{"id":5351,"date":"2025-04-07T12:10:22","date_gmt":"2025-04-07T12:10:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/?p=5351"},"modified":"2025-04-07T12:55:53","modified_gmt":"2025-04-07T12:55:53","slug":"akp-hukumeti-iran-ile-iliskileri-iran-karsiti-bir-savasa-destek-duzeyine-cikarir-mi","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/?p=5351","title":{"rendered":"AKP H\u00fck\u00fcmeti \u0130ran ile \u0130li\u015fkileri \u0130ran Kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 Bir Sava\u015fa Destek D\u00fczeyine \u00c7\u0131kar\u0131r M\u0131?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

AKP H\u00fck\u00fcmeti \u0130ran ile \u0130li\u015fkileri \u0130ran Kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 Bir Sava\u015fa Destek D\u00fczeyine \u00c7\u0131kar\u0131r M\u0131?<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

\u0130smet Horasanl\u0131- AKP\u2019ye yak\u0131n SETA Think Tank Uzman\u0131<\/strong>, Ocak 2025<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye-\u0130ran \u0130li\u015fkilerinde 2024 Y\u0131l\u0131nda Neler Oldu?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ba\u015fl\u0131k bize aittir. Orijinali bu rapordan al\u0131nm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. https:\/\/www.setav.org\/assets\/uploads\/2025\/01\/r257.pdf<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Suriye\u2019de, \u0130ran destekli Esad rejimi devrildi ve muhalefet iktidara geldi. Yeni y\u00f6netim, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye daha yak\u0131n politikalar izlemeye ba\u015flad\u0131.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Irak politikas\u0131nda \u00f6nemli geli\u015fmeler ya\u015fand\u0131. Kalk\u0131nma Yolu Projesi\u2019nde ciddi ilerleme kaydedildi ve ter\u00f6rle m\u00fccadele konusunda bir anla\u015fmaya var\u0131ld\u0131.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Zengezur Koridoru \u00fczerindeki m\u00fczakereler devam etti. \u0130ran, bu projeye kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0130ran\u2019\u0131n n\u00fckleer program\u0131 yeniden g\u00fcndeme geldi. KOEP\u2019e taraf olan AB \u00fclkeleri, \u0130ran\u2019\u0131 \u201ctetik mekanizmas\u0131\u201d ile tehdit etti.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

G\u0130R\u0130\u015e<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

AKP H\u00fck\u00fcmeti \u0130ran ile \u0130htiyatl\u0131 Kom\u015fuluk ve B\u00f6lgesel Rekabet Politikas\u0131n\u0131 s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmeye devam edecek. T\u00fcrkiye ve \u0130ran, Ortado\u011fu b\u00f6lgesinin tarihsel, k\u00fclt\u00fcrel ve devlet gelene\u011fi a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan en \u00f6nemli \u00fclkelerinden ikisidir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0130ki \u00fclke aras\u0131nda tarihsel benzerlikler oldu\u011fu kadar b\u00f6lgesel jeopolitik rekabet de bulunmaktad\u0131r. Bu nedenle Ortado\u011fu\u2019daki b\u00f6lgesel de\u011fi\u015fimler, iki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki ili\u015fkileri do\u011frudan veya dolayl\u0131 olarak etkilemektedir. Bunun yan\u0131 s\u0131ra \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n k\u00fcresel akt\u00f6rlerle ili\u015fkileri de iki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki rekabet ve i\u015f birli\u011fi dinamiklerini \u015fekillendirmektedir. B\u00f6lgesel d\u00fczeyde Irak\u2019taki geli\u015fmeler, Suriye\u2019deki rejim de\u011fi\u015fikli\u011fi ve Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131 Nah\u00e7\u0131van\u2019a ba\u011flayan Zengezur Koridoru jeopolitik a\u00e7\u0131dan \u00f6nemli olup her iki \u00fclkeyi de yak\u0131ndan ilgilendirmektedir. Buna ek olarak Bat\u0131 ile \u0130ran aras\u0131ndaki ihtilaf\u0131n \u00fc\u00e7 ana dinami\u011fi bulunmaktad\u0131r: \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n n\u00fckleer program\u0131, f\u00fcze program\u0131 ve \u0130ran destekli milisler. Bat\u0131 ile \u0130ran aras\u0131nda devam eden gerilimlerde T\u00fcrkiye temkinli ve ihtiyatl\u0131 bir d\u0131\u015f politika benimsemi\u015f; \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n n\u00fckleer program\u0131 ve bu program nedeniyle uygulanan yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar konusunda net bir duru\u015f sergilerken di\u011fer iki meselenin ise m\u00fcmk\u00fcn oldu\u011funca d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda kalmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

