On Marx’s Triple Critique of Western Modernity: individualism, the logic of reification, and the logic of capital

Author Li Dianlai is a professor and doctoral supervisor at the School of Philosophy, Wuhan University.

June 2024

Abstract

Although Marx did not use the term “modernity” in his works, his comprehensive critique of capitalism effectively constituted a critique of Western modernity. In the system of Western capitalism, subjectivity, as the dominant principle of modernity, is mainly manifested in the expansion and spread of individualism, the logic of reification, and the logic of capital. Marx’s profound examination and critique of these three forms constitute the substantive content of his critique of Western modernity. Marx’s critique of Western modernity does not mean that he theoretically rejected modernity. Rather, through this critique, Marx achieved a fundamental reconstruction of modernity, thus providing us with a better solution for understanding and developing modernity. Therefore, it can be seen that Marxism constitutes a critical force against Western-style modernization and the civilization it represents, but within its theoretical framework lies a wealth of intellectual resources for arguing, defending, supporting, and promoting modernization. Our modernization in China guided by Marxism is a modernization development model with enormous advantages and vigorous vitality, representing a new form of human civilization. The fundamental concept of this model also embodies, confirms, and enriches Marx’s thought on modernity.

[Keywords] Marx; Western modernity; individualism; logic of reification; spread of the logic of capital;

To deeply elucidate the connotation, logic, and characteristics of Chinese-style modernization, it is necessary to clarify a major theoretical issue: the relationship between Marxism and modernization.

Clearly, to truly clarify this issue, a comprehensive understanding of Marx’s thought on modernity is essential. We know that, chronologically, modernity originated in the West, its initial vehicle being the capitalist system. Although Marx did not use the term “modernity” in his works, his comprehensive critique of capitalism, from another perspective, is also a critique of Western modernity. Marx’s critique is comprehensive and profound, focusing on three aspects: the expansion and spread of individualism, the logic of reification, and the logic of capital—which are all manifestations of Western modernity. Grasping Marx’s critique of these three aspects is key to fully understanding his thought on modernity, an important prerequisite for clarifying the relationship between Marxism and modernization. 

I. A Critique of Individualism

What exactly is modernity? This is a question with many different interpretations. People often attribute modernity to instrumental rationality based on Weber’s knowledge map. Compared to this understanding, Habermas’s analysis is more worthy of attention. In *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, Habermas identifies subjectivity as the dominant principle of modernity.

Frankly speaking, this is an extremely accurate and profound identification, mainly because, historically speaking, modernity refers to a modern society that is vastly different from ancient or traditional societies. In the West, a series of major historical events and changes since the 16th century, such as the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the Scientific Revolution, and the Industrial Revolution, are the fundamental markers of the arrival of modern society and therefore important bases for our understanding of modernity.

These historical events and changes occurred in different fields, but they share a common element: the “appearance” and “establishment” of humanity as the subject, that is, the establishment of the principle of subjectivity. In fact, broadly speaking, not only these landmark historical events and changes, but almost all historical progress and civilizational achievements formed on the surface of modern society are probably related to the establishment of the principle of subjectivity in one way or another. From this perspective, “subjectivity” is more capable of vividly portraying and depicting modernity than other categories, including instrumental rationality. Of course, we cannot reverse the logical relationship here—it is not modernity that creates subjectivity, but rather that subjectivity endows modern society with a new spiritual principle, thus enabling modernity to become a coordinate system that represents and defines the direction of social development.

Subjectivity can be examined from two perspectives: the cognitive subject and the value subject. Regarding the former, the establishment of the principle of subjectivity shaped the philosophical tradition of epistemology, with modern rationalism and empiricism being its two major branches. Regarding the latter, subjectivity is embodied in the mainstream values ​​of modern society, such as rights and freedoms, and the defense of these values ​​constitutes a main thread in Western political philosophy since Hobbes and Locke. To make a judgment on the right and wrong of modernity, it seems more appropriate to focus on the value subject, because compared to the cognitive subject, the value subject has a clearly evident value orientation. Furthermore, from the perspective of the value subject, rights and freedoms are naturally important characteristics of modernity, but it must also be recognized that the key point in the defense of rights and freedoms by political philosophers such as Locke, Smith, and Mill lies in the “individual.”

