A Systematic Analysis of the Main Causes of the Collapse of the Soviet Union

Cheng Enfu & Ding Jun  

Cheng Enfu is a principal professor at the University of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, director of the Research Center for Economic and Social Development at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and president of the World Association for Political Economy. He can be reached at 65344718[at]vip.163.com.

Prof. Ding Jun   Shanghai University of Finance and Economics and Director of World Association for Political Economy

One of the most significant historical events of the 20th century was the dramatic transformation of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. Over the past 20 years, numerous discussions and research findings have been made both domestically and internationally regarding the causes of the Soviet Union’s collapse and subsequent downfall. However, even within Marxist intellectual circles, there is no consensus on which of the many causes was the primary one. This year marks the 20th anniversary of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the full political, economic, and social consequences of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union stepping down from power have become apparent. It is therefore essential to re-examine and objectively analyze the main reasons for the Soviet Union’s disintegration. This is not only of significant academic value but also extremely important for Marxists in various countries engaged in the contemporary socialist movement, particularly crucial for strengthening the ruling party and consolidating its ruling position.

I. Three main reasons for the dramatic changes and disintegration of the Soviet Union

Regarding the causes of the dramatic changes and disintegration of the Soviet Union, from a wealth of foreign language materials and research findings, we have primarily selected four categories: first, the reflections of former CPSU leaders; second, analyses of communist parties and left-wing forces in CIS countries; third, analyses by scholars from CIS countries; and fourth, research by scholars from Western countries and China. The authors believe that the dramatic changes, disintegration, and loss of power of the CPSU in the Soviet Union had both ideological and organizational causes. The fatal political root cause was the betrayal of Marxism and scientific socialism by the CPSU leadership group headed by Gorbachev.

(I) Ideological reasons: Excessive denial of Stalin and the Western strategy of peaceful evolution led to long-term ideological confusion, while rigid ideological theories and rigid traditional propaganda and education systems and mechanisms were difficult to eliminate in a timely and effective manner.

First, Khrushchev’s excessive denunciation of Stalin caused ideological confusion.

“The 20th Congress of the CPSU dealt a blow to the Soviets that could not be recovered. This was the first step in undermining the legitimacy of the Soviet state.”[1] “Previously, the Soviet government had tried every means to make Stalin’s ideas and policies attractive, but after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, it condemned and exposed Stalin as much as possible. The change was too great and caused confusion in people’s minds. The 20th Congress of the CPSU actually caused a split in social thought, dividing it into two camps: Stalinists and anti-Stalinists.”[2]

Among them, those who doubted Marxism and socialism gradually became the backbone of liberal intellectuals and cadres in the decades to come, catering to and supporting Gorbachev’s reforms’ principles of “democratization” and “openness.” Gorbachev also acknowledged the shock that Khrushchev’s excessive denial of Stalin had on his own ideology and beliefs. In 2006, on the 50th anniversary of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Gorbachev, in an interview with a reporter from Rossiyskaya Gazeta, said, “The resolutions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU did indeed have a great impact on me, especially considering I was still a young man at the time. In 1955, having just graduated from university, I came to Tavropol. After a seven-day internship at the Tavropol Krai Prosecutor’s Office, my superiors assigned me to lead the propaganda department of the Komsomol Tavropol Krai Committee. The 20th Congress of the CPSU was held in February 1956. I was once a staunch Communist Party member, one could say it was hereditary. I joined the Party in the 10th grade and even wrote essays praising Stalin.” After the red book of Khrushchev’s report was issued in 1956, instructing that its spirit be conveyed among party members, we needed to go to every district committee to explain and clarify those shocking facts that were far beyond our comprehension. [3]

As one Russian summarized: “Khrushchev destroyed the pillars of the national spirit, Brezhnev did not repair them, but merely covered the cracks with red paint, while Gorbachev and Yeltsin dug holes in the cracks, causing the edifice to eventually collapse.” [4]

Secondly, the ideological confusion caused by the peaceful evolution of the West. During the Cold War, the United States and other Western countries launched a full-scale psychological war against the Soviet Union. By 1975, the CIA had participated in the publication of more than 1,500 books about the Soviet Union in various ways. There were many books that denigrated Stalin, and the Americans were pleased that Khrushchev had set a precedent for denying Stalin. Anti-Soviet propaganda through books and periodicals was also actively carried out in the West, especially in the United States. Under the propaganda of the United States, some people called the Soviet Union an “evil empire” and regarded it as a huge concentration camp where people would be driven to live on the Gulag Archipelago for a small problem or saying something they shouldn’t have. [5] Movies became a more vivid propaganda tool for Americans, giving rise to a super-high-tech and super-intelligent United States, while potentially forming an image of a “backward and primitive” Russia. After the Carter administration, which declared that the protection of human rights was a core element of its foreign policy, took office, the strategy of “fighting against communism” included the idea of ​​supporting the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries in their fight for human rights. The United States established more than 60 radio stations around the Soviet Union, broadcasting to the Soviet Union around the clock in the languages ​​of various nationalities of the Soviet Union, distorting and vilifying the history of the Soviet party and state, distorting and vilifying Stalin, and glorifying the Western values ​​of “human rights, freedom, and democracy”. The pro-Western liberal intellectuals in the Soviet Union who had grown up under the education of the Western “voice” for many years believed that the “morality and politics” of the United States and Western countries were superior to those of the Soviet Union. All the diplomatic activities of the Soviet leaders were interpreted as a confrontation between the “totalitarian” Soviet Union and the “free” West. Concepts such as national interests, national integrity, national dignity, and patriotic responsibility were regarded by liberals as the essential attributes of communism and great power chauvinism. [6] The accumulation of misinformation played a role. By the mid-1980s, especially among young people, the former ideas of freedom, kindness, equality, sincerity, and mutual assistance were distorted and ridiculed, replaced by pornography, violence, self-deprecation, and worship of the West. Those who did not lose self-supervision and remained loyal to morality and integrity, and loyal to socialist ideals, were either marginalized or openly ridiculed, and were subsequently called “enemies of reform”, “remnants of totalitarianism”, etc. [7]

Admiration for the West gradually became a trend, impacting and interfering with the independent thinking of Soviet people. Russian and Soviet culture were considered “insignificant” and “backward.” Soviet history was called “the history of totalitarianism.” Therefore, on December 11, 2009, Gennady Zyuganov, the current chairman of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, emphasized in response to netizens’ questions about “the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the downfall of the CPSU”:

“The domestic ‘fifth column’ [8] played an important role in the collapse of the Soviet Union, operating at all levels and even in the highest leadership.” [9]

Admittedly, the premise for the success of the “fifth column” and the effectiveness of the West’s peaceful evolution strategy was the ideological chaos within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

In short, given the relatively rigid ideology and theory within and outside the Soviet Party, and the obvious lack of democracy and effectiveness in propaganda, education, and ideological and political work, Khrushchev’s excessive denial of Stalin and the Western strategy of peaceful evolution triggered a long period of ideological confusion, thus becoming an important ideological and theoretical foundation or a leading ideological reason for the dramatic changes and disintegration of the Soviet Union.

(II) Organizational reasons: The CPSU gradually promoted and gave important positions to a large number of non-Marxist cadres, while the organizational system and mechanisms with serious drawbacks were difficult to eliminate in a timely and effective manner.

First, the selection and appointment of members of the Soviet Communist Party leadership group was undemocratic and unjust. Lenin once pointed out that the masters of the country now are the workers and peasants, and the country should select the best and most special talents in a broad, orderly, systematic and transparent manner as managers, organizers and participants and leaders of economic construction in the country or localities. Stalin’s principles for selecting managers at all levels lacked openness. Secrecy became a distinctive feature and important principle of the official rank list, especially after 1932, the list of appointed officials was kept strictly confidential. The official rank list enabled this monopolistic privileged class to gradually strengthen its own position and legitimize it. It separated itself from society and the people, and to a large extent deviated from the principle of intra-party democracy, and covered the eyes of ordinary Communist Party members and social supervision. [10] The cadres of this type of government who were trained by the official rank list regarded the Party Congress, Soviet Congress, and Trade Union Congress as large-scale events. All kinds of discussions and debates at the meetings were considered unnecessary or even harmful, which hindered the cause of the Party. For them, the most important thing was to get the leader’s instructions and to be loyal to the superior. Many cadres did whatever it took to pursue leadership positions.