ANA DINAMIKLER<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Irak: Kalk\u0131nma Yolu Projesi ve Ter\u00f6rle M\u00fccadele<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye \u00f6nc\u00fcl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcndeki \u201cKalk\u0131nma Yolu Projesi\u201d, Basra K\u00f6rfezi\u2019ni T\u00fcrkiye \u00fczerinden Avrupa\u2019ya bir otoyol ve demir yolu a\u011f\u0131yla ba\u011flayacakt\u0131r. Bu proje ayn\u0131 zamanda Basra, Ba\u011fdat ve Musul gibi T\u00fcrkiye ile g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc tarihsel ba\u011flara sahip \u015fehirleri birbirine ba\u011flayacakt\u0131r. Buna ek olarak hatt\u0131n b\u00f6lge i\u00e7in son derece \u00f6nemli olan Kerbela ve Necef gibi \u015fehirlerden ge\u00e7mesi, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin tarihsel ba\u011flar\u0131na dayal\u0131 yumu\u015fak g\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fc b\u00f6lgede \u00f6nemli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde art\u0131racakt\u0131r. Bu ba\u011flamda T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Irak\u2019taki farkl\u0131 toplumsal kesimlerde \u00f6nemli bir etki sahibi oldu\u011fu ger\u00e7e\u011fi g\u00f6z ard\u0131 edilmemelidir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

K\u00fclt\u00fcrel meselelerin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra Kalk\u0131nma Yolu Projesi T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye \u00f6nemli ekonomik faydalar da sa\u011flayabilir. Projenin tamamlanmas\u0131yla birlikte T\u00fcrkiye ile Irak aras\u0131ndaki \u015fu anda yakla\u015f\u0131k 20 milyar dolar olan ticaret hacminin 30-40 milyar dolara ula\u015faca\u011f\u0131 tahmin edilmektedir ki bu da T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Irak pazarlar\u0131nda daha aktif bir rol oynamas\u0131na olanak tan\u0131yacakt\u0131r. Bu do\u011frultuda 2024 olduk\u00e7a hareketli bir y\u0131l olmu\u015ftur. 22 Nisan 2024\u2019te Cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 Erdo\u011fan on \u00fc\u00e7 y\u0131l aradan sonra Irak\u2019a ilk ziyaretini ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirmi\u015f ve bu ziyaret s\u0131ras\u0131nda Kalk\u0131nma Yolu Projesi\u2019ne ili\u015fkin bir mutabakat zapt\u0131 imzalanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.1<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Benzer \u015fekilde 29 A\u011fustos 2024\u2019te projenin taraflar\u0131 olan Irak, T\u00fcrkiye, Katar ve Birle\u015fik Arap Emirlikleri (BAE) aras\u0131nda \u0130stanbul\u2019da bakanlar zirvesi ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilmi\u015ftir.2<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ayr\u0131ca T\u00fcrkiye ve Irak aras\u0131nda ter\u00f6rle m\u00fccadele konusunda \u00f6nemli anla\u015fmalar imzalanm\u0131\u015f ve \u00fcst d\u00fczey g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeler yap\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. 14 Mart\u2019ta T\u00fcrkiye Genelkurmay Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Ya\u015far G\u00fcler, Milli \u0130stihbarat Te\u015fkilat\u0131 (M\u0130T) Ba\u015fkan\u0131 \u0130brahim Kal\u0131n ve D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan\u0131 Hakan Fidan\u2019\u0131n Ba\u011fdat\u2019a yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 ziyaret bunun bir g\u00f6stergesidir.3<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Irak \u00fczerindeki etkisi ise giderek azalmakta ve Irak\u2019taki \u015eii dini liderler Tahran\u2019\u0131 ele\u015ftirmektedir. Bir zamanlar \u0130ran yanl\u0131s\u0131 \u00f6nemli bir lider olan Mukteda Sadr\u2019\u0131n, \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Irak\u2019taki m\u00fcdahalelerini ele\u015ftirmesi ve Esed rejiminin d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f\u00fcne y\u00f6nelik olumlu yorumlar\u0131 bunun \u00f6rneklerindendir.4<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 giri\u015fimlerine ra\u011fmen Tahran\u2019\u0131n etkisinin