In his *Natural Rights and History*, Leo Strauss, when discussing Locke, explicitly pointed out this issue: “By shifting the focus from natural obligations or responsibilities to natural rights, the individual, the self, becomes the center and source of the moral world, because man—different from man’s ends—becomes that center and source.” Moreover, if the theoretical defense of individual value by political philosophers contributed to individualism, then individualism is undoubtedly a statute and general rule of life in civil society that gradually formed since the 16th century. In fact, people, as the main body of civil society, are atomized, profit-driven individuals. Each independent individual establishes a value world centered on their own interests; this is typical individualism. In his early studies of 18th-century British history, Engels astutely examined this individualism, stating: “The activities of England are those of independent, parallel individuals, the movement of unconnected atoms that rarely act as a whole, and even when they do, they act from the perspective of individual interests. The current widespread poverty and extreme disunity are manifestations of this lack of unity among individuals.” These facts unequivocally demonstrate that subjectivity, as the dominant principle of Western modernity, is largely embodied in individualism, and individualism is a fundamental “marker” of Western modernity.

According to Locke, Smith, and others, individualism is not the source of social contradictions; on the contrary, it is an important prerequisite or inherent characteristic of harmonious and orderly social relations. In their view, a world centered on the individual is one that eliminates discriminatory factors and external coercion, thereby ensuring respect for people. In such a world, while people may be “self-interested,” they will not “harm others,” or rather, “self-interest” and “altruism” can be combined. However, the reality is that Locke and Smith depicted an overly idealized picture of life. Throughout philosophical history, there has been no shortage of examination and critique of individualism. For example, Hegel, within the theoretical framework of his philosophy of law, criticized the principle of the particularity of the atomized individual in civil society, arguing that this principle can only become a rational rule of life when integrated into universal ethics.

 Contemporary political philosopher Charles Taylor, in *The Anxiety of Modernity*, identifies the loss of meaning and moral decay caused by individualism as a major concern of modernity. Although Hegel and Taylor did not focus on the same point, they both revealed the same problem: within the value system of individualism and the logic of modernity it signifies, there exists an undeniable division and opposition. This problem has often been obscured in the liberal tradition after Locke, but it truly reflects a regression in the rapid advancement of Western modernity. Marx provided a more profound revelation of this issue.

In fact, revealing and criticizing individualism and the resulting divisions and conflicts was one of Marx’s central tasks after *On the Jewish Question*. This work was also the focus and main thread of his critique of civil society. *On the Jewish Question* is an important text written by Marx during his early period of critiquing Hegel’s philosophy of law.

 In this text, Marx concretized the rights and freedoms that modern political philosophers had theoretically defended into real rights in civil society, thereby identifying and revealing two interrelated issues: first, the self-interested nature of real rights in civil society and the profit-seeking nature of civil society itself; and second, the binary differentiation between “the private person” and “the public person,” the individual and the community, and particularity and universality. Marx’s identification and revelation of these two issues clearly touched upon the crux of individualism, because he clearly saw the divisions and conflicts existing in the value system of individualism. This identification and revelation was influenced by Hegel to some extent, but Marx was destined to be far more profound than Hegel, because he did not use the speculative logic of reconciliation to overcome the drawbacks of individualism, but instead pointed the spearhead of criticism at the birthplace of modern individualism—civil society as the sum total of material life and relations of production.

Furthermore, Marx’s dissection and critique of civil society, as he himself stated in the preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, written in 1859, was conducted within the framework of political economy. In his systematic and in-depth study of political economy, Marx continued the critique he initiated in *On the Jewish Question*, pointing out that in modern commodity society, the result of each individual pursuing their own interests is not the growth and affirmation of universal interests, but rather a universal negativity of mutual harm and conflict. Moreover, in his study of political economy, Marx revealed and critiqued a more fundamental division and opposition: the antagonism between labor and capital, and social exploitation and class differentiation embodied in the production of surplus value. Neither Hegel nor Taylor, nor any other philosopher, addressed this issue in their critiques of individualism. Or rather, this issue was almost impossible for them to consider. This division and opposition, seemingly unrelated to individualism, should actually be seen as a consequence of the prevalence of individualism. This is not only because a “jungle law” of survival of the fittest and a logic of the strong inherent in unrestrained competition for interests, but also because a deeply entrenched and unshakeable logic exists in modern civil society and capitalist society—the logic of exploiting the labor of others through personal possession. This is just as Marx and Engels pointed out in *The Communist Manifesto*: “The fundamental condition for the existence and rule of the bourgeoisie is the accumulation of wealth in private hands, the formation and proliferation of capital; the condition of capital is wage labor.”

