**Lenin 2 : Revolutionary Personality and the Philosophy of Victory: Commemorating the 150th Anniversary of Lenin's Birth**

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**The “Second Nature” of a Revolutionary’s Personality**

In Lenin's time, in addition to dedication and personal qualities, the personality of a revolutionary was also manifested in the ability to grasp the main contradictions and put them into action, the so-called "second nature". This requires that while engaging in practical movements, one must also engage in intensive theoretical work to identify opportunities for action in the complex reality, persuade or even defeat the wrong views of the same camp, and conceive the strategy and tactics of the revolution.

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Lenin first “discussed in Iskra the idea that in the complex chain of political activity one must be able to highlight the central link of the moment in order to grasp it and give the whole chain a direction.” Trotsky commented: “Later, Lenin repeated this idea more than once, and often spoke of the form of the chain and the links themselves. This method seemed to pass from the conscious realm to the subconscious and finally became his second nature.”[11] **Trotsky, On Lenin, p. 100.**

Lenin's overall analysis and specific grasp of the situation were ultimately subject to what Lenin considered to be the decisive "link" in the specific situation, so that in specific actions, he often put aside those things that directly or indirectly conflicted with the central task. "This 'shortcoming' of his is only the reverse side of his talent for the greatest internal mobilization of all forces, which made him the greatest revolutionary in history." [12] Trotsky, On Lenin, p. 100.

The so-called highlighting the central link of the time in the complex chain of political activities and pointing out the direction for the entire chain refers to a kind of judgment of the times. In January 1915, Lenin proposed a methodology for identifying the characteristics of the times in his article "Flying the Flag of Others".

"It is indisputable that we live at the junction of two epochs; and therefore the great historical events which are passing before us cannot be understood unless we first analyse the objective conditions of the transition from one epoch to the other. We are dealing here with the great historical epochs. In every epoch there is and always will be individual, partial, sometimes forward, sometimes backward movements, all kinds of deviations from the general form and general tempo of the movement.

We cannot know how fast the various historical movements of a given era will develop, or how much they will achieve. But we can know, and do know, which class is at the center of this or that era, and determines the main content of the era, the main direction of its development, the main characteristics of the historical background of the era, and so on. Only on this basis, that is, taking into account the different basic characteristics of each "era" (rather than individual historical events in individual countries), can we correctly formulate our own strategy; only by understanding the basic characteristics of a certain era can we consider the more specific characteristics of this country or that country on this basis. "[13] Lenin, “Flying Someone Else’s Banner”, in Lenin’s Selected Works on Capitalism, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009, pp. 91-92.

Contrary to the way of judging the times as Lenin said, confusing the main content and development direction of the times, blurring the central force of the times, and then moving strategies or tactics that may be appropriate or correct under other era conditions to a completely different era context, will form left, right, left in form but right in reality, dogmatic or empiricist opportunism.

The "second nature" of a revolutionary's personality is not an abstract internationalism or a pure concept, but an internationalism deeply rooted in national life. On April 23, 1920, Trotsky published an article in Pravda to celebrate the 50th anniversary of Lenin's birth. It is quite interesting that the focus of this short article is not internationalism, but Lenin's "deep nationality": "Lenin is rooted in Russia's modern history, summarizes history, and gives it the highest expression. It is through this path that Lenin has reached the pinnacle of internationalist action and world influence."

Trotsky believed that in addition to the qualities of dialectical materialism, revolutionary leaders also need "a potential creative power which we call intuition: the ability to quickly assess the situation, to distinguish the essential and important things from the coarse, to fill in the missing parts of the picture with imagination, to think of others, first of all the enemy, to combine all these together, and to strike in time when the 'formula' for striking is formed in the mind. This is the intuition of action. On the other hand, this intuition is also combined with what the Russians call sensitivity." [14] Trotsky, On Lenin, pp. 132, 134.

Trotsky was aware that such an emphasis on Lenin’s “national” character might come as a surprise, and he explained that “to lead the revolution which Russia is now experiencing, unprecedented in the history of nations, requires an organic and inseparable connection—a deep-rooted connection—with the fundamental forces of people’s life.” “The theoretical exposition of the internationalism of the socialist revolution had long been known, but it was only in Lenin that it first acquired its national expression, and that is why Lenin was the foremost and most direct revolutionary leader of the world proletariat.”[15] Trotsky, On Lenin, pp. 132, 134.

