**World Politics: Coordination of US and European Policies toward China in the era of Great Power Competition by Wang Xiaowen**

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**Summary**

**European Union is still a major great power in world Politics. During Biden's term, the US and Europe have stepped up their coordination of policies toward China, focusing on the economic, trade and technological fields, strengthening geopolitical and military security cooperation, and they also incorporated ideology into it, especially bundling human rights and values ​​with other issues, and implementing a comprehensive strategy to contain China.**

**At the same time, the US and Europe have obvious differences in their perception of China, differences in relationship positioning, differences in policy choices and differences in implementation. The " America First " principle and the Ukrainian crisis and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have caused the US and Europe to face some differences and contradictions.**

**The coordination of US and European policies toward China during the Biden administration has shown the characteristics of institutionalization, comprehensiveness and camp expansion, and the future direction is still uncertain. From the perspective of the trilateral relationship between China, the United States and the European Union, the overall development of China-EU relations is conducive to the balance and stability of the trilateral relationship between China, the United States and European Union , but at the same time, China must be vigilant against the challenges brought to the development of China-EU relations by the rise of EU protectionism.**

The transatlantic relationship between the United States and Europe is the most complex, closest and most enduring alliance in today's international relations, and has an important and far-reaching impact on the international landscape. Over the past half century, the relationship between the United States and Europe has undergone a profound evolution from the "special relationship" during the Cold War to the "partnership" after the Cold War.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the European Union, the global interests and strategic goals of the United States and Europe gradually diverged, and bilateral relations showed the 2 sided characteristics of coexistence of cooperation and conflict. As China's international status has steadily risen, the United States and Europe have attached more and more importance to policy coordination toward China, and China-US-EU triangle relations have become one of the most influential trilateral relationships in today's international landscape.

After taking office, the Biden administration has used US-EU coordination as an important tool for strategic competition with China. The depth, breadth and richness of the US-EU policy coordination toward China have reached an unprecedented level. In the later period of Biden's tenure, the differences between the United States and Europe have increased, Europe has sought "strategic autonomy", and China-EU pragmatic cooperation has ushered in new opportunities.

**Main contents of the coordination of US and EU policies toward China**

Economic, trade and technological issues are the focus of the coordination of US and European policies toward China. The two sides have reached a containment policy with the so-called "de-risking" as the goal.

In June 2021, shortly after Biden took office, the EU and the US established the Trade and Technology Committee (TTC), with the main objectives of expanding bilateral trade and investment, avoiding new trade barriers, cooperating in key areas such as technology, digital, and supply chains, supporting joint research and development, and jointly promoting compatible international standards.

Relying on the mechanism of the Trade and Technology Committee, the US and Europe have reached the following consensus on policy coordination toward China: in terms of economy, trade and investment, reduce dependence on China's supply chain by enhancing "supply chain resilience"; in terms of technology and industry, maintain technological leadership and hinder China's development by coordinating investment and export controls.

In April 2022, on the eve of the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said that supply chains should be transferred to allies and partners through "friendly outsourcing" to reduce risks.

European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde echoed this and said that the Ukrainian crisis was a turning point. In March 2023, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed the so-called "de-risking" concept, falsely claiming that the "Belt and Road" initiative and other mechanisms and institutions "led" by China are changing the existing international order. Given that "decoupling" from China is neither feasible nor in Europe's interests, the EU should be committed to "de-risking" against the Chinese economy.

In April, US President's National Security Advisor Sullivan clearly expressed his recognition of the concept of "de-risking" and expressed the need to establish a safe and resilient supply chain. "De-risking" can be understood as a replica of the concept of "decoupling". **The United States and Europe have mainly taken the following measures:**

First, strengthen supply chain resilience and sustainable supply of raw materials through legislation, such as the "European Economic Security Strategy", "European Economic Security Package" and "Critical Raw Materials Act" promulgated by the European Union.

