**Iranian Issue and USA in the Changing World Pattern: Iran and Turkiye Camps in the Middle East; Three Camps in the Middle East**

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**Introduction**

**Generally speaking, there are three camps in the Middle East: Iran and its allies, namely the Shia and pro-Iran camp, which have very close relations with Russia and are seen as a force that checks and balances the United States in the Middle East.**

**The pro-Muslim Brotherhood camp centered on Turkey and Qatar. And thirdly the anti-Iran and anti-Muslim Brotherhood camp formed by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel.**

**Overall, in the Middle East, the Shia camp centered on Iran and Turkiye led the pro-Muslim Brotherhood camp supported by Qatar are more powerful than the third camp.**

**Any external power that wants to exert influence in the Middle East must first handle its relations with these two camps.**

On May 19, Iran time, a helicopter carrying Iranian President Raisi, Foreign Minister Abdollahyan and others made a hard landing. No one on board showed signs of survival, which caused shock and speculation from all walks of life. Raisi has always been regarded as a representative of Iran's conservatives, and his pragmatic governing style has gained a certain development space for Iran. His death not only casts a shadow on the future handover of Iranian politics, but also adds a variable to the current complex and turbulent situation in the Middle East. Under the new situation, how do we re-understand Iran ? What is the global significance of the so-called "Iran issue" ?

Iran's significance lies not only in its energy supply capacity, but also in its strong influence on the regional order and its development potential. For more than 40 years since the Iranian Islamic Revolution, the United States has been encircling it, and it has intensified it in the Trump era. Its "maximum pressure" policy is both a means and an end. It seeks either Iran to bow its head and cooperate, or Iran to cause internal unrest and regime change, and ultimately establish a geopolitical pattern in the Middle East dominated by the United States.

In the four-tier competition and three camps in the Middle East, Iran cooperated with the rising sub-national armed forces in the Middle East to ensure its own security; economically, it promoted the "resistance economy" of its manufacturing industry; and adopted a "restrained escalation" strategy in political confrontation, proving its position and capabilities in the Middle East.

The author points out that under the promotion of the United States, the complex geopolitical competition pattern in the Middle East has not reduced the security threats in the region, and countries are unable to focus on development, which in turn has exacerbated the imbalance of population growth, regional development and resource distribution, and made turmoil, contradictions and conflicts more prominent.

**The "Iran Issue" in the Changing World Pattern**

In 2019, US President Trump stepped up the intensity of his "maximum pressure" policy on Iran. In May, the US government announced the end of exemptions for Iran's oil exports; in June, it began to impose sanctions on Iran's petrochemical exports and sent an aircraft carrier battle group to the waters around Iran. The US-Iranian relations, which had been greatly eased during the Obama administration, have experienced major reversals, and the "Iran issue" has once again become one of the focus events of international attention. What caused the US government to make such a major policy shift? What is the global significance of the "Iran issue" highlighted by this?

**The United States’ Middle East strategy and the “Iran issue”**

Let us first review the “Iran issue” of the United States after the Gulf War. After the Gulf War in 1991, Iraq and Iran became the two main opponents of the United States in the Middle East. During the Clinton administration, the United States formulated a "dual containment" policy against Iraq and Iran, and made Iraq a priority target. The Clinton administration made material and ideological preparations for a military strike against Iraq. On this basis, the Bush administration launched the Iraq War in 2003 and overthrew the Saddam regime. Since then, with the emergence of the "rise of Iran", Iran has become the biggest challenge for the United States in the Middle East. The alliance system built by the United States in the Middle East includes Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Israel, Turkey and other countries. Even if these allies work together to exert pressure, it is impossible to promote regime change in Iran and reverse Iran's growing influence in the region, nor can it make Iran succumb in terms of its nuclear program. The long-term confrontation between the United States and Iran has become an action that invests huge resources but cannot achieve strategic demands. In fact, it is an excessive consumption of US strategic resources.

