{"id":5719,"date":"2025-08-13T06:13:11","date_gmt":"2025-08-13T06:13:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/?p=5719"},"modified":"2025-08-13T20:26:08","modified_gmt":"2025-08-13T20:26:08","slug":"five-major-changes-unseen-in-a-century-china-and-usa-has-become-two-poles-of-the-world","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/?p=5719&lang=en","title":{"rendered":"Five Major Changes Unseen in a Century: China and USA has Become Two Poles of the World"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Five Major Changes Unseen in a Century: China and USA has Become Two Poles of the World<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

The International Landscape  has Changed From a “one superpower and multiple strong powers” to a “two poles and multiple strong powers”<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

The Integration Process of the Global Capitalist System Has Broken and the liberal “world order” has fallen into an unprecedented predicament.<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

June\u00a0 2024<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The author <\/strong>Yan Yilong<\/strong> is an associate professor at the School of Public Administration at Tsinghua University and vice president of the Institute of National Conditions Research at Tsinghua University<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Summary<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The “two-poles and multiple- strong powers” pattern does not mean that there will be a co-governance ( cooperative) pattern between China and the United States like the G2, but instead there may occur a world governance system in which China and the United States compete with each other, check and balance each other, engage in high-intensity game, and at the same time rely on and complement each other. This is a bit like the “two-pole connected” global order that Marx and Engels talked about back then.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The great economic convergence is accompanied by the collective renaissance of non-Western civilizations, transforming non-Western countries from recipients of the world system into co-builders. This is the process by which different civilizations of the world achieve true universality through equal exchange and dialogue, rather than a universality disguised as Westernness. It is also the process by which non-Western civilizations, non-Western countries, and non-Western peoples acquire subjectivity in world history. Once this latent, suppressed, and marginalized subjectivity is revived, we  will undoubtedly usher in a new era in human history.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Text Begins Here<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The grand strategic game between China and the United States, amidst a transformation unseen in a century, determines the trajectory of Sino-US relations and the strategic competition between them. While this strategic competition presents a formidable challenge we must confront, both time and momentum are on China’s side. China is not only capitalizing on this trend but also shaping this trend. China’s development and strategic choices themselves constitute the inherent variables of this transformation unseen in century. This transformation unseen in a century is a multifaceted process, a composite of decades, centuries, and centuries of change.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n
  • The changing international landscape: From a “one superpower and multiple powers” to a “two poles and multiple powers” landscape<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

    After the Cold War, the world’s basic structure was one of “one superpower and multiple other strong states.” Although global power was dispersing toward multiple centers, the United States remained the sole superpower. China’s rise has gradually separated it from the second group (Multiple other strong states) and China’s  power is gradually approaching that of the United States. China’s catch-up with the United States is a long-term process, like two parallel trains: the American train in front and the Chinese train behind.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    First, the front train catches up with the rear, and eventually, the rear train surpasses the front. This process has spanned decades and is still ongoing. Indicators such as total human resources, grain output, and urban population surpassed those of the United States during the Mao Zedong era.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    In 1993, China surpassed the United States in steel production. Since the beginning of the new century, China’s catch-up has accelerated, with China now surpassing the United States in key aggregate indicators such as the number of mobile phones, internet users, goods exports, industrial value added, electricity generation, and highway mileage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    As you can see, after China surpassed the United States in these aggregate indicators, it has generally not looked back, with many indicators currently several times higher than those of the United States. While China previously caught up with and then surpassed the United States in modernization indicators, it has been significantly ahead of the United States from the outset in some of the latest technological indicators.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    For example, China and the United States developed high-speed rail at about the same time, but by the end of 2020, China’s operating high-speed rail mileage had reached 37,900 kilometers, ranking first in the world and more than double the total high-speed rail mileage of the rest of the world. The United States had only 735 kilometers during the same period. Of course, China still lags behind the United States to varying degrees in comprehensive scientific and technological strength, higher education, military power, and global resource allocation capabilities. China still lags considerably behind the United States in per capita indicators reflecting its level of development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    At the same time, judging by land area, population, economic output, foreign trade volume, scientific and technological prowess, and military strength, no other major power in the world has the conditions to develop into a global power like China and the United States, becoming a world “pole.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    For example, Russia has the largest land area in the world, a population of over 100 million, and is a world-class military power, but its economic output hardly qualifies it as a major power. Japan, with a relatively large economy and a population exceeding 100 million, is the world’s third-largest economy, but it is a small country in terms of land area, and a semi-sovereign state firmly tied to American warships. If the European Union were a sovereign state, it would also be a world pole, but as a regional alliance, it cannot coordinate its forces and take action like a united state, and European Union faces challenges on all fronts. India, another major power with relatively balanced resources, has the potential to become a global power after China and the United States, but its overall strength still lags far behind.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The “two-pole, multiple big powers” pattern does not mean that there will be a co-governance pattern between China and the United States like the G2, but rather a world governance system in which China and the United States compete with each other, check and balance each other, engage in high-intensity game, and at the same time depend on and complement each other. This is a bit like the “two-pole connected” global order that Marx and Engels talked about back then.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      \n
    • “Long 16th Century”:<\/strong> shift of power between the East and the West: But Today World History Moves from a great divergence to a Great Reversal<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