Second, adopt protectionist policies that are beneficial to domestic technologies and industries, such as the United States launched the "Revitalizing American Manufacturing and Ensuring the Security of Critical Supply Chains Plan" to ensure the resilience of key industrial chains, and promote the return of semiconductor and clean energy manufacturing industries to the United States by signing the "Chips and Science Act" and "Inflation Reduction Act".

Third, unite allies to reshape the global supply chain, such as Biden took the 2021 G20 Rome Summit as an opportunity to convene the "Global Supply Chain Resilience Summit" and seek to establish a US-led global supply chain through the US-EU Trade and Technology Committee and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.

**Emerging new technologies are the areas where the US and Europe focus on coordination to contain China**.

The US and Europe focus on the semiconductor field and try their best to contain and suppress China. The US and Europe passed a bill to strengthen local chip production capacity. In August 2022, the United States passed the Chips and Science Act, which provides $52.7 billion in support for US semiconductor research and development and manufacturing. Companies that build chip factories in the United States will receive a 25% tax cut, but any company that receives US government subsidies must manufacture chips in the United States.

In September 2023, the EU Chip Act officially came into effect, planning to invest 3.3 billion euros in chip research and development and innovation, so that the EU's chip production share in the world will increase from the current 10% to 20% in 2030. The US-EU Trade and Technology Committee held a ministerial meeting in April 2024 and decided to further strengthen semiconductor industry cooperation and extend relevant institutional arrangements for 3 years, namely a joint early warning mechanism to identify supply chain disruptions and take early action and a transparent mechanism for sharing semiconductor subsidy policies.

Recently, the European Union is conducting a survey to assess the degree of European companies' dependence on mature process chips produced in China; the United States has also accelerated the return of the semiconductor industry chain through subsidies. Taiwan’s TSMC, Samsung, Micron and other companies have successively received subsidies from the US government, with a total amount of nearly US$33 billion. In addition, in 2022, the United States, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan will form a "chip quadrilateral alliance" and promote linkage between European allies and "Indo-Pacific" allies, and even coerce allies to jointly implement chip export controls on China.

**At the same time, the United States and Europe have strengthened their coordination of China policies in the fields of military security and geopolitics.**

On the one hand, NATO has extended its strategic vision to the "Indo-Pacific" region and for the first time regarded China as a strategic threat. The "NATO 2022 Strategic Concept" document emphasizes the importance of the "Indo-Pacific" region to NATO and includes China in the strategic document for the first time, claiming that China poses a challenge to its interests, security and values, and claiming that it will respond to the "systemic challenges" brought by China.

The 2023 NATO Vilnius Summit Declaration once again made groundless accusations and distorted smears against China, deliberately exaggerating the so-called "China threat", and maliciously tied the China-Russia new era comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership to the Ukrainian crisis, in order to find "legitimacy" for NATO to strategically link the "Indo-Pacific" region with Atlantic security and point the finger at China.

On the other hand, the United States and Europe have increased their strategic coordination on the South China Sea and Taiwan issues. The United States and Europe have reached a consensus on the South China Sea issue under the framework of the "Indo-Pacific" strategy, advocating that the South China Sea and the "Indo-Pacific" region should establish a so-called "rules-based" regional order, and in the name of so-called "freedom of navigation" and "rules" to contain and constrain China's legitimate behavior and legitimate rights and interests in the South China Sea.

The United States and Europe have issued joint statements on the South China Sea issue many times. For example, in response to the "March 23" incident in which Philippine ships illegally intruded into Ren'ai Reef in 2024, the United States and Europe issued a statement denying China's legitimate maritime claims to the waters around Ren'ai Reef and falsely accused China of undermining regional stability and international norms.

At the same time, the European Union has strengthened its military presence in the South China Sea and the "Indo-Pacific" region. For example, in March 2023, the European Union and the United States held their first joint naval exercise. In April 2024, France, which had previously only served as an observer, participated in the US-Philippines "Shoulder to Shoulder" joint military exercise for the first time. In addition, the Taiwan Strait issue has also become an important topic for US-European policy coordination. At the NATO summit, the United States asked NATO allies to assist the US military in "defending Taiwan" when necessary; in February 2024, the United States and the European Union issued a statement unilaterally emphasizing the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, pointing the responsibility and spearhead at China.