Individualism is a value system, and philosophers like Taylor have mostly criticized it from a value-based perspective. However, it’s clear that Marx’s critique in political economy didn’t remain at a purely value-based level; it delved into the core of social institutions, essentially a socio-historical critique based on historical materialism. He didn’t simply shift the focus of his critique of individualism; rather, he pushed the critique of individualism and the Western modernity it signifies to its deepest level—a critique that reaches the very foundations. This is something no other Western philosopher has achieved.

II. A Critique of the Logic of Reification

In the unfolding of Western modernity, subjectivity as the dominant principle manifests not only as individualism but also as a logic of reification. This logic of reification, like individualism, was placed in the “defendant’s seat” by Marx. To explain this issue from its origins, we should understand Locke’s relevant ideas. The reason is that, theoretically, Locke can almost be considered the originator of this logic of reification.

In *Two Treatises of Government*, Locke, the father of liberalism, offered a powerful defense of natural rights. In his defense, natural rights primarily refer to three things—life, liberty, and property. Through this defense, Locke greatly emphasized the subjective status of human beings. However, as Strauss pointed out, he also placed the individual at the center and source of the moral world, thus providing theoretical support for the growth of individualism. It is also important to note that his defense of these three things was not evenly weighted; rather, property held the most important position in his mind and value system. For example, when discussing the purpose of government, he directly stated that “the great and primary purpose of men uniting as a state and placing themselves under government is the protection of their property.” Locke’s emphasis on property theoretically conformed to and echoed the historical formation of civil and commercial societies, playing a role in establishing the value premise for their development. This principle is not difficult to understand—from another perspective, in modern civil society and commercial society, the most basic element, commodities, are property or things that can be exchanged for property. Property is essentially the cornerstone, central axis, and lifeline of civil society and commercial society.

Furthermore, Locke’s theory of property had a profound influence on the development of classical political economy in England, and Smith’s theory of wealth is, broadly speaking, an expanded and amplified version of the former. Moreover, Locke’s theory established a fundamental principle for Westerners to understand their lives, their lifestyles, and to build their value systems, using property as the standard. The Western definition of rights is a typical example. Logically, “rights” is a broad category. However, in the Western world from the 17th to the 19th centuries, rights were primarily defined from the perspective of possession of property and belongings, making property rights, real rights, and ownership the most important and iconic forms of rights. Compared to Locke and Smith, Hegel was a philosopher with a reflective and critical spirit, yet he also gave real rights and ownership an important position, specifically elevating them to the level of personality and human will. This is fully reflected in *The Principles of the Philosophy of Law*. In this work, Hegel states that distinguishing rights into personal rights, property rights, and the right to sue is extremely confusing. Personal rights are essentially property rights. “In order to acquire ownership, that is, to achieve the determination of personality, it is not enough for mere internal representation or will that something belongs to me; in addition, it is necessary to acquire possession of the thing. Through the acquisition of possession, the aforementioned will acquires determination, which necessarily includes the recognition of others… Man embodies his will in things; this is the concept of ownership, and the next step is the realization of this concept.” Here, Hegel emphasizes that the “labels” of subjectivity, such as personality and human will, can only achieve determination, that is, acquire reality, objectivity, and certainty, in the possession and ownership of property; otherwise, they only possess empty and unreal subjective forms.

Like Locke, Hegel was a key participant and promoter of Western modernity (of course, his critique of individualism cannot be denied). His views are a microcosm, representing a way of understanding humanity and subjectivity among Westerners after Locke. The fundamental point of this understanding is projecting humanity and subjectivity onto property, possessions, and wealth, which constitute the necessary premise and fundamental marker for establishing human subjectivity. This understanding, as a belief, is rooted in the cognitive system of Western modernity. According to this understanding, a person can only see and confirm their “existence” as a human being in external possessions; otherwise, they cannot claim to possess an independent personhood, personality, and self-respect, or can only claim to be “inhuman.” In modern commercial society, where traditional worldviews, philosophies of life, and values ​​have greatly diminished, this understanding and belief have their own rationale. However, the problem lies in the fact that the spiritual core of subjectivity is human beings as an end in themselves. Once a person entrusts their existence and subjectivity to external possessions, they essentially descend from “end” to “means,” fundamentally deviating from the spiritual core of subjectivity. If this is a glaring paradox of Western modernity, then the key to this paradox lies in the establishment of the logic of reification. The Western Marxist philosopher Erich Fromm once said: “The problem of the 19th century was the death of God; the problem of the 20th century was the death of man.” But in reality, before the 20th century, with the firm establishment of the logic of reification, humanity existed in name only, because it was enslaved and abstractly dominated by things. This situation shows that the divisions and oppositions in Western modernity not only appear in the spectrum of individualistic values ​​but also in the logic of reification. While people are opposed to each other, people are also opposed to things. Undoubtedly, a comprehensive and profound examination of Western modernity cannot bypass this logic of reification that creates the opposition between people and things.