After Obama came to power, he tried to break this dilemma. One of the main ideas of the Obama administration's Middle East policy is to ease relations with Iran, thereby reducing the United States' strategic resource investment in the Middle East and increasing the United States' control over the Middle East. The logic of the Obama administration's policy of "easing relations with Iran, reducing investment, and increasing control" in the Middle East is: on the one hand, Iran has a strong influence in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Afghanistan and other countries, and easing relations with Iran is conducive to the United States' handling of relations with these countries; on the other hand, Saudi Arabia, Israel and other countries that have long been in confrontation with Iran are traditional allies of the United States. Even if the United States eases relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel cannot find other global powers to replace the United States' influence in the Middle East. They can only compete with Iran by strengthening their cooperative relationship with the United States in order to influence the United States' policies. By easing relations with Iran, the United States can strengthen the dependence of its traditional allies on the United States.

From a strategic perspective, the Obama administration's policy design is beneficial to the United States, but this policy faces both internal and external challenges. Externally, there is great dissatisfaction and opposition from the United States' traditional allies, especially Saudi Arabia and Israel, because for them, this means accepting Iran's regional power status; internally, there are the divided party interests and long-formed policy inertia in the United States. Accepting Iran means accepting an equal partnership, which is difficult for many policy elites in the United States, which has long been a dominant position in the Middle East. The combination of external and internal opposition has constrained the Obama administration's Middle East policy. On the one hand, the Obama administration has eased tensions with Iran, and on the other hand, it has been slow to lift sanctions on Iran. Not only has it retained all primary sanctions, but it has also not allowed Iran to use the US dollar in terms of secondary sanctions.

After Trump came to power, he quickly abandoned the strategic approach set by the Obama administration to ease US-Iran relations. Although he is aware of the special status of Iran and Turkey in the Middle East and recognizes their importance, he does not want to cooperate with an Iran with strong autonomy. His "extreme pressure" is nothing more than the expectation of cooperating with a surrendered Iran. If Iran is willing to obey the geopolitical arrangements of the United States, the United States will be willing to normalize relations with it, provide defensive weapons, and invest huge amounts of money to help Iran's economy develop further. In exchange, Iran will assist and support the United States in handling Middle East affairs and become the strategic pillar of the United States in the Middle East.

At present, the "maximum pressure" measures taken by Trump are first to impose stricter sanctions on Iran, especially in the energy and financial fields. When the Obama administration was implementing sanctions against Iran in 2011, there was still a lot of room for the United States to restrict Iran's energy exports, such as requiring Iranian crude oil importers to reduce oil imports by 20% every 6 months to obtain exemptions, which provided conditions for the volatile imports of relevant countries. The exemption policy implemented by the Trump administration in November 2018 took strict measures, not only requiring a one-time reduction of 40% in total volume, but also not restricting the total import volume by country, but directly making requirements on companies and enterprises, and reviewing each related company one by one. Such restrictions are more precise, putting pressure on each related company, forming a targeted constraint mechanism, and cannot be shared by the country. Furthermore, sanctions against companies can be linked to their parent companies and affiliated companies, which means that companies that originally had no business in the United States and could ignore sanctions will also be affected by their affiliated companies.

At the same time, the United States has also restricted financial payment tools for entities that have cooperation and trade relations with Iran. These measures are undoubtedly more "precise" and "strict". In May 2019, the Trump administration directly cancelled the exemption for Iran's oil exports, and on this basis tried to completely block Iran and cut off its foreign trade. In the energy and financial fields, the Trump administration has pushed "maximum pressure" to the extreme.

Secondly, USA is trying to mobilize its allies in the Middle East as much as possible to cooperate with the United States in "encircling" Iran, isolating and suppressing Iran . In January 2017, the United States proposed a regional security order concept called "Arab NATO", whose goal is to form a military security group with the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar as the center, expanding outward to Egypt, Jordan and Morocco, and then covering other Arab countries such as Algeria, to jointly put pressure on Iran. Later, the name of this strategic framework was changed to "Middle East Strategic Alliance".

But until now, this security mechanism has been difficult to advance. There are serious contradictions within Arab countries, such as Qatar's severance of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt and other countries, and Egypt also clearly announced in 2019 that it would not participate in this mechanism.

Thirdly, USA seeks to promote Arab countries and Israel to unite against Iran. Because of the Palestinian issue, there are huge moral and political obstacles for Arab countries to cooperate with Israel.