**The United States uses ideology as a weapon to contain China and has increased policy coordination with the European Union in human rights, values ​​and other aspects.**

After Biden took office, Biden held the first and second "Global Democracy Summits" in December 2021 and March 2023, respectively, inviting more than 100 countries and regions including EU countries to attend the meetings, and China and Russia were excluded.

Some "human rights organizations" and think tanks supported by the US government frequently accuse some developing countries that did not come to the meeting as "dictatorship and undemocratic" countries.

The "2023 Report on Human Rights Violations in the United States" issued by the Information Office of the State Council of China reveals with facts and data that the human rights situation in the United States has deteriorated, civil and political rights have become empty talk, and the stubborn disease of racism has caused far-reaching harm. It can be seen that the United States, under the banner of "democracy", is actually politicizing, weaponizing and instrumentalizing "democracy", winning over Western allies to suppress China and other countries, and serving the United States' global hegemony strategy.

American political analyst Garland Nixon said: "The so-called 'Democracy Summit' has nothing to do with democracy. It is just a way to reshape the Cold War in order to dominate the world." At the same time, the United States and Europe bundle human rights and values ​​with other issues of strategic competition with China.

For example, the United States and Europe have "stigmatized" China on Xinjiang-Uygur Region related issues, implemented the "Using Xinjiang to Control China" plot, and imposed sanctions on Chinese companies on the pretext of so-called "forced labor" in Xinjiang. In December 2021, Biden signed the so-called "Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act", announcing a comprehensive ban on the import of goods from Xinjiang. In June 2022, the European Parliament passed a resolution on Xinjiang with 513 votes in favor, 14 abstentions, and 1 vote against, calling on the EU and its members to sanction relevant Chinese officials and prohibit Europe from importing Xinjiang products involving so-called "forced labor".

In addition, the United States has wooed the EU to establish a "Democratic Technology Alliance", tying values ​​and technological competition with China, and under the banner of so-called "democratic values", it has excluded China from its dominant technological system, built an international camp to contain China, and tried its best to maintain the technological monopoly of the United States and the West.

**Differences and disagreements between the US and Europe on China policies**

There are differences between the United States and Europe in their perception and positioning of China, as well as their diplomatic concepts and approaches toward China. The "America First" principle, the Ukrainian crisis, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and other issues have caused greater differences between the two sides, which to a certain extent have led to a temperature difference in their China policies.

Firstly, in terms of the perception of China, there are certain differences in the positioning and tolerance of China between the United States and Europe. The difference in the perception of China between the United States and Europe stems from their views on the international order.

After the end of the Cold War, the United States sought to establish a unipolar hegemonic world, with the strategic goal of ensuring that its political, economic, and military strength far exceeded that of other countries, making itself the shaper and leader of the international order. This strategic thinking has enabled the United States to always uphold the concept of hegemony, constantly looking for and suppressing competitors that may challenge its hegemonic position. In the eyes of the United States, China is currently the only country that has the strength to challenge its global hegemony. In October 2022, the National Security Strategy document released by the United States clearly stated that "China is the only competitor that has the intention to reshape the international order and is constantly strengthening its economic, diplomatic, military and technological strength to achieve this goal." Against the backdrop of the Ukrainian crisis, the U.S. National Defense Strategy report released in the same year regarded China as the biggest strategic competitor facing the United States in the next few decades.

The United States falsely claimed that China is constantly expanding its influence in the "Indo-Pacific" region, China is trying to reshape the norms and order of the "Indo-Pacific" region, and then establish an international order dominated by China. Therefore, in order to ensure its global hegemony and gain absolute advantage over China, the United States has spared no effort to suppress China.