Second, non-Marxist cadres gradually entered the leadership positions of the CPSU. Some Russian scholars divide the social elites during the CPSU’s rule into four generations. The first generation is called “Lenin’s Guards,” for whom the idea of ​​world revolution was a priority and of great importance. The second generation consists of Stalinists, who are disciplined executors of Stalin’s socialist will. The third generation consists of outstanding representatives of party bureaucrats, with Khrushchev and especially Brezhnev becoming their leaders. The fourth generation, the last generation of Soviet “social elites,” is a generation with a completely mixed composition. [11] After Brezhnev came to power, most of the newly recommended leaders were from the “mechanical” generation that came from the mid-1930s, that is, executors of orders, who were no longer accustomed to taking responsibility and making independent decisions.

“The environment distorted the code of conduct for CPSU cadres, and being two-faced, inconsistent in word and deed, and scheming seemed to be the conditions for survival. They were recommended to the highest leadership positions in the party and the state not because of their revolutionary merits or leadership talents, but primarily because they followed the rules of climbing the cadre ladder and energetically climbed to the top of the regime.” [12]

The Brezhnev era was a period of relatively stable development in the appointment of officials by the CPSU’s official rank system. However, some commentators have described the Brezhnev era as a period of “leaders protecting each other” and “rampant privilege and corruption.”

B.S. Shevelukha, chairman of the Russian Society of Socialist Scholars, summarized that the mistakes made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in cadre work weakened the party and ultimately led to the destruction of the Soviet Union. The biggest mistake of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s cadre policy was to put Gorbachev and Yeltsin into the top leadership positions. [13] As Mandel pointed out, the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which had betrayed Marxism and socialism, “seized power through a mechanism of adverse selection of cadres.” [14]

In short, after Gorbachev became the top leader of the party, he made extensive use of the drawbacks of the Soviet Union’s traditional highly centralized and non-democratic organizational system. In just a few years, under the guise of cadre rejuvenation and reform, he replaced a large number of the original party, government and military leaders who adhered to the socialist direction, and promoted and gave important positions to a large number of cadres who were anti-party, anti-socialist or had ambiguous positions. This laid an important organizational and cadre foundation for the political “change of direction”.

(III) Political Reasons: The Soviet leadership betrayed Marxism and socialism, and the highly centralized and unrestrained traditional political system and mechanisms were difficult to eliminate in a timely and effective manner.

First, they actively betrayed Soviet socialism. On May 18, 2010, the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta published an interview with Ligachev, one of the former leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. When asked how he should view the Soviet reforms after a quarter of a century, Ligachev, who had always fought against Gorbachev and Yeltsin, replied that there were two positions and tendencies in the reforms of the 1980s. The first was the one I firmly supported and fought for. This was a socialist reform, a self-renewal of socialism, not the dismantling of the Soviet system. The second was the position of Gorbachev and his allies. They carefully considered the following explanation for their betrayal of socialism, the Party and the people. They said that the Soviet system had accomplished many things, and everyone knew that it entered history with a glorious chapter. But it could not be reformed and improved. It should be smashed and replaced with a capitalist system. [15]

Similar descriptions can be found in the documents of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation:

[“In the latter half of the 1980s, Leninists in Soviet society were eager to solve the social problems that had matured and to suppress the negative tendencies that had accumulated in society and bring them into a new state. But such aspirations were exploited by traitors to socialism through deception. Others pretended to shout the slogan ‘More democracy, more socialism!’ but in reality they were doing things to eliminate them… The role of the state was weakened, and material shortages were artificially created, which triggered protests from the people. Mass media was deliberately handed over to representatives of bourgeois views. They used psychological warfare to indoctrinate the masses with a large amount of information that maliciously slandered the Soviet Union and its history, and turned a blind eye to the forces that opposed the Soviet regime and the unity of the Union State.” [16]

The Belarusian Communist Party program goes even further, stating:

“The mass media, which fell into the hands of slanderers and instigators, vilified socialism and Soviet history, paving the way for forces opposing the Soviet regime and the Union states, thus enabling a counter-revolutionary state coup in August-December 1991.” [17]

On March 17, 1991, the Gorbachev leadership group attempted to abandon the Communist Party’s rule and the socialist system and dissolve the Soviet Union, and thus held a referendum on whether to dissolve the Soviet Union. 185,647,335 citizens in the Soviet Union were eligible to participate in the referendum, and 148,574,606 voted, accounting for 80.0%. Of these, 113,512,812 voted to retain the Soviet Union, accounting for 76.4%, 32,303,927 voted against, accounting for 21.7%, and 2,757,817 voted invalid, accounting for 1.9%. Although anti-Soviet and anti-socialist propaganda had been rampant before, most of the citizens who participated in the referendum still believed that the Soviet Union must be retained. [18] Yeltsin, the Russian president and one of the main figures in the Gorbachev leadership group, signed the Belovezh Accords [19], namely the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, with the leaders of Belarus and Ukraine on December 8, 1991, declaring that “the Soviet Union has ceased to exist as a subject of international law and a geopolitical entity.” Twenty years later, on March 2, 2011, Gorbachev’s 80th birthday, the Russian news agency reported that, according to a survey by the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center, 42% of Russians believed that Gorbachev was the culprit behind the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Secondly, it was a deliberate betrayal of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. Many researchers believe that the fate of East Germany and the entire German question were resolved by the Soviet leadership, headed by Gorbachev, in a way most detrimental to socialism, revealing Gorbachev’s determination to denigrate socialism. US President Bush had already perceived Gorbachev’s intentions, emphasizing to US Ambassador to the Soviet Union Walter in late 1988 that the decisive moment had arrived and that the map of the Federal Republic of Germany should include the Democratic Republic. The US got its wish, and a unified Germany immediately joined NATO. American journalist Walsh wrote about this:

[“In June 1990, Gorbachev visited the United States. In the Bush office, with advisors to the two presidents and heads of foreign embassies in attendance, Gorbachev casually declared that he would agree to recognize a unified Germany as a member of NATO if the German people wished. The attendees were stunned. “Bush even asked Gorbachev to repeat what he had said.”[20]]

What Russians found most intolerable was that Gorbachev’s simple nod not only indicated his agreement but also effectively nullified the outcome of the Potsdam Agreement, which was seen as a manifestation of the Soviet Union’s victory in the Great Patriotic War.

Regarding Gorbachev’s handling of the fate of East Germany, Kryuchkov, former chairman of the KGB, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and member of the State Emergency Committee of the Soviet Union, confirmed that at the end of 1989, Gorbachev met with the newly elected US President Bush in Malta, where Gorbachev “mortgaged” East Germany, was very attentive to George Bush, and made a surprising statement that the Soviet Union was prepared not to regard the United States as its main adversary. In other words, he abandoned his military and political stance in front of the United States without receiving any reward. In the spring of 1990, when meeting with German Chancellor Kohl in the Caucasus, Gorbachev announced that Moscow was not against German reunification. For Kohl, such a statement was completely unexpected, so much so that Kohl asked the translator to repeat what Gorbachev had said. After the translator repeated it, Kohl was even bewildered for a moment, but he quickly thanked Gorbachev and brought this unexpected news back to Bonn. [21]

In short, the Gorbachev and Yeltsin leadership group, by exploiting the highly centralized and unrestrained traditional political system, actively betrayed Marxism, socialism, and the fundamental interests of the vast majority of the people. This was the fatal political root and direct cause of the dramatic changes and disintegration of the Soviet Union (including the socialist countries of Eastern Europe). Incidentally, the accusation that such an objective revelation and summary deviates from historical materialism is unfounded. Dialectical historical materialism emphasizes that the masses are the ultimate force and fundamental role in determining and driving history, and it never denies the decisive role or power of key figures, leaders, and their leadership groups in specific historical events and points in time.