For this reason, the United States hopes to promote cooperation between Arab countries and Israel by promoting the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, such as the "deal of the century " led by Kushner .

However, compared with the previous administration, the Trump administration is more biased towards Israel on the Palestinian-Israeli issue, believing that as long as all of Israel's demands are met, the Palestinian-Israeli issue can be resolved. Therefore, the Trump administration moved the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem to support Israel's sovereignty claim over the Golan Heights. The reason why Israeli leader Netanyahu won a huge victory in the recent general election is also related to this. Netanyahu successfully conveyed this view to the people: it is precisely because of his tough behavior that the United States unilaterally supports Israel.

However, the United States' unilateral support for Israel is bound to trigger a sustained backlash from Arab countries. Although Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman wants to cooperate with Kushner's policy, King Salman stood up to oppose Saudi Arabia's support for the "deal of the century" proposed by the United States because it involves Saudi Arabia's morality and legitimacy among Arab countries.

Officials in charge of Iran affairs at the U.S. State Department said that "maximum pressure" on Iran is both a means and an end. If "maximum pressure" cannot make Iran yield and negotiate on U.S. terms, then using "maximum pressure" to continue to weaken Iran and plunge Iran into turmoil, and even to create conditions for the ultimate change of the Iranian regime, is also in the interests of the United States. Therefore, in addition to severe sanctions, "maximum pressure" also includes provoking various contradictions in Iran to cause social unrest. In addition to "maximum pressure" on Iran itself, pushing back Iran's influence in Syria, Iraq and other countries is also an important means to contain Iran.

In general, the Trump administration's Middle East policy is centered on Iran, and aims to establish a geopolitical structure in which the United States has absolute control in the Middle East by resolving the Iranian issue. Faced with the United States' series of "extreme pressure" measures and geopolitical layout, the Iranian government has shown opposition and an uncompromising attitude. So, what is Iran's confidence? What is Iran's representative significance in the Middle East and what is its room for maneuver?

**The multi-layered competition structure in the Middle East and Iran’s special status**

Before 1979, Iran was the United States' largest ally in the Middle East. After the Islamic Revolution, the United States took continuous sanctions against Iran. The intention of the United States to impose sanctions on Iran is to contain and isolate Iran, cause the collapse of Iran's economy and trigger social unrest, and ultimately achieve regime change. Iran has persisted under heavy pressure for 40 years, which is enough to show that Iran is not as fragile as people think. On the contrary, it may still have considerable development potential. In terms of national strength, Iran is a well-deserved big country in the Middle East, with an area of ​​more than 1.6 million square kilometers and a population of more than 80 million. Iran's crude oil reserves account for about 10% of the world's total reserves, natural gas reserves rank second in the world, and comprehensive oil and gas reserves are among the highest in the world. In addition, Iran also has a considerable industrialization foundation, which is very prominent in the Middle East, where the export of oil and gas resources is the main economic structure.

Iran and Turkey are the two most promising powers in the Middle East, and this potential is comprehensive, including industrial strength, population size, resource conditions, security capabilities, etc. Iran and Turkey are truly powerful countries in the Middle East, and therefore have become the most powerful competitors for the "leadership" in the Middle East, constituting the first level of competition within the Middle East - the competition around who is the largest country in the Islamic world.

Iran has become an absolute dominant force among Shiites. In contrast, Turkey has not yet become an absolute dominant force among Sunnis. The two sides have adopted a limited, non-confrontational competition approach to the goal of who can become the largest country in the Islamic world. That is, the two sides will focus their competition on the Syrian crisis while maintaining high-level visits, trade exchanges, and diplomatic interactions. Turkey's goal is to grow into the top ten economies in the world through sustained economic development in the next ten to fifteen years; while Iran hopes to grow into the largest economy in the Gulf region. In fact, both sides have their own long-term strategic plans, and they also have the corresponding execution capabilities and a certain industrial and resource base. At present, Turkey and Iran are the countries at the forefront of the Middle East in terms of accumulation and development in science and technology, education, and industry. In terms of nuclear energy, nanotechnology, aerospace, and biopharmaceuticals, Iran is the country with the highest level in the Middle East.