      Clearly, today the global development pattern is shifting from Great Divergence to Great Convergence, and world history is shifting from a Great Divergence to a Great Reversal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Since what historians call the “Long Sixteenth Century,” today a major divergence between the West and the rest of the world has emerged. The West has emerged as the dominant civilization in the global system. Under the pressure of the West’s overwhelming military, material, and spiritual superiority, all differences between non-Western civilizations and national conditions have been disciplined as the gap between pre-modernity and modernity, periphery and center. Westernness and modernity have merged into a global universality, and non-Western countries have been actively or passively incorporated into this system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The shift from a Great Divergence to a Great Reversal in world history is a process of returning from the rise of the West to a long-term historical norm. Calculated in terms of purchasing power parity, Western countries’ share of world GDP was only 18.2% in 1500. This share subsequently rose steadily, peaking at 57.1% in 1950. This share then continued to decline, with the rate of decline accelerating significantly since the 21st century. In 2000, their share was 45.9%, but by 2018 it had fallen to 33.4%, already lower than its share in 1850, and this trend continues. Conversely, the share of non-Western countries in world GDP continues to rise. Clearly, the global development pattern is shifting from Great Divergence to Great Convergence, and world history is shifting from a Great Divergence to a Great Reversal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The great economic convergence is accompanied by the collective renaissance of non-Western civilizations, transforming non-Western countries from recipients of the world system into co-builders. This is the process by which different civilizations of the world achieve true universality through equal exchange and dialogue, rather than a universality disguised as Westernness. It is also the process by which non-Western civilizations, non-Western countries, and non-Western peoples acquire subjectivity in world history. Once this latent, suppressed, and marginalized subjectivity is revived, it will undoubtedly usher in a new era in human history.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        \n
      • Global Institutional Change: The Integration Process of the Global Capitalist System Has Broken<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

        Since the end of World War II, rapid productive forces growth and continued improvements in living standards have led to an integration process of global capitalist system. Within countries, this process manifested itself as a significant easing of class contradictions, with the interests of the bourgeoisie becoming the “general interests” of society as a whole.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        The middle class emerged as the backbone of society, and the poor also enjoyed better welfare benefits. Western society has emerged as what Herbert Marcuse<\/strong> described as a “comfortable, stable, rational, and democratically unfree” one-dimensional society. Between countries, this process has been a win-win for both developed and developing countries. Developed countries, facing declining domestic rates of capital profit, have gained new development space by expanding into international markets and investing in developing countries. Developing countries, in turn, have gained development opportunities by taking over industrial transfers from developed countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        With the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008 the integration of the global capitalist system is fracturing. This fracture is manifesting itself domestically in fractures between classes, races, social ideologies, and political models. Western society is bidding farewell to its seemingly “boring” yet comfortable past. “Fracturing” and “dividing” are increasingly used to describe American society, while Europe is also gradually saying goodbye to its ultra-stable society, with income and wealth inequality continuing to widen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        From the perspective of international relations, the breakdown in the integration process is manifested in the shift from mutually beneficial cooperation to confrontation and conflict between nations. Global outward investment and trade are shrinking, and a trend of deglobalization is emerging. Unilateralism, isolationism, separatism, and trade protectionism are making a comeback. The diplomatic arena is shifting from one of cooperation and negotiation to one of confrontation and conflict. Trade conflicts and territorial disputes between nations are becoming increasingly intense, and conflicts between Russia and Ukraine and Israel and Palestine have erupted one after another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        The rupture of global capitalist integration means that Western economies and societies are undergoing profound transformations. This will bring many uncertainties to the future of the world, but it also presents many new possibilities. Conversely, with the rise of China, a new type of socialism will increasingly demonstrate universal vitality and vigor in the 21st century.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          \n
        • Globalization is changing: The upward trend of globalization has reversed, and the liberal “world order” has fallen into an unprecedented predicament.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