In summary, based on the highly centralized and rigid traditional socialist system and model, among the three main or fundamental causes of the collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union, the long-term ideological and theoretical confusion was the basic cause, the long-term organizational and policy errors were the key cause, and the political betrayal of implementing “new thinking on reform” was the direct fatal cause and the primary cause. The three main causes involve the relationships and positive and negative effects of ideology and politics, theory and practice, leaders and the masses, individuals and groups, systems and policies, unification and disintegration, reform and “change of direction”, long-term and short-term, internal and external factors, politics and economy, etc. The inevitable result of their combined effect is the collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union. Other causes, even if they objectively exist, are ranked after the three main causes or are partial causes. [22]

As Comrade Jiang Zemin pointed out: “The most important lesson from the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union is that the socialist path was abandoned, the dictatorship of the proletariat was abandoned, the leading position of the Communist Party was abandoned, and Marxism-Leninism was abandoned. As a result, the already serious political, economic, social and ethnic contradictions were further intensified, ultimately leading to the historical tragedy of dramatic changes in the system and the disintegration of the country.”[23]

II. Analysis of Five Other “Main Causes” for the Dramatic Changes and Disintegration of the Soviet Union

In the 20 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, extensive research has been conducted both domestically and internationally on the causes of its dramatic changes and disintegration, resulting in a wealth of research findings. However, some one-sided or erroneous theories of so-called primary causes or root causes persist. These are summarized and briefly commented on below.

(I) The Inevitability of the Traditional Model

The first question: Did the traditional Stalinist model inevitably lead to the dramatic changes and disintegration of the Soviet Union? As early as ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, some scholars in China wrote articles stating:

“As early as August 1989, after the dramatic changes in six Eastern European countries including Poland, I proposed that the fundamental reason for these dramatic changes was the systemic problem. That is to say, the Stalinist model had too many flaws, and the reforms failed one after another. As a result, the system eventually reached a dead end and lost its driving mechanism. Later, I have been studying the reasons for the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union from the perspective of the system.” [24]

In his book, the scholar reiterated that “the fundamental reason for the collapse of the Soviet Union was a systemic problem, that is to say, the Soviet traditional system had too many flaws and had entered a dead end, losing its driving mechanism.” [25] The book, New Explorations into the Collapse of the Soviet Union, also clearly states:

[“The book’s new perspective is that the 70-year-old Stalinist model was the main cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union.” [26]

A.V. Buzgarin, a renowned Russian economist and professor at Moscow State University, proposed that Soviet socialism was a “mutant socialism,” arguing that this “mutant” contained significant contradictions.

“One pole is the malignant expansion of bureaucracy, and the other pole is the socialist element with the potential to respond to new challenges. But the latter is slowly being suppressed by the bureaucracy.”[27]

He emphasized that the intensification of internal contradictions in “mutation socialism” was the cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and that the Stalinist model was the main cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and that its collapse was inevitable. [28]

In our view, the Stalinist model was the first socialist model in human history. Its basic characteristics and essence are manifested in the following ways: ideologically and culturally, it was guided by Marxism-Leninism; politically, it was a system of Communist Party rule and people’s congresses; and economically, it was based on public ownership, a planned economy, and distribution according to work. This fundamental institutional model was more advanced and superior than all other fundamental capitalist institutional models, thus achieving significant economic, political, cultural, and military successes, and changing the world’s landscape dominated by capitalist exploitation and oppression. However, it rejected diversity in the ideological and cultural sphere, democratization in the political sphere, and marketization in the economic sphere, thus exhibiting serious drawbacks and making major mistakes. Although these drawbacks and errors are smaller than those of historical and contemporary capitalist models, they still require serious reflection, profound criticism, and comprehensive reform.

The key question is whether the Stalinist model, or a reformed traditional socialist model, would necessarily lead to capitalism. It is well known that since the 1980s, traditional socialism based on the Stalinist model has gradually evolved into three paths: first, the path of comprehensive reform and opening up, represented by China and Vietnam, implementing a socialist market economy and democratic political system; second, the path of appropriate reform, represented by Cuba, Laos, and North Korea, gradually increasing market and democratic mechanisms; and third, the path of comprehensive capitalist transformation, represented by the Soviet Union and most Eastern European countries, implementing basic capitalist economic, political, and cultural systems.

To say that the Stalinist model is bound to collapse or fail is tantamount to saying that all traditional socialist countries, including China, are bound to collapse and fail. Clearly, this seemingly reasonable “traditional model inevitability theory” cannot withstand logical analysis, let alone the verification of current reality. It is crucial to distinguish between the inevitability and contingency of the Stalinist model’s evolution. Contingency means possible, but not certain. The Stalinist model must go through the intermediate stage of the formation of the aforementioned three main causes before it definitively (or in another sense, “inevitably”) leads to capitalism; otherwise, it is merely one of the possibilities of evolution or choice.

The above conclusions can also be verified by several surveys conducted by the Institute of Comprehensive Social Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 1999, 2000, and 2001. 66.5%, 63.2%, and 57.6% of the respondents believed that the collapse of the Soviet Union could have been prevented, while only 20.3%, 25.4%, and 30.0% agreed that the collapse of the Soviet Union was inevitable. [29] In December 2005, the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center conducted a public opinion survey in 153 settlements in 46 regions, territories, and republics of Russia. 57% of the respondents believed that the collapse of the Soviet Union could have been avoided. [30] That is to say, most Russians do not agree with the view that “the social system of the Soviet Union at that time was bound to perish.” Even Gorbachev himself agreed with this. In 2006, on his 75th birthday, someone asked Gorbachev, “If you hadn’t carried out those reforms, what would you be doing now?” Gorbachev replied, “If I were still in good health, I would still be the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Because during my time in power, the social system was still stable enough.” [31] Indeed, the socialist system, which was destroyed by Gorbachev and other so-called “reformers,” did not need to be held responsible for the wrong reform path. The fact that a system that was stable enough and which the people did not want to disintegrate suddenly collapsed in just a few years is a lesson that should be deeply pondered by future generations!

The second question: Did the traditional planned economy model inevitably lead to the dramatic changes and disintegration of the Soviet Union? It should be acknowledged that the traditional planned economy system had both advantages and disadvantages. As contemporary Western economist Paul Samuelson pointed out in his textbook *Economics* when explaining “Why We Should Study the Soviet Economy”: “Contrary to what its early critics believed, the Soviet economy grew rapidly, expanding its influence and winning many allies. It successfully transformed itself from a military weak country, so weak that it begged Germany for an armistice in 1918, into a superpower that the whole world feared. From an economic point of view, perhaps the most significant lesson is that a command economy can function. A command economy is one in which the state owns the means of production, profit is not the primary driving force, and major decisions are made administratively—such a command economy can function well for a long period of time.”[32]]

In fact, even under the traditional planned economy system and an international environment favorable to large private-ownership countries, the Soviet Union’s development performance and efficiency surpassed those of most Western countries. From 1925 to 1940, the Soviet Union accomplished in just 15 years what major capitalist countries took 50-100 years to achieve. In 1913, Russia’s industrial output ranked fourth in Europe and fifth in the world. By 1940, its industrial output had surpassed that of Britain, France, and Germany, becoming the largest in Europe and second largest in the world. Post-World War II recovery was also rapid. From 1964 to 1982, the Soviet economy grew at an average annual rate of 6.1%, exceeding that of all Western countries. Its GDP increased 1.46 times, and its industrial output accounted for one-fifth of the world’s total. It led the world in the production of more than 20 major industrial products, surpassing the United States. By the mid-1980s, when Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet Union’s comprehensive national strength far exceeded that of developed or underdeveloped private-ownership countries such as Germany, France, Britain, and Japan, becoming the world’s second-largest economic and technological power, increasingly approaching that of the United States. [33] During the 70 years of the Soviet regime, the Soviet Union’s industrial development rate was six times that of other industrialized countries in the world. Due to the increasing size of the national economy and its base, the growth rate began to decline continuously from the mid-1970s, but even so, it was still higher than that of capitalist countries. For example, between 1981 and 1985, the Soviet Union’s GDP grew by 20%, while the United States grew by 14%, and France and Italy by 8%. [34] However, after Gorbachev came to power, he always portrayed this period as entirely negative.

