difficult to form a unified, institutionalized platform.
In addition, the newly rising “Global South” countries are susceptible to being used and divided by Western countries, which indicates a certain degree of vulnerability and instability. Western countries are competing for discourse power over this concept by wooing and favoring “Global South” countries.
Batı ülkeleri, “Küresel Güney” ülkelerini kazanmaya çalışarak ve zaman zaman pohpohlama yoluyla “Küresel Güney” kavramını kendi çıkaralarına uygun bir söylem içine hapsetmeye çalışıyorlar.
As mentioned below, the US and Western countries are unwilling for these nations to be completely autonomous and US and Western countries attempt to isolate China from “Global South” countries, thereby they aim to disrupt the relationship between China and developing countries.
For example, the 2023 Munich Security Conference discussed “North-South cooperation” as a topic, and the G7 summit also invited some “Global South” countries to attend its G7 meetings. In the context of great power competition, “Global South” countries, including Turkey, will continue to be key targets for the US and the West to win over. A scholar wrote: “my conclusion here is that Turkey’s southern route (“Global South”) is not alternative to Turkish traditional route (Western) and also not alternative to post traditional route (Anatolian), instead for me Turkey’s southern route is complementary, aiming to acquire importance in global governance.” [68]
See https://rpquarterly.kureselcalismalar.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/vol1.2-Donelli-Levaggi.pdf
2. Constraints to Turkey’s Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy Coming from Non-“Global South” Countries
Amidst the collective rise and pursuit of strategic autonomy by “Global South” countries, non-“Global South” countries, represented by the US and Europe, are actively trying to win over and compete for these “Global South” countries. Of course, US and Europe do not wish that “Global South” countries’ strategic autonomy will not become too prominent.
As long as Turkey remains a US ally, if its strategic autonomy is within the tolerable range of the United States, the US may still engage in persuasion and compromise.
However, if Turkey crosses the US’s bottom line, touches upon fundamental US interests in the Middle East, or even challenges US leadership and hegemonic status, these will lead to a shift in the US stance towards criticism or even sanctions.
On the one hand, Turkey’s tough attitude and strong actions cannot erase Turkey’s dependent relationship with the United States. The US plays an important role in safeguarding Turkey’s national security. Additionally, Turkey still needs to rely on the US to achieve military, economic, and political goals, and Turkey is not yet capable of competing with the US for regional security dominance.
Although Turkey has made great efforts to diversify its defense equipment and weapons, a considerable amount of American-made equipment will still exist in its defense products for the foreseeable future, and it is impossible for Turkey to completely detach from NATO’s security and defense system.
A Turkish think tank’s research report, “70 Years of Turkey-NATO Relations,” detailed the importance of NATO to Turkey and Turkey’s contributions to NATO, looked forward to Turkey’s position in the “NATO 2030” agenda, and proposed several policy recommendations for deepening Turkey-NATO relations.[69]
On the other hand, although Turkey’s strategic autonomy has to some extent benefited from the US’s strategic retrenchment in the Middle East, this will not fundamentally change the important position of the US in Middle Eastern affairs. Turkey remains an important link in the US’s strategic alliance system.
Due to the needs of great power competition, the Biden administration has launched a so-called “New Middle East Policy,” seeking to rebuild relationships with regional allies and partners. This micro-adjustment of US Middle East strategy has, to a certain extent, weakened Turkey’s capacity and room for manoeuvre in its pursuit of strategic autonomy.
Therefore, although the conflicts between Turkey and the US are deepening due to the Turkey’s demand for strategic autonomy, Turkey’s asymmetric dependence on the US will continue to constrain Turkey’s goals and vision for strategic autonomy for a long time.
In this regard, some scholars have pointed out that the shift from strategic dependence to strategic autonomy has changed Turkey’s relationship within the NATO alliance, but Turkey-NATO— their mutual need determines that they will maintain a situation of “conflict without breaking.”[70]
For the European Union, although European Union is slow to agree to Turkey’s accession, the EU is also unwilling to completely abandon this important member and sees seeking a new model for EU-Turkey relations as an important agenda item. On the Eastern Mediterranean issue, Turkey and the EU have common interests and should jointly address potential challenges.[71]
Ilke Toygür from the Center for Applied Turkey Studies at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs argues that EU policymakers can no longer conduct effective diplomacy or formulate broader geopolitical strategies on the premise of Turkey’s EU accession.
EU policymakers need to look elsewhere and innovate to regain leverage over Turkey’s democratic backsliding and other aspects of EU-Turkey relations.[72]
From this, it can be seen that Turkey’s deviation from “Europeanization” does not mean a complete rupture of relations, and the EU’s attitude towards Turkey’s identity issue still plays an important role in Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy.