**The EU's view of international order is based on rules, norms and multilateralism.**

Unlike the United States, the EU believes that the world today is multipolar and no major power can dominate the world alone. Therefore, the EU has a relatively open and inclusive attitude towards China's rapid development and rising international status. With the advancement of European integration, the EU regards itself as a "normative force", attaches particular importance to the influence of Western liberal values ​​in the international community, and maintains the so-called "rules-based and values-based" world order.

Unlike the United States' hegemony anxiety, the EU is worried that China's rise will challenge Western liberal values ​​and establish an international order that runs counter to the values ​​advocated by the EU. In 2021, the European Parliament adopted the "New EU-China Strategic Report", emphasizing that China is a partner and negotiating partner of the EU, as well as an economic competitor and institutional competitor of the EU. The first "China Strategy" published by Germany in 2023 positioned China as a "partner, competitor and institutional rival", but the existence of institutional opposition with China does not mean that there is no possibility of cooperation. China's role in addressing key global challenges is indispensable, and the EU's competition with China does not intend to hinder China's economic development and social progress.

**Second, in terms of China strategy, there are differences between the unilateralism of the United States and the multilateralism of the European Union and the diplomatic approaches.**

The United States' foreign goals and foreign behavior are of a continuously expansionist nature, imposing its will on others, and have the characteristics of unilateralism.

Since the Trump administration, the United States has launched a "whole-of-government" strategic competition with China, adopting an extreme and tough "anti-China, containment, and resistance to China" strategy in the fields of economy, politics, diplomacy, and ideology, which has a strong unilateral color.

The Biden administration has inherited the "Trump political legacy", positioned China as the "most severe competitor", and further strengthened its containment of China: in terms of economy, USA maliciously "decouples and breaks the trade chain" with China to enhance the competitiveness of the US economy.

In terms of science and technology, USA willfully implements the "small courtyard and high wall" strategy, increases R&D investment, and forms the so-called "Democratic Technology Alliance" to deepen technological competition with China.

In terms of military security, USA builds a "partnership system" and strengthens "mini-multilateral" military cooperation based on the Quadrilateral Security Mechanism between the United States, Japan, India and Australia, and contains China on the Taiwan issue and the South China Sea issue.

In terms of human rights and values, it bundles ideology with other issues and smears and suppresses China on issues related to Xinjiang-Uygur, Tibet, and Hong Kong. Although the Biden administration advocates the restoration of "multilateralism", the essence of its China policy is unilateralism, which aims to consolidate the United States' own hegemony and absolute advantage. It is a "pseudo-multilateralism" that undermines the inclusive and global multilateral process.

**The EU's diplomatic strategy adheres to the concept of multilateralism, with institutionalism and coordination and cooperation as the main principles and means.**

The Global Strategy of the EU's Foreign and Security Policy, released in 2016, points out that effective multilateralism is an important principle, and "principled pragmatism" is actually a revision of multilateralism to make it more flexible and better realize the interests of the EU, such as taking partnership as an important means to promote effective multilateralism.

The EU's diplomatic approach to China is more in line with the concepts of multilateralism and pragmatism and pragmatic cooperation.

EU countries have benefited from China's economic rise and have a high degree of economic interdependence with China. In 2023, China is the EU's third largest partner for goods exports and the EU's largest partner for goods imports. The EU is highly dependent on China for imports of key infrastructure, especially in products and materials for green energy transformation. Although the EU has proposed a so-called "de-risking" policy to reduce its dependence on China, the EU realizes that it is difficult to achieve this goal in the short term.

At a time when the EU economy is affected by factors such as the Ukrainian crisis, cooperation with China is particularly important. Von der Leyen pointed out in the European Parliament that the EU does not want to cut off its economic, social, and political ties with China. The relationship with China is so important that the EU must formulate its own strategic guidelines. French President Macron said in 2023 that France would not act as a "vassal" of the United States on the Taiwan issue; German Chancellor Scholz also emphasized that China's rise does not mean that Europe will isolate China or restrict cooperation with China. In general, although the EU's diplomatic strategy toward China fluctuates from time to time, it does not completely follow the US "decoupling" policy, but reflects a certain degree of "strategic autonomy".