Lenin's theory of imperialism is a vivid manifestation of the methodology of this era of cognition. This work rarely directly involves China, but its theoretical analysis has laid the premise for the new start of the Chinese revolution. If the imbalance of the imperialist world system has created the "weak link" of this international system, then the domestic division caused by the multi-power competition pattern has also provided a "weak link" for domestic revolution.

Because "the great achievements of the speculative nature of international capitalism have not yet fully matured to the level of international cooperation and are still hindered by capitalist groups using national sentiments and policies to enforce their special interests," while "the Western powers jointly attacked China," they also competed and fought with each other within China, causing civil war and separatism in China in the form of proxy wars. The process of the great powers such as France, Russia, Germany, Britain, Japan, and the United States competing for international spheres of influence was accompanied by the process of dividing up spheres of influence within China. The purpose of both was to occupy the monopoly of investment and development in different regions through political and military power in order to obtain excess profits. [16]

Therefore, there are two weak links in the era of imperialism: one is the "weak link" that Lenin called the "uneven economic and political development" as the "absolute law of capitalism", "from which it should be concluded that socialism may first triumph in a few or even in a single capitalist country", [17] and the other is the gap caused by the uneven domestic political and economic development and the contradictions between the imperialist agents within the oppressed nations, which provided conditions for the survival and development of China's revolutionary forces in the vast countryside and on the borders and marginal areas of the provinces.

"Weak links" not only refer to the fragility of the ruling order, but also to the possibility of breaking through its system. Therefore, "weak links" rely on the generation of revolutionary forces and cannot exist on their own. The revolutionary forces of the 20th century did not exist independently within a country or region, but rather were movements of nations, classes/strata, and regions that showed themselves in "weak links" and had profound international connections. In other words, if there were no revolutionary forces and revolutionary theories committed to breaking through the ruling system, there would be no "weak links"; if the "weak links" of the capitalist international system and the "weak links" of domestic rule could not be considered together, it would be difficult to form revolutionary strategies and tactics.

For the revolutionary forces, if they only regard imperialism as an economic phenomenon, rather than a situation of political and military competition based on economic needs, and do not understand that there is no clear and distinct boundary between the old imperialist policies and the new imperialism, they will not be able to form a specific strategy and tactics to resist imperialism. In this sense, without a specific revolutionary strategy and tactics, the weak link cannot become a "weak link". Therefore, who exactly is the revolutionary force, or where the revolutionary force develops from, constitutes the premise for identifying the "weak link".

We are now very familiar with Lenin’s analysis of the Eastern Question and the Chinese Revolution from around the time of the 1905 Revolution to the Xinhai Revolution. His advocacy of national self-determination and the theory of imperialism developed around the outbreak of World War I, as well as his judgment of “advanced Asia and backward Europe”, have incorporated the Eastern Question—from the Balkan crisis to the Chinese Revolution—into the analysis of the latest stage of global capitalism.

In his famous “On the Right of Nations to Self-Determination”, Lenin said: “In Eastern Europe and Asia the era of bourgeois-democratic revolutions began only in 1905. The revolutions in Russia, Persia, Turkey and China, the Balkan wars, etc., are the whole series of events of world significance which are taking place in our ‘East’ in our time.”[18] In fact, the position of the Russian Revolution on the national question was intrinsically linked to the process of “Asian Awakening”.

However, before the Northern Expedition (1924-1927), with very few exceptions, even within their respective leaderships, few attempted to link the Russian and Chinese revolutions in a more concrete way. They might have agreed with Lenin on the uneven development of the imperialist era and the theory of the weak link, but they never combined this theory with the exploration of revolutionary forces in China.