kademeli olarak azalmas\u0131, \u0130ran i\u00e7inde de ele\u015ftirilere yol a\u00e7m\u0131\u015f ve \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n \u00f6zellikle T\u00fcrkiye ve Suudi Arabistan gibi kom\u015fular\u0131n\u0131n gerisinde kald\u0131\u011f\u0131na dair de\u011ferlendirmeler yap\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Kalk\u0131nma Yolu Projesi de bu ele\u015ftirilerde \u00f6rnek olarak g\u00f6sterilmektedir.5<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan bu proje bir b\u00f6lgesel \u00fcst\u00fcnl\u00fck perspektifi olarak de\u011fil b\u00f6lge \u00fclkeleri aras\u0131ndaki i\u015f birli\u011fini art\u0131rmak i\u00e7in bir s\u0131\u00e7rama tahtas\u0131 olarak g\u00f6r\u00fclmektedir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Suriye: Rejim De\u011fi\u015fikli\u011fi<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye, Suriye ile 911 kilometrelik en uzun s\u0131n\u0131ra sahip kom\u015fusu olmas\u0131n\u0131n yan\u0131 s\u0131ra on \u00fc\u00e7 y\u0131l s\u00fcren i\u00e7 sava\u015f nedeniyle en fazla say\u0131da Suriyeli m\u00fclteciye ev sahipli\u011fi yapan \u00fclke durumundad\u0131r. Ancak uzun y\u0131llard\u0131r Suriye\u2019de iktidarda olan Baas rejimi, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019den uzakla\u015fm\u0131\u015f ve \u00fclkeyi \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n askeri ve siyasi manevra alan\u0131na d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcrm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. \u00d6yle ki \u0130ran, rejimi desteklemekle kalmam\u0131\u015f, ayn\u0131 zamanda do\u011frudan \u0130ran\u2019dan e\u011fitimli milis gruplar\u0131n\u0131 Suriye\u2019ye g\u00f6ndermi\u015f ve baz\u0131 durumlarda dan\u0131\u015fmanl\u0131k ad\u0131 alt\u0131nda \u00fcst d\u00fczey komutanlar\u0131n\u0131 b\u00f6lgede tutmu\u015ftur. Bu milisler zaman zaman T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye kar\u015f\u0131 faaliyetlerde de bulunmu\u015ftur. T\u00fcm bunlara ra\u011fmen T\u00fcrkiye, Esed rejimini m\u00fczakerelere davet etmi\u015f ve \u00f6zellikle m\u00fclteciler ve s\u0131n\u0131r g\u00fcvenli\u011fi konular\u0131ndaki g\u00fcvenlik endi\u015felerini bar\u0131\u015f\u00e7\u0131l yollarla \u00e7\u00f6zmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin bu tutumu, Esed rejiminin muhalifleri taraf\u0131ndan bile sert tepkilerle kar\u015f\u0131lanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ancak Esed rejimi uzla\u015fma \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131lar\u0131na yan\u0131t vermedi\u011finde T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin muhalefeti daha fazla tutmas\u0131n\u0131n bir nedeni kalmam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. B\u00f6ylece muhalefet \u0130dlib\u2019den hareket ederek on bir g\u00fcn i\u00e7inde \u015eam\u2019da iktidar\u0131 ele ge\u00e7irmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bu geli\u015fme b\u00f6lge i\u00e7in bir d\u00f6n\u00fcm noktas\u0131 olarak tarihe ge\u00e7mi\u015f ve hem ulusal hem de b\u00f6lgesel d\u00fczeylerde \u00f6nemli de\u011fi\u015fiklikler getirmi\u015ftir. Bir yandan elli \u00fc\u00e7 y\u0131ll\u0131k Baas rejimi sona ererken di\u011fer yandan da Suriye\u2019yi \u201cstratejik derinli\u011fi\u201d olarak tan\u0131mlayan \u0130ran, bu \u00fclke \u00fczerindeki etkisini kaybetmi\u015ftir.6<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

 Bu arada T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin etkisi, T\u00fcrkiye yanl\u0131s\u0131 politikalar izleyen muhalif gruplar\u0131n iktidara gelmesiyle do\u011fal olarak artm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. B\u00f6ylece Esed\u2019in yerini muhalefetin almas\u0131yla T\u00fcrkiye ve \u0130ran b\u00f6lgesel jeopolitik etki a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan yer de\u011fi\u015ftirmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