The second level of competition in the Middle East is the competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Many people believe that the competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia is a sectarian conflict, a competition between Sunnis and Shiites, but the actual situation is more complicated. The competition between the two is a comprehensive confrontational competition, including five aspects: first, the competition of political systems, namely Iran's Islamic republic political model and Saudi Arabia's monarchical political model; second, the competition of foreign policies. Saudi Arabia basically relies on the United States in its foreign policy, while Iran tries to seek an independent foreign policy rather than simply anti-American; third, the competition about regional security. The two countries each have their own alliance system in the Middle East; then there is the competition of social culture and religion, and sectarian conflicts are the embodiment of this aspect; finally, there is the competition of science and technology and economy. Saudi Arabia has a relatively developed oil economy and considerable financial capital reserves, but compared with Iran, Saudi Arabia has great deficiencies in industrial and technological accumulation.

**The third level of competition in the Middle East is between pro-Muslim Brotherhood forces and anti-Muslim Brotherhood forces.**

In the Middle East, there are Muslim Brotherhood organizations in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco and other countries. Turkey's ruling party, the Justice and Development Party, is a party of the Muslim Brotherhood nature, so Turkey supports the Muslim Brotherhood; Qatar also makes supporting the Muslim Brotherhood an important policy. Egypt and the UAE are countries that firmly oppose the Muslim Brotherhood. After the Egyptian regime change in 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood won the parliamentary elections, and its leader Morsi was elected president of Egypt in 2012. In 2013, with the support of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other countries, Sisi overthrew the government controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood and successfully took power. Egypt began to fully suppress the Muslim Brotherhood, and its relations with Turkey and Qatar also became tense. Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and other countries oppose the Muslim Brotherhood, while Turkey, Qatar and other countries support the Muslim Brotherhood. The competition between the two camps is reflected in the conflicts in Libya, Syria and Yemen.

The fourth level of competition in the Middle East is the competition within Arab countries. After King Salman came to power in 2015, Saudi Arabia began a relatively drastic transformation. In the domestic political system, power is concentrated in King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman; in foreign policy, there is a tendency of "Salmanism", that is, taking the initiative and adopting an offensive foreign policy on regional issues, including launching a war against Yemen in 2015, breaking off diplomatic relations with Iran in 2016, and breaking off diplomatic relations with Qatar in 2017; in terms of economy, the fall in oil prices in 2014 put great pressure on the Saudi economy, and the plan to list Saudi Aramco in 2018 was also stopped. Saudi Arabia performed poorly in the war in Yemen, failed to gain an advantage in the competition with Iran and Qatar, and faced relatively great difficulties overall. On the one hand, the UAE supports Saudi Arabia in regional affairs, and on the other hand, it competes with Saudi Arabia in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region; Qatar also tried to expand its influence with the help of the Arab Spring.

The multi-level competition in the Middle East makes the regional structure extremely complex. There are many Arab countries, but they are highly differentiated, which in turn gives non-Arab countries more room for action. Non-Arab countries in the Middle East, such as Iran, Turkey, and Israel, have established their own regional alliance system among Arab countries. Iran's allies are Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, Israel's allies or potential allies are Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, and Jordan, and Turkey's allies are Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood in Arab countries.

The traditional powers in the Middle East include Iran, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, among which Egypt and Saudi Arabia have seen their power shrink. Some key small countries, such as the UAE and Qatar, have formed relatively strong financial and fiscal capabilities based on their energy industries, and use them to support their regional diplomatic ambitions and seek greater influence in the Middle East.