For example, the Communist International revolutionary Roy opposed Lenin's united front policy and believed that Sun Yat-sen was a scheming strategist and a reactionary. [19] At the Far Eastern Workers' Congress (Moscow, January 1922), Zinoviev was extremely dissatisfied with Sun Yat-sen's request for American aid and fiercely criticized the bourgeois style of the Chinese Kuomintang. [20] In 1925, in order to mourn the death of Sun Yat-sen, Radek, who later served as the president of Moscow Sun Yat-sen University, published an article in Pravda, specifically mentioning the following facts:

"One day in 1916, when the First World War was raging, a group of Bolsheviks met in Bern to discuss the question of national self-determination. Lenin suddenly proposed at the meeting that the Bolsheviks should unite with the Chinese revolution in the future. This proposal seemed like a foolish dream at the time! It was really conceivable that the Russian proletariat would fight shoulder to shoulder with hundreds of millions of Chinese. Among the five or six Bolsheviks present at the meeting, some imagined that if they lived long enough, they might see this dream come true." [21]

Even Trotsky did not become interested in this until the 1920s, especially during the period of the Shanghai workers' uprising.

However, Lenin's judgment was completely different. Radek recalled: "In 1918, when China and Russia were still divided by the Czechs, the Social Revolutionaries and Kolchak, Lenin once asked whether it was possible to select revolutionaries from among the Chinese workers who had immigrated to Russia to have contact with Sun Yat-sen. Now we have established contact with the Chinese people. The mission we entrust to the Chinese revolutionaries today is to expand our contact with hundreds of millions of people." [22]

It was under Lenin’s influence that the Fourth Congress of the Communist International adopted the General Discussion of the Eastern Question from November 1922 to February 1923. After analyzing the inherent defects of the Chinese Communist Party, it advocated the realization of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and the establishment of a united front. [23] In January 1923, Soviet government representative Adolf Joffe met with Sun Yat-sen in Shanghai and issued the Sun Yat-sen-Joffe Manifesto. On the premise of recognizing Sun Yat-sen’s view that communism and the Soviet system were not suitable for China at that time, the Kuomintang officially began the three major policies of “allying with Russia, allying with the Communist Party, and supporting farmers and workers” and the first cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

Based on his specific grasp of the overall characteristics of the imperialist era and the different social conditions, Lenin transcended the obvious divisions between Sun Yat-senism and the Chinese revolution on the one hand, and the communist movement on the other, and discovered the potential of the Chinese revolution and its consistency with the Russian revolution.

This also profoundly influenced Li Dazhao and the first generation of Chinese Communists. Their internationalism and world view also had a character based on national life. In the speech commemorating the second anniversary of Lenin's death mentioned above, Li Dazhao expressed a point of view that seemed incredible to "pure" Marxists or communists:

Leninism is the theory and strategy of the proletarian revolution in the era of imperialism. Sun Yat-senism is the theory and strategy of the oppressed national revolution in the era of imperialism. In theory, Sun Yat-senism and Leninism can be combined into one, and in strategy they can also be consistent. Therefore, Leninists can be said to be Sun Yat-senists; Sun Yat-senists are also Leninists! Their doctrines are both revolutionary doctrines... There is no difference between the greatness of their thoughts and personalities. [24]

As the most steadfast communist with the deepest Marxist theoretical knowledge in China at that time, Li Dazhao asserted that "If Sun Yat-sen had been born in Russia, he would have been a Lenin; if Lenin had been born in China, he would have been a Sun Yat-sen too! Their doctrines may seem different on the surface, but it is actually because of their different environments. Sun Yat-sen and Lenin had the same goal, but unfortunately the environment did not allow him to achieve it as successfully as Lenin!" [25] Li Dazhao was not trying to erase or confuse the differences between the revolutions led by Lenin and Sun Yat-sen. Instead, he was trying to find the connections and intersections between differences and even contradictions in the political logic formed by the interaction between the world situation and domestic conditions. In the process of identifying common enemies, he expanded the scope of comrades and friends and formed a broad front.

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On April 28, 1927, half a month after Chiang Kai-shek launched the "April 12" coup in Shanghai, Li Dazhao was strangled in Beijing by Fengtian warlord Zhang Zuolin. Five months later, the Autumn Harvest Uprising led by Mao Zedong failed, and Mao retreated to the Jinggangshan area in Jiangxi, establishing the first revolutionary base and China's red regime. Under the guidance of Lenin's "weak link" theory, a new stage of the Chinese revolution began. Unlike Lenin, who mainly focused on the imperialist international system and the imbalance between countries, Mao Zedong's analysis focused on the domestic manifestations of this unbalanced system.