G\u00fcney Kafkasya: Zengezur Koridoru<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Zengezur Koridoru, T\u00fcrkiye ve \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n iki b\u00f6lgesel g\u00fc\u00e7 olarak kar\u015f\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131ya geldi\u011fi bir di\u011fer \u00f6nemli konu olmu\u015ftur. \u0130ran, koridorun in\u015fas\u0131na son derece olumsuz tepki vermi\u015f ve benzer bir ge\u00e7i\u015fin kendi topraklar\u0131 \u00fczerinden sa\u011flanmas\u0131ndan yana olmu\u015ftur. \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n koridorun a\u00e7\u0131lmas\u0131na y\u00f6nelik olumsuz tepkisinin iki ana nedeni vard\u0131r. Bunlardan ilki \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Ermenistan ile s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131n\u0131 ve dolay\u0131s\u0131yla G\u00fcney Kafkasya ile ba\u011flant\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 kaybetmek istememesidir. Bu ba\u011flamda \u0130ran, meseleyi co\u011frafi s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131n\u0131n korunmas\u0131 olarak yorumlamaktad\u0131r. Ancak koridor Ermenistan topraklar\u0131ndan ge\u00e7ti\u011fi i\u00e7in ortada hukuki a\u00e7\u0131dan \u0130ran\u2019\u0131 ba\u011flayan bir durum bulunmamaktad\u0131r. \u0130kincisi \u0130ran b\u00f6lgesel bir rakip olarak g\u00f6rd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin artan etkisini ve T\u00fcrk cumhuriyetlerine do\u011frudan ba\u011flanmas\u0131n\u0131 olumsuz bir geli\u015fme olarak de\u011ferlendirmektedir. Bu duruma hukuki bir gerek\u00e7e bulamayan \u0130ran \u201cJeopolitik de\u011fi\u015fim bizim k\u0131rm\u0131z\u0131 \u00e7izgimizdir\u201d s\u00f6ylemini geli\u015ftirmi\u015ftir.7<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ancak sahadaki ger\u00e7eklik \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n k\u0131rm\u0131z\u0131 \u00e7izgilerine de\u011fil uluslararas\u0131 hukuk ve anla\u015fmalara dayanmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0130ran\u2019\u0131n N\u00fckleer Program\u0131<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

 \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n n\u00fckleer program\u0131, ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta ABD taraf\u0131ndan \u201cBar\u0131\u015f i\u00e7in Atomlar\u201d program\u0131 kapsam\u0131nda ba\u015flat\u0131lm\u0131\u015f olsa da g\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fczde iki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki en \u00f6nemli ihtilaflardan biri haline gelmi\u015ftir. Bu ba\u011flamda \u0130ran ile Birle\u015fmi\u015f Milletler G\u00fcvenlik Konseyi\u2019nin (BMGK) be\u015f daimi \u00fcyesi ve ilaveten Almanya aras\u0131nda yap\u0131lan, Kapsaml\u0131 Ortak Eylem Plan\u0131 (KOEP) olarak bilinen ve iki y\u0131ll\u0131k m\u00fczakerelerin ard\u0131ndan imzalanan anla\u015fma \u00f6nemlidir. Bu anla\u015fma uyar\u0131nca \u0130ran n\u00fckleer faaliyetlerini yaln\u0131zca bar\u0131\u015f\u00e7\u0131l ama\u00e7larla ve uluslararas\u0131 g\u00fcvenli\u011fi tehdit etmeyecek \u015fekilde BM denetimi alt\u0131nda s\u00fcrd\u00fcrecektir. Bunun kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131nda Tahran\u2019a uygulanan ambargolar belirli bir s\u00fcre ask\u0131ya al\u0131nacak ve \u0130ran y\u00fck\u00fcml\u00fcl\u00fcklerini tam olarak yerine getirirse tamamen kald\u0131r\u0131lacakt\u0131r. AB ve BM yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131n ask\u0131ya al\u0131nmas\u0131, 18 Ekim 2025\u2019te sona erecek olan BM-2231 karar\u0131yla g\u00fcvence alt\u0131na al\u0131nm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.8<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Buna g\u00f6re KOEP taraflar\u0131ndan biri \u201ctetik mekanizmas\u0131n\u0131\u201d devreye sokmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u00fcrece BM yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131 18 Ekim 2025\u2019e kadar ask\u0131da kalacak ve sonras\u0131nda tamamen kald\u0131r\u0131lacakt\u0131r. Di\u011fer bir deyi\u015fle KOEP\u2019in Avrupal\u0131 taraflar\u0131n\u0131n yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131 yeniden uygulamak i\u00e7in yaln\u0131zca 18 Ekim 2025\u2019e kadar s\u00fcreleri bulunmaktad\u0131r. T\u00fcrkiye, \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n n\u00fckleer program\u0131 konusunda her zaman net bir pozisyona sahip olmu\u015ftur. Buna g\u00f6re T\u00fcrkiye bir yandan \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n n\u00fckleer program\u0131n\u0131n bar\u0131\u015f\u00e7\u0131l