{"id":4039,"date":"2024-05-20T00:49:31","date_gmt":"2024-05-20T00:49:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/?p=4039"},"modified":"2024-05-20T00:49:31","modified_gmt":"2024-05-20T00:49:31","slug":"avrupa-mali-sermayesi-turkiyenin-dunyada-elinde-tuttugu-kartlari-nasil-goruyor","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/?p=4039","title":{"rendered":"Avrupa Mali Sermayesi, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin D\u00fcnyada Elinde Tuttu\u011fu Kartlar\u0131 Nas\u0131l G\u00f6r\u00fcyor\u00a0"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Avrupa Mali Sermayesi, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin D\u00fcnyada Elinde Tuttu\u011fu Kartlar\u0131 Nas\u0131l G\u00f6r\u00fcyor<\/strong> <\/h1>\n\n\n\n

AB\u2019nin T\u00fcrkiye Politikas\u0131 \u0130\u00e7in Tavsiyeler ve Potansiyel S\u00fcrt\u00fc\u015fme Alanlar\u0131<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

AB G\u00fcvenlik Ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar\u0131 Enstit\u00fcs\u00fc Raporu\u2026 The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) taraf\u0131ndan ayn\u0131 ba\u015fl\u0131kla yay\u0131mlanan raporun y\u00f6netici \u00f6zeti b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fc \u00e7evirisidir.<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

\u00c7eviren: Zeki KAYA<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Y\u00f6netici \u00d6zeti<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye’nin d\u00fcnyan\u0131n \u00e7e\u015fitli b\u00f6lgelerindeki etkisi geni\u015flemi\u015ftir.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bu durum, sadece ekonomik anlamda de\u011fil, \u00fclkenin e\u011fitim giri\u015fimleri veya Afrika, Orta Do\u011fu, G\u00fcney Kafkasya ve Bat\u0131 Balkanlar’daki izleyiciler aras\u0131nda T\u00fcrk televizyon dizilerinin pop\u00fclaritesi gibi yumu\u015fak g\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fcn ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 bir \u015fekilde yans\u0131t\u0131lmas\u0131yla da a\u00e7\u0131kt\u0131r. G\u00fc\u00e7 yelpazesinin sert g\u00fc\u00e7 ucunda, bu durum T\u00fcrkiye’nin TB2 insans\u0131z hava ara\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131n modern sava\u015f alanlar\u0131nda artan \u00f6nemiyle de kendini g\u00f6stermektedir. Bu k\u00fclt\u00fcrel ihracat ve teknolojik geli\u015fmelerin birle\u015fimi, \u00fclkenin diplomatik beceri, ekonomik geni\u015fleme ve g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc askeri yetenekler konusundaki net hedeflerini ortaya koymaktad\u0131r. Ancak, daha yak\u0131ndan bak\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda daha n\u00fcansl\u0131 bir ger\u00e7eklik ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmaktad\u0131r. T\u00fcrkiye, ulusal ekonomik endi\u015feler, artan g\u00fcvenlik kayg\u0131lar\u0131 ve de\u011fi\u015fen k\u00fcresel d\u00fczen aras\u0131nda dikkatli ve hassas bir yol izlemek zorundad\u0131r.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Son yirmi y\u0131lda T\u00fcrkiye, yukar\u0131da belirtilen b\u00f6lgelere a\u00e7\u0131lm\u0131\u015fken, Covid-19 pandemisi ve Ukrayna sava\u015f\u0131 taraf\u0131ndan \u015fiddetlenen son ekonomik zorluklar, Ankara’y\u0131 bu b\u00f6lgelerle daha yak\u0131n i\u015f birli\u011fine itmi\u015ftir. Bu stratejik angajman, T\u00fcrkiye ad\u0131na izole olma riskini a\u015fmak ve Bat\u0131’dan uzakla\u015farak stratejik \u00f6zerklik sa\u011flaman\u0131n yan\u0131 s\u0131ra \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131na hizmet eden ba\u011flant\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131 s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmeye \u00f6zen g\u00f6stermek gibi iki amaca hizmet etmektedir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bat\u0131’dan uzakla\u015farak stratejik \u00f6zerklik Elde Etme<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye’nin \u00e7ok y\u00f6nl\u00fc ve uyarlanabilir yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131, ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n anahtar\u0131d\u0131r. \u00c7e\u015fitli diplomatik ara\u00e7lar ve hedefe y\u00f6nelik ileti\u015fim kullanarak, Ankara bu d\u00f6rt b\u00f6lgede \u00f6nemli bir akt\u00f6r olarak ortaya \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu strateji hem elitler hem de genel n\u00fcfus i\u00e7in g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc ve g\u00fcvenilir bir ortak imaj\u0131n\u0131 vermekte ve peki\u015ftirmektedir. 31 Mart yerel se\u00e7imlerinin ard\u0131ndan T\u00fcrkiye’nin siyasi manzaras\u0131n\u0131n dramatik bir \u015fekilde de\u011fi\u015fti\u011fini not etmek \u00f6nemlidir. Adalet ve Kalk\u0131nma Partisi (AKP), kurulu\u015fundan bu yana ilk kez \u00fclkenin en b\u00fcy\u00fck partisi de\u011fildir. Buna kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k, tarihsel olarak rakibi ve d\u00fc\u015fman\u0131 olan milliyet\u00e7i Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP), 1977\u2019den beri ilk kez anketlerde birinci s\u0131ray\u0131 alm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Her iki parti de bu de\u011fi\u015fen siyasi ortamda birlikte \u00e7al\u0131\u015fman\u0131n bir yolunu bulmak zorunda kalacakt\u0131r. Bu Chaillot Belgesi, her b\u00f6lgeye ayr\u0131lm\u0131\u015f be\u015f b\u00f6l\u00fcmden olu\u015fmaktad\u0131r: Bat\u0131 Balkanlar; G\u00fcney Kafkasya; Orta Do\u011fu\/Kuzey Afrika\/K\u00f6rfez; ve Afrika. B\u00f6lgesel ve \u00fclke spesifik \u00f6zellikler olmas\u0131na ra\u011fmen, t\u00fcm b\u00f6l\u00fcmler T\u00fcrkiye’nin artan ayak izine odaklanarak motivasyonlar\u0131n\u0131 ve stratejilerini analiz etmekte ve Avrupa Birli\u011fi i\u00e7in olas\u0131 etkilerini de\u011ferlendirmektedir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A\u015fa\u011f\u0131da \u0130ngilizcesini verdi\u011fimiz  Son b\u00f6l\u00fcmde, AB i\u00e7in politika \u00f6nerileri sunulmaktad\u0131r<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