Mao Zedong's analysis was based on China’s uniqueness: “Within a country, surrounded by white regimes, there is a small area or several small areas of red regimes that have existed for a long time. This has never happened in any country in the world. There are unique reasons for this strange thing to happen. And its existence and development must also have certain conditions.” [26]

The so-called uniqueness is carried out within the systemic analysis:

First, imperialism ruled China indirectly rather than directly, which led to continuous wars and divisions among the white regimes in China. [27] This is the uniqueness of China, which is different from the domestic situation of imperialist countries and the situation of colonies under direct imperialist rule, that is, an unbalanced state of development.

Secondly, the conditions for the existence of the Red regime are not only the existence of a large number of poor peasants (which is one of the forms of comprehensive development of capitalist and non-capitalist production forms at this stage), but more importantly, the existence of revolutionary experience and mobilization in some areas. [28]

Third, the long-term existence of small red areas depends on whether there is a development of a nationwide revolutionary situation. [29]

Fourth, if there is no "formal Red Army of considerable strength", but only local Red Guards, it will not lead to a separatist situation, especially a long-term separatist situation. [30]

Finally, if there is no strong revolutionary organization, or if there is a strong organization but it frequently makes policy mistakes, then the red regime cannot exist. [31]

In fact, Mao Zedong's analysis was not understood by the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party at the time. His writing not only provided strategies and tactics for real struggles, but also fought and debated with other propositions within the party in the form of theoretical analysis.

Mao Zedong's strategy and tactics drew on Lenin's theoretical analysis of the imperialist era, and the title "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire" also reminds us of the inscription of Iskra. In the vast Chinese countryside, through armed struggle and land revolution, military struggle, social transformation, the united front, political power and party building were integrated together to forge an unprecedented revolutionary force composed mainly of peasants. This is the people's war.

People's war is not a purely military concept, but a political category. Under the unique conditions of China in the 20th century, people's war is a process of creating a new political subject, as well as a political structure and self-expression form that is compatible with this political subject. In people's war, the representative relationship of modern political parties has been fundamentally transformed. The birth of the people as a subject with peasants as the main content and the worker-peasant alliance as the political shell has promoted the emergence or transformation of all political forms (such as border government, political parties, farmers' associations and trade unions, etc.).

The general principles of people's war include: first, war can only be waged by mobilizing and relying on the masses; second, not only a strong regular army is necessary, but also local armed forces and militia; third, the category of soldiers and civilians implies a political process closely related to military struggle, centered on land reform and regime building.

In the process of fighting the new coronavirus, the Communist Party of China has prominently appealed to this tradition, summarizing the fight against the epidemic as "people's war, total war, and blocking war." Blocking war is a definition of the campaign goal, while people's war and total war are summaries of the nature of the struggle. People's war is manifested in group prevention and control, from the community-family, unit-individual to different levels of government, and total war shows that this struggle is a comprehensive mobilization of the national system and national capabilities. The people's war in the 20th century was the basic way to overcome the total war of imperialist countries, so people's war and total war are opposing categories. In the 21st century, when the epidemic gave rise to a comprehensive national mobilization, the party once again resorted to the model of people's war to form a new type of social mobilization that is connected from top to bottom and supports horizontally.

In the first stage of the fight against the epidemic, provinces across the country sent more than 40,000 medical staff to Wuhan. Jiangsu Province alone sent 13 medical teams based on cities. Streets, towns, schools, factories and commercial institutions became the basic units for fighting the epidemic. [32] Without the "people's war", the national system often falls into the bad habits of bureaucracy and formalism. In the early stage of the epidemic, China promptly informed the WHO and other countries including the United States of the epidemic and provided relatively accurate research results, but the disease control direct reporting system failed to operate effectively. The local bureaucratic system lacked sensitivity to the unprecedented sudden epidemic and made mistakes in judgment. It still habitually suppressed public opinion and missed opportunities under the logic of stability and economic development.

The comprehensive and effective anti-epidemic mobilization was formed under the direct intervention of the central government. Unlike the people's war in the 20th century, the anti-epidemic "people's war" is a process carried out under the framework of the national total war. Its goal is to stop the virus through the mobilization of the whole people and scientific prevention and control, rather than to generate new political entities.