**Generally speaking, there are three camps in the Middle East: Iran and its allies, namely the Shia and pro-Iran camp, which have very close relations with Russia and are seen as a force that checks and balances the United States in the Middle East. The pro-Muslim Brotherhood camp centered on Turkey and Qatar; and the anti-Iran and anti-Muslim Brotherhood camps formed by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel. Overall, in the Middle East, the Shia camp centered on Iran and the pro-Muslim Brotherhood camp centered on Turkey and Qatar are more powerful. Any external power that wants to exert influence in the Middle East must first handle its relations with these two camps.**

In the focal countries of the current conflict in the Middle East, such as Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya and Lebanon, we can see the mutual game between several major camps in the Middle East. In addition, a new phenomenon has emerged in these focal countries, namely the rise of non-state armed actors. Non-state armed actors have weapons but are not government agencies. Sometimes they are called militia organizations, and sometimes they call themselves political parties, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthi armed forces in Yemen, and Iraqi popular mobilization forces. These organizations have played an important role in maintaining national sovereignty and security, and to a certain extent participate in the central government. They have a certain degree of legitimacy. Such organizations can also be called sub -state armed actors . Whether it is a regional power or a superpower outside the region, finding such allies in these focal countries can gain a relatively obvious advantage.

Iran has maintained its continued influence on regional security by relying on its partnership with many sub-national armed actors, thereby effectively responding to the US's "regional pushback" policy against Iran. In the USA's conception, as long as the US strengthens restrictions on Iran's oil revenue, Iran will lack sufficient resources to support its regional allies. However, by supporting sub-national armed actors in key countries in the Middle East, Iran can effectively maintain its regional influence. According to Iran's assessment, the cost of Iran's support for regional allies is only 0.5% of its GDP. The interests of these sub-national armed actors are highly consistent or convergent with Iran's interests, so they do not need Iran to provide high material support. For example, in the process of opposing the "Daesh" organization, Iran has supported an Iraqi Shiite militia of about 200,000 people, the military strength of Hezbollah in Lebanon has increased from 5,000 to 70,000, and the Houthi armed forces in Yemen have about 250,000 armed forces. In the Middle East, Iran is equivalent to recreating an armed force of the same size as Iran's military outside its borders. This is a concentrated reflection of Iran's regional security capabilities.

The Trump administration's "maximum pressure" on Iran has indeed caused serious difficulties for the Iranian economy. For example, at the beginning of 2018, the exchange rate of the US dollar to the Iranian currency was 1 US dollar to 40,000 rials. By September 2018, it had become 1:160,000 rials, an increase of 400%. Such huge fluctuations in the exchange rate have had a huge impact on the Iranian economy. For Iran, although it is impossible to completely avoid economic difficulties, it has the ability to ensure that the economic pressure imposed by the United States will not turn into social unrest. Because Iran itself has a good industrial base, most products can be produced domestically and do not involve imports. Therefore, despite the "maximum pressure" of the Trump administration, the prices of basic necessities such as energy have not fluctuated much.

Iran has taken the US sanctions as an opportunity to vigorously promote the "resistance economy" to enhance its manufacturing capabilities. The Iranian people generally realize that this pressure mainly comes from the United States, rather than the Iranian government itself, thus avoiding domestic political polarization. In May 2019, Iran began to adopt "restrained escalation" to respond to the US's "extreme pressure". In June 2019, Iran's air defense forces shot down a US drone that invaded Iranian airspace and successfully curbed the US's retaliatory attempt, thus forming a strong military deterrent and psychological deterrent to the United States and its regional allies such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

**Choices of major powers in the context of the multi-faceted competition structure in the Middle East**

Trump's policy towards Iran marks that the United States has returned to its long-standing strategic concept in the Middle East: that is, using "security" as an excuse, establishing a competitor in the Middle East, setting up a common enemy, developing a group of allies around this core, forming an alliance relationship system, and establishing a regional order of "collective security". The demand for security has a certain objectivity, but the price of this "collective security" order is to sacrifice the demand for "development". Because when the common enemy is not completely eliminated and the serious security threats are not resolved, development cannot become a theme, and "security" will overwhelm "development". One of the biggest lessons of the United States' actions in Iraq is that it disbanded the Iraqi Baath Party and the Iraqi army, resulting in a situation where the control of the Iraqi central government was completely collapsed. The cost of maintaining order in Iraq was too high for the United States itself, and until now, the control of the Iraqi government has not been fully restored. Therefore, maintaining the basic political, military and security structure of Middle Eastern countries and formulating economic development strategies and feasible economic development plans that are in line with national conditions are two basic elements for the strong national capacity building of Middle Eastern countries.