          Globalization was indeed once a mighty historical trend. We define the “trade openness index” as the ratio of global imports and exports to GDP. In 1500, the trade openness index was only 0.5%-2.5%, but by 2008 it had reached 61.1%. The Age of Discovery, industrialization, and the formation of the global system all drove globalization. In particular, after World War II, postwar reconstruction and global liberalization fueled a surge in globalization that lasted for over 60 years. Between 1945 and 2008, the trade openness index increased by 51 percentage points.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          Historically, there have been backlashes against globalization.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

           Between 1914 and 1945, the world experienced two world wars, and the trade openness index fell from 18.0% to 10.1%. Since 2008, a new round of deglobalization has emerged. Global foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP has declined from a high of 5.40% to 1.51%, returning to the outward investment intensity seen in the early 21st century. Global trade has also been affected by deglobalization. The total trade-to-GDP ratio was 61% in 2008, fell to 52% in 2020, and then recovered to 63% in 2022. This wave of deglobalization has brought unprecedented crises to the liberal “world order”\u2014economically, crisis of free investment and trade between countries; and politically, crisis of where a few countries set the rules and the majority follow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

            \n
          • New Industrial Revolution: The rise of the digital revolution has become a strategic high ground for competition among major powers.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

            Industrial revolutions trigger the disruption and transformation of traditional industries, the replacement of core industries, and the restructuring of industrial chains, thus revolutionizing the economic landscape. Historically, the key factor in the rise of world powers has been their leadership in emerging industrial revolutions. From the 1760s to the 1840s, Britain led the First Industrial Revolution, becoming the world’s leading power. From the 1860s to the 1870s, Western developed countries such as Germany and the United States led the Second Industrial Revolution, becoming world powers. Since the 1950s, the United States has been the primary leader of the Third Industrial Revolution, making it the world’s most powerful country. During the First and Second Industrial Revolutions, China played a marginal role. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, China sought to catch up, completing the first two Industrial Revolutions while also becoming a follower and active participant in the Third Industrial Revolution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

            The digital revolution currently underway will make human society itself intelligent. This will reshape not only all industries but also society and government, driving the evolution of a trinity: a smart economy, a smart society, and a smart government. Competition in this revolution has become a focal point among major powers worldwide and a key strategic challenge in the Sino-US competition. In February 2019, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy released a new industry initiative, identifying artificial intelligence (AI), high-end manufacturing, quantum information science, and 5G as key to US industrial dominance in the future. In February 2024, the US National Science and Technology Council released its 2024 edition of the Critical and Emerging Technologies List, encompassing advanced computing, advanced engineering materials, advanced network perception and feature management, AI, automation, unmanned systems, (18.860, -0.31, -1.62%), and human -machine interface technologies . The core focus is on strategic planning centered around the digital revolution .<\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Unlike previous industrial revolutions, China has become a leader in the digital revolution. While still lagging behind the United States overall, China is leading or running parallel in key areas such as the digital economy, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and 5G. This presents enormous opportunities, but also significant risks. China faces not only fierce market competition but also pressure and blockades from competitors.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

            Five Major Changes Unseen in a Century: China and USA has Become Two Poles of the World The International Landscape  has Changed From a “one superpower and multiple strong powers” to a “two poles and multiple strong powers” The Integration Process of the Global Capitalist System Has Broken and the liberal “world order” has fallen […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[28,34,1,32],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5719","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-english-en","category-international-en","category-uncategorized","category-world-en"],"blocksy_meta":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5719","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=5719"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5719\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5726,"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5719\/revisions\/5726"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=5719"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=5719"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=5719"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}