**Third, in terms of US-EU relations, the "America First" principle, the Ukrainian crisis and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have increased the differences and rifts between the two sides.**

Although Biden has repaired the transatlantic partnership after taking office, it is still difficult for the United States to get rid of the "America First" tone in its European strategy.

In terms of economy and trade, in 2022, the United States passed the Inflation Reduction Act, which aims to curb inflation and invest in domestic clean energy production. This bill provides high subsidies for the domestic electric vehicle automobile industry in the United States, with a strong unilateral and protectionist color.

The EU believes that the bill discriminates against the EU's electric vehicles, batteries, renewable energy and energy-intensive industries, which will affect the competitiveness of European industry and may attract European companies to move to the United States, causing the "hollowing out" of the European economy. In response, the EU introduced the "Green Deal Industry Plan" to improve the EU's green technology competitiveness by taking a series of support measures to cope with the adverse effects of the US Inflation Reduction Act on Europe.

**In terms of military, shortly after Biden took office, he established the US-UK-Australia Trilateral Security Partnership (AUKUS).**

The United States and Britain provided Australia with nuclear submarine technology and helped it build a nuclear submarine fleet, while Australia unilaterally tore up a $66 billion agreement with France to purchase 12 conventional submarines. France was very angry about this, accusing the United States of unilateralism and Australia of violating the "spirit of cooperation", and urgently recalled its ambassadors to the United States and Australia. This incident has weakened France’s and the European Union's trust in the United States.

**The Ukrainian crisis has brought heavy losses to the EU in many aspects, while the United States has reaped the benefits.**

In terms of energy and economy, EU countries were heavily dependent on Russian oil, natural gas, coal and other energy. As the channels for Russia to transport energy to EU countries are cut off, energy prices in European countries have risen, and the economies of EU member states have been negatively affected to varying degrees. Negatively affected by the energy crisis, Germany, which is heavily dependent on manufacturing, will shrink its economy by 0.3% in 2023 and is expected to remain mired in the quagmire in the next few years.

However, the United States purchased a large amount of cheap Russian crude oil before the ban on Russia came into effect, and exported its own energy to Europe at a high price. In terms of strategic security, the United States is the biggest beneficiary of the Ukrainian crisis. Through proxy wars, the Ukrainian crisis has been prolonged and long lasting, consumes Russia's national strength to the greatest extent possible, and bundling the strategy of containing China with the Ukrainian crisis to maintain USA global hegemony. At the same time, the Ukrainian crisis has directly impacted the existing European security structure and exposed the problem of insufficient European defense capabilities. The United States took the opportunity to strengthen NATO's strategic capabilities. **The confrontational European security structure further exacerbated the EU's security dependence on the United States, the EU's strategic autonomy was severely weakened, and the United States' dominant position in the European security architecture was further consolidated.**

For the EU, the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is worse than the previous one. Due to geographical and historical reasons, Europe is deeply affected by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In October 2023, a new round of Israeli-Palestinian conflict triggered the Red Sea crisis, which posed new challenges to the EU economy and may face a new round of refugee crisis, exacerbating social confrontation and further stimulating the development of far-right forces. At the beginning of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the EU's position was relatively consistent with that of the United States. As time went on, the EU's position changed. For example, Spain and Ireland believed that Israel should immediately stop its offensive on Gaza. In May 2024, EU member states Norway, Spain and Ireland announced their recognition of the State of Palestine respectively. The EU has always advocated a "two-state solution" and supported Palestine to become a full member of the United Nations. The United States made it clear that the "two-state solution" needs to be achieved through direct negotiations between Palestine and Israel, rather than unilateral recognition by other countries. It opposes Palestine becoming a member of the United Nations, abuses its veto power in the UN General Assembly's vote on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and provides all-round support to Israel.

**Characteristics and Trends of US-EU Policy Coordination toward China**

During the Biden administration, the coordination between the United States and Europe has been strengthened, showing the characteristics of institutionalization, comprehensiveness, and expansion of the camp structure.