In the 20th century, existentialism and Western Marxism critiqued Western modernity, and the logic of reification was one of its targets. For example, Erich Fromm, in *Escape from Freedom*, stated: “The individual’s submission to economic ends, becoming a means to achieve them, is based on the peculiarity of the capitalist mode of production, which makes the accumulation of capital the purpose and goal of economic activity… Although the labor principle aimed at accumulating capital is objectively significant for human progress, subjectively it makes man labor for ends outside himself, making him a servant of the machine he has created, thus giving him a sense of personal insignificance and powerlessness.” Besides recognizing the critique of the logic of reification by philosophers like Fromm in the 20th century, we must also see that Marx had already offered a resounding critique of this logic in the 19th century. This critique by Marx serves as a crucial thread running through his critique of capitalism and Western modernity as its vehicle.

In his *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx, in revealing and criticizing the alienation of the worker, incisively pointed out: “For a man who is merely a worker and has no other identity, he retains his human characteristics only because these characteristics exist for alien capital… Production not only produces man as a commodity, as a commodity man, as a man with commodity determinations; it produces man according to these determinations as a being dehumanized both mentally and physically.” He also profoundly pointed out that while British political economy superficially acknowledges human independence and autonomy, it actually thoroughly denies and is hostile to man because it theoretically establishes private property as the intrinsic essence of man. Marx’s critique here is directed at the alienated existence of the worker and British political economy; however, it is important to recognize that the focus of his critique is the logic of reification permeating Western modernity. This logic of reification is deeply “imprinted” on dehumanized entities such as capital, commodities, and private property. In *The Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels summarized their critique of the logic of reification in a single sentence: “In bourgeois society, capital has independence and individuality, while the active individual does not.” This statement vividly reveals the antagonism between man and things—independence and individuality originally represent human subjectivity, but capital, as a tangible yet intangible “thing,” completely devours human subjectivity, turning people into slaves of capital.

When Marx began his systematic research into political economy, he did not weaken his critique of the logic of reification due to the establishment and prominence of capitalist relations of production. On the contrary, he expanded and advanced this critique within a broad historical perspective. This is particularly evident in the Economic Manuscripts of 1857-1858.

In his *Economic Manuscripts of 1857-1858*, Marx explicitly identified and delineated the forms and stages of human historical development. According to his identification and delineation, human dependence, human independence based on dependence on things, and free individuality are the three forms and three stages of human historical development. Clearly, the second major form and stage refers to the era of the “full” unfolding of Western modernity, embodied in capitalism, and the logic of reification is its essence. Although humans possess subjectivity and independence in this stage of development, this is ultimately predicated on and based on dependence on things. If Marx examines the logic of reification within the “grand history” of human development, then this examination is also a critique unfolding in the depths of history. This is because Marx did not consider human dependence on things as the final state of human development, but rather as a transitional form with significant flaws. In the stage of human dependence, subjectivity has not yet been established; in dependence on things, although human social relations and productive capacity have been developed relatively fully, people have become tools; in the stage of free individuality, people become ends in themselves and achieve all-round development, which is the ultimate state of human development.