ama\u00e7larla kullan\u0131lmas\u0131 gerekti\u011fini vurgulam\u0131\u015f di\u011fer yandan bu konuda \u0130ran\u2019a kar\u015f\u0131 ayr\u0131mc\u0131l\u0131k yap\u0131lmas\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin resmi pozisyonuna g\u00f6re bar\u0131\u015f\u00e7\u0131l olmayan ama\u00e7larla geli\u015ftirilen bir n\u00fckleer program\u0131n engellenmesi gerekmekteyse de bu yakla\u015f\u0131m yaln\u0131zca \u0130ran\u2019a y\u00f6nelik \u00e7ifte standart olarak uygulanmamal\u0131d\u0131r. Nitekim Cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 Erdo\u011fan 2018\u2019de yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir konu\u015fmada \u0130ran\u2019a uygulanan ambargolar\u0131n do\u011fru olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ve bunun d\u00fcnyadaki dengeyi istikrars\u0131zla\u015ft\u0131rd\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ifade etmi\u015ftir.9<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye, \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n n\u00fckleer program\u0131 \u00fczerindeki ihtilafa kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmac\u0131 bir yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131 da desteklememekte ve b\u00f6yle bir yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131n b\u00f6lgesel istikrars\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131 daha da art\u0131raca\u011f\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fc savunmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 2025 \u00d6NG\u00d6R\u00dcLER\u0130<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

 2024\u2019teki geli\u015fmelere paralel olarak \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n b\u00f6lgedeki faaliyetleri, n\u00fckleer program\u0131, Zengezur Koridoru\u2019na y\u00f6nelik politikas\u0131 ve Kalk\u0131nma Yolu\u2019na yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131 2025\u2019te de g\u00fcndemde kalmaya devam edecektir. Bu ba\u011flamda Suriye\u2019deki yeni d\u00f6nem, \u0130ran i\u00e7in k\u0131sa vadede telafi edilemeyecek bir kay\u0131pt\u0131r. Nitekim \u0130ranl\u0131 yetkililer, Suriye\u2019yi \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n stratejik derinli\u011fi olarak nitelendirmektedir. Dolay\u0131s\u0131yla \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n kendisi i\u00e7in bu kadar \u00f6nemli bir \u00fclkeden vazge\u00e7mesi olas\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fcnmemektedir. Bu nedenle \u0130ran, yeni Suriye h\u00fck\u00fcmeti ile bir anla\u015fma yapma dahil farkl\u0131 yollar deneyecektir. Ayr\u0131ca bu y\u00f6nde T\u00fcrkiye\u2019den arabuluculuk yapmas\u0131n\u0131 talep etmesi de muhtemeldir. T\u00fcrkiye ise b\u00f6lgeye y\u00f6nelik \u201cortak duru\u015f\u201d politikas\u0131 \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde \u0130ran\u2019\u0131 d\u0131\u015flamak istememektedir. Ancak ge\u00e7mi\u015f deneyimlerine dayanarak \u0130ran\u2019a kar\u015f\u0131 temkinli bir tutum benimseyecektir. B\u00f6lgesel jeopolitik a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6neme sahip di\u011fer iki konu ise Zengezur Koridoru ve Kalk\u0131nma Yolu Projesi\u2019dir. \u0130ran, do\u011fal s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131n\u0131n de\u011fi\u015fece\u011fine ve Kafkasya ile ba\u011flant\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n kesilece\u011fine inand\u0131\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in Zengezur Koridoru\u2019na kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kmaktad\u0131r. \u00d6te yandan koridorun \u0130ran\u2019\u0131 baypas ederek T\u00fcrkiye\u2019yi do\u011frudan T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetleri ile ba\u011flayacak olmas\u0131 da \u0130ran taraf\u0131ndan ho\u015f kar\u015f\u0131lanmamaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mevcut durumda T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin T\u00fcrk cumhuriyetleri ve Rusya ile kara ba\u011flant\u0131s\u0131 b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde \u0130ran \u00fczerinden ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmektedir. Bu durum \u0130ran\u2019a bu ba\u011flant\u0131 hatlar\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6zlemleme imkan\u0131 verdi\u011fi gibi ekonomik olarak da fayda sa\u011flamaktad\u0131r. \u0130ran, koridorun a\u00e7\u0131lmas\u0131yla ya\u015fayaca\u011f\u0131 ekonomik kayb\u0131 kabul etmemekte ve bu siyasi denklemin d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda b\u0131rak\u0131lmay\u0131 tolere etmemektedir. Bu nedenle 3+3 m\u00fczakere format\u0131 gibi platformlara b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6nem vermektedir. 