Avrupa Mali Sermayesi, Türkiye’nin Dünyada Elinde Tuttuğu Kartları Nasıl Görüyor 

AB’nin Türkiye Politikası İçin Tavsiyeler ve Potansiyel Sürtüşme Alanları

AB Güvenlik Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Raporu… The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) tarafından aynı başlıkla yayımlanan raporun yönetici özeti bölümü çevirisidir.

Çeviren: Zeki KAYA

Yönetici Özeti

Türkiye’nin dünyanın çeşitli bölgelerindeki etkisi genişlemiştir.

Bu durum, sadece ekonomik anlamda değil, ülkenin eğitim girişimleri veya Afrika, Orta Doğu, Güney Kafkasya ve Batı Balkanlar’daki izleyiciler arasında Türk televizyon dizilerinin popülaritesi gibi yumuşak gücünün başarılı bir şekilde yansıtılmasıyla da açıktır. Güç yelpazesinin sert güç ucunda, bu durum Türkiye’nin TB2 insansız hava araçlarının modern savaş alanlarında artan önemiyle de kendini göstermektedir. Bu kültürel ihracat ve teknolojik gelişmelerin birleşimi, ülkenin diplomatik beceri, ekonomik genişleme ve güçlü askeri yetenekler konusundaki net hedeflerini ortaya koymaktadır. Ancak, daha yakından bakıldığında daha nüanslı bir gerçeklik ortaya çıkmaktadır. Türkiye, ulusal ekonomik endişeler, artan güvenlik kaygıları ve değişen küresel düzen arasında dikkatli ve hassas bir yol izlemek zorundadır.

Son yirmi yılda Türkiye, yukarıda belirtilen bölgelere açılmışken, Covid-19 pandemisi ve Ukrayna savaşı tarafından şiddetlenen son ekonomik zorluklar, Ankara’yı bu bölgelerle daha yakın iş birliğine itmiştir. Bu stratejik angajman, Türkiye adına izole olma riskini aşmak ve Batı’dan uzaklaşarak stratejik özerklik sağlamanın yanı sıra çıkarlarına hizmet eden bağlantılarını sürdürmeye özen göstermek gibi iki amaca hizmet etmektedir.

Batı’dan uzaklaşarak stratejik özerklik Elde Etme

Türkiye’nin çok yönlü ve uyarlanabilir yaklaşımı, başarısının anahtarıdır. Çeşitli diplomatik araçlar ve hedefe yönelik iletişim kullanarak, Ankara bu dört bölgede önemli bir aktör olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu strateji hem elitler hem de genel nüfus için güçlü ve güvenilir bir ortak imajını vermekte ve pekiştirmektedir. 31 Mart yerel seçimlerinin ardından Türkiye’nin siyasi manzarasının dramatik bir şekilde değiştiğini not etmek önemlidir. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), kuruluşundan bu yana ilk kez ülkenin en büyük partisi değildir. Buna karşılık, tarihsel olarak rakibi ve düşmanı olan milliyetçi Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP), 1977’den beri ilk kez anketlerde birinci sırayı almıştır. Her iki parti de bu değişen siyasi ortamda birlikte çalışmanın bir yolunu bulmak zorunda kalacaktır. Bu Chaillot Belgesi, her bölgeye ayrılmış beş bölümden oluşmaktadır: Batı Balkanlar; Güney Kafkasya; Orta Doğu/Kuzey Afrika/Körfez; ve Afrika. Bölgesel ve ülke spesifik özellikler olmasına rağmen, tüm bölümler Türkiye’nin artan ayak izine odaklanarak motivasyonlarını ve stratejilerini analiz etmekte ve Avrupa Birliği için olası etkilerini değerlendirmektedir.

Aşağıda İngilizcesini verdiğimiz  Son bölümde, AB için politika önerileri sunulmaktadır.

AB’nin, Türkiye’nin amaçlarını, motivasyonlarını ve stratejilerini anlamaya yönelik önemli bir çıkarı vardır, özellikle iş birliğinin AB’nin kendi hedefleriyle örtüştüğü alanlarda, örneğin istikrarı teşvik etmek, ekonomik kalkınmayı teşvik etmek ve ortak güvenlik endişelerini ele almak gibi.

Bu, özellikle Türkiye’nin giderek daha fazla işlem temelli bir yaklaşıma yöneldiği ve dış politikada her bölge ve ortakla kendi çıkarlarını önceliklendirdiği bir zamanda önemlidir.

Bu dinamikleri anlamak ve Türkiye ile açık ve yapıcı diyalog kurarak, AB’nin ülkeyle olan ilişkisini bölgesel istikrar ve refahın temellerini atmak için kullanabilir.

This chapter outlines policy recommendations for the EU to navigate this evolving landscape, capitalising on Türkiye’s strengths while addressing potential areas of friction.

LEVERAGING TÜRKIYE’S STRENGTHS

As seen in the four previous chapters, Türkiye commands significant soft power which allows it to build bridges with countries across these regions. The EU can explore various ways to leverage this soft power to promote regional stability and cultural exchange.