3. Constraints to Turkey’s Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy Coming from Turkey’s Domestic Factors
Some scholars have pointed out that Turkey’s dilemma is that its domestic politics are built on a society with divided values; its pillar lies in the ability of the AKP and Erdoğan to maintain economic development and sustain a political-value balance.[73]
Currently, Turkey is experiencing lira depreciation, rising inflation, and an increase in the unemployment rate, which has had a huge negative impact on its economic development and directly limits the Turkey’s ability to provide economic support for the pursuit of strategic autonomy.
From the “2023 Vision” to the call to launch the “Century of Türkiye,” Turkey under Erdoğan’s leadership can be described as ambitious. However, at present, many of the economic goals in the “Vision” have not been achieved. For example, Turkey aimed to become one of the top ten global economies by 2023, with a per capita GDP of $25,000.
As economic globalization deepens, no country can detach itself from the existing international economic order, especially since Turkey’s economic industries are still in the low-to-middle end, and its financial and economic dependence on the United States is relatively strong. The long-term economic growth model that has overly relied on foreign investment has not allowed Turkey to completely change its industrial structure.
Therefore, Turkey’s economy still faces great risks. Turkey is currently still a middle power, and the strength of a middle power cannot support its excessive ambitions and expectations for strategic autonomy, which determines the limits of Turkey’s strategic autonomy. Therefore, although Turkey seeks strategic autonomy and maintains close relations with Russia and China, Turkey cannot afford to alienate the West; Turkey’s identity as a NATO member and being part of the EU customs union still plays an important role for Turkey.[74]
Turkey’s strategic autonomy quest also faces pressure from the internal opposition parties.
In the 2023 presidential election, the largest opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and its coalition partners, received 48.09% of the votes, and Erdoğan was elected by a narrow margin. In previous elections, the vote share difference between the CHP and the AKP was much larger. In the 2024 local elections, the CHP won the mayoral elections in 35 cities (the AKP won 24), including Turkey’s major cities like Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, and most coastal areas, and received about 37.76% of the vote (the AKP received about 35.48%).[75]
This mayoral election was a major blow to both Erdoğan and the AKP. This is because the domestic opposition in Turkey supports NATO, acknowledges NATO’s crucial role in providing deterrence for national security, and seeks to advance the alliance relationship with the United States on an equal basis, attempting to bring Turkey back into the F-35 program.[76]
The then-chairman of the Turkish Republican People’s Party, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, had criticized Erdoğan’s Turkey for deviating from the Western path. Meral Akşener, the chairwoman of the Good Party (IYI), demanded that the Erdoğan government should get rid of its excessive dependence on Russia, abandon the S-400 missiles, and nationalize the Akkuyu nuclear power plant co-built by Russia.[77]
The chairman of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD), one of Turkey’s most influential business organizations, Simone Kaslowski, called on the Erdoğan government to fully utilize the opportunity of the Russia-Ukraine conflict to return to the West and become a trustworthy member of NATO or the Council of Europe.[78]
V. Conclusion
Against the backdrop of the rise of “Global South” countries and by the enhancement of Turkey’s own national strength, Turkey’s strategic autonomy has shown remarkable performance and distinct characteristics in the economic, political, cultural, defense, and diplomatic spheres. Turkey’s strategic autonomy has had a significant positive impact on the collective rise of “Global South” countries and significant positive impact on Turkey’s relations with non-“Global South” countries.
Due to various constraints, the pace of Turkey’s strategic autonomy will further slow down, but overall, Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy will continue to strongly guide its domestic and foreign policy transformation. Turkey will continue to draw closer to “Global South” countries to achieve a balance among multiple strong global actors. The purpose of Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy is to correct its excessively pro-Western line, not to completely break away from the West.
Therefore, we should have a clear understanding of the essence of Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy: it is not about completely detaching from the US alliance system or NATO’s security framework, but instead Turkey wants to use this discourse ( quest for strategic autonomy) to pursue national interests. Ultimately, whether Turkey can achieve true strategic autonomy depends on changes in both the international and domestic environments and requires further observation and examination.
We should view Turkey’s strategic autonomy rationally, neither underestimate Turkey’s determination nor overestimate Turkey’s capabilities for strategic autonomy.
A clear understanding will be beneficial for the future development of China-Turkey relations. As both a “Global South” country and a US ally, Turkey is representative and typical in its pursuit of strategic autonomy.
Other members of the “Global South” which are in the US alliance system, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Gulf countries, also have aspirations for strategic autonomy.
As great power competition unfolds, the US and the West are vigorously trying to win over and compete for these “Global South” countries. As an emerging major power and a member of the “Global South,” China should combine its continued cooperation with these countries with the implementation of its “Three Global Initiatives,” uphold a mindset of cooperation and mutual benefit, jointly promote the reform of the global governance system and governance capacity, and thereby break the attempts of the US and the West to woo “Global South” countries, and optimize China’s diplomatic strategy.
Footnotes & References
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