However, in the later period of Biden's tenure, the strategic autonomy of the European Union has become prominent and the differences between the United States and Europe have increased. There is still uncertainty in the future coordination between the United States and Europe. From the perspective of China, the United States and Europe, China-EU relations are generally stable, and Europe emphasizes "strategic autonomy", which is conducive to the stable development of trilateral relations and even the international situation to a certain extent.

**First, compared with the Trump administration, the US-EU coordination has been comprehensively strengthened during the Biden administration.**

First, the coordination of China policy has been institutionalized, and the coordination areas are comprehensive and extensive. The US and Europe have established a series of formal coordination and dialogue mechanisms on issues related to China. After Biden took office, Biden launched the "US-EU Dialogue on China Issues" and the "US-EU High-Level Consultation on Indo-Pacific Issues" mechanisms.

Over the past 4 years, the US and Europe have discussed a wide range of issues related to China, including supply chain security, so-called "economic coercion", human rights issues, the Taiwan issue, and cooperation in clean energy, infrastructure, and maritime security in the "Indo-Pacific" region.

The US and Europe coordinate their economic and technological competition policies toward China through the Trade and Technology Committee. The 6th ministerial meeting of the US-EU Trade and Technology Committee held in April 2024 discussed emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, 6G, as well as cooperation in export controls, investment reviews, and supply chains.

Second, the US-EU policy coordination camp on China has expanded, and the bilateral coordination mechanism has been extended horizontally to the multilateral interaction mechanism. Biden is good at leveraging allies and partner countries to jointly implement a policy of containment against China.

The Group of Seven (G7) has become an important coordination platform, and has successively launched the "Building Back a Better World" (B3W) and "Global Infrastructure and Investment Partnership" programs to offset the influence of the "Belt and Road" initiative.

At the same time, the European Union launched the "Global Gateway" program to enhance its geopolitical influence on a global scale based on strategic considerations of great power games and the reshaping of the international order. The United States and Europe have also strengthened coordination and cooperation with partner countries in other areas. For example, in the field of key minerals, the United States and Europe have wooed mineral-rich countries such as Australia and Canada to establish a "Mineral Security Partnership." The United States and Europe also intend to win over and divide the "Global South" countries to maintain the dominance of Western countries and curb China's influence in the "Global South."

**Second, as the EU's strategic autonomy becomes more prominent, the differences between the US and Europe increase, and the uncertainty of future policy coordination between the two sides increases.**

On the Taiwan issue, European polls show that most respondents are unwilling to be involved in a war over the Taiwan issue.

Macron said that Europe must reduce its dependence on the United States and avoid being involved in the confrontation between the United States and China on the Taiwan issue. This remark has aroused dissatisfaction in the United States.

At the same time, there are differences within the US-EU economic coordination mechanism with China. The original intention of the establishment of the US-EU Trade and Technology Committee was to deal with competition with China, but after the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis, it became an important platform for coordinating sanctions and export controls against Russia.

In fact, at the sixth ministerial meeting of the US-EU Trade and Technology Committee held in April 2024, the results achieved against China were extremely limited, and China was mentioned only three times in the joint statement issued. The United States insists on putting China at the top of every statement, but the EU prefers to avoid directly targeting China.

In the coordination of science and technology policies toward China, the United States coerced European allies to jointly " exclude China in Chip trade". In response, the Netherlands, Germany and other countries stated that Europe would not "completely copy" the US chip export control policy toward China, and it was necessary to formulate independent policies in a unified manner under the EU framework.

On the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, China, France and the EU have strengthened their consensus and called for and they advocated a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. European Council President Michel expressed support for the "two-state solution" and supported the recognition of the State of Palestine. The recognition of the State of Palestine by 3 EU member states also reflects the widening differences between the United States and Europe on the Palestinian-Israeli issue.

The EU has become a force to check and balance the United States on the Palestinian-Israeli issue. The "hypocrisy" and "double standards" of the US power politics have been fully exposed, causing dissatisfaction in the international community, and will to a certain extent weaken the US hegemony and influence in the Middle East.