Statistical data shows that it was a series of policies by Gorbachev’s leadership that abandoned socialism, leading to the negative economic growth and socio-economic crisis before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Taking national income as an example, in the five years before Gorbachev came to power (1981-1985), it grew by 17%, with an average annual growth rate of 3.4%. However, between 1986 and 1990, it grew by only 6.8%, with an average annual growth rate of just 1.3%. Notably, negative growth occurred for the first time in 1990, declining by 4%, and then by nearly 15% in 1991. Similarly, gross national product (GNP) grew by 19.5% between 1981 and 1985, with an average annual growth rate of 3.9%. However, between 1986 and 1990, it grew by only 13.2%, with an average annual growth rate declining to 2.6%. It declined by 2% in 1990, and by a staggering 17% in 1991. Looking at social labor productivity, the average annual growth rate dropped from 3.1% between 1981 and 1985 to 2.7% between 1986 and 1989, then fell to -3% in 1990, and exceeded -10% in 1991. It can be said that the economic recession during Gorbachev’s rule was unprecedented in Soviet history. [35]

Furthermore, even according to Western comparative economic systems theory, the four typical systems—market capitalism, planned capitalism, planned socialism, and market socialism—each have their own advantages and disadvantages, and their transformation depends on the choices and guiding ideologies of policymakers. If a planned economy or planned socialism inevitably leads to failure and a shift to market capitalism, then how can we explain China and Vietnam’s successive adoption of socialist market economies?

(II) The Theory of Gorbachev’s Reforms Getting Out of Control

In his book “Revolution from Above: The End of the Soviet System,” renowned American Marxist economist Professor David Kotz argues that Gorbachev’s principles of openness, economic reforms, and political democratization unexpectedly led to the rise of a pro-capitalist alliance within the Soviet Union, resulting in opposition movements and ultimately causing the Soviet Union to abandon its socialist beliefs and embrace Western-style capitalism.

“In Gorbachev’s view, this openness would allow people to openly discuss how prosperous the reforms he called for would be. He hoped to use this to mobilize social forces and overcome the instinctive resistance to major changes. However, once civil society emerged under the stimulation of openness, the Soviet leadership would lose complete control over the discussion.”[36] “The complete democratization of the political system could greatly weaken the power in the hands of the leaders and even bring unintended consequences. True democratization could transfer power from Gorbachev and his staff to other dissident groups.”[37] “However, the democratization of reforms made Gorbachev’s political power weaker and weaker, making it impossible for him to complete the process of socialist reform, although this situation was not obvious at the beginning.”[38]

We believe that it is not Gorbachev and his right-wing group, who adhere to Marxism and the direction of socialist reform, who want to improve socialism through political democratization and openness, economic marketization, and ideological liberalization, but rather Gorbachev and his right-wing group, who are essentially “dissidents,” who want to overthrow the flawed socialist system under the rule of the CPSU through so-called bourgeois humanitarian socialism and democratic socialism, and to convert it to capitalism, thereby leading the entire Eastern European socialist countries to turn to the capitalist road.

The facts show that after Gorbachev came to power, a right-wing group gradually formed, centered on Gorbachev and including Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, and Medvedev, who dominated the Politburo. Gorbachev initially feigned support, but later, when the time was right, he expressed his approval of a multi-party system. Subsequently, at the February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1990, he formally proposed a resolution to amend Article 6 of the Constitution, abolishing the CPSU’s legal leadership over the state power. At the 28th Congress of the CPSU, Gorbachev declared that the CPSU would play the role of a parliamentary party. All of this was not an unexpected consequence that “weakened Gorbachev’s political power and prevented him from completing the socialist reform process,” but rather a premeditated betrayal. Therefore, former Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Ryzhkov, analyzed in “The Great Decade of Turmoil”:

Gorbachev: “This man also possesses a devilish fondness for betrayal.” “He not only betrayed the ideals upon which we and the entire nation based our following and trust, but he also repeatedly and cunningly sold out those who shared his ideals.” “Throughout his historical career, the General Secretary’s aim was to eliminate the Party, eliminate the state, and remove those activists who opposed these goals and actions one by one.” “Mistakes can be forgiven, but premeditated betrayal cannot be tolerated.”]

When discussing the historical responsibilities of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, he pointed out: “Gorbachev led the country toward capitalism, while Yeltsin, Gaidar, and their cronies led it to capitalism, and barbaric capitalism at that.” “This is the main betrayal of the two leaders—the reform leader Gorbachev and the post-reform leader Yeltsin.”

His views and attitudes are:

“Mistakes can be forgiven, but premeditated betrayal cannot be tolerated.”

In his book “The Rise and Fall of Gorbachev,” Bolkin, who served as Gorbachev’s secretary and later as a secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, pointed out: “Neither world wars, revolutions, nor the military and economic confrontation between the two camps could destroy or dismember this great nation. The Soviet Union was breached from within, destroyed by a small group of influential party and state leaders, and brought down by the opposition.”

The Russian Public Opinion Foundation conducted two opinion polls on the evaluation of Gorbachev in 2001 and 2004. 56% and 51% of respondents, respectively, believed that “Gorbachev’s rule caused greater harm to the people,” while only 14% and 11% believed that “he brought more benefits to the people.” [39]

Communist parties in CIS countries such as Russia and Ukraine generally agree with the view that “the betrayal of Marxism and socialism by the upper leadership of the CPSU headed by Gorbachev was the direct and primary cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the loss of the CPSU’s ruling position.” Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, has stated on many occasions that great nations and powerful organizations are not destroyed by the victors, but by internal betrayals. The Communist Party of Ukraine, in its programmatic document, states: “Some unprincipled, hypocritical, and even hostile individuals held extremely important positions, including members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the position of General Secretary of the Central Committee. At a crucial moment for the fate of the Soviet Union, these titled ‘superior-appointed officials’ betrayed the Party and ran to the camp of the most vicious enemy of socialism, handing over the country to brutal and evil capitalism without the war, and plunging the masses into poverty and suffering.” [40]

Furthermore, in a speech at the American University in Ankara, Turkey, in 1999, Gorbachev made no secret of his long-standing determination to bury socialism and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: “My purpose in life is to eliminate communism, which exercises an intolerable dictatorship over the people. For this purpose, I have used my position in the party and the state. It is for this reason that my wife has always encouraged me to continuously occupy a higher position in the state. When I came to know the West, my decision became irreversible. For this, I needed to eliminate the entire leadership of the CPSU and the Soviet Union…” [[41]]

Because this statement was too explicit, Gorbachev attempted to deny having said it, but has yet to release the full text of his speech to prove it. However, in August 2011, when answering a question from the British newspaper *The Guardian* regarding the significance of his actions on the 20th anniversary of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev reiterated: “It led to the end of the Cold War, propelled the emergence of a new world order, and ultimately paved the way for a gradual transition of nations from totalitarianism to democracy.”[42]

This proves once again that Gorbachev, like the hostile Western forces, has always regarded the traditional socialist Soviet Union as a “totalitarian” state that needs to be eradicated.