Also in the *Economic Manuscripts of 1857-1858*, when comparing ancient and modern times, Marx more explicitly and directly critiqued the logic of reification. He pointed out that in ancient times, almost no one paid attention to or studied the problem of wealth, but mainly studied the problem of shaping good citizens. This reflects the fundamental difference between ancient and modern times, and also reflects a kind of “vulgarity” in modern times. “The ancient viewpoint appears far more sublime than the modern world. According to the ancient viewpoint, man, regardless of how narrowly defined by national, religious, or political norms, always manifests himself as the end of production. In the modern world, production manifests itself as the end of man, and wealth as the end of production. In fact, if we discard the narrow bourgeois form, then isn’t wealth simply the universality of individual needs, talents, enjoyments, productive forces, etc., arising from universal exchange? Isn’t wealth the full development of man’s dominion over natural forces—both what is commonly called ‘natural’ forces and man’s own natural forces? Isn’t wealth the absolute expression of man’s creative talents? This expression has no other prerequisite than prior historical development, which has enabled this comprehensive development—the comprehensive development of all human power, not measured by old standards—towards a full realization of human potential.” Becoming the end itself… In bourgeois economy and the corresponding age of production, this full development of human inner essence manifests as complete emptiness; this universal objectification process manifests as total alienation, and the abandonment of all predetermined one-sided ends manifests as the sacrifice of one’s own end for some purely external purpose. Therefore, on the one hand, the naive ancient world appears more sublime. On the other hand, the ancient world is indeed more sublime in all that people strive for closed forms, shapes, and predetermined limitations. The ancient world provides satisfaction from a narrow perspective, while the modern world does not; in other words, wherever the modern world manifests itself as self-satisfaction, it is vulgar. According to Marx’s comparison, unlike the ancient world which saw humanity as an end, the modern world takes wealth production as its end, that is, wealth becomes the axis of the modern world. Here, Marx uses negative terms such as “complete emptiness,” “total alienation,” and “vulgarity” to evaluate the “comprehensive development,” “full development of inner essence,” “universal objectification,” and “self-satisfaction” achieved by modern people around the axis of wealth, while using the positive term “sublime” to characterize the ancient world. If the central theme of Marx’s evaluation and identification in this comparison between the past and present is to critique the reification logic formed in the historical context of “Western modernity” and Western modernity, then the breadth, scope, height, and depth of his critique are in no way inferior to the critiques made by 20th-century philosophers.

III. A Critique of the Expansion and Spread of the Logic of Capital

When we mention the subject, we naturally think of its opposite—the object. When defining and describing modernity based on subjectivity, the subject-object dualism is also an important perspective for understanding the divisions and oppositions within Western modernity. In the epistemological philosophical tradition that developed after Descartes, subject and object are two indispensable elements. However, since the fundamental task of cognition is to understand and grasp the object, in epistemology, the subject-object dichotomy often ultimately results in their unity. Of course, in Kant’s heterogeneous thinking, the subject does not truly achieve unity with the object (what is recognized is only the phenomenon, not the thing-in-itself). However, in the realm of behavior, the situation is quite different. While assuming the role of subject and master in this realm, one usually establishes an external object, that is, views and treats the external world according to “objectification thinking.” This is naturally not about better understanding the external world, but often about dominating and controlling the external world from the subject’s perspective, making it serve the subject. Undeniably, in this context, the relationship established between subject and object is a typical binary opposition model. This opposition model has permeated and permeated the logic of Western modernity, which is an undeniable fact.

The subject-object dualism in Western modernity is particularly evident in the relationship between humanity and nature, and in the unfolding of the logic of capital. When humanity arrogantly regards itself as the master of nature, nature becomes an “object” serving humanity, thus creating an opposition between humanity and nature. When the logic of capital, based on the principle of profit maximization, is conceived as the general subject, its expansion and spread to the external world as the object becomes a mode of unfolding, even an inherent characteristic—essentially, also a subject-object dualism. While Marx did not use the keyword “subject-object dualism” to examine capitalism and Western modernity as its vehicle, his profound examination and critique of the expansion and spread of the logic of capital is a significant piece of evidence that he, in fact, criticized the subject-object dualistic mode of thinking and behavior.

Specifically, Marx examined and critiqued the expansion and spread of capitalist logic within the narrative framework of the “world historical movement.” This “world historical movement” refers to the trend and process by which the bourgeoisie, through the development of world markets, brought the modes of production, lifestyles, and forms of civilization of different countries and nations toward Western capitalism. Marx and Engels offered a highly insightful revelation of this trend and process in *The Communist Manifesto*. They pointed out: “The need to ever expand the markets for its products drives the bourgeoisie to travel all over the globe. It must settle everywhere, develop everywhere, establish connections everywhere… The bourgeoisie has uprooted the national foundations beneath its industry. Ancient national industries are being destroyed, and are being destroyed every day. They have been squeezed out by new industries, the establishment of which has become the lifeblood of all civilized nations; these industries process no longer local raw materials, but raw materials from extremely distant regions; their products are not only for domestic consumption, but also for consumption throughout the world. Old needs, satisfied by domestic products, have been replaced by new needs, satisfied by products from extremely distant countries and regions. Local and national self-sufficiency and isolation have been replaced by mutual interaction and interdependence among nations in all respects. This is true of material production, and it is also true of intellectual production… The bourgeoisie, by means of the rapid improvement of all the instruments of production and of the most convenient means of communication, has drawn all nations, even the most barbaric, into civilization. Its low-priced commodities are its heavy artillery, used to destroy all walls and conquer the most stubborn xenophobic sentiments of barbarians. It compels all nations—if they do not wish to perish—to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to promote what it calls civilization within themselves, that is, to become bourgeois. In short, it creates a world in its own image.”