Development cooperation: The EU-Türkiye Bridge for Development

The EU and Türkiye possess significant resources and expertise in development projects. By establishing a joint foundation for infrastructure, education, and healthcare projects they can maximise their regional impact. Such a foundation would require a clear mission statement outlining its goals, governance structure and funding model. For example, the foundation, which could be called ‘the EU-Türkiye Bridge for Development’ (EUTB Bridge), could have a board of directors comprising representatives from the EU, Türkiye and potentially other regional stakeholders. Funding could come from various sources, including the EU budget, Türkiye’s national budget, international financial institutions and the private sector. This collaborative approach would foster research and development, ultimately promoting regional stability. To accelerate public and private investments in key areas like connectivity, digitalisation, energy, transport, and the Green Deal, the signature of contracts under the Turkey Investment Platform should be prioritised. This requires close collaboration with European and international financial institutions. In this context, the European Investment Bank should be encouraged to resume its full range of operations in Türkiye.

Conflict resolution and mediation

 Türkiye’s diplomatic efforts in several countries across these regions deserve recognition. The EU can build upon this by establishing a dialogue platform, enabling joint efforts in conflict resolution initiatives. This would foster a more cooperative approach to regional security challenges. For instance, both sides could create a formal framework for joint EU-Türkiye conflict resolution efforts. This framework could take one of two forms: 1. A dedicated ‘EU-Türkiye Conflict Resolution Task Force’ with representatives from both parties’ diplomatic services and conflict resolution experts; 2. ‘Thematic Working Groups’ that would focus on specific regional conflicts, for instance a ‘South Caucasus Working Group’, or a ‘Sahel Working Group’. A more coordinated EU-Türkiye approach can contribute to de-escalation and conflict resolution in critical regions. Such an initiative would combine the EU’s financial resources with Türkiye’s regional influence and connections for maximum impact.

ADDRESSING AREAS OF POTENTIAL FRICTION T

o cultivate a successful partnership, the EU and Türkiye need to acknowledge potential areas of friction and navigate them constructively. This concerns in particular managing the issue of Turkish accession as well as stepping up cooperation in the field of humanitarian aid and development.

Charting a new course: EU-Türkiye relations beyond accession

While immediate EU membership discussions might not be the sole or central focus, the EU must acknowledge Türkiye’s aspirations and keep channels open for the future. Publicly acknowledging Türkiye’s long-standing ambition to join the EU would demonstrate respect for Türkiye’s strategic goals while setting realistic expectations about the current state of play. This avoids making accession the sole pillar of the relationship and allows for a more flexible partnership model.

Beyond politics, better aid: EU-Türkiye cooperation

Joint efforts can significantly improve the efficiency and transparency of humanitarian aid delivery. The EU and Türkiye can establish protocols to address concerns about the politicisation of aid, ensuring aid reaches those most in need. This collaboration could involve conducting joint needs assessments in crisis-affected regions to gain a comprehensive understanding of humanitarian needs and avoid duplication of efforts. The EU and Türkiye bring complementary strengths to the table. The EU can provide financial resources and expertise in logistics and coordination, while Türkiye can utilise its geographical proximity and cultural understanding to facilitate access to certain areas, as well as convince its closer partners – such as the Gulf States – to tap into their substantial financial resources. Finally, to address the issue of the politicisation of humanitarian aid, both the EU and Türkiye could develop protocols to ensure neutrality, impartiality and independence in the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

FOSTERING STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

Regular and open communication is crucial for building trust and navigating complex challenges. Some ways to achieve this are outlined below.

Regular consultations

The suspension of the EU-Türkiye High-level Dialogues on Economy, Energy, and Transport in 2019, due to Türkiye’s unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, should be reversed. These high-level meetings serve as critical forums for discussing regional developments of mutual interest to the EU and Türkiye. Their resumption should be followed by the reconvening of the Association Council and the High-level Political Dialogue at the ministerial level. Reinstating these dialogues would contribute to a more transparent and well-functioning relationship, facilitating collaborative problem-solving. Besides, both the EU and Tûrkiye should seek to organise further rounds of sectoral High-level Dialogues on climate change, public health, migration and security, agriculture, and research and innovation.

Joint analysis and threat assessments

Information sharing and collaboration on threat assessments related to terrorism, extremism and regional instability are crucial. This strengthens regional security by enabling the anticipation and mitigation of potential threats. To this end, both actors should agree to conduct more structured and regular dialogues on foreign policy and regional issues. One approach could involve extending an invitation to the Turkish Foreign Minister to participate in relevant informal meetings of EU Foreign Ministers.

ADDRESSING SPECIFIC REGIONAL CHALLENGES

Beyond broad areas of cooperation, the EU and Türkiye can collaborate on regional challenges by deploying strategies tailored to the needs of specific sectors:

Western Balkans

> Investing in regional cooperation frameworks: Türkiye can support the region by investing more political capital in regional cooperation frameworks, including through the SEECP. By maintaining a balanced approach with all countries and a strategic Euro-Atlantic posture, Ankara can use its influence to advocate for closer regional cooperation, ultimately accelerating EU integration for the countries of the Western Balkans.

