Wu Hao: Positive Contribution and Negative Effects of Communist International on the failure of the Great Revolution (1924-27) in China
Severe Disagreements Between Borodin, Roy and Vilyinsky Who Fought in the Great Revolution (1924-27)
Taken from Chinese Communist Party History Network, March 2022
At the critical moment when the revolution was facing a serious crisis, the Communist International and the Soviet Communist Party (Bolsheviks) representatives in China were full of contradictions and could not formulate a good way to deal with the crisis. Roy repeatedly suggested to Stalin and Bukharin that Borodin and CPC Chairman Chen Duxiu should be replaced.
Roy even called the CPC Chairman Chen Duxiu “the agent of the Kuomintang in the Communist Party” and “Chen Duxiu should be removed from the leadership of the Communist Party.” Borodin believed that Roy had made an organizational mistake by showing Wang Jingwei a telegram that must not be shown to anyone else, and asked the Communist International to recall him.
The Communist International and the Soviet Communist Party (Bolsheviks) still hoped to hold on to Wang Jingwei. The Central Political Bureau of the Soviet Communist Party (Bolsheviks) decided to give another 2 million rubles in aid to the Wuhan National Government and telegraphed Wang Jingwei: “In order to save the revolution, Wang Jingwei government should stop wavering, must support the land revolution and the peasants, and continue to cooperate with the Communists”. These calls could no longer hold back Wang Jingwei, who had already turned right.
The Intensification of the Revolutionary Crisis and the May Emergency Directives
Around the time of the Fifth National Congress of the CPC, the situation in Wuhan deteriorated sharply, and counter-revolutionary activities quickly surfaced. The Wuhan KMT Central Committee and the National Government headed by Wang Jingwei also quickly turned reactionary.
Under this situation, the reactionary officers of the Wuhan government, instigated by Chiang Kai-shek, openly launched an armed rebellion. At the end of April 1927, He Jian, a subordinate of Tang Shengzhi and commander of the 35th Army of the National Revolutionary Army, convened reactionary officers in Hankou to discuss the anti-communist “purge” plan. On May 9, Yang Sen, commander of the 20th Army of the National Revolutionary Army stationed in eastern Sichuan and commander of the Sichuan-Hubei Border Defense, led his troops to occupy Yichang, forcibly disbanded the Yichang General Labor Union and the Peasant Association, massacred the workers and peasants, and issued a telegram against the Communist Party and the Wuhan Punishment. Xia Douyin, commander of the 14th Independent Division of the National Revolutionary Army, which had recently moved to Yichang, worked closely with Yang Sen. On May 13, he issued a telegram to ally with Chiang to oppose the Communist Party and attack the Wuhan government. On the 17th, he led his troops to approach the Zhifang Town near Wuchang.
The local tyrants and evil gentry took advantage of the rebellion of Yang Sen and Xia Douyin to counterattack. In just one month, the number of peasants killed reached 4,000 to 5,000. At this time, the main force of the Wuhan National Government was fighting fiercely with the Fengtian Army in Henan and could not return to help. Some upper-class figures of the Kuomintang in Wuhan were terrified and prepared to flee. Ye Ting, then commander of the Wuchang garrison, led his troops to fight back according to the orders of the CPC Central Committee and the National Government, and quickly defeated Xia Douyin’s rebels. On May 25, the Wuhan National Government formed a Western Expedition Army to attack Yang Sen’s troops who were approaching Hanyang. On June 24, the Western Expedition Army recaptured Yichang, and Yang Sen led some troops to flee to Badong by land and sea. The situation in Wuhan temporarily eased.
On May 21, Xu Kexiang, the head of the 33rd Regiment of the 35th Army of the National Revolutionary Army, which was reorganized from the original Zhili warlord troops, launched a counter-revolutionary rebellion in Changsha, mobilizing troops to launch a surprise attack on the Kuomintang Hunan Provincial Party Committee, the Provincial Federation of Trade Unions, the Provincial Peasant Association and other organs, confiscated the guns of the workers’ pickets, and arrested and killed more than 100 Communist Party members and revolutionary masses, shrouding Changsha in white terror. This is the May 21st Incident. (The telegram on the 21st rhymed with the word “Ma”, so the incident that took place on this day is called the May 21st Incident – author’s note) After the incident, Wang Jingwei and others strongly advocated “mediation” of the so-called “military-industrial conflict”, claiming on the one hand that Xu Kexiang would be investigated, and on the other hand, ordered the investigation of the “excessive” behavior of the workers and peasants’ movement. The CPC Central Committee, headed by Chen Duxiu, originally advocated the use of force to deal with Xu Kexiang’s troops, as they did with Xia Douyin, but after hearing the opinions of Wang Jingwei and others, they changed their minds and believed that it was not appropriate to use force to attack at present from a political perspective, “everything should be solved by the (Wuhan) government, and no free action should be taken.”