According to Marx and Engels, the history of the world historical movement is a history of civilizations, characterized by the capitalist mode of production, expanding their territory through the global market. The subordination of uncivilized and semi-civilized countries to civilized countries, peasant nations to bourgeois nations, and the East to the West is a direct result of this historical process. Marx and Engels did not view this historical process and its results from a purely neutral value standpoint; rather, their revelation, viewed from another perspective, is a profound critique. The key issue is that the essence of the transformation from regional, local history to world history is not an open dialogue and fusion between different modes of production and civilizations, but rather the Western capitalist powers’ use of plunder, conquest, and colonialism to “force” non-capitalist nations and non-capitalist modes of production to disintegrate and transform at the level of civilization. Marx and Engels saw this essence with absolute clarity. Therefore, in their view, the history of the world historical movement is simultaneously a history of plunder and conquest, a history strikingly similar to the primitive accumulation of capital. Marx explicitly identified, exposed, and criticized this point in the “Primitive Accumulation” chapter of *Capital* and in a series of editorials published in the *New York Daily Tribune*. For example, in *Capital*, he stated: “The discovery of gold and silver deposits in the Americas, the extermination, enslavement, and burial in the mines of the indigenous peoples, the commencement of the conquest and plunder of the East Indies, and the transformation of Africa into a commercial hunting ground for blacks—all these marked the dawn of the capitalist age of production. These idyllic processes were the main factors of primitive accumulation. What followed was a commercial war waged by European nations on the earth as their battlefield. This war began with the Dutch secession from Spain, reached a great scale in the British anti-Jacobin war, and continued in the Opium Wars against China, etc.” In “The Brutal Actions of the British in China,” published in the *New York Daily Tribune*, Marx directly called the Opium War a “war of extreme injustice” waged by the British “on untenable pretexts.” In fact, these identifications, revelations, and criticisms made by Marx are embedded in his revelation of the movement of world history and constitute an important aspect of his critique of capitalism.

It is not difficult to see that Marx’s direct critique of the violent acts of Western capitalist powers was inevitably directed at the expansion and spread of the logic of capital. This is because the primary driving force behind the bourgeoisie’s global settlement, development, and networking is the continuous expansion of product sales to achieve capital accumulation. Marx’s critique of the expansion and spread of the logic of capital profoundly touches upon the subject-object dualism present in Western modernity. This is both the opposition between the logic of capital as the general subject and the external world as the object, and the conflict and opposition between different modes of production, different lifestyles, different forms of civilization, and different nations and peoples. Marx’s revelation of these oppositions is a crucial aspect of his understanding of the movement of world history and his critique of Western modernity, which is embodied in capitalism. Today, people often use Marx’s revelation of the world historical movement to understand the movement and development of modernization and modernity on a global scale, and also to understand Marx’s thought on modernity. The choice of this argument is undoubtedly appropriate, but it’s crucial to avoid the misconception that if world history encompasses a global modernization movement, then this movement is essentially a process of lower civilizations transforming themselves according to the standards of higher civilizations. This misconception mistakenly identifies Western modernization and modernity as an inescapable “matrix” of modernization and modernity, and will inevitably lead to a serious misunderstanding of Marx’s thought on modernity. It must be recognized that Marx’s revelation of the world historical movement contains a profound critique of Western modernity, and this critique tells us that Western modernization and modernity are merely a model of modernization and modernity, not an inescapable “matrix.” This issue then leads to another, deeper question—did Marx theoretically reject modernity?

IV. To reject modernity or to rebuild modernity?

Marx’s profound critique of Western modernity, encompassing individualism, the logic of reification, and the expansion and spread of the logic of capital, constitutes the substantive content of his critique. Does Marx’s critique of Western modernity mean that he theoretically rejected modernity? Undeniably, if Western modernity is considered the inescapable “matrix” of modernity, it might lead to the interpretation of Marx’s critique as a general critique of modernity, easily resulting in the conclusion that Marx and Marxism reject modernity. This conclusion would clearly cause a serious misalignment and rupture between theory and reality. In fact, whether Marx theoretically rejected modernity is a fundamental and crucial question that we must solemnly and seriously address.