In his memoirs, Ryzhkov bluntly pointed out:

“It is difficult to see through a person’s heart and understand his true intentions. But it is absolutely true that Gorbachev had long harbored the desire to eliminate the Communist Party, which had opened up a bright future for him, and to eliminate the socialism that had nurtured him. He himself said this after 1991.” [43]

Gorbachev said,

“Ever since he was old enough to understand, he had dreamed of burying communism.” [44]

Many Russian studies on Gorbachev mention that from a young age, Gorbachev harbored suspicion and hatred towards the Soviet regime, and used the destruction of the system from the top of the pyramid as his motivation to climb higher.

(III) The Theory of Being Abandoned by the People

Some studies argue that, under the long-term rule of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, “a considerable number of CPSU members, including leading cadres, became seriously detached from the masses, and even abused their power for personal gains. The CPSU was no longer a faithful representative of the fundamental interests of the broadest masses of the people, but rather a faithful representative of the special interests of a few privileged classes. The socialist cause lost the heartfelt support and endorsement of the masses.” [45] The abandonment of the CPSU by the working class and the Soviet people, which it had always represented, was the decisive factor leading to the collapse of the CPSU and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. [46]

We believe that although the ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union had its drawbacks, including a highly centralized economic, political, and cultural system lacking democratization, serious bureaucracy and abuse of power, and other errors, it generally represented the fundamental interests of the working class and the broad masses of the people. The CPSU was not abandoned by its members and the masses, but rather by the Gorbachev and Yeltsin leadership and their followers, step by step. From Gorbachev’s rule until the collapse of the Soviet Union, many high-ranking leaders, ordinary party cadres, and the masses opposed the CPSU in various forms and to varying degrees, but all were suppressed, attacked, encircled, and repressed. For example, on March 13, 1988, the newspaper *Soviet Rossiya* published a reader’s letter from Nina Andreyeva, a teacher at the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute, entitled “I Cannot Abandon My Principles.” The letter pointed out many abnormal phenomena in the public opinion at the time: such as the unprecedented activity of various informal organizations supported by hostile forces at home and abroad, the rhetoric of Western parliamentary system, multi-party system, complete denial of the leading position of the Communist Party and the working class, and vicious attacks on Soviet history and socialist system in various media and seminars, etc. The letter immediately caused a huge uproar throughout the Soviet Union. The article was reprinted 937 times in newspapers of various republics, regions, cities and industries. The Leningrad Polytechnic Institute where Andreeva was located received tens of thousands of letters from people from all over the country and all walks of life, of which more than 80% of the letters fully affirmed the author’s opinions. A large number of letters were also sent to Pravda, of which more than 80% supported Andreeva’s views. [47]

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU held emergency meetings for two consecutive days to discuss countermeasures, with the aim of stopping and counterattacking this so-called “force against reform.” As a result, Gorbachev reassigned Ligachev, the Politburo member who adhered to Marxist-Leninist principles and was originally in charge of ideology, to be in charge of agriculture, and replaced him with Yakovlev, the anti-Marxist Central Committee Secretary. [48] In addition, a large number of party members voluntarily withdrew from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was controlled by the anti-Marxist leadership group, and some generals even committed suicide to express their dissatisfaction. During the constitutional amendment, a large number of representatives opposed the cancellation of the clauses concerning the CPSU’s rule. In the first referendum, more than 70% of the people opposed the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The actions of the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the “August 19” incident to save the Soviet Union from disintegration should all be regarded as various strong resistances on behalf of the broad masses of people. As for the results of some opinion polls after the CPSU and the Soviet Union were disrupted by the Westernization faction and hostile forces at home and abroad, they could no longer truly represent the essential will of the broad masses of people. [49]

A closely related argument to the “abandonment by the masses” is the outright assertion that the Soviet Union was not a socialist country at all, and therefore the Soviet people should abandon it. For example, the Japanese Communist Party claims that…

“The Soviet Union followed the correct path during Lenin’s time, but it seriously trampled on the ‘socialist path’ from the time Stalin came to power, and it was no longer a socialist country, or rather, no longer a country with socialism as its goal.” [50]

At the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Japanese Communist Party held a meeting of its standing committee members, where Chairman Tetsuzo Fuwa delivered a speech entitled “Celebrating the End of the History of Great Power Nationalism and Hegemonism—On the Occasion of the Collapse of the Soviet Union.” He said: “The Soviet Union, as a tyrannical hegemonic power, has caused enormous harm to the world until now. The Japanese Communist Party is extremely pleased with its disintegration.” [51]

How should we scientifically analyze this argument? We must acknowledge that the Soviet socialist path had flaws and serious errors, such as the coercion and orders during agricultural collectivization, the overreach and illegality of the purges, the centralization of political leadership, and great-power chauvinism in international relations. However, it was still a socialist country, and Stalin and subsequent leaders made mistakes while following the socialist path. According to historical materialism, judging the social nature of a country is not based on whether it has made mistakes or the magnitude of those mistakes, but on its fundamental economic and political system and its nature. Just as judging whether there is a substantial difference between the social nature of fascist countries like Germany, Italy, and Japan and the anti-fascist countries like the United States, Britain, and France, it is not about who started the war first or what domestic policies were implemented, but whether private ownership was dominant and whether bourgeois parties held power. Since the Soviet Union implemented a fundamental economic and political system of public ownership and communist leadership, certain domestic and foreign policies, specific institutional and systemic problems could be resolved through continuous reform and improvement, without repeating the mistakes of capitalism. As rational Marxists, we should severely criticize the mistakes made by the Soviet Union, but we should not follow global hostile forces in cheering the dramatic changes and disintegration of socialism in the Soviet Union. Attempting to distance ourselves from the Stalinist model does not equate to denying that the Soviet Union was still a socialist country. Otherwise, since all past socialist countries imitated the Stalinist model, would they all be considered socialist countries? Western scholars do not make such unscientific assertions and analyses.

Another argument closely related to the “theory of abandonment by the masses” is the emphasis on the Soviet Union’s dogmatization of Marxism, which therefore the Soviet people should abandon. For example, some works state:

“The CPSU dogmatized Marxism-Leninism, causing the party’s guiding ideology to remain in a rigid or semi-rigid state for a long time. … The CPSU has always attached importance to ideological work, but it has ‘text booked’ the ideas in classic works, stripping them of their living soul, neglecting theoretical innovation, and not allowing independent thinking, which has caused the party’s guiding ideology to lose its appeal and educational function to the vast number of cadres and the masses, especially the younger generation.” [52]

Other scholars have conducted cross-disciplinary studies on the ossification of ideology and theory during the rule of a particular leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. For example, they argue that the ossification of ideology and theory within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was particularly severe during Brezhnev’s 18 years in power.

【“During the Brezhnev era, the Soviet Union gradually took the understanding and interpretation of Marxism-Leninism by the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and their conclusions as the sole criteria for judging right and wrong and distinguishing friend from foe in the ideological field. They talked about ‘developed socialism’ but turned a blind eye to the difficulties and problems that actually existed. They were silent about the decay and decline of a large number of capitalist systems and the various new situations that emerged in the socio-economic development of some developed capitalist countries. This kind of empty preaching that dogmatized Marxism, absolutized the Soviet model and was seriously divorced from reality caused ideological confusion and even rebellious psychology among the masses.”[53]

We must be soberly aware that while the Soviet Union did indeed experience widespread dogmatism and ideological rigidity regarding Marxism, this dogmatism is fundamentally different from dogmatism and blind worship of Western capitalist thought, and even more so from skepticism and denial of Marxism and socialism. The former only leads to the problem of blindly criticizing capitalism as “leftist” socialism, while the latter leads to the worship and belief in capitalism, thereby negating Marxism and socialism. These two different types of dogmatism and ideological tendencies will bring about two different kinds of ideological confusion and social consequences. Clearly, the dramatic changes and disintegration of the socialist Soviet Union, and its shift to the capitalist road, were the result of ideological and theoretical worship of the West and abandonment of Marxism and socialism; the result of capitalist ideology triumphing over socialist ideology; and also closely related to the people’s aversion to those who verbally recited Marxist phrases but actually used them to seek personal gain for cadres. It was not necessarily a consequence of some dogmatism towards Marxism and socialism. Did the dogmatism towards Marxism and socialism and the sweeping away of certain “feudal, capitalist, and revisionist” ideologies during China’s Cultural Revolution, which far exceeded that of the Soviet Union, lead to the capitalist road?