AB’nin, T\u00fcrkiye’nin ama\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131, motivasyonlar\u0131n\u0131 ve stratejilerini anlamaya y\u00f6nelik \u00f6nemli bir \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131 vard\u0131r, \u00f6zellikle i\u015f birli\u011finin AB’nin kendi hedefleriyle \u00f6rt\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc\u011f\u00fc alanlarda, \u00f6rne\u011fin istikrar\u0131 te\u015fvik etmek, ekonomik kalk\u0131nmay\u0131 te\u015fvik etmek ve ortak g\u00fcvenlik endi\u015felerini ele almak gibi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bu, \u00f6zellikle T\u00fcrkiye’nin giderek daha fazla i\u015flem temelli bir yakla\u015f\u0131ma y\u00f6neldi\u011fi ve d\u0131\u015f politikada her b\u00f6lge ve ortakla kendi \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6nceliklendirdi\u011fi bir zamanda \u00f6nemlidir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bu dinamikleri anlamak ve T\u00fcrkiye ile a\u00e7\u0131k ve yap\u0131c\u0131 diyalog kurarak, AB\u2019nin \u00fclkeyle olan ili\u015fkisini b\u00f6lgesel istikrar ve refah\u0131n temellerini atmak i\u00e7in kullanabilir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This chapter outlines policy recommendations for the EU to navigate this evolving landscape, capitalising on T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s strengths while addressing potential areas of friction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