Under the state of emergency, protecting people's lives and meeting their daily needs were given top priority, while capital appreciation and expansion took a back seat. The rare energy of the "people's war" was revived, providing the greatest guarantee for victory in the first phase of the fight against the epidemic. Many Western commentators attributed China's anti-epidemic process to "centralization", but were unable to recognize the energy of the "people's war" under the national mobilization system, and failed to distinguish the complex relationship between the people's war and total war.

Can this energy, which is repeatedly presented in emergency situations—flood relief, earthquake relief, and epidemic relief—break through its fate as a means of mobilization, revitalize the initiative and dynamism of the people, and once again give birth to the identity of the "modern monarch" and the people? Under contemporary conditions (economy, technology, communication methods, etc.), can this energy bridge the gap between political and social forms and provide impetus for new socio-political forms?

As the media and intellectual elites talk about how the plague will change the future world order, this is a historical experience that needs to be stated again: there will be no new order without new politics. Therefore, the question remains: what should be done?

**The Eternal Revolutionary and the "Philosophy of Victory"**

Depression and melancholy accompany every setback and loss of hope. When historians, philosophers and sentimental observers look back at the 20th century with failure as the starting point, should we also think about the new understandings of failure and victory that were born, developed and transformed at the same time as the consciousness of the century?

When Lenin died, the Soviet Union was still a cradle. As a revolutionary activist, his series of policy changes took place amidst alternations of failure and victory, especially failure.

**"If there is anything we should especially remember from Lenin's many strategic teachings, it is what he called the policy of great changes: today to the barricades, tomorrow to the stables of the Third State Duma, today to call for a world revolution, the world October Revolution, and tomorrow to negotiate with Kühlmann and Czernin for the humiliating peace of Brest-Litovsk."[33]**

**“If the alarm sounds in the West, and it will, then even if we are still preoccupied with calculations, balances and the New Economic Policy, we will answer without hesitation and without hesitation: We are revolutionaries through and through, we have always been, we are and we will always be. (Stormy applause, standing ovation.)”[34]**

The Chinese revolution developed rich thoughts on failure and victory, and these thoughts also redefined the revolution itself from within the revolutionary process. Therefore, it is difficult to grasp the dialectical relationship between failure and victory without the internal perspective of the Chinese revolution.

Lu Xun's "literature against despair" and Mao Zedong's "philosophy of victory" of "moving from victory to victory" are two literary/philosophical interpretations of hope and despair, failure and victory that are inherent in the process of the Chinese revolution. They are also two types of revolutionaries' personality and their "political philosophy".

In my opinion, the "philosophy of victory" is a kind of historical thinking that is generated by fully integrating oneself into the collective struggle, that is, the strategic thinking of the revolutionary subject. Sacrifice and tragedy are placed in the action program for victory, thus completely eliminating the elements of loneliness, boredom, decadence or helpless distress in the field of literature and thought since the "May Fourth Movement". The "philosophy of victory" is rooted in the cruel and tragic history of group struggle, and is also reflected in the strategic consideration of finding a way to victory in a failed situation. Failure is not only the mother of success, but also the logical starting point of the "philosophy of victory". Starting from failure means re-identifying the "weak links" in the predicament, seeking strategies and tactics to defeat the enemy, and then rebuilding the relationship between the enemy and us in the process of creating a new situation. This process is actually the process of rebuilding the self or subject.

Mao Zedong's "Why Can the Red Political Power in China Exist" (October 5, 1928), "The Struggle in the Jinggang Mountains" (November 25, 1928), "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire" (January 5, 1930) and other texts marked the birth of the "philosophy of victory", which provided a kind of optimistic context for later writers to describe the twists and turns and difficulties of the revolutionary process, "from victory to victory" or "the future is bright, but the road is tortuous". In August 1949, on the eve of the birth of the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong reviewed the history since 1840 and argued in an irrefutable way:

**"The logic of the imperialists is so different from the logic of the people. Make trouble, fail, make trouble again, fail again, until destruction - this is the logic of imperialism and all reactionaries in the world towards the people's cause..." "Struggle, fail, struggle again, fail again, struggle again, until victory - this is the logic of the people, and they will never go against this logic..." [35]**

From the perspective of recreating the subject, this process of struggle, failure, and victory is not only the logic of the people, but also the process of creating the people as the subject of the revolution. The resistance struggles since the Opium War were not completed by the same group of people. There are important differences between the subjects of each resistance, but the logic of struggle-failure-struggle constructs them into an increasingly mature and powerful "people" who move from struggle and failure to victory. Therefore, the "philosophy of victory" is aimed at implementing the people and their will.