(iv) The Arms Race Theory

Both the former Soviet Union and present-day Russia are crowned with the title of military superpowers. Many scholars at home and abroad have begun to explore the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union, believing that the Soviet Union had long vigorously developed heavy industry and military industry, engaged in an arms race, violently exported revolution, and fought for world hegemony, which deviated from the socialist principle of working for the benefit of the people. The political life and economic system in the Soviet Union were also adapted to this. The highly centralized planned economy system was formed to meet the requirements of developing heavy industry, especially military production, and was also an important part of its war-prepared economy. Economic system reform and expansion of enterprise autonomy would impact this system and conflict with the most important strategic task of strengthening military production, and were naturally restrained. This is an important deep-seated reason that cannot be ignored for the decline and disintegration of the Soviet Union. [54]

The view that the arms race dragged down the Soviet Union and caused its disintegration has been published in many Western newspapers. Some scholars have written articles to examine how Western society views the reasons for the disintegration of the Soviet Union, citing similar views from France, Germany, Japan and other countries. For example, the French newspaper Le Figaro published an article arguing that the Soviet Union had long and consistently implemented a war economy, using various funds for military purposes as quickly and directly as possible, while only providing the most basic necessities, creating a miracle that could rival the United States militarily. However, the United States was much richer than the Soviet Union and could easily provide funds for a military budget of less than 5% of the US GDP. Compared with the United States, the Soviet Union’s GDP was not high, but it had to use a large part of it for military expenditures. With the development of the US economy and the growth of its technological potential, this increasing extraction eventually gradually suffocated the Soviet Union’s economic growth. The German magazine Der Spiegel also published an article arguing that the Soviet Union wasted billions of dollars by expanding its military for survival. In the end, it became insolvent and disintegrated itself. [55]

We believe that the Soviet Union’s forced military buildup and arms race in response to the military interventions of fourteen Western countries, the military invasion by Nazi Germany, and the military threats and aggression of the US-led NATO alliance during the Cold War certainly affected the development of the national economy and the improvement of the living standards of urban and rural residents. However, it certainly did not lead to the national economy and finances becoming “insolvent and self-disintegrating.” Contrary to the subjective assumption of the “arms race dragging down” theory, the Soviet Union’s national economy, fiscal revenue, and science and technology improved year by year, gradually approaching and even surpassing the United States in many areas.

It is worth pointing out that after Gorbachev came to power, he tried to curry favor with the West in terms of military equipment and the arms race. The most condemned aspect of this was the destruction of the “Oka” missile system. According to relevant Russian sources, the weapon was developed under the leadership of Academician Sergei Nepobedimeye, a famous tactical missile design master of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. It took seven years to build the missile system, with nearly 100,000 scholars, designers, workers, experimental personnel and soldiers involved. At the time, it was said to be able to “hit any corner of the earth”. In order to gain the favor of the United States and NATO, Gorbachev destroyed 239 “Oka” missiles with a range of 400 kilometers. In fact, it did not violate any international treaty, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. [56]

Regarding this situation, Vladimir Shchedrin, a professor at Chuvash State University in Russia, wrote in his “Baghdad Diary”: “In our army, there is a unique weapon, which has never existed in the world and there is no similar weapon now. Its history is also very unique: the weapon was manufactured, put into use, and then completely destroyed in an instant, including all the blueprints, designs and processes.” [57]

The appeasement of the West regarding the arms race and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact began even before Gorbachev took office as the top leader of the CPSU. According to Yakovlev, a member of the CPSU Central Committee who attended the meeting, when Gorbachev visited London as a member of the Politburo, he took the initiative to show Margaret Thatcher a secret military map marking the locations in Britain where nuclear missiles would strike in the event of a world war. Thatcher was overjoyed by the frankness of her outstanding partner. [58] After Gorbachev came to power, he spent a lot of time abroad, making him the CPSU leader who spent the most time abroad. Some Russians sarcastically remarked:

During his trip to the West (where he was treated like a hero), Gorbachev returned to Moscow and launched a new round of policies to disintegrate the state: “reform” itself, the military system, the military-industrial complex, and so on. “He made the simultaneous dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and NATO a strategic goal against the West. In the end, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, while NATO still exists today.” [59]

According to historical records, when former US Secretary of State Baker met with Gorbachev, Baker assured Gorbachev that NATO would not expand “an inch” eastward from its current position and was prepared to discuss the international legal guarantee of this “no eastward expansion,” Gorbachev surprisingly said that he was not worried about NATO’s military expansion toward Russia. Baker was very surprised by the Soviet leader’s attitude. [60]

The “arms race drags down” theory also contains an inference that the Soviet Union’s living standards were low due to the arms race, which led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. One scholar commented: If the extreme poverty of the Soviet people in terms of food, clothing, housing and other things before World War II, and the unnatural deaths of tens of millions of people, could be explained by the fact that “the people must make sacrifices for the prosperity of the country”; then the fact that the living standards and quality of life of the Soviet people could not be improved accordingly in the 45 years after World War II, and that the social economy declined, can only be attributed to the deviation of the ruling ideology of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, its low governing ability, and its stubbornness. It is not surprising that such a ruling party was abandoned by the people. [61]

Numerous statistical data and research works from the Soviet Union and around the world confirm that the living standards of the Soviet people were continuously improving and increasingly approaching the actual quality of life of ordinary residents in developed Western countries. For example, in 1960, the Soviet national income was 145 billion rubles, which increased to 577.7 billion rubles in 1985, nearly tripling in 1960. In 1960, the Soviet Union’s per capita gross social output and national income were 1431 rubles and 683 rubles respectively, which had correspondingly increased to 5003 rubles and 2090 rubles in 1985, representing increases of 2.4 times and more than 2 times respectively. The growth in real income of all residents (per capita, %), with 1940 as 100, reached 646% by 1985. For example, the Soviet Social Consumption Fund increased from 41.9 billion rubles in 1965 to 147 billion rubles in 1985. The various payments and benefits received by residents from the Social Consumption Fund on a per capita basis increased from 182 rubles in 1965 to 530 rubles in 1985, a 1.9-fold increase. Third, the Soviet Union maintained a low-rent policy since 1928. In 1913, the effective living space per capita in urban areas was only 6.3 square meters, which increased to 14.1 square meters in 1985, more than doubling the pre-revolutionary level. Eighty percent of families in Soviet cities lived in apartment-style housing. In the 1980s, Soviet national housing was allocated according to a plan, with each household paying an average monthly rent of 3 rubles, while the average monthly rent for American residents was several hundred dollars. In the mid-1980s, a survey of “livable cities” was conducted by relevant American organizations, with key evaluation indicators including the availability of goods in stores, traffic conditions, housing comfort, sewage treatment, hot water supply, and air cleanliness. The three Soviet cities of Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev were surveyed and all entered the ranks of the world’s ten most comfortable cities (Gorbachev said that compared with the living conditions of ordinary American workers, Soviet people “lived in caves”). [62] Fourth, in 1980, the Soviet Union’s per capita grain output had reached 715 kg, and grain coupons were never issued to restrict grain consumption. The consumption of starchy foods continued to decrease, while the consumption of foods with high protein content increased significantly. In 1985, the per capita consumption of major foods was: 61.4 kg of meat and meat products, 323 kg of milk and dairy products, 260 eggs, 17.7 kg of fish and fish products, 42 kg of sugar, 9.7 kg of vegetable oil, and 133 kg of bread products. The Engel coefficient of industrial workers’ families was 45.6% in 1922 and decreased to 32.9% by 1975. Fifth, in 1985, every 100 urban and rural households owned 97 television sets and 90 refrigerators. [63]

Moreover, globally, numerous factors, including the natural environment, history, and current realities, determine the level and changes in the living standards of urban and rural residents in a country. The level of living standards generally cannot directly become the primary cause of fundamental social system abrupt changes. Throughout the 20th century, the living standards of ordinary residents in most developing capitalist countries were not as high as those in most socialist countries, yet these capitalist countries did not drastically transform into socialist countries. Similarly, if a developing socialist country were to undergo a dramatic shift towards capitalism, it would not be because, or at least not simply because, its living standards differed from those of developed capitalist countries.