LEVERAGING T\u00dcRKIYE\u2019S STRENGTHS<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As seen in the four previous chapters, T\u00fcrkiye commands significant soft power which allows it to build bridges with countries across these regions. The EU can explore various ways to leverage this soft power to promote regional stability and cultural exchange.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Development cooperation: The EU-T\u00fcrkiye Bridge for Development<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The EU and T\u00fcrkiye possess significant resources and expertise in development projects. By establishing a joint foundation for infrastructure, education, and healthcare projects they can maximise their regional impact. Such a foundation would require a clear mission statement outlining its goals, governance structure and funding model. For example, the foundation, which could be called \u2018the EU-T\u00fcrkiye Bridge for Development\u2019 (EUTB Bridge), could have a board of directors comprising representatives from the EU, T\u00fcrkiye and potentially other regional stakeholders. Funding could come from various sources, including the EU budget, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s national budget, international financial institutions and the private sector. This collaborative approach would foster research and development, ultimately promoting regional stability. To accelerate public and private investments in key areas like connectivity, digitalisation, energy, transport, and the Green Deal, the signature of contracts under the Turkey Investment Platform should be prioritised. This requires close collaboration with European and international financial institutions. In this context, the European Investment Bank should be encouraged to resume its full range of operations in T\u00fcrkiye.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conflict resolution and mediation<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s diplomatic efforts in several countries across these regions deserve recognition. The EU can build upon this by establishing a dialogue platform, enabling joint efforts in conflict resolution initiatives. This would foster a more cooperative approach to regional security challenges. For instance, both sides could create a formal framework for joint EU-T\u00fcrkiye conflict resolution efforts. This framework could take one of two forms: 1. A dedicated \u2018EU-T\u00fcrkiye Conflict Resolution Task Force\u2019 with representatives from both parties\u2019 diplomatic services and conflict resolution experts; 2. \u2018Thematic Working Groups\u2019 that would focus on specific regional conflicts, for instance a \u2018South Caucasus Working Group\u2019, or a \u2018Sahel Working Group\u2019. A more coordinated EU-T\u00fcrkiye approach can contribute to de-escalation and conflict resolution in critical regions. Such an initiative would combine the EU\u2019s financial resources with T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s regional influence and connections for maximum impact.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

ADDRESSING AREAS OF POTENTIAL FRICTION T<\/p>\n\n\n\n

o cultivate a successful partnership, the EU and T\u00fcrkiye need to acknowledge potential areas of friction and navigate them constructively. This concerns in particular managing the issue of Turkish accession as well as stepping up cooperation in the field of humanitarian aid and development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Charting a new course: EU-T\u00fcrkiye relations beyond accession<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

While immediate EU membership discussions might not be the sole or central focus, the EU must acknowledge T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s aspirations and keep channels open for the future. Publicly acknowledging T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s long-standing ambition to join the EU would demonstrate respect for T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s strategic goals while setting realistic expectations about the current state of play. This avoids making accession the sole pillar of the relationship and allows for a more flexible partnership model.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Beyond politics, better aid: EU-T\u00fcrkiye cooperation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Joint efforts can significantly improve the efficiency and transparency of humanitarian aid delivery. The EU and T\u00fcrkiye can establish protocols to address concerns about the politicisation of aid, ensuring aid reaches those most in need. This collaboration could involve conducting joint needs assessments in crisis-affected regions to gain a comprehensive understanding of humanitarian needs and avoid duplication of efforts. The EU and T\u00fcrkiye bring complementary strengths to the table. The EU can provide financial resources and expertise in logistics and coordination, while T\u00fcrkiye can utilise its geographical proximity and cultural understanding to facilitate access to certain areas, as well as convince its closer partners \u2013 such as the Gulf States \u2013 to tap into their substantial financial resources. Finally, to address the issue of the politicisation of humanitarian aid, both the EU and T\u00fcrkiye could develop protocols to ensure neutrality, impartiality and independence in the delivery of humanitarian assistance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