It’s important to recognize that while modernity originated in the West chronologically, its unfolding and realization are plural, not singular. Therefore, Marx’s critique of Western modernity, embodied in capitalism, is not a theoretical dismantling or rejection of modernity itself. He neither sought to return to tradition under the banner of “historical conservatism,” nor did he intend to present a discourse akin to “hypermodernity” under the premise of a complete farewell to modernity. Rather, through his critique of Western modernity, Marx offered a superior solution for understanding and developing modernity. He did not theoretically reject modernity but rather achieved a fundamental reconstruction of it. To clarify this issue at its core, we must return to subjectivity as the dominant principle of modernity.

An obvious truth is that the expansion and spread of individualism, the logic of reification, and the logic of capital represent three forms of subjectivity unfolding in Western modernity. However, it is absolutely wrong to say that subjectivity can only become a truly effective principle of the times through these three forms. From a qualitative perspective, whether it is individualism, the logic of reification, or the expansion and spread of the logic of capital, in a certain sense, they are merely alienated forms of subjectivity. They “develop” and “devolve” the principle of subjectivity to an extreme, but this creates deep-seated divisions, oppositions, and antagonisms, meaning that Western modernity can ultimately only be a modernity model characterized by contradictions. Marx’s critique of these three alienated forms of subjectivity not only did not theoretically dissolve the principle of subjectivity itself, but on the contrary, it “transformed” and “saved” this principle in a new direction. The core of this “transformation” and “salvation” lies in the establishment of a non-divided, non-opposing, and non-alienated value subject, which includes two fundamental points: first, every individual becomes a dignified subject; second, human beings become ends in themselves.

Let’s look at the first point—everyone becoming a dignified subject. In traditional societies where subjectivity was not yet universally established, people lived in a “cage” of dependence on others, restricted and oppressed by pre-existing discriminatory factors, and were in a state of “inhumanity.” A major historical requirement for the establishment of subjectivity in modern society is to fundamentally eliminate pre-existing discriminatory and oppressive factors, liberating people from the “cage” of dependence on others, and ensuring that their lives, personality, dignity, rights, and freedoms are effectively defended and protected—that is, for everyone to become a dignified subject. This historical requirement can be summarized by a statement made by Hegel in *The Principles of the Philosophy of Right*: “To become a person and to respect others as people.” It should be said that Western political philosophers, represented by Locke, defended subjectivity according to this historical requirement. However, because their defense fostered individualism, “becoming a person” and “respecting others as people” could not be unified in their defense system; on the contrary, a tension arose between the two. This situation is reflected in real society as the mutual antagonism between atomized individuals and the class differentiation and antagonism formed in the solidification of social structures. In such oppositions, it is unrealistic to say that every individual becomes a dignified subject. This is because these oppositions create a division between “strong subjects” and “weak subjects,” between “central subjects” and “marginal subjects,” or between “subjects” and “non-subjects,” between “humans” and “non-humans.” This division and differentiation creates a relational system that “makes people into things that are insulted, enslaved, abandoned, and despised.”

For Marx, the ultimate goal of his philosophy was “human liberation.” “Human liberation” clearly does not refer to the liberation of a segment of the population, but rather the liberation of “every single person.” Therefore, his critique of individualism does not mean replacing “lowercase man” with “capitalized man,” nor does it indicate a disregard for individual value and dignity. On the contrary, one of the fundamental problems his critique seeks to solve is to thoroughly shatter the system of relationships that insult, enslave, abandon, and despise people, formed within the value system of individualism and the framework of capitalism, so that “every single person” can be liberated and become a freely and fully developed individual. Marx and Engels clearly stated this point in *The Communist Manifesto*. They pointed out that the proletariat seeks to eliminate individuality, independence, and freedom, but these are the individuality, independence, and freedom that the bourgeoisie protects in the relations of wage labor and private property. Communism does not deprive anyone of the right to possess the products of society, but only of the right to use such possession to enslave the labor of others. In the communist association of free individuals, “the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.” It is evident that in the value system established by Marx, “every individual” and “all people,” “becoming a person” and “respecting others as human beings” are completely unified. Within this unity, every individual inevitably becomes a dignified subject, without any distinction of superiority or inferiority in subjectivity. Marx’s “transformation” and “salvation” of the principle of subjectivity are thus revealed. The underlying spirit of this “transformation” and “salvation” offers important insights into resolving the antagonisms formed by the expansion and spread of capitalist logic, although Marx himself did not explicitly state this. Because it is conceivable that in the framework of “world history,” if we do not regard capitalist logic as the sole subject, but rather respect each region, nation, and country as a subject, then this aligns with the spiritual principles of the “community of shared future for mankind” we advocate today, rather than leading to a mutually antagonistic relationship.