(V) The Theory of Mistakes in Ethnic and Religious Affairs

Some scholars believe that the rapid expansion of Russian power since Peter the Great was mainly a process of the Russian people conquering other different nationalities by force, and the ethnic contradictions and grievances have been deep for centuries. During the Stalin era, the centralization of power was too great, the promotion of Great Russianism and the restriction of ethnic minorities from using their own languages ​​and scripts greatly hurt national feelings. Before and after World War II, under the slogans of “defending the Soviet Union” and “consolidating the border”, the Soviet Union forcibly implemented the policy of relocating ethnic minorities, such as driving the Tatars from the warm and rich Crimean region to the cold and desolate Central Asia and Siberia, and driving the Ingushetians and Chechens from the Caucasus to Central Asia, which sowed the seeds of ethnic hatred. The Soviet Union has long implemented the erroneous policy of classifying ethnic issues, the discriminatory policies on the economic development, customs, education and promotion of ethnic minorities, and even the attempt to “assimilate” ethnic groups, which seriously hurt the feelings of ethnic minorities and increased their centrifugal force. Therefore, it led to the Soviet Union splitting into 12 CIS countries after the independence of the three Baltic states. [64]

In fact, it was the oppression and enslavement of conquered peoples by successive Tsars that fueled Russian national chauvinism, leading to sharper contradictions between the Russian and non-Russian nationalities. The Soviet Union, a federal state built on the ruins of Tsarist Russia, emphasized political national unity and mutual economic support, greatly mitigating national tensions and preventing major ethnic unrest and conflict. It was only Gorbachev’s abandonment of the socialist policy of “openness and democratization” regarding national unity that provided an opportunity for rampant nationalism. For example, this led to the Almaty uprising in December 1986 and the large-scale demonstrations by Crimean Tatars in June 1987. After abandoning Marxism and socialism, Yeltsin, disregarding the will of the majority of Soviet citizens who voted against the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and driven by personal interests and obedience to Western intentions, further promoted policies of national division and the disintegration of the Soviet Union based on rampant nationalism, ultimately leading to its collapse. It is evident that the erroneous policies of the Gorbachev and Yeltsin leadership group led to the conflict between ethnic groups and the rampant spread of nationalism, which in turn led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, rather than the traditional ethnic contradictions before Gorbachev’s rule that led to the rampant spread of nationalism and the collapse of the Soviet Union (nationalists naturally took advantage of the right of each constituent republic to freely secede from the Union, as explicitly stipulated in the Soviet constitutions of 1924, 1936, and 1977). [65]

We can further analyze that in any multi-ethnic country in the world, including the United States, Britain, Spain, India, and China, there are contradictions of varying degrees among different ethnic groups. The levels of economic and social development in different ethnic regions are also not entirely consistent, and the desire of various ethnic leaders to become leaders of independent countries is an objective reality. The question is whether the disintegration of a multi-ethnic independent country was directly caused by general ethnic differences and traditional ethnic contradictions. This requires specific research based on key facts, and it is inappropriate to exaggerate contradictions or make subjective assumptions. Furthermore, Stalin, who made significant contributions to Marxist theory of nationalities, was Georgian, and his assertion that people of a non-Russian nationality “promoted Great Russian chauvinism” deserves empirical and logical verification and scrutiny.

Some scholars also regard the failure of religious policy as the main reason for the collapse of the Soviet Union, and specifically attribute it to three aspects: First, the strategy of the anti-religious struggle in the early and middle period of the Soviet Union violated the laws of ideological struggle, and the long-term religious persecution strengthened the centrifugal tendency of the people towards the Soviet party and regime. Second, the religious persecution in the early and middle period of the Soviet Union seriously damaged the image of the Soviet socialist country, weakened the appeal of socialism, and created conditions for international anti-socialist forces to infiltrate Soviet society. The major reversal of religious policy in the later period of the Soviet Union under the guidance of “new thinking” made the Soviet Union gradually relax its vigilance against the political infiltration of Western hostile forces using religion. Third, the religious issue was intertwined with the national issue, and played a role in promoting the collapse of the Soviet Union. [66]

We believe that replacing religious belief with a scientific worldview, outlook on life, and values ​​is a long process of theoretical dissemination and ideological education, requiring certain economic and political conditions and an international environment. The CPSU and its government failed to recognize the protracted and arduous nature of this process, hastily employing various means to eliminate religious belief among the masses and implementing overly harsh policies towards religious organizations and clergy. This was indeed a mistake in the religious policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government. However, the question remains: would the relatively harsh religious policies of traditional socialism necessarily lead to the dramatic changes and disintegration of the Soviet Union? If the Soviet Union had not made this mistake of implementing overly harsh religious policies, would the Gorbachev leadership have attacked Marxism and socialism, implemented a completely laissez-faire religious policy, and ultimately led to the dramatic changes and disintegration of the Soviet Union? Would hostile Western forces not have used religion to subvert the Soviet Union through ideological and religious infiltration? The correct answer is self-evident.

Note:

[1] Уроки ХХ съезда. http://www.orossii.ru/2006-09-29

[2] Ролъ 20-го съезда КПСС в разоблачении кулъта личности. http://library.by/2002-11-13

[3] Двадцатый съезд -двадцатый суд.http://www.rg.ru/2006-02-14

[4]Уроки ХХ съезда.http://www.orossii.ru/2006-09-29

[5] Роль США в уничтожении нашей Родины. http://www.usinfo.ru/2006-07-15

[6] Олег Попов：Защитники прав человека или”агенты глобализма”? Журнал «Москва», №1, 2004 г.

[7]О развале СССР. http://www.rakurs-art.ru/ 2007-04-15

[8] In October 1936, when Spanish rebels and German and Italian fascist forces jointly attacked Madrid, the capital of Spain, a rebel general boasted in a radio broadcast that his four columns were attacking Madrid, while the fifth column was waiting in the capital. Later, the fifth column became a general term for traitors and spies recruited and sent in by imperialism when carrying out subversive activities in other countries.

[9] Геннадий Зюганов： «пятая колонна» внутри страны сыграла большую роль в развале СССР. http://vkontakte.ru/2009-12-11

[10] Становление партийной номенклатуры.http://www.pravda.ru/2007-03-10

[11] Смена политических элит в России в 80-е — 90-е годы.http://student.km.ru/2001-05-11

[12] Кадровая политика Л. И. Брежнева. http://www.examen.ru/2003-07-18

[13] В.С.

[14] Mandel, Power and Money: Marxist Bureaucratic Theory, translated by Meng Jie et al., Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press, 2001, p. 8.

[15] Мы отучили начальников пить за государственный счет.http://www.ng.ru/ 2010-05-18

[16]Программа КПРФ.http://kprf.ru/2008-12-18

[17]Программа КПБ.http://www.comparty.by/2003-12-13

[18] Порядок назначения и проведения референдума.http://revolution.allbest.ru/2010-06-04

[19] The leaders of the three countries met in Belovezhskaya Sopka near Brest, Belarus, and reached an agreement on the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which is often referred to as the Belovezhskaya Agreement by the CIS countries.