The Middle East is currently in the process of a dramatic and profound transformation. At the regional level, it is a reconstruction of the geostrategic pattern; at the national level, it is a process of building and re-building the nation-state.

Driven by the US Middle East policy, the complex geopolitical competition pattern in the Middle East has led to the failure to reduce the security threat in the region, and countries are often unable to focus on development, which in turn has exacerbated the imbalance between population growth and economic and resource growth in the Middle East, and the imbalance between regional development and resource distribution, resulting in constant turmoil, contradictions and conflicts in the Middle East. Therefore, at the regional level, it is urgent to establish a regional security consultation mechanism to provide a platform for regional countries to contact and consult, so as to effectively ease the fierce geopolitical competition.

Western countries have long implemented a deindustrialization policy in the Middle East. For example, during Britain's colonial history in Egypt and the United States' alliance with Egypt, no industrialization policy was implemented. From the perspective of the national interests of the colonial sovereign, the sovereign does not want the colonial countries to establish a complete industrial system, because industrial capacity is the basis for the sovereign to effectively control the colonies, and the industrial capacity grown in the colonies will also lead to market competition for the sovereign. This long-term deindustrialization policy has caused many Middle Eastern countries to lack industrialization strategies, industrialization practices and accumulation. The ultimate problem is that in the process of rapid population growth in the Middle East due to the oil dividend and the international low food price dividend, the employment needs of the majority of young people cannot be met. The youth unemployment rate in many Middle Eastern countries is around 30%, which is actually the reason for social unrest in the past few years.

Therefore, for the Middle Eastern countries to truly get out of this turbulent quagmire, they need to vigorously develop labor-intensive manufacturing to absorb young people into employment, which is actually the most urgent demand of these countries. However, the development of manufacturing requires considerable funds, technology and experience, and the populous countries in the Middle East often lack these conditions.

Therefore, many countries in the Middle East are very concerned about China's "Belt and Road" initiative and look forward to connecting their own development strategies with the "Belt and Road" initiative, because this undoubtedly means an important opportunity for many Middle Eastern countries to get rid of the turmoil and achieve orderly development. Take Iran as an example. After the United States withdrew from the Iran nuclear agreement, the Iranian political elite has deeply realized that Iran needs to establish a substantive strategic relationship with China and Russia. Iran as a West Asian country, Russia as a North Asian country and China as an East Asian country should carry out real Asian integration, which is strongly consistent with China's "Belt and Road" initiative.

For China, it is also necessary to pay more attention to Iran and understand Iran's special significance from the perspective of the changes in the global order. The importance that the Obama and Trump administrations attach to Iran has already shown that Iran is the most important force and variable in the Middle East.

 If Iran is still regarded as just a "middle power", its importance is undoubtedly ignored. Iran is a regional power with global influence and an important force in maintaining regional stability and balance. China has made it clear that it will view the relationship between the two countries from a long-term perspective and strategic height. Iran's significance lies not only in its energy supply capacity, but also in its strong influence on the regional order and its huge development potential.

Historical experience shows that any major country that wants to play a leading role in the world must exert influence in the Middle East. This is because the Middle East has dual global energy and geopolitical importance. For most Middle Eastern countries, the trend of seeking a great power balance diplomacy is becoming increasingly obvious, and China is an important partner of these countries. China does not seek an alliance system in the Middle East, but establishes partnerships of different levels and contents with Middle Eastern countries. China has established a comprehensive strategic partnership with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates and other countries, as well as partnerships with some other Arab countries, Israel, Turkey and other countries. Most Middle Eastern countries are unwilling to take sides between the world's major powers when implementing a great power balance policy; and China and the United States have not formed a fierce competition in terms of energy security and geostrategy in the Middle East.

In general, the Middle East remains a stage for great power competition and a platform for great power cooperation. How to control this game so that it does not evolve into fierce competition and sharp confrontation, and how to find opportunities and handles for cooperation, so as to stabilize the relations between great powers and promote the stability of the regional situation and the construction of the political, economic and security capabilities of regional countries, are issues that the world powers need to think about for a long time when formulating Middle East policies.