{"id":6183,"date":"2026-02-20T07:07:03","date_gmt":"2026-02-20T07:07:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/?p=6183"},"modified":"2026-02-20T07:07:04","modified_gmt":"2026-02-20T07:07:04","slug":"brejnevin-1969da-cine-yonelik-tam-olcekli-nukleer-saldiri-plani-saldirinin-onlenmesi","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/?p=6183","title":{"rendered":"Brejnev’in 1969’da \u00c7in’e Y\u00f6nelik Tam \u00d6l\u00e7ekli N\u00fckleer Sald\u0131r\u0131 Plan\u0131: Sald\u0131r\u0131n\u0131n \u00d6nlenmesi"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Brejnev’in 1969’da \u00c7in’e Y\u00f6nelik Tam \u00d6l\u00e7ekli N\u00fckleer Sald\u0131r\u0131 Plan\u0131: Sald\u0131r\u0131n\u0131n \u00d6nlenmesi<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n\n
\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Aral\u0131k 2025<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Derleyen: Eyl\u00fcl Deniz<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kamuoyuna a\u00e7\u0131lan yeni devlet belgelerine g\u00f6re Sovyetler Birli\u011fi’nin 1969 y\u0131l\u0131nda \u00c7in’e kar\u015f\u0131 olas\u0131 bir n\u00fckleer sald\u0131r\u0131y\u0131 ciddi \u015fekilde d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc ve planlad\u0131\u011f\u0131 tarihi kay\u0131tlar ve gizlili\u011fi kald\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015f belgelerle do\u011frulanmaktad\u0131r. Her ne kadar bu sald\u0131r\u0131 ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmemi\u015f olsa da, \u00f6zellikle 1969 yaz\u0131 ve sonbahar\u0131nda iki \u00fclke n\u00fckleer bir \u00e7at\u0131\u015fman\u0131n e\u015fi\u011fine gelmi\u015ftir. <\/strong>Bu kritik d\u00f6nemin ana hatlar\u0131n\u0131 \u015f\u00f6yledir: 1969 Mart ay\u0131nda \u00c7in-Sovyet s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131nda (Zhenbao Adas\u0131 \/ Damanski Adas\u0131) \u00e7\u0131kan \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar sonras\u0131 iki \u00fclke aras\u0131nda tansiyon doruk noktas\u0131na ula\u015ft\u0131.        <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bkz. China Daily, GlobalSecurity.org<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sovyet Savunma Bakan\u0131 Andrey Gre\u00e7ko liderli\u011findeki baz\u0131 \u00fcst d\u00fczey komutanlar, \u00c7in’in n\u00fckleer tesislerine (Lop Nur, Jiuquan) ve b\u00fcy\u00fck \u015fehirlerine y\u00f6nelik “s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131” veya “h\u0131zl\u0131” bir n\u00fckleer sald\u0131r\u0131y\u0131 g\u00fcndeme getirdi ve planlad\u0131lar.     <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00c7in Askeri Web A\u011f\u0131, NY Times Gazete ar\u015fivleri<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

ABD;mso-tab-count:1′> Sovyetler, A\u011fustos 1969;mso-tab-count:1′>            ABD D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 ar\u015fivleri<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sald\u0131r\u0131n\u0131n Ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmeme Nedenleri:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

1. ABD’nin n\u00fckleer sald\u0131r\u0131ya net muhalefeti: Bu, Sovyetlerin riski \u00e7ok y\u00fcksek g\u00f6rmesine yol a\u00e7t\u0131.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. \u00c7in’in kar\u015f\u0131 misilleme kapasitesi: \u00c7in’in konvansiyonel sava\u015f g\u00fcc\u00fc ve n\u00fckleer cayd\u0131r\u0131c\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n belirsizli\u011fi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. Bar\u0131\u015f\u00e7\u0131l Diplomatik Giri\u015fimler: Eyl\u00fcl 1969’da Sovyet Ba\u015fbakan\u0131 Kos\u0131gin ile \u00c7in Ba\u015fbakan\u0131 Zhou Enlai’nin Pekin havaalan\u0131nda ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirdi\u011fi kritik g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fme tansiyonu d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcrd\u00fc.    <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kaynaklar: China Daily, History Channel belgeleri<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Krizin Derinlemesine Analizi<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bu kritik d\u00f6nemi daha iyi anlamak i\u00e7in, olaylar\u0131 jeopolitik ba\u011flam\u0131na oturtmak gereklidir:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sovyet-\u00c7in Geriliminin Kayna\u011f\u0131<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

1950’lerin sonlar\u0131ndan itibaren iki sosyalist \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki ideolojik ve stratejik ittifak bozulmaya ba\u015flad\u0131. Sovyetler Birli\u011fi, 1960 y\u0131l\u0131nda \u00c7in’deki t\u00fcm m\u00fchendis uzmanlar\u0131n\u0131 geri \u00e7ekti t\u00fcm sanayi projelerini durdurdu ve iki \u00fclke, Marksizm-Leninizm’in “do\u011fru” yorumu konusunda sert bir propaganda sava\u015f\u0131na giri\u015fti. Bu ideolojik ayr\u0131\u015fma, 1969’a gelindi\u011finde silahl\u0131 \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmaya d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fen derin bir d\u00fc\u015fmanl\u0131k yaratm\u0131\u015ft\u0131.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