Let’s look at the second point—human beings becoming ends. As pointed out above, the essence of reification logic, which sets humans against things, is that it makes things ends and humans means. Marx’s critique of reification logic aims to fundamentally reverse the distorted path of modern humans relying on external objects to establish the meaning of their lives and confirm their subjectivity, thus enabling humans to truly become ends. This idea of ​​Marx’s is fully manifested in his concept of “the free and all-round development of human beings.” This concept not only emphasizes the freedom and individuality of each person but also the “all-round development” of each individual. Reification logic cannot bring about all-round development; a society where it prevails will inevitably embark on a one-dimensional development path. Only in a society where humans are ends can all-round development be realized. Of course, in summary, the significance of “human beings becoming ends” lies in two complementary aspects: on the one hand, the all-round development of human beings; on the other hand, the true “return” of subjectivity. These two aspects together demonstrate that Marx’s critique of reification logic also contains the “transformation” and “salvation” of the principle of subjectivity.

It is particularly important to point out that our understanding of “human beings becoming ends in themselves” should not be one-sided, especially not to arbitrarily and erroneously assume that Marx neglected or devalued the value of things. In fact, Marx defined material production as the premise and driving force of human history and development, believing that “what an individual is depends on the material conditions under which they produce,” and that “people cannot be liberated until they have adequately guaranteed their food, drink, shelter, and clothing in both quality and quantity.” The communist society he envisioned was also built upon the foundation of an unlimited flow of material wealth. This indicates that, in the direction established by Marx for the principle of subjectivity, things are not ends in themselves, but rather indispensable prerequisites for human development. Failing to see this point makes it impossible to have a complete and accurate understanding of “human beings becoming ends in themselves,” inevitably leading to a profound misinterpretation of Marx, and hindering the use of theory to explain and guide reality. This is because without a developed material civilization as a foundation, the all-round development of humanity can only become an empty slogan.

The above two points profoundly embody Marx’s “transformation” and “salvation” of the principle of subjectivity. This “transformation” and “salvation” constitute, in fact, a fundamental reconstruction of modernity. Through this “transformation” and “salvation,” Marx opened up a new path for the development of modernity, and overcoming the fragmented, contradictory, and alienated model of modernity is one of the core elements of this new path. The idea of ​​reconstructing modernity is reflected not only in Marx’s critique of capitalism and Western modernity as its vehicle, but also extends and is encompassed in his depiction of communism. Habermas has profoundly pointed out that modernity is an unfinished project. To continuously advance and deepen this project, we cannot ignore Marx’s reconstruction of modernity. It can be said with certainty that on the new path opened up by Marx, modernity will not only not encounter the difficulty of vitality depletion, but will instead demonstrate boundless vitality.

In summary, the central theme of Marx’s thought on modernity is a profound critique of Western modernity from three aspects: the expansion and spread of individualism, the logic of reification, and the logic of capital, and a reconstruction of modernity in a new direction. Through this central theme, we can make a clear judgment and explanation regarding the relationship between Marxism and modernization. In short, theoretically, Marxism constitutes a critical force against Western-style modernization and the civilization it represents, rather than simply endorsing, affirming, or accepting it. However, this does not mean that the modernization drive that humanity is currently accelerating cannot find positive and effective theoretical discourse and ideological propositions at the Marxist theoretical level. In fact, Marxist theory contains rich intellectual resources for demonstrating, defending, supporting, and promoting modernization. Marxism is not only fully capable of developing a unique model of modernization without relying on Western modernity and modernization discourse, but its developed model can also effectively avoid the various contradictions and shortcomings that arise in Western-style modernization, such as division, opposition, and alienation, thus allowing the cause of modernization to continue on a virtuous and healthy development path. This relationship between Marxism and modernization is of great significance for our profound understanding and interpretation of Chinese-style modernization. Chinese-style modernization is a modernization development model guided by Marxism. Its core concepts, which it advocates and implements, include common prosperity for all people, coordinated development of material and spiritual civilization, harmonious coexistence between humanity and nature, and a path of peaceful development. These concepts embody, confirm, and enrich Marx’s thought on modernity, and profoundly and vividly interpret the superiority of the modernization model theoretically revealed by Marxism. Marx opened up a new path for modernity, while Chinese-style modernization, guided by Marxism, provides humanity with a new model of modernization that possesses broad development space and vigorous vitality, representing a new form of human civilization.