[20] Развал СССР методами американской разведки.http://belvol.livejournal.com/2010-07-10

[21]В.А.Крючков о предательствах Горбачёва.http://pomnimvse.com/2001-11-10

[22] A 2001 poll conducted by the Institute of General Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences on “the main causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union” showed that 44% of the respondents believed that Gorbachev and Yeltsin should bear the main responsibility for the collapse of the Soviet Union; while only 17.2% believed that it was caused by “the Soviet socio-economic crisis” and only 11.2% believed that it was caused by “the crisis of the communist ideological system”.

[23] Jiang Zemin, “Speech at the National Conference on Social Security Work”, April 2, 2001, Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Vol. 3, p. 230.

[24] Lu Nanquan: “The Soviet Communist Party’s economic system theory that cannot keep pace with the times and its serious consequences”, Russian Studies, No. 4, 2001.

[25] Lu Nanquan et al., eds., Research on the Deep-seated Causes of the Dramatic Changes in the Soviet Union, China Social Sciences Press, 1999, p. 341.

[26] Gong Dafei, ed., New Explorations into the Dramatic Changes in the Soviet Union, World Knowledge Press, 1998.

[27]А.В.Бузгалин,От мутантного социализма к царству свободы,Социализм 21,Москва, 2009г., «культурная революция»,С.400- 401.

[28] А. В. Бузгалин, А. И.

[29] Wu Enyuan, “A Review of Some Popular Views on the Lessons of the Collapse of the Soviet Union”, Marxist Studies, No. 6, 2005.

[30] See the survey results from the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center website: http://wciom.ru/ December 19, 2005

[31] Wu Enyuan, “The collapse of the Soviet Union was not mainly due to its system”, Global Times, May 25, 2011.

[32] Samuelson, Economics (12th edition), China Development Press, 1992, p. 1296. American economist Fisher Donbütsch also commented: “How well did the planned economy work? For most of the period after World War II, the Soviet Union grew faster than Japan, but faster than the United States.” See Fisher and Donbütsch, Economics (Volume 2), China Finance and Economics Press, 1989, p. 586.

[33] Cheng Enfu, “The Four Theoretical Assumptions of Modern Marxist Political Economy”, Chinese Social Sciences, No. 1, 2007.

[34]О.Матвейчев, Д.Лапицкий.  http://www.contr-tv.ru/2004-05-17

[35] Li Chuifa, “The economic situation is getting worse and worse”, in Liu Hongchao et al., eds., The Evolution of the Soviet Union from 1985 to 1991, Xinhua Publishing House, 1992, p. 57.

[36] David Kotz and Fred Weir, Revolution from the Top: The End of the Soviet System, translated by Cao Rongxiang et al., Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2008, p. 71.

[37] David Kotz and Fred Weir, Revolution from the Top: The End of the Soviet System, translated by Cao Rongxiang et al., Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2008, p. 103.

[38] David Kotz and Fred Weil, Revolution from the Top: The End of the Soviet System, translated by Cao Rongxiang et al., Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2008, p. 113.

[39] Quoted from: Wu Enyuan, “Various Debates on the Soviet Union’s ‘Hopeless’ Status”, People’s Forum, No. 332.

[40]Програма КПУ.http://www.kpu.net.ua/1995-8-12

[41] Распад Союза Советских Социалистических Республик.http://rossiya.narod.ru/2000-8-20

[42] Quoted from The Guardian website, August 17, 2011, “Gorbachev: I should have abandoned the Communist Party sooner”; “Gorbachev: I was too open-minded to Yeltsin”, see Reference News, August 19, 2011.

[43] Ryzhkov, The Tragedy of a Great Power, translated by Xu Changhan et al., Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, 2008, p. 365.

[44] Ryzhkov, The Tragedy of a Great Power, translated by Xu Changhan et al., Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, 2008, p. 15.

[45] Bao Xinjian, “The contemporary value, practical orientation and innovative significance of the Three Represents Thought”, Scientific Socialism, No. 3, 2001.

[46] Liu Jingbei, “Some Thoughts on the Defeat of the CPSU”, Contemporary World and Socialism, No. 2, 2001.

[47] Центральный Комитет ВКПБ：Изискры возгорелосъ пламя. http://www.vkpb.ru/2003-02-18

[48] ​​Under the direct instruction of anti-Marxist leader Yakovlev, Pravda published a counterattack article on April 5 entitled “The Principles of Reform: Revolutionary Thinking and Action,” launching a full-scale counterattack and suppression against Nina Andreyeva. Pravda called Nina Andreyeva’s letter “a manifesto of anti-reform elements” and referred to Nina Andreyeva as “an enemy of reform, a Stalinist, a conservative, an institutional bureaucrat, and a representative of the party elite.” See Li Shenming et al., “Be Vigilant in Times of Peace—Historical Lessons from the Collapse of the CPSU—Commentary on an 8-Episode DVD Educational Reference Film,” Russian, Central Asian and Eastern European Studies, No. 2, 2007.

[49] The differences on whether or not to implement a socialist system were obviously enormous. Some scholars have pointed out that around 1990, some polling agencies in the United States and the West conducted some public opinion polls in the Soviet Union. But even in that year of extreme ideological confusion, the results of the polls among the general public were: only 5%-20% advocated for capitalism, while as many as 80% wanted to stick to socialism. However, the results of the polls among the “elite group” of about 100,000 people who occupied important leadership positions in the party and government organs were completely opposite: only 9.6% advocated for socialism, 12.3% advocated for democratic socialism, and as many as 76.7% wanted to implement capitalism. See W. Kotz and Fred Weil, Revolution from the Top: The End of the Soviet System, translated by Cao Rongxiang et al., Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2003, pp. 151-152.

[49] David Kotz and Fred Weil, Revolution from the Top: The End of the Soviet System, translated by Cao Rongxiang et al., Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2008, p. 71.

[50] Fuwa Tetsuzo: “New Relationship Between the Communist Party of Japan and the Communist Party of China”, New Japan Publishing House, 1998, page 35.

[51] Fuwa Tetsuzo: “The disintegration of the hegemonic party and the Japanese Communist Party”, [Japanese] “Avant-garde” November 1991 issue, page 30. Same as above

[52] Zhou Shangwen, “How the CPSU lost the trust of the people”, Journal of China Executive Leadership Academy Pudong, No. 4, 2009.

[53] The Sixth Bureau of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: “Looking at the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union from the perspective of ideological issues during the Brezhnev period”, Party Building Research, No. 9, 2000.

[54] Zuo Fengrong, “The Reasons for the Dramatic Changes in the Soviet Union from the Perspective of Foreign Strategy”, Russian Studies, No. 2, 2003.

[55] Cao Yuxia: “How Western Society Views the Causes of the Collapse of the Soviet Union”, Theoretical Front of Higher Education Institutions, No. 1, 2001.

[56] Горбачев – президент, предавший свою страну.http://malech.narod.ru/2005-04-24

68.

[58] К.Г. Мяло, Россия и последние войны XX века(1989-2000). «Вече», 2002 г. ,c.85.

[59]К.Г. Мяло ,Россия и последние войны XX века(1989-2000). «Вече», 2002 г. ,с.102.

[60] К.Г. Мяло, Россия и последние войны XX века(1989-2000). «Вече», 2002 г. ,с.103.

[61] Ye Shuzong: “Economic recession has shattered the legitimacy of the CPSU’s rule”, Exploration and Debate, No. 8, 2008.

[62] Развал СССР методами американской разведки.http://belvol.livejournal.ru/2010-07-10

[63] Lu Nanquan, Zhang Chu, Chen Yichu, et al., Seventy Years of National Economic Development in the Soviet Union, Machinery Industry Press, 1988, pp. 459-467.

[64] Guo Xingen, “A Review of Several Major Viewpoints on the Causes of the Collapse of the Soviet Union”, Socialist Studies, No. 2, 2003.

[65] Zhu Xiufang, “A Historical Interpretation of the Gorbachev Phenomenon”, Russian Studies, No. 4, 2009.

[66] Liu Heting, “The Hidden Role of Religious Factors in the Disintegration of the Soviet Union”, Journal of International Relations, No. 3, 2009.