1969 S\u0131n\u0131r \u00c7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131 (Zhenbao Adas\u0131 Olay\u0131)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mart 1969’da, Ussuri Nehri \u00fczerindeki Zhenbao Adas\u0131’nda (Damanski Adas\u0131) patlak veren kanl\u0131 \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalarda her iki taraf da a\u011f\u0131r kay\u0131plar verdi. Teknolojik olarak daha zay\u0131f olan \u00c7in ordusunun Sovyet ordusuna kar\u015f\u0131 ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 direni\u015fi, Moskova’da \u015fok etkisi yaratt\u0131. Bu yenilginin yaratt\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u00f6fke ve “\u00c7in tehdidini k\u00f6k\u00fcnden kaz\u0131ma” d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcncesi, Kremlin’de n\u00fckleer se\u00e7ene\u011fin masaya gelmesine neden oldu.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sovyetlerin Nab\u0131z Yoklamas\u0131 ve ABD’nin Yan\u0131t\u0131<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sovyetler, olas\u0131 bir sald\u0131r\u0131n\u0131n uluslararas\u0131 sonu\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131 anlamak i\u00e7in en kritik ad\u0131m\u0131 att\u0131: ABD’ye dan\u0131\u015fmak. A\u011fustos 1969’da bir Sovyet yetkili, Washington’da bir ABD D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri yetkilisine, “\u00c7in’in n\u00fckleer tesislerine sald\u0131r\u0131rsak sizin tepkiniz ne olur?” diyerek do\u011frudan bir soru y\u00f6neltti.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ba\u015fkan Nixon ve dan\u0131\u015fman\u0131 Henry Kissinger, bu soruyu b\u00fcy\u00fck bir stratejik dikkatle de\u011ferlendirdi. Onlara g\u00f6re, \u00c7in’in yok edilmesi, k\u00fcresel g\u00fc\u00e7 dengesini tamamen Sovyetler Birli\u011fi lehine bozacak ve ABD i\u00e7in kabul edilemez bir durum yaratacakt\u0131. Bu nedenle ABD, Sovyetler’e bu plana kesinlikle kar\u015f\u0131 oldu\u011funu net bir \u015fekilde iletti. Ayr\u0131ca, Eyl\u00fcl 1969’da Washington Star gazetesinde “Sovyetler, \u00c7in’i Sessize Almak \u0130\u00e7in N\u00fckleer Sald\u0131r\u0131y\u0131 Te\u015fvik Ediyor” ba\u015fl\u0131kl\u0131 bir haberin s\u0131zd\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131yla plan kamuoyuna duyuruldu. Bu durum, s\u00fcrpriz bir sald\u0131r\u0131 olas\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 tamamen ortadan kald\u0131rd\u0131.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Geri Ad\u0131m ve Diplomasi<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

ABD’nin net tutumu ve uluslararas\u0131 bask\u0131, Sovyetleri daha temkinli olmaya itti. Vietnam lideri Ho Chi Minh’in Eyl\u00fcl 1969’daki cenaze t\u00f6reni, bir diplomasi f\u0131rsat\u0131 yaratt\u0131. Sovyet Ba\u015fbakan\u0131 Aleksey Kos\u0131gin, bu vesileyle Pekin’e giderek \u00c7in Ba\u015fbakan\u0131 Zhou Enlai ile havaalan\u0131nda kritik bir g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fme ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirdi. Bu g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fme, tansiyonun d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcr\u00fclmesi ve s\u0131n\u0131r m\u00fczakerelerinin yeniden ba\u015flat\u0131lmas\u0131 konusunda bir d\u00f6n\u00fcm noktas\u0131 oldu. Her ne kadar d\u00fc\u015fmanl\u0131k devam etse de, n\u00fckleer sava\u015f tehlikesi bu g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fme sayesinde bertaraf edildi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sonu\u00e7 olarak, Sovyetler Birli\u011fi’nin 1969’da \u00c7in’e y\u00f6nelik bir n\u00fckleer sald\u0131r\u0131y\u0131 planlad\u0131\u011f\u0131 tarihi bir ger\u00e7ektir. Ancak bu plan, ABD’nin kararl\u0131 muhalefeti, \u00c7in’in cayd\u0131r\u0131c\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve son anda devreye giren diplomatik giri\u015fimler sayesinde hayata ge\u00e7irilmemi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Brejnev’in 1969’da \u00c7in’e Y\u00f6nelik Tam \u00d6l\u00e7ekli N\u00fckleer Sald\u0131r\u0131 Plan\u0131: Sald\u0131r\u0131n\u0131n \u00d6nlenmesi Aral\u0131k 2025 Derleyen: Eyl\u00fcl Deniz Kamuoyuna a\u00e7\u0131lan yeni devlet belgelerine g\u00f6re Sovyetler Birli\u011fi’nin 1969 y\u0131l\u0131nda \u00c7in’e kar\u015f\u0131 olas\u0131 bir n\u00fckleer sald\u0131r\u0131y\u0131 ciddi \u015fekilde d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc ve planlad\u0131\u011f\u0131 tarihi kay\u0131tlar ve gizlili\u011fi kald\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015f belgelerle do\u011frulanmaktad\u0131r. Her ne kadar bu sald\u0131r\u0131 ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmemi\u015f olsa da, \u00f6zellikle 1969 yaz\u0131 […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[20,49],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6183","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-arsiv","category-arsiv-tr"],"blocksy_meta":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6183","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=6183"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6183\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6185,"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6183\/revisions\/6185"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=6183"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=6183"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marksizm.org.tr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=6183"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}