FOSTERING STRATEGIC DIALOGUE<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regular and open communication is crucial for building trust and navigating complex challenges. Some ways to achieve this are outlined below.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regular consultations<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The suspension of the EU-T\u00fcrkiye High-level Dialogues on Economy, Energy, and Transport in 2019, due to T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, should be reversed. These high-level meetings serve as critical forums for discussing regional developments of mutual interest to the EU and T\u00fcrkiye. Their resumption should be followed by the reconvening of the Association Council and the High-level Political Dialogue at the ministerial level. Reinstating these dialogues would contribute to a more transparent and well-functioning relationship, facilitating collaborative problem-solving. Besides, both the EU and T\u00fbrkiye should seek to organise further rounds of sectoral High-level Dialogues on climate change, public health, migration and security, agriculture, and research and innovation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Joint analysis and threat assessments<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Information sharing and collaboration on threat assessments related to terrorism, extremism and regional instability are crucial. This strengthens regional security by enabling the anticipation and mitigation of potential threats. To this end, both actors should agree to conduct more structured and regular dialogues on foreign policy and regional issues. One approach could involve extending an invitation to the Turkish Foreign Minister to participate in relevant informal meetings of EU Foreign Ministers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

ADDRESSING SPECIFIC REGIONAL CHALLENGES<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Beyond broad areas of cooperation, the EU and T\u00fcrkiye can collaborate on regional challenges by deploying strategies tailored to the needs of specific sectors:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Western Balkans<\/p>\n\n\n\n

> Investing in regional cooperation frameworks: T\u00fcrkiye can support the region by investing more political capital in regional cooperation frameworks, including through the SEECP. By maintaining a balanced approach with all countries and a strategic Euro-Atlantic posture, Ankara can use its influence to advocate for closer regional cooperation, ultimately accelerating EU integration for the countries of the Western Balkans.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

> Harnessing expertise in disaster management: T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s experience in disaster management and environmental protection can be valuable for regional cooperation. Sharing expertise and best practices strengthens regional resilience in these critical areas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

> Promoting dialogue: T\u00fcrkiye can play a constructive role in preventing further security escalation by encouraging both Belgrade and Pristina not to give up on existing lines of communication and instead focus on small yet significant technical advancements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s balanced and cautious stance vis-\u00e0-vis both Belgrade and Pristina allows for a more inclusive \u2018bottom-up\u2019 approach to dialogue, where both sides feel equally involved, unlike the often-criticised \u2018top-down\u2019 approach of the EU. > Countering extremism: T\u00fcrkiye could contribute to curtailing Islamic extremism. Unlike actors like Saudi Arabia and Iran, T\u00fcrkiye has a unique advantage due to its historical legacy, economic power, and strategic and political influence with the majority Sunni Muslim population in the Balkans. This advantage can be utilised to counter the appeal of Shia Islam propagated by rival players. A joint EU\/T\u00fcrkiye community-based initiative focused on youth empowerment, social cohesion and outreach programmes to counter extremist narratives, particularly in rural and underprivileged communities, could be a powerful tool for achieving this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

South Caucasus<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

> Deterring escalation: The EU can impress upon T\u00fcrkiye the importance of avoiding further escalation of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and highlight the constructive role Ankara can play in deterring such escalation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

> Fostering peace and connectivity: The EU can seek to persuade T\u00fcrkiye to support a comprehensive peace agreement, leading to normalised relations, open borders, and facilitating connectivity projects in the region. International guarantees, loans and technical assistance for improved connectivity under the Middle Corridor (including the Syunik road and railroad, potentially reopening the Kars-Yerevan railroad) can incentivise progress on this front.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

> Promoting a balanced regional order: While acknowledging T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s strategy of avoiding direct confrontation with Russia in the South Caucasus, the EU can emphasise the potential risks that Russian dominance here pose to regional instability. A more balanced regional order would benefit all parties involved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