> Harnessing expertise in disaster management: Türkiye’s experience in disaster management and environmental protection can be valuable for regional cooperation. Sharing expertise and best practices strengthens regional resilience in these critical areas.

> Promoting dialogue: Türkiye can play a constructive role in preventing further security escalation by encouraging both Belgrade and Pristina not to give up on existing lines of communication and instead focus on small yet significant technical advancements.

Türkiye’s balanced and cautious stance vis-à-vis both Belgrade and Pristina allows for a more inclusive ‘bottom-up’ approach to dialogue, where both sides feel equally involved, unlike the often-criticised ‘top-down’ approach of the EU. > Countering extremism: Türkiye could contribute to curtailing Islamic extremism. Unlike actors like Saudi Arabia and Iran, Türkiye has a unique advantage due to its historical legacy, economic power, and strategic and political influence with the majority Sunni Muslim population in the Balkans. This advantage can be utilised to counter the appeal of Shia Islam propagated by rival players. A joint EU/Türkiye community-based initiative focused on youth empowerment, social cohesion and outreach programmes to counter extremist narratives, particularly in rural and underprivileged communities, could be a powerful tool for achieving this.

South Caucasus

> Deterring escalation: The EU can impress upon Türkiye the importance of avoiding further escalation of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and highlight the constructive role Ankara can play in deterring such escalation.

> Fostering peace and connectivity: The EU can seek to persuade Türkiye to support a comprehensive peace agreement, leading to normalised relations, open borders, and facilitating connectivity projects in the region. International guarantees, loans and technical assistance for improved connectivity under the Middle Corridor (including the Syunik road and railroad, potentially reopening the Kars-Yerevan railroad) can incentivise progress on this front.

> Promoting a balanced regional order: While acknowledging Türkiye’s strategy of avoiding direct confrontation with Russia in the South Caucasus, the EU can emphasise the potential risks that Russian dominance here pose to regional instability. A more balanced regional order would benefit all parties involved.

MENA/Gulf  Region

> Humanitarian and cultural cooperation: The EU and Türkiye can partner to amplify humanitarian and cultural efforts in the MENA region. By combining emergency aid, infrastructure development and investment in human capital, as exemplified by Türkiye’s model, they can create a more sustainable impact. Collaboration on joint initiatives focusing on education, healthcare, vocational training, cultural exchange programmes and heritage preservation projects would draw on and showcase the strengths of both parties in soft power diplomacy. The EU could co-fund projects and provide expertise to enhance the impact of aid efforts, as well as offer expertise and support to Türkiye in improving its disaster management capabilities, as demonstrated by the challenges faced during the February 2023 earthquake.

> Facilitating dialogue and mediation: The EU can encourage Türkiye to utilise its growing influence to facilitate dialogue and mediate conflicts in the MENA region. Given that Türkiye is also the co-founder of the Friends of Mediation Initiative within the UN together with Finland, the EU can support these efforts by providing resources and expertise for mediation and peacebuilding initiatives. The EU could also join forces with Türkiye on diplomatic efforts in areas where they share mutual interests, such as fostering stability in Libya, Syria or Gaza.

> Boosting regional economic integration: The EU can collaborate with Türkiye to facilitate trade agreements and economic partnerships between the EU, Türkiye and MENA countries. Furthermore, encouraging joint infrastructure projects and knowledge sharing would boost regional economic integration.

 > Addressing regional security:

The EU and Türkiye can collaborate to develop a comprehensive and holistic approach to energy security and resource management in the MENA region. This can involve promoting renewable energy solutions and encouraging cooperation on water resource management.

 Given Türkiye’s unique position as a NATO member in proximity to conflict zones and its experience in managing refugee flows and combating terrorism, the EU can support joint efforts to address these common security challenges.

Africa Region

> Learning from successful models : The EU can learn valuable lessons from Türkiye’s successful engagement in sub-Saharan Africa. Combining large-scale infrastructure projects with social initiatives like schools and hospitals creates a more sustainable and impactful development strategy.

> Investing in regional growth : Investing in hub-like projects can attract further pri – vate investment, stimulate intra-African trade, and address pressing needs like job creation and access to electricity. This fo – cus on regional connectivity could significantly contribute to Africa’s economic development.

> Strengthening the EU-Africa partnership:

 The EU can enhance its partnership with the African Union by expanding participation from a wider range of stakeholders, including the private sector, cities, NGOs, and others. Türkiye’s experience in stimulating job creation could be successfully replicated by the EU’s private sector through working closely with the regional offices of the European Investment Bank.

> Leveraging soft power : The EU can leverage its soft power potential by increasing educational exchanges with Africa, fostering long-term partnerships and mutual understanding.

> Collaborating on shared goals:

Türkiye and the EU can cooperate on areas of shared in – terest in Africa such as green transitions, climate change mitigation, peace process es, and security cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism. Both parties should strive to maintain a collaborative approach that avoids undermining each other’s partnerships on the continent.