2025\u2019te \u0130ran benzer \u015fekilde koridorun k\u0131smen kendi topraklar\u0131ndan ge\u00e7mesini \u00f6nererek ve s\u00fcreci m\u00fczakerelerle uzatarak bir rol \u00e7almaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015facakt\u0131r. Bu sayede hem bu denklem d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda kalmam\u0131\u015f olacak hem de di\u011fer \u00e7ekincelerini a\u015fabilecektir. Ancak bu t\u00fcr \u00f6nerilerin di\u011fer taraflarca kabul edilip edilmeyece\u011fi bir soru i\u015faretidir. Zengezur Koridoru\u2019nun aksine \u0130ran, Kalk\u0131nma Yolu Projesi\u2019ne kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kmamaktad\u0131r. \u0130ran, H\u00fcrm\u00fcz Bo\u011faz\u0131 \u00fczerindeki hakimiyeti sayesinde transit ge\u00e7i\u015fleri kontrol edebilmekte ve ayn\u0131 zamanda projenin sunabilece\u011fi potansiyel i\u015f birli\u011fi ve f\u0131rsatlar\u0131 hesaba katmaktad\u0131r. Ayr\u0131ca \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n bir par\u00e7as\u0131 oldu\u011fu, Hindistan\u2019dan Rusya ve Avrupa\u2019ya \u0130ran \u00fczerinden ge\u00e7en Uluslararas\u0131 Kuzey-G\u00fcney Ula\u015ft\u0131rma Koridoru\u2019nun (INSTC) mevcut ko\u015fullarda i\u015flevsel olmas\u0131 pek m\u00fcmk\u00fcn g\u00f6r\u00fcnmemektedir.10<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bu nedenle Kalk\u0131nma Yolu Projesi\u2019ne engel te\u015fkil eden bir durum bulunmamakta ve B\u00fcy\u00fck Faw Liman\u0131\u2019n\u0131n 2025\u2019e kadar tamamlanmas\u0131n\u0131n projenin di\u011fer ayaklar\u0131nda \u00f6nemli ilerlemelere yol a\u00e7mas\u0131 beklenmektedir. Dolay\u0131s\u0131yla Kalk\u0131nma Yolu Projesi, 2025\u2019te Ankara ve Tahran aras\u0131nda i\u015f birli\u011fine dayal\u0131 bir ili\u015fkiye zemin haz\u0131rlayabilir. 2025\u2019te \u0130ran g\u00fcndeminde yer alacak bir di\u011fer konu, \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n n\u00fckleer program\u0131 olacakt\u0131r. Bunun nedeni, \u0130ran\u2019a y\u00f6nelik BM yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131 ask\u0131ya alan BM\u2019nin 2231 say\u0131l\u0131 karar\u0131n\u0131n Ekim 2025\u2019te sona erecek ve bu tarihe kadar KOEP\u2019e taraf \u00fclkelerden birinin tetikleme mekanizmas\u0131n\u0131 devreye sokmamas\u0131 durumunda BM ambargolar\u0131n\u0131n tamamen kald\u0131r\u0131lacak olmas\u0131d\u0131r. Bu nedenle, Ekim 2025\u2019e kadar AB ile \u0130ran aras\u0131nda n\u00fckleer mesele konusunda yo\u011fun bir diplomasi y\u00fcr\u00fct\u00fclecektir. \u00d6te yandan, yeni Trump y\u00f6netiminin \u0130ran konusunda benimseyece\u011fi politika da \u0130ran g\u00fcndeminde yo\u011fun bir \u015fekilde yer alacakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Trump\u2019a g\u00f6re, \u0130ran ile yap\u0131lacak bir anla\u015fma \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n n\u00fckleer program\u0131n\u0131, balistik f\u00fczelerini ve b\u00f6lgedeki milis g\u00fc\u00e7lerini s\u00fcresiz olarak kapsamal\u0131d\u0131r. B\u00f6yle bir anla\u015fmaya var\u0131lamamas\u0131 durumunda Trump\u2019\u0131n, \u0130ran\u2019a y\u00f6nelik \u201cmaksimum bask\u0131\u201d politikas\u0131na geri d\u00f6nerek sert ekonomik yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar uygulamas\u0131 olas\u0131d\u0131r. Buna kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k, \u0130ran KOEP\u2019i yeniden canland\u0131rmaya veya benzer bir anla\u015fma yapmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015facakt\u0131r. E\u011fer bunu ba\u015faramazsa zaman kazanmaya ve Trump d\u00f6nemini minimum hasarla atlatmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015facakt\u0131r. Bu do\u011frultuda, mevcut konjonkt\u00fcr\u00fcn devam etmesi, T\u00fcrkiye-\u0130ran ticaret hacmi a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan olumlu bir durum olarak de\u011ferlendirilmektedir. ABD\u2019nin yapt\u0131r\u0131m uygulamas\u0131na ra\u011fmen AB ve BM yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131n ask\u0131ya al\u0131nmas\u0131 nedeniyle iki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki ticaret hacmi olumlu bir seyir izlemi\u015ftir. Ancak AB ve BM yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131n yeniden devreye girmesi durumunda T\u00fcrkiye-\u0130ran ticari ili\u015fkileri bundan olumsuz y\u00f6nde etkilenecektir. Ayr\u0131ca maksimum bask\u0131 politikas\u0131n\u0131n yol a\u00e7aca\u011f\u0131 ekonomik zorluklar nedeniyle \u0130ran\u2019dan T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye y\u00f6nelik olas\u0131 bir g\u00f6\u00e7 art\u0131\u015f\u0131 da olumsuz bir durum olarak nitelendirilmektedir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n n\u00fckleer program\u0131na y\u00f6nelik tutumu de\u011fi\u015fmeyecektir. T\u00fcrkiye, yaln\u0131zca bar\u0131\u015f\u00e7\u0131l ama\u00e7lar ta\u015f\u0131mayan n\u00fckleer programlara de\u011fil ayn\u0131 zamanda bu t\u00fcr programlardan kaynakl\u0131 tedbirlerin yaln\u0131zca \u0130ran\u2019a uygulanmas\u0131na da kar\u015f\u0131d\u0131r. Ayr\u0131ca T\u00fcrkiye, \u0130ran\u2019a y\u00f6nelik yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131 onaylamamakta ve askeri m\u00fcdahalenin bir \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fc savunmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n\n\n

  1. Timour Azhari, Ece Toksabay ve Ahmed Rasheed, \u201cIraq and T\u00fcrkiye to Elevate Security, Economic Ties after Erdogan Visit\u201d, Reuters, 22 Nisan 2024. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  2. Bilgay Duman, \u201cKalk\u0131nma Yolu Projesi Umut Veriyor\u201d, Anadolu Ajans\u0131, 31 A\u011fustos 2024. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  3. \u201cSay\u0131n Bakan\u0131m\u0131z\u0131n Irak Cumhuriyeti\u2019ne Ziyareti\u201d, T.C. D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131, 14 Mart 2024, https:\/\/ www.mfa.gov.tr\/sayin-bakanimizin-irak-cumhuriyeti-ni-ziyareti–14-mart-2024–bagdat.tr.mfa, (Eri\u015fim tarihi: 12 Ocak 2025). \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  4. \u201cMukteda Sadr: Muntazeer-e tashkeel-e dovlat-e demokratic dar Suriya hastim.\u201d BBC News Farsi, X, 9 Aral\u0131k 2024, https:\/\/x.com\/bbcpersian\/status\/1866122812919881798, (Eri\u015fim tarihi: 12 Ocak 2025). \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  5. Hoda Ahmadi, \u201cAkab Oftaden az Hamsayeh\u201d, Tejaret-e Farda, 16 Kas\u0131m 2024, https:\/\/www.tejaratefarda.com\/fa\/tiny\/news-48132, (Eri\u015fim tarihi: 12 Ocak 2025). \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  6. \u0130smet Horasanl\u0131, \u201c\u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Suriye\u2019de Kaybettikleri ve Olas\u0131l\u0131klar\u201d, Sabah, 11 Ocak 2025. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  7. Mohammad Jamshidi, X, 9 Eyl\u00fcl 2023, https:\/\/x.com\/MhmmdJamshidi\/status\/170047332655 0839478, (Eri\u015fim tarihi: 12 Ocak 2025). \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  8. \u201cResolution 2231 (2015) on Iran Nuclear Issue\u201d, United Nation, https:\/\/main-un-org.translate. goog\/securitycouncil\/en\/content\/2231\/background?_x_tr_sl=en&_x_tr_tl=tr&_x_tr_hl=tr&_x_tr_ pto=tc, (Eri\u015fim tarihi: 12 Ocak 2025). \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  9. \u201cCumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 Erdo\u011fan: \u0130ran Yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131 Do\u011fru Bulmuyoruz\u201d, Anadolu Ajans\u0131, 6 Kas\u0131m 2018. \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li>
  10. Umud Shokri, \u201cNorth-South Transporot Corridor: Iran-Russia New Railway to Circumvent Western Pressure\u201d, Gulf International Forum, https:\/\/gulfif.org\/north-south-transport-corridor-iran-russia-new-railway-to-circumvent-western-pressure, (Eri\u015fim tarihi: 12 Ocak 2025). \u21a9\ufe0e<\/a><\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n