They even publicly accused the incident of “naturally being related to the immature actions of the Hunan peasant movement” and decided to send Tan Pingshan to Hunan to correct the “excessive” behavior. At this time, there were more than 5 million members of the peasant associations in various counties in Hunan, but because they did not receive strong leadership from the Communist Party, they were scattered all over the country and could not effectively fight back against the counter-revolutionary forces. In addition, the Communist Party organizations in many places in Hunan were established or developed in the legal environment of the climax of the Great Revolution. “They had no experience in struggle and could not cope with this struggle environment.” They were also lacking in mental preparation for the sudden attack of the counter-revolutionary forces, “so when the incident came, they were in a panic.” After the incident, the Hunan Provisional Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China once decided to mobilize more than 10,000 peasant soldiers from more than 10 counties near Changsha to march to Changsha. However, under the CPC Central Committee’s policy of peaceful resolution, some people were afraid that the attack on the city would destroy the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, so they changed their plan midway and ordered a retreat. 5,000 peasant soldiers from Liuyang and other places attacked Changsha alone because they did not receive orders in time, and were defeated by Xu Kexiang. The peasant soldiers in various counties were defeated one by one. Xu Kexiang and other counter-revolutionaries became even more crazy. In just over 20 days, they massacred more than 10,000 people in counties near Changsha. The party organization in Hunan suffered a serious blow.
Zhu Peide, the commander-in-chief of the Fifth Front Army of the National Revolutionary Army that ruled Jiangxi and the chairman of the Jiangxi Provincial Government, also turned reactionary in late May and early June, using the so-called “courtesy expulsion” method to expel the Communist Party members and the left-wing Kuomintang from Jiangxi. Subsequently, martial law was declared in Nanchang, prohibiting the workers’ and peasants’ movement.
As the Wang Jingwei clique became increasingly reactionary and Yang Sen, Xia Douyin, Xu Kexiang, and Zhu Peide defected one after another, the Communist International and the CPC Central Committee headed by Chen Duxiu still regarded Wang Jingwei as a member of the KMT left and believed that the most important issue at the moment was to improve the relationship between the CPC and the KMT left. Therefore, they adopted an accommodating attitude towards the Wang Jingwei clique, followed them in accusing the workers’ and peasants’ movement of “excessiveness”, and did not dare to resolutely fight against the reactionary attacks. This wrong attitude could only make the overall situation worse.
At the Eighth Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International held from May 18 to 30, 1927, in the face of the critical situation of the Chinese revolution, Stalin and others still believed that “Wuhan is the center of the Chinese revolutionary movement” and Wang Jingwei was still a leftist, saying that “the role played by the Chinese Left Kuomintang in the current Chinese bourgeois democratic revolution is close to the role played by the Soviets in the Russian bourgeois democratic revolution in 1905.” The meeting finally passed the “Resolution on the Chinese Question”, proposing tasks and policies such as launching a rural land revolution, arming the workers and peasants, developing the Kuomintang and resolutely opposing withdrawal from the Kuomintang, and actively participating in the central and local government agencies in Wuhan, and criticized Chen Duxiu’s wavering attitude on the above issues without naming him.
On the day when the Eighth Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International ended, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) made a decision on the Chinese question and sent a telegram to Borodin, Roy and Soviet Consul General in Hankou Liuks in China. The main content of the telegram was: (1) Without land revolution, victory cannot be achieved and the Kuomintang leadership will become a plaything in the hands of unreliable generals. We firmly advocate the actual confiscation of land from below through the peasant associations. At the same time, we must fight against excessive behavior, but we must not use the army. (2) It is necessary to make concessions to handicraftsmen, merchants and small landlords. Only the land of large and medium landlords should be confiscated. If the situation requires, the land of medium landlords can be temporarily not confiscated. The land of officers and soldiers should not be touched. (3) Change the composition of the Kuomintang leadership and absorb more new worker and peasant leaders from below to join the Kuomintang Central Committee. At the same time, rely on the millions of people in the workers and peasants organizations to expand the Kuomintang local organizations. (4) Mobilize 20,000 Communist Party members, plus 50,000 revolutionary workers and peasants in Hunan and Hubei, to form their own reliable army. (5) Establish a military tribunal headed by prominent Kuomintang members and non-Communists to punish officers who maintained contact with Chiang Kai-shek or instigated soldiers to persecute the people and workers and peasants. This was the May Emergency Directive. This directive put forward important proposals to save the situation, such as launching agrarian revolution and establishing the CCP’s own revolutionary armed forces. It pointed out the key to overcoming the revolutionary crisis and was theoretically of positive significance. However, Stalin and others hoped that the Wang Jingwei group would cooperate with the Chinese Communist Party to implement this directive.
On June 1, the Chinese Communist Party received this urgent directive. On June 7, at the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Chen Duxiu talked about his views on the urgent directive. Regarding the land revolution, he pointed out that the “excessive behavior” of the peasant movement hindered the resolution of the land issue, and that the “excessive” behavior should be corrected first, otherwise the land issue could not be discussed. Regarding the absorption of worker and peasant leaders to strengthen the Kuomintang Central Committee, he said: “The Kuomintang leadership was elected at the Party Congress. How can we change it now?” Regarding the formation of a new worker and peasant army, he believed that: “It is impossible to establish our own armed forces” when we cut off contact with the warlord generals. As for the establishment of a revolutionary court, he believed that it was also impossible. Chen Duxiu finally said: “We wholeheartedly agree with the instructions, but the problem is that our party may not be able to implement them.” Tan Pingshan, Zhang Guotao and others also expressed that they could not accept the urgent directive. Borodin complained that Moscow did not understand the situation in China. Although Luo Yi believed that this instruction should be implemented, he could not come up with a practical way. In this way, the May urgent directive was not implemented.
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