The true measure of failure is not failure itself, but whether the logic of struggle continues to exist. Lu Xun defined Sun Yat-sen as an "eternal revolutionary" - the so-called "eternal revolutionary" is a revolutionary defined by continuous failure.

"Victory" does not present itself as a final result, but as a process of continuous struggle without being defeated by failure. [36] The reason why the "philosophy of victory" is optimistic is that it is always linked to the dialectical understanding of the dilemma and the strategic actions based on this understanding. Victory does not lie in the abstract future or abstract utopianism, but in the dialectical analysis of the balance of power between the enemy and us and in concrete practice. The "philosophy of victory" is a philosophy of action, but it is not voluntarism. On the contrary, it places the will to win and the analysis of the situation - especially the balance of power between the enemy and us - in the confrontation and transformation of contradictions, and actively intervenes in this confrontation and transformation.

Lu Xun's "literature against despair" rejects an optimistic worldview, but does not oppose collective struggle; it never places hope in the subjective category, but attempts to explore the path to the future in the broad world. "Literature against despair" is distinct from "optimistic literature", but has something in common with "philosophy of victory".

The "philosophy of victory" of the Chinese revolution was first born in hardship and bloodshed, and was produced from the analysis of the defeat situation that was extremely unfavorable to the revolutionary forces. The countryside, not the city, and the border areas, not the center, became the place where the revolutionary strategy could be carried out, but the definition of this new space came from the defeat situation and the disparity in strength between the enemy and us. The logic of victory lies in continuous action, exploration and struggle, which is different from blind optimism or fantasy hope.

The transformation of the "philosophy of victory", that is, the transformation from the "philosophy of victory" to various "optimistic literature", is precisely the abandonment of the analysis of this extremely unfavorable situation of failure, and thus the abandonment of real strategic and specific tactical thinking. Once such thinking is abandoned, action may lose direction and instead place hope on the inevitability of victory or the abstract future. The result is that the truth of "despair" is confirmed by burying "hope" with "falsehood", thus blocking the future dimension contained in "resistance to despair". This is not the logic of victory, but the logic of blind action, and it is also very easy to become the logic of "turning", the latter is the consequence of replacing resistance to despair with despair. "Literature of hope" and "optimistic literature" are fantasy, while "literature against despair" and "philosophy of victory" are action.

Revolutionaries are the personification of the themes of "resisting despair" and "moving toward victory." They are indeed similar to "mythical figures" (and therefore are repeatedly stigmatized and pushed into the "mortal world"), but let me imitate Gramsci's tone and say that the most complete manifestation of "myth" is not the political party or its leader as an organization of collective will, but the promoter of the actual actions of the organizational force that indicates that the collective will is already at work. Such a personality type can only be born in action. Even in a hopeless situation, it can inspire people to explore the future bit by bit and unyieldingly under their feet, thereby promoting the political maturity of the movement.

What is to be done?, written by Lenin in 1901-1902, is a model of the "philosophy of victory": in an unfavorable situation, we should deeply analyze the characteristics of the times, the relationship between current tasks and fundamental goals, promote the coordination of the theoretical, political and practical economic aspects of the entire struggle through theoretical research and strategic debate, and dialectically unify the phased tasks and the ultimate goals in the specific strategic and tactical analysis.

"What should we do?" is a proposition for formulating an action program and heading for victory. In the post-revolutionary and post-party era, re-raising the issue of the personality of revolutionaries as one of the political legacies of the 20th century is by no means to advocate personality cult or personal role, but to provide inspiration and motivation for political innovation and action - in an era when the political system centered on party politics is in a general crisis, not only within the country but also within the world, the question of "what should we do?" is constantly raised from various new factors and new conditions that already exist in reality, forcing us to concretely explore the possibility of new political, economic and social systems. Isn't it the inspiration given to us by this great legacy?

**Notes to this article:**

[11] L. D. Trotsky, On Lenin, p. 100.

[12] Ibid., p. 101.

[13] Lenin, “Flying Someone Else’s Banner”, in Lenin’s Selected Works on Capitalism, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009, pp. 91-92.