    <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    AKP H\u00fck\u00fcmeti \u0130ran ile \u0130li\u015fkileri \u0130ran Kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 Bir Sava\u015fa Destek D\u00fczeyine \u00c7\u0131kar\u0131r M\u0131? \u0130smet Horasanl\u0131- AKP\u2019ye yak\u0131n SETA Think Tank Uzman\u0131, Ocak 2025 T\u00fcrkiye-\u0130ran \u0130li\u015fkilerinde 2024 Y\u0131l\u0131nda Neler Oldu? Ba\u015fl\u0131k bize aittir. Orijinali bu rapordan al\u0131nm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. https:\/\/www.setav.org\/assets\/uploads\/2025\/01\/r257.pdf Suriye\u2019de, \u0130ran destekli Esad rejimi devrildi ve muhalefet iktidara geldi. Yeni y\u00f6netim, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye daha yak\u0131n politikalar izlemeye ba\u015flad\u0131. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":"[{\"content\":\"Timour Azhari, Ece Toksabay ve Ahmed Rasheed, \u201cIraq and T\u00fcrkiye to Elevate Security, Economic Ties after Erdogan Visit\u201d, Reuters, 22 Nisan 2024.\",\"id\":\"82bb6494-3cd4-4fea-9b9e-3b325c9ace06\"},{\"content\":\"Bilgay Duman, \u201cKalk\u0131nma Yolu Projesi Umut Veriyor\u201d, Anadolu Ajans\u0131, 31 A\u011fustos 2024.\",\"id\":\"c8e8a1ef-3f62-4121-a5f4-2f4fb7a432a7\"},{\"content\":\"\u201cSay\u0131n Bakan\u0131m\u0131z\u0131n Irak Cumhuriyeti\u2019ne Ziyareti\u201d, T.C. D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131, 14 Mart 2024, https:\/\/ www.mfa.gov.tr\/sayin-bakanimizin-irak-cumhuriyeti-ni-ziyareti--14-mart-2024--bagdat.tr.mfa, (Eri\u015fim tarihi: 12 Ocak 2025).\",\"id\":\"f5ad3945-6b27-4b00-9397-a2babe3de9e1\"},{\"content\":\"\u201cMukteda Sadr: Muntazeer-e tashkeel-e dovlat-e demokratic dar Suriya hastim.\u201d BBC News Farsi, X, 9 Aral\u0131k 2024, https:\/\/x.com\/bbcpersian\/status\/1866122812919881798, (Eri\u015fim tarihi: 12 Ocak 2025).\",\"id\":\"2e1d469d-f9d0-43af-981a-afe26516c204\"},{\"content\":\"Hoda Ahmadi, \u201cAkab Oftaden az Hamsayeh\u201d, Tejaret-e Farda, 16 Kas\u0131m 2024, https:\/\/www.tejaratefarda.com\/fa\/tiny\/news-48132, (Eri\u015fim tarihi: 12 Ocak 2025).\",\"id\":\"35a41d2f-ede3-4e3c-971a-e334453f54f5\"},{\"content\":\"\u0130smet Horasanl\u0131, \u201c\u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Suriye\u2019de Kaybettikleri ve Olas\u0131l\u0131klar\u201d, Sabah, 11 Ocak 2025.\",\"id\":\"07b45618-84e9-4dcb-98da-03751a42018c\"},{\"content\":\"Mohammad Jamshidi, X, 9 Eyl\u00fcl 2023, https:\/\/x.com\/MhmmdJamshidi\/status\/170047332655 0839478, (Eri\u015fim tarihi: 12 Ocak 2025).\",\"id\":\"6c70aaf2-36fb-41a5-a150-c30e2a0d493e\"},{\"content\":\"\u201cResolution 2231 (2015) on Iran Nuclear Issue\u201d, United Nation, https:\/\/main-un-org.translate. goog\/securitycouncil\/en\/content\/2231\/background?_x_tr_sl=en&_x_tr_tl=tr&_x_tr_hl=tr&_x_tr_ pto=tc, (Eri\u015fim tarihi: 12 Ocak 2025).\",\"id\":\"b116a452-f915-48db-b2c6-9fe82920d55d\"},{\"content\":\"\u201cCumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 Erdo\u011fan: \u0130ran Yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131 Do\u011fru Bulmuyoruz\u201d, Anadolu Ajans\u0131, 6 Kas\u0131m 2018.\",\"id\":\"31eea806-3ae9-4aa3-bc9b-58e25df73eb4\"},{\"content\":\"Umud Shokri, \u201cNorth-South Transporot Corridor: Iran-Russia New Railway to Circumvent Western Pressure\u201d, Gulf International Forum, https:\/\/gulfif.org\/north-south-transport-corridor-iran-russia-new-railway-to-circumvent-western-pressure, (Eri\u015fim tarihi: 12 Ocak 2025).\",\"id\":\"d9c24c31-3fb0-4476-87b1-552c6c0c5569\"}]"},"categories":[49,20,51,5,45,4,53],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5351","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-arsiv-tr","category-arsiv","category-dunya-sosyalizmi-tr","category-dunya-sosyalizmi","category-genel-tr","category-turkiye-sosyalizmi","category-turkiye-sosyalizmi-tr"],"blocksy_meta":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5351","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=5351"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5351\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5363,"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5351\/revisions\/5363"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=5351"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=5351"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=5351"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}