**Third, China-EU relations have strong endogenous driving force and broad development prospects, and are expected to play a positive role in the trilateral relationship between China, the USA and the EU.**

From the end of 2022 to the present, under the leadership of the diplomacy of heads of state, the dialogue and exchange mechanism between China and major partners such as the European Union, France and Germany has been fully restored to normal, and bilateral relations have been repaired and steadily set sail.

Since the end of 2022, leaders of many European countries and the European Union, such as Germany, France, Spain, and the Netherlands, have visited China, and high-level dialogues between China and the European Union in the fields of strategy, economy and trade, green energy and digital industry have achieved fruitful results.

In December 2023, European Council President Michel and European Commission President von der Leyen visited China, and the 24th China-EU Leaders' Meeting was held in Beijing, coinciding with the 20th anniversary of the establishment of a comprehensive strategic partnership between China and the European Union and the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the China-EU leaders' meeting mechanism.

This was also the first time that China and the European Union have resumed offline leaders' summits since 2019. In May 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping successfully visited France, Serbia and Hungary, enhancing strategic mutual trust between China and Europe and injecting new impetus into promoting the stable development of China-EU relations.

During the trip, President Xi Jinping held a trilateral meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Macron and von der Leyen expressed their desire to strengthen dialogue and cooperation with China and enhance mutual trust. In addition, as the differences between the United States and Europe on the Ukraine issue intensify and it is still difficult to reach a consensus, coupled with the EU's concerns about Trump's possible election as US president and the subsequent "isolationist" policy, of Trump the EU will further emphasize multilateralism and "strategic autonomy".

The steady progress of China-EU relations in the past two years has helped to reduce the pressure on China from US-EU coordination. China's active role in its relations with the United States and Europe will also promote the stable development of trilateral relations to a certain extent.

**It is worth noting that the EU's policy toward China has certain duality and complexity, and we need to be vigilant that the EU may make certain swings between China and the United States based on its own interests.**

For example, in terms of the US-European boycott of electric vehicles, in May 2024, when US Treasury Secretary Yellen visited Germany, Yellen tried to win over the EU to work with the United States to deal with the so-called "overcapacity" problem in China.

Von der Leyen said that the EU would not join the US in imposing tariffs on China. However, on June 12, the European Commission issued a statement announcing that it would impose an additional tariff of up to 38.1% on electric vehicles imported from China. This is a manifestation of the EU's protectionism of "destroying fair competition" in the name of so-called "maintaining fair competition", which is completely inconsistent with the previous promise not to impose tariffs. The results of the European Parliament elections show that the EU's extreme right-wing forces are constantly rising, and the "right turn" in the political ecology will push the EU's policies to be more conservative and inward-looking, focusing on economic security and trade protection, which may bring more challenges to China-EU relations.

**Conclusion**

During the Biden administration, the coordination between the United States and Europe reached an unprecedented level. However, factors such as the Ukrainian crisis, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the US elections have stimulated the EU's "strategic autonomy", and the differences between the United States and Europe on China's policies have increased.

China-EU relations have generally developed steadily, and there is an opportunity for corresponding adjustments in the trilateral relationship between China, the United States and the EU. In recent years, China has taken the initiative to lead China-EU relations back to the normal track and achieved remarkable results, but it is still necessary to be vigilant against the rise of EU protectionism and the interference it brings to the development of China-EU relations.

China and the EU have common interests in promoting the multipolarization of the world and economic globalization. Strengthening exchanges and cooperation between China and the EU is the will of the people and the general trend. China and the EU have the responsibility to provide more stability to the world and provide more guidance and support for global governance. In the face of new situations and changes, China's diplomacy in the new era adheres to true multilateralism, carries forward the valuable experience of the "six musts", and promotes the world towards a bright prospect of peace, security, prosperity and progress. Taking the promotion of the healthy development of China-EU relations as the starting point, we should promote the balance and stability of the trilateral relationship between China, the United States and the EU, and inject more certainty and positive factors into the world entering a new period of turbulence and change.