[14] Trotsky, On Lenin, pp. 132, 134.

[15] Ibid., p. 135.

[16] John A. Hobson, Imperialism, translated by Ji Ming, Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 1964, p. 246.

[17] Lenin, “On the Slogan of a Federation of Europe”, Selected Works of Lenin, Vol. 2, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1972, p. 709.

[18] Lenin, “On the Right of Nations to Self-Determination”, Selected Works of Lenin (Second Edition), Vol. 2, pp. 517-518.

[19] [20] Marie-Claire Bergère, Sun Yat-sen (Chapter 9 with Lin Tiangui, Biography with Yang Shiyun), translated by Wen Haoyi, Taipei: Times Publishing, 2010, p. 324.

[21] [22] Pravda No. 60 (No. 2991: March 14, 1925), quoted from Sheng Yue, Moscow Sun Yat-sen University and the Chinese Revolution, Beijing: Oriental Publishing House, 2004, p. 16.

[23] Ibid., pp. 324-325.

[24] [25] Li Dazhao, “Speech at the Meeting Commemorating the Second Anniversary of Lenin’s Death”, The Complete Works of Li Dazhao, Volume 4, p. 641.

[26] Mao Zedong: “Why Can the Red Political Power in China Exist?”, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1966, p. 51. The original title of this article was “Resolution of the Second Party Congress of the Counties in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area (October 5, 1928, at Buyun Mountain, Ninggang)”. When it was included in Volume 1 of Selected Works of Mao Zedong, the title and content were revised, but the basic meaning remained unchanged. The original text and revisions can be found in Mao Zedong Literature Research Association, ed., Volume 2 (May 1927-August 1931), supervised by Takeuchi Minoru, Japan: Sososha Co., Ltd., 1983, pp. 15-23. The text is quoted here according to the revised text of Selected Works of Mao Zedong.

[27] Ibid., p. 51.

[28]-[31] Ibid., p. 52.

[32] Before a vaccine for the novel coronavirus is developed, the only thing that can truly stop the virus is the social system. In rural areas, in recent years, through the village cadres stationed in towns and villages, the state's administrative power has been fully infiltrated into villages. In the fight against the epidemic in many areas, the village cadres are the leading force and have mobilized the party members and cadres in the village, but the basic forces are related to the original social organizational structure, such as the elderly (elderly associations) and village committee cadres who are responsible for daily work. The manifestation is that each village protects itself, forming separatism and separation. If a more serious epidemic occurs, it will inevitably require direct intervention by the government, otherwise conflict incidents can be expected. In urban communities, residents come from all directions, and the street committees are responsible for epidemic prevention work. These community committees (mostly with local grassroots forces before real estate development) have had various conflicts with residents in community management and "rights protection" for many years. They have many conflicts with community residents in terms of personnel relations and interests. Therefore, in practice, they need to cooperate with community property management. The property management follows commercial logic, and the street follows administrative orders. The two are combined in the fight against the epidemic, but they have not formed an organic integration. In comparison, the dormitory communities and old communities in the city center have more socialist elements and traditional neighborhood relations, and the organization is more organic. In addition, due to the closed community approach to fight the epidemic, the allocation of daily necessities for residents is an important issue, which has led to close coordination between commercial channels such as express delivery companies and the government and the community.

Overall, it is a successful coordination and interaction between the government, business, community and residents. In an emergency, people's freedom of movement is restricted, and immigrants and people without fixed residence or occupation face unprecedented difficulties (for example, due to the closed management of the community, especially in the early stages of the anti-epidemic process, many tenants without household registration or temporary residence permits cannot obtain proof of entry and exit of the community and are forced to return to their registered residence or remain in a closed state for a long time). This is the actual dilemma faced by a highly mobile society. But in any case, the issue of community mobilization and organization is one of the keys to understanding China's victory in the early stages of the fight against the epidemic.

[33] Trotsky, On Lenin, p. 147.

[34] Ibid., p. 148.

[35] Mao Zedong, “Abandon Illusions, Prepare for Struggle”, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 4, p. 1487.

[36] Lu Xun, “The First Anniversary of the Death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen”, in The Complete Works of Lu Xun, Volume 7, Beijing: People’s Literature Publishing House, 2005, p. 306.