MENA\/Gulf  Region<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

> Humanitarian and cultural cooperation: The EU and T\u00fcrkiye can partner to amplify humanitarian and cultural efforts in the MENA region. By combining emergency aid, infrastructure development and investment in human capital, as exemplified by T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s model, they can create a more sustainable impact. Collaboration on joint initiatives focusing on education, healthcare, vocational training, cultural exchange programmes and heritage preservation projects would draw on and showcase the strengths of both parties in soft power diplomacy. The EU could co-fund projects and provide expertise to enhance the impact of aid efforts, as well as offer expertise and support to T\u00fcrkiye in improving its disaster management capabilities, as demonstrated by the challenges faced during the February 2023 earthquake.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

> Facilitating dialogue and mediation: The EU can encourage T\u00fcrkiye to utilise its growing influence to facilitate dialogue and mediate conflicts in the MENA region. Given that T\u00fcrkiye is also the co-founder of the Friends of Mediation Initiative within the UN together with Finland, the EU can support these efforts by providing resources and expertise for mediation and peacebuilding initiatives. The EU could also join forces with T\u00fcrkiye on diplomatic efforts in areas where they share mutual interests, such as fostering stability in Libya, Syria or Gaza.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

> Boosting regional economic integration: The EU can collaborate with T\u00fcrkiye to facilitate trade agreements and economic partnerships between the EU, T\u00fcrkiye and MENA countries. Furthermore, encouraging joint infrastructure projects and knowledge sharing would boost regional economic integration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 > Addressing regional security:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The EU and T\u00fcrkiye can collaborate to develop a comprehensive and holistic approach to energy security and resource management in the MENA region. This can involve promoting renewable energy solutions and encouraging cooperation on water resource management.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 Given T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s unique position as a NATO member in proximity to conflict zones and its experience in managing refugee flows and combating terrorism, the EU can support joint efforts to address these common security challenges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Africa Region<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

> Learning from successful models : The EU can learn valuable lessons from T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s successful engagement in sub-Saharan Africa. Combining large-scale infrastructure projects with social initiatives like schools and hospitals creates a more sustainable and impactful development strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

> Investing in regional growth : Investing in hub-like projects can attract further pri – vate investment, stimulate intra-African trade, and address pressing needs like job creation and access to electricity. This fo – cus on regional connectivity could significantly contribute to Africa\u2019s economic development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

> Strengthening the EU-Africa partnership:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 The EU can enhance its partnership with the African Union by expanding participation from a wider range of stakeholders, including the private sector, cities, NGOs, and others. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s experience in stimulating job creation could be successfully replicated by the EU\u2019s private sector through working closely with the regional offices of the European Investment Bank.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

> Leveraging soft power : The EU can leverage its soft power potential by increasing educational exchanges with Africa, fostering long-term partnerships and mutual understanding.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

> Collaborating on shared goals:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye and the EU can cooperate on areas of shared in – terest in Africa such as green transitions, climate change mitigation, peace process es, and security cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism. Both parties should strive to maintain a collaborative approach that avoids undermining each other\u2019s partnerships on the continent.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Avrupa Mali Sermayesi, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin D\u00fcnyada Elinde Tuttu\u011fu Kartlar\u0131 Nas\u0131l G\u00f6r\u00fcyor  AB\u2019nin T\u00fcrkiye Politikas\u0131 \u0130\u00e7in Tavsiyeler ve Potansiyel S\u00fcrt\u00fc\u015fme Alanlar\u0131 AB G\u00fcvenlik Ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar\u0131 Enstit\u00fcs\u00fc Raporu\u2026 The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) taraf\u0131ndan ayn\u0131 ba\u015fl\u0131kla yay\u0131mlanan raporun y\u00f6netici \u00f6zeti b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fc \u00e7evirisidir. \u00c7eviren: Zeki KAYA Y\u00f6netici \u00d6zeti T\u00fcrkiye’nin d\u00fcnyan\u0131n \u00e7e\u015fitli b\u00f6lgelerindeki etkisi geni\u015flemi\u015ftir. Bu durum, sadece […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4039","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-turkiye-sosyalizmi"],"blocksy_meta":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4039","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=4039"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4039\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4040,"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4039\/revisions\/4040"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=4039"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